



The International Conference for 70th Anniversary
of Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

Graduate Studies in the Disruptive Society :

Innovation in Development Studies, Human Rights, and Resource Politics

12-13 July 2018

Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University , Thailand

Organized by

Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy in International Development
Studies (MAIDS-GRID) programme ,
Faculty of Political Science , Chulalongkorn University , Thailand

Institute for Human Rights and Peace Studies
Mahidol University , Thailand

The Bachelor of Political Science Program in Politics and International
Relations (BIR) , Thammasat University , Thailand

Introduction

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Erica Chenoweth, a prominent scholar in civil resistance studies, states in [one of her article](#) saying "[i]f you feel as though we live in a particularly disruptive time in history, you're right. But it's the *kind* of disruption that is unique to our time." While she refers it to a circumstance "that nonviolent resistance campaigns have become the modal category of contentious action worldwide," her statement can be expanded to a wider context. Disruptive society manifests itself not only in nonviolent resistance, but also in many other ways – i.e. human rights abuse, increase in inequality, environmental challenges, competition for resources. While the term disruption can be coined as a theoretical concept, it would be more suitable to treat it here as an accurate description of our contemporary society. It points to the fact that there are many challenges in the globalized world threatening our social life and awaiting to be solved. And it is the duty of social scientist and all stakeholders to understand and come up with the innovations for constructive engagement.

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Wimonsiri Sawathanon

Introduction

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INTERSECTIONALITY IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

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Abstract

The implementation of transdisciplinary approaches within research projects are valued by scholars of different scientific backgrounds for their ability to foster collaborations between scientific disciplines and to jointly tackle socially as well as environmentally relevant issues. Thus, transdisciplinarity has been facilitated not only by academia but also by public funding bodies. One example is the Erasmus+ CBHE Project KNOTS which promotes multi-lateral knowledge networks of transdisciplinary studies to tackle global challenges since its establishment in October 2016. Funded by the European Commission's Erasmus+ programme, the project aims to establish transdisciplinary platforms addressing issues of migration, inequality and environment in the region Southeast Asia.

One significant point of reference in transdisciplinary research is the co-production of knowledge, called Mode-2. In contrast to the traditional science production model, namely Mode-1, which separates sciences, policy and society, Mode-2 emphasises connections between science/researchers and society/practitioners (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 18). Hence, academic, as well as non-academic actors, are involved in the knowledge production process to pursue an increasing relevance and usability of scientific findings for society and policy-makers. Depending on different research designs, the intensity of non-academic actors' engagement might vary. Rosendahl et al., for instance, differentiate between four types: (i) information, (ii) consultation, (iii) collaboration, and (iv) empowerment of practitioners (ibid., 24). With respect to the KNOTS project, the following research question evolves: How are non-academic actors engaged in the knowledge production process within the KNOTS project?

In the course of this study particular attention will be given to this year's Summer School and Field Trips held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, from July 17th - 30th. A holistic approach will encompass the close examination of the interaction between scholars and practitioners in all project phases through qualitative research methods. This includes the analysis of the selection process of non-academic actors, their preparation for the participation in summer school and field trip activities, as well as their contribution towards the evaluation of research results. Throughout the research, the ideal integration of the public-private sector - as

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advocated in the literature and as communicated by the KNOTS project - will serve as a 'best practice' roadmap. Hereby, we aspire to generate further understanding of the challenges, barriers and potentials of the co-production of knowledge within transdisciplinary research projects.

Keywords: *transdisciplinary research, co-production of knowledge, non-academic actors, qualitative research*

Introduction

Intersectionality is a widespread concept in feminist and gender studies and finally it also established itself in other social sciences. In the last 20 years intersectional approaches made considerable contributions to the development studies.

To address inequality and structures of oppression, which are determined by various factors such as a person's gender, age, sexuality, or racial position, are main issues of the development studies. However, social inequality, exclusion, oppression and discrimination, but also privileges, have always been marked by numerous interlocking factors. Therefore, an intersectionality approach could be an analytical and theoretical instrument to address the interactive and mutually constitutive relationship among these categories.

The first part of this paper will focus on introducing the concept of intersectionality as a theoretical approach. In this chapter it will be explained how and when intersectionality emerged, what the main characteristics are and also discussing its relevance. Secondly, Intersectionality will be introduced as a methodological approach and as a research paradigm, which is still not as elaborated as it is in the theoretical discussion. The third chapter should be regarded as a proposal to how a research could be conducted based on an intersectional paradigm. It will be including suitable research methods as well as the reflection on the positionality of researchers.

In the last part the relevance of intersectionality, theoretical and practical, within transdisciplinary contexts such as the development studies will be discussed. As it is a complex and diverse field in which a lot of actors of different disciplines and backgrounds work together, intersectionality could be one way to cope with difficulties that may arise.

Intersectionality - a theoretical concept

"Ain't I a woman?" with this question Sojourner Truth opens in 1851 a relevant and important discussion on feminist theory and practice. In her talk at the Women's Convention in Akron/Ohio she discussed the universalization of the unitary picture of gender, which does not take into account the intersection of other categories of oppression and inequality. She pleads for the intersection of the fights against sexism, racism and other forms of oppression. This is how the first step towards intersectionality was taken. In 1890 the concept found acceptance in the feminist theories. It started with a critic of black feminists and activists on a middle class white feminism, which ignored the missing experiences of black women within both feminist and anti-racist theories. They did not acknowledge the differences between women's lives nor the overlapping

of different categories of oppression. Black women were not only affected by gender inequality but also by phenomenon of social inequality based on skin color and the category 'race'. Out of this critic on the mainstream white feminism and on the high rate of discrimination in the US-American law, Kimberle Crenshaw, who was an US American lawyer, introduced the concept of intersectionality. She described it with a metaphorical picture of a street crossing, which is always overlapping and intersecting. (See Winkler 2009:13) She used the concept of intersectionality to “denote the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women's employment experiences. [Her] objective there was to illustrate that many of the experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood, and that the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.” (Crenshaw 1999:1244) The case of the lawsuit against “General Motors” exemplifies the discrimination based on more than one category of inequality. Black women took legal action as a result of being dismissed from their work at GM. Therefore, they wanted to claim for their rights. Their lawsuit based on gender inequality was not granted because there were other women who did not lose their job, neither on the basis of racism because other black men still had their job. They did not get the chance to claim their own rights as black women because there is no recognition of overlapping of more than one structural inequality. (See Crenshaw 1989: 141ff.)

Table 1
Conceptual differences among approaches to the study of race, gender, class and other categories of difference in political science

	Unitary Approach	Multiple Approach	Intersectional Approach
Q1: How many categories are addressed?	One	More than one	More than one
Q2: What is the relationship posited between categories?	Category examined is primary	Categories matter equally in a predetermined relationship to each other	Categories matter equally; the relationship between categories is an open empirical question
Q3: How are categories conceptualized?	Static at the individual or institutional level	Static at the individual or institutional level	Dynamic interaction between individual and institutional factors
Q4: What is the presumed makeup of each category?	Uniform	Uniform	Diverse; members often differ in politically significant ways
Q5: What levels of analysis are considered feasible in a single analysis?	Individual <i>or</i> institutional	Individual <i>and</i> institutional	Individual <i>integrated</i> with institutional
Q6: What is the methodological conventional wisdom?	Empirical or Theoretical; Single method preferred; multiple method possible	Empirical or Theoretical; Single method sufficient; multiple method desirable	Empirical and Theoretical; Multiple method necessary and sufficient

Figure 1 (Hancock 2007: 64)

In development studies prior to the emergence of intersectional approaches, there were two different approaches to address this issue: unitary and multiple approaches. Within a unitary approach, one category (such as gender or age) is more important than all others, and researchers do not take into account the ways other categories of inequality might influence the result. The multiple

approaches add one category onto another. But this approach also assumes that the relationship between categories is predetermined.

The beginning of the intersectional approaches was when researchers started to realize that analysing inequality only based on one category is insufficient. Hancock (See Figure 1) describes the intersectional approach as one that is raised out of this insufficiency of, and in contrast to unitary and multiple approaches. Within the development studies nowadays the intersectionality approach tries to address this complexity, explaining that it accounts for the interplay of identities at the intersections of race, sex, class, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, ability, or other characteristics.

Intersectionality - a research paradigm

Despite the popularity of intersectionality as a theoretical approach nowadays, developing a methodology for intersectional research is not given the same importance. However, there are some researchers who see intersectionality as a research paradigm. To what extent intersectionality can be taken as a research paradigm, states Katharina Walgenbach (2012) in her article. With reference to Kuhn (1973), intersectionality is recognized as a paradigm because it "provides a set of concepts, theoretical interventions, premises, problems, and models of solutions that serve as a common orientation framework and open up new research perspectives." (Kuhn 1973: 25ff., Walgenbach 2012). As the origin of intersectional approaches was in the 1970s and largely due to the movement of the 'Black Feminist', one understands the theoretical-political genealogies (See Walgenbach) as the founding moment of the emergence of this paradigm. So-called 'black' feminists and theoreticians questioned the universal character of the 'woman' category, emphasizing that feminist issues only take into account the experiences of white women. This led to critics of the one-dimensional perspective argue for the consideration of further forms of repression such as sexuality, social class, violence.

Based on the fact that intersectional analyses deal exclusively with social inequality relations and power structures in certain spaces / fields, the author states that the paradigm, in contrast to diversity or heterogeneity concepts, is relatively little free interpretable. (Walgenbach 2012)

For this purpose, she argues: *"The field of research or the common object of intersectionality are rather power, domination and normalization relations that reproduce social structures, practices and identities" / "Das Forschungsfeld bzw. der gemeinsame Gegenstand von Intersektionalität sind vielmehr Macht-, Herrschafts- und Normierungsverhältnisse, die soziale Strukturen, Praktiken und Identitäten reproduzieren"*. (Walgenbach 2012)

Fundamentally, it is about breaking up juxtaposed/additive aspects of social categories or forms of oppression and instead looking at the simultaneity of their interaction, as well as examining the interactions.

In order to prevent the additive moment of the differences of social categories, intersectionality must include anti-racist, post-colonial and socio-critical perspectives in the analysis. Klapeer (2014) argues that intersectional research practices are *"always to be thought of as theory-based processes and thus never*

merely a methodological approach" / „immer auch als theoriegeleitete Prozesse zu denken und damit nie nur eine methodische

Herangehensweise".(ibid. 71) If one neglects the methodological and epistemological embedding in a feminist and racism-critical framework of theory and the accompanying "transformative interest in knowledge", intersectional approaches would lose their potential of analysis and political intervention, according to the author. (ibid. 71)

The term "interdependent categories" (Walgenbach 2012, 2007, Dietze et al., 2007) aims to draw attention to the interdependence of social categories in the context of the debate on intersectionality in order to be able to work out complex structures.

Intersectionality can thus serve as a generic term and analysis tool or orientation framework to be able to investigate certain problems. (See Walgenbach 2012) Klappeer (2014) also points out that an intersectional analysis is based on the rejection of one "master category" (See Klappeer 2014: 57).

In a next step, the selection of social categories that seem relevant for a research will be problematized. Here, Walgenbach also refers to the so-called, et-cet-era 'problem, which was taken up by Klappeer (2014). With the help of a multi-level analysis (Mehrebenenanalyse) the view on the diversity is ensured and "at the same time arbitrariness in the selection of categories"/ "zugleich [die] Beliebigkeit bei der Auswahl von Kategorien" (Degele / Winker 2009: 206) is avoided. The selection and weighting of the categories was influenced by different factors, as well as by the respective research interests and theoretical approaches (See Walgenbach 2012). It is further discussed that intersectionality is a theoretical concept as well as a methodology and analysis strategy for social inequalities and power relations. The openness behind it is viewed as a major potential for an intersectional paradigm. (See Walgenbach 2012) The analysis of several social categories and their interactions as well as the consideration and connection of different levels of power structures, such as institutions, social practices, increase the complexity of intersectional research. This aspect is clarified with the terms of multi-level analysis or even various analysis levels in the so-called intersectionality paradigm.

For this purpose, Leslie McCall (2005) distinguishes three approaches that should be helpful in the context of intersectional research and the study of social inequality. The author distinguishes between anti-categorical complexity, intra-categorical complexity and inter-categorical complexity. The first approach refers to the historical and discursive production of differences and categories, which requires an examination of "*concrete social practices of construction and production of inequality and difference categories and their relation to processes of identity and subject construction*" / "*konkreten sozialen Praxen der Konstruktion und Hervorbringung von Ungleichheits- und Differenzkategorien und ihrem Verhältnis zu Prozessen der Identitäts- und Subjektkonstruktion*". (Klappeer 2014: 64; Degele / Winker 2007; 2011; Choo / Ferree 2010; McCall 2005) Methodologically, this results from the fact that it is not merely a matter of capturing social categories but focusing on the questioning of the production of social inequalities (ibid., 64). The inter-categorical aspiration of intersectional analysis does not simply assume that categories overlap, but rather are interlinked and methodologically interwoven with "*approaches to performativity and discourse theory, which focus the production of subjects and identities*

through disciplining and / or normalizing Discourses and political structures.” / “performativitäts- und diskurstheoretischen Ansätzen die die Hervorbringung von Subjekten und Identitäten durch disziplinierende und / oder normalisierende Diskurse und politische Strukturen fokussieren verwoben seien”. (Ibid. 65) Consequently the approach deals with the relationship inequalities between social categories and should be classified on a macro level (Walgenbach 2012, McCall 2005). The 'intra-categorical' approach of an increasing complexity of intersectional analysis draws the attention to the differences within a category (e.g., 'women'). Identity questions are the focus of the investigation, and thus social categories should be conceptualized and critically reflected as "historically, socially and culturally produced" (ibid.).

In the context of development research, the majority of the authors agree on the paradigm of intersectionality. They claim that it is particularly suited to enable the grasp of the increase of complexity in the investigation of effects, production and mutual conditions of social categories of inequality relations. An essential aspect, which is taken up repeatedly, is that the different levels cannot be considered separately. Interconnected, conditioning social dimensions *"in which categories manifest themselves in different ways and which can be (re-) produced, modified, appropriated or subverted by social practices are of central importance". / "in denen sich Kategorien auf unterschiedliche Weise manifestieren (können) und die durch soziale Praxen (re-)produziert, verändert, angeeignet oder unterlaufen werden (können) sind dabei von zentraler Bedeutung". (ibid. 69f)*

From the described characteristics of the potential of openness as well as the focus on mutual dependencies of social categories for the analysis of inequality or power structures, intersectional approaches seem to be particularly suitable for research projects in Development Studies or transdisciplinary research contexts. In the following, we will discuss our methodological approach and the importance of reflecting on the role of researchers.

How could an intersectionality-driven research look like?

The aim of an intersectional research should be to analyze different levels of power structures and the variety of social positions and experiences in a specific context. This means that the results of such a study should show which categories of oppression and inequality are relevant and which connection exists between them. Using an intersectional approach, should lead to the main social categories which influence the participation and interaction of people in a specific context. Simultaneously they form a foundation for discrimination and privileges. (See Christensen & Jensen 2012: 110f.)

Thereby, researchers should not use pre-constructed social categories. It should be an open and fluid process of spotting the relevant factors and their interaction. At the same time, there must not be a hierarchy between the categories and their relevance. Hancock (2007) explains that the target of intersectional research is not to deny existing social categories and power structures, but to „[identify] the hegemonic (ideas, cultures, and ideologies), structural (social institutions), disciplinary (bureaucratic hierarchies and administrative practices), and interpersonal (routinized interactions among individuals) playing fields upon which race, gender, class, and other categories or traditions of difference interact to produce society”. (Hancock 2007:74) Even though the categories are a social

construction they are likely to lead to serious effects and consequences on people's life. They are embedded in power structures and cannot be seen separately.

Christensen & Jensen describe the quantity of categories of oppression and inequality is a main issue of intersectional research. Research should not start with a fixed number of categories, it should rather be decided in the process of analyzing which and how much categories play a significant role. Trying to avoid constructing hierarchy between the categories is another main issue which is a result of this open process. (See Christensen & Jensen 2012: 112; Hancock 2007)

During the whole research process, is it necessary for the researchers to reflect the own positionality and further the underlying power and dominance structures which have an influence on the categories and their interrelation as well as the interaction of the researchers and the analysis itself. (See Hunting 2014: 6)

Cole (2009) provides some questions, as an attempt to guide the researchers and help them to reflect the process of category-building. "Who is included within this category? [...] What role does inequality play? [...] Where are there similarities?" (See Cole 2009: 172)

Regarding the compatible methods for an intersectional research authors recommend qualitative research methods, which are hermeneutic. Hancock explains, that "multiple methods" are required to conduct an intersectional study. (See Hancock 2007: 64)

For example, participant observation is one method, which could be used to enter a field and get access to gather information. There are some difficulties regarding the double role of the researchers using this method, which should be taken into account. (See Burges 1990: 80f.) Burges sees an advantage in this method because: "*The value of being a participant observer lies in the opportunity that is available to collect rich detailed data based on observations in natural settings. [...] The result is that researchers can utilise their observations together with their theoretical insights to make seemingly irrational or paradoxical behavior comprehensible to those within and beyond the situation that is studied.*" (Burges 1990: 79)

The main difficulty in participant observation within an intersectional approach is, not to observe fixed and pre-built social categories. Researchers should, again, not deny the existence of the categories which have real consequences, they rather are supposed to outline the diversity and the overlapping of categories.

Another research method which could be used in an intersectional research are qualitative interviews. The combination of participant observation and interviews opens the possibility of methods-triangulation to compare and correlate the results. This offers a broader and more complete view on realities of life and experiences of people. (See Lüders 2005: 400)

The pitfall of this method is once more, not to ask questions regarding pre-fixed categories. One possibility is to start from everyday life narratives and personal experiences of interview partners. Thereby the overlapping of categories and the complexity and variety of experiences may become more visible. Therefore, authors explain that intersectional interviews mean to invite a person to speak about their identity and their experiences in a specific context. (See Christensen & Jensen 2012: 113f. 117ff.)

Regarding the sampling in an intersectional research, authors advise to make it diverse. This means that the focus should be on people of different backgrounds and with diverse realities. The research interest includes not only people who are part of a “minority” but also members of “majority groups”. Privileges and inequality exist in different levels and should be analyzed from an extensive perspective. (See Hunting 2014: 12; Christensen & Jensen 2012: 112)

The interpretation and the final analysis of the data intend to capture multiplicative experiences. Intersectionality-informed researchers often employ so called more-stages analysis, based on the Grounded Theory model. (See Breuer 2010) Further, intersectional researches often use an adapted model of GT, which could be adjusted to time and research interest. Especially narrative data can be analyzed using the open processed interpretation and the three levels of coding, open, axial and selective, which are used in the Grounded Theory. (Schultz 2014; Charmaz 2006; Strauus and Corbin 1990) Hunting describes the coding process as followed:

“Open coding (sometimes referred to as first-level or substantive coding) involves an analysis of data that codes a passage using multiple and overlapping codes. Bowleg illustrates this using an example narrative of a Black lesbian woman’s experiences of discrimination, using codes for heterosexism, violence, sexism, and intersectionality. Axial coding then focuses on inductively refining each of these separate codes into more distinct codes (e.g., a code for the intersections of sexism and heterosexism, one for the intersections of racism, sexism, and heterosexism, etc.). Lastly, selective coding is used to further refine the codes in order to reflect a specific aspect of intersectional experience (e.g., how Black lesbians’ experiences of violence reflect intersections of racism, sexism, and heterosexism)”. (Bowleg 2008 in Hunting 2014:14)

As described above, categories should be the result and not the starting point. It seems to be difficult because the data is not always explicit and obvious, that is why researchers are aimed to identify the relevant categories and codes by considering the social and historical context. (See Hunting 2014: 13)

It is important to have a slight insight on the personal motivation of the researchers, knowing that the motivation and their political attitudes will shine through the research project. Therefore, researchers have to reflect their own position and be aware of it. The global power structures and the intersectional identity of each person are often not made visible and influence the interaction without being aware of it. The position of a researcher consists of three levels. The first one is, that we are, as researchers, part of the society we want to research in and then also part of the research-field. That is why we have to declare which role we play in this context and how this influences the process. Second, we have a specific position in the scientific field, which influences our research questions, our methods and the whole process. Third, the scientific field offers a variety of research traditions and paradigms, in which one can decide to be or not to be situated in. (See Mayer 2018) The election of the research methods comes along with awareness about and explanation of the pre-existing knowledge of the researchers. This could be on a theoretical basis but also on an everyday life basis. It is not the goal to avoid this kind of knowledge, but to use it as a resource by being aware of it. (See van der Waal 2009: 26) It might be said that in an intersectional research approach it is not enough to be open towards the research results and the social categories which are relevant in a specific field,

but also the own intersectional identity which influences not only the way we interact and think but also the way people perceive us.

Intersectionality in a transdisciplinary context

The concept of transdisciplinary emerged as a practice that transcends disciplinary boundaries and generates knowledge in a problem-oriented way. Based on a concrete societal problem, the cooperation of scientists from different disciplines, public and private sector representatives as well as the civil society takes place. Bernstein (2015: 15) also explains that transdisciplinary is more than just a criticism of the disciplines but is now also a scientific practice (See Russell et al., 2008: 460f, Bernstein 2015: 15, Pohl 2011: 622) that focuses on practical solutions. It is often equated with the so-called Mode-2. (Gibbons et al 1994, Nowotny 2006: 1, Russell et al., 2008: 464) Development Studies could be seen as a transdisciplinary field in which different disciplines and actors work together.

According to Pohl (2011), four main characteristics of transdisciplinary can be elaborated, which receive different weighting in different concepts of transdisciplinary: "(1) the focus on socially relevant issues, (2) transcending and integrating disciplinary paradigms, (3) doing participatory research and (4) the search for a unity of knowledge beyond disciplines". (Pohl 2011: 619)

The author then presents three concepts that involve different combinations of these characteristics. (Figure 2) Concept B has the major relevance and transdisciplinary is defined accordingly in most researches. In addition to addressing socially relevant problems and overcoming disciplinary boundaries, concept B also includes the inclusion of "non-academic actors". (See Pohl 2011: 619)

Transdisciplinarity according to concept	A	B	C
Features of transdisciplinarity			
Relating to socially relevant issues			
Transcending and integrating disciplinary paradigms			
Participatory research			
Searching for a unity of knowledge			

Figure 2 Transdisciplinarity according to concept (Pohl 2011: 620)

It is a participatory approach, which refers to the mode-2 knowledge production. In it the importance of the inclusion of different actors and different knowledge is presented. (Gibbons et al., 1994: 12ff.)

Hanschitz et.al. (2009) state that transdisciplinary research projects claim, as already mentioned, the aspiration to so-called grassroots/basisdemokratisch participation. "*The basic idea of participation [was] a defining feature of transdisciplinary projects*" / "*Der Grundgedanke der Partizipation [sei] ein definierendes Merkmal von transdisziplinären Projekten*" (Hanschitz et al., 2009: 85) The authors also highlight some of the dangers and challenges that characterize participatory approaches. Among other things, they highlight a

double challenge for transdisciplinary research projects that want to realize a participatory claim. On the one hand, it is about accompanying and initiating processes in the respective problem background, which include all 'those affected'. On the other hand, the focus is on the social mediation of knowledge and scope of action of the various actors, whose different positions should be justified. (ibid., 83)

With the problematization of the 'affected persons' the authors refer to a central aspect, which can also be questioned in such contexts of research. As the text says: *"Being affected is not without presupposition. It is essentially determined by the realization of projects, whereby the complex interrelations between top-down and bottom-up processes are of central importance". / "Betroffenheit ist nicht voraussetzungslos. Sie ist wesentlich bestimmt durch das Zustandekommen von Projekten, wobei die komplexen Wechselverhältnisse von Top-down und Bottom-up-Prozesse zentrale Bedeutung gewinnen"*. (Ibid. 84/94) Here is where the aspect of inclusion and exclusion becomes central. As a part of such a research, it has to be investigated based on intersectional approaches, which social categories influence the knowledge exchange, the knowledge production and participation in a transdisciplinary project setting. Inclusion and exclusion mechanisms regarding transdisciplinary research projects and participation are relevant. In addition, topics such as power relations and trust, ethics, motivation, responsibility and the reflection of one's own position go hand in hand.

In each phase of such a project, imbalances within groups and between actors are visible. *"Discrimination refers to inequality of distribution and participation" / "Diskriminierung bezeichnet ungleichwertige Verteilungs- und Partizipationsverhältnisse"* emphasize Hanschitz et.al. (ibid. 95) A central task of transdisciplinary or participatory processes is therefore to establish a continuous transparency and to create a framework for an exchange.

The authors point to a multitude of obstacles, external and internal factors, as well as the conditions and challenges that should be expected within the scope of transdisciplinary research and the claim to successfully integrate the 'affected'. (See ibid., p. 96) The following wording should be considered: *"In a process-oriented way, new social constellations arise in the course of transdisciplinary research. The mediation of differences requires an active culture of all those involved, which has its handicap in the more consumption-oriented attitude". / "Prozessorientiert gesprochen ergeben sich im Zuge transdisziplinärer Forschungen neue soziale Konstellationen. Die Vermittlung der Unterschiede bedarf einer aktiven Kultur aller Beteiligten, die ihr Handicap in der eher konsumorientierten Haltung hat"*. (ibid. 97)

In the sense of transdisciplinary, participatory research, power and inequality conditions should be addressed in the entire research context and learned how to deal with. In this case participatory action research methods and local knowledge in development, as well as the involvement of so-called "non-academic actors", scientific and civil actors, who can participate in 'monitoring and developing policy' and thus deal with real social problems are required. After MacDonald et.al. 'PAR' or the concept of action research is attributed to Kurt Lewin (1944). The method is described in the article as following: "Participatory action research (PAR) is considered as a subset of action research, which is the" systematic collection and analysis of data for the purpose of taking action and making change "by generating practical knowledge (ibid.: 35 according to Gillis & Jackson, 2002, p.264).

"Participatory action research" is understood as a dynamic process with whom social surveys and problems in socio-political contexts can be investigated.

The author also associates the PAR method with Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire, which focused on critical reflection necessary for personal and social change. (ibid. 37)

Moreover, 'PAR' is also democratic, insofar as the aim is to involve all participants equally in research or problem-oriented processes. (ibid. 39) The continuous reflection of one's own position as a researcher, after reviewing various literature on participation in a transdisciplinary research context, is significant and is also emphasized in the intersectional approaches.

Despite this, there are difficulties in implementation and in the concrete research / learning process in a transdisciplinary context such as development studies. Different authors address different issues and obstacles, but rarely consider a solution or the cause of the problem. The issues of transdisciplinary in relation to "Knowledge Commodification vs. Mutual learning" are described by Russell et al. (2008). According to Russell power plays an important role in such a context, in which mutual learning and exchange of different actors should take place on an equal level. The interaction becomes different through an existing power gap regarding different levels, be it economic, political, scientific or personal.

Intersectionality could and should be an approach to address difficulties in achieving participation within transdisciplinary contexts, such as the development studies.

The so called "power flower" is one way to address intersectionality in a concrete and individual level in order to visualize privileges on the one hand and categories of oppression with the underlying power structures on the other hand. It makes clear that the relevant categories are different depending on the context. Furthermore, it is helpful showing each individual her or his positionality. It could be used to reflect one's position to understand intersectionality of categories of inequality.




Figure 3 Power Flower (<http://www.ucalgary.ca/utoday/issue/2014-02-20/education-studentvisions-shift-teachers-bring-about-social-justice-classroom>)

Conclusion

Intersectionality refers to both a theoretical argument and an approach to conduct empirical research that emphasizes the interaction of categories of difference and inequality. Intersectional qualitative research should not be conducted by a priori fixed categories of investigation, but rather as a process of generating fluid categories. During the whole research process, it is essential to reflect the own positionality as researcher.

An intersectional perspective can serve to consider how the respective constellations differ from locality to locality and from context to context. It could also function as a critical and political tool, to criticize a hierarchical North-South dichotomy of knowledge production.

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THE (RE)PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 'SUMMER SCHOOL' IN CHIANG MAI 2018

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Abstract

The sociology of knowledge consists of many different streams and does not present itself as a unified field of study. An underlying thesis to all streams is that knowledge is social. The sociology of knowledge deals with the production, transfer and usage of knowledge within societies. The fundamental hypothesis is that knowledge is shaped upon and integrated into the social context. An integral part of Transdisciplinarity is knowledge (re)production. Transdisciplinarity is concerned with reorganizing academic knowledge in order to address socially relevant issues. An essential part of the reorganization process is participatory research, which includes academic as well as non-academic actors. Within this framework, we focus on the Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018, which is part of the KNOTS programme. In this context, our research interests are: How is knowledge produced and transferred? Are knowledge asymmetries altered through the project? How is the produced knowledge used and does it contribute to solve societal problems? After having completed our research in the Summer School, we will analyse our findings and discuss whether the objectives of the KNOTS programme in the domain of "knowledge" have been successfully accomplished. If possible, we would also like to include ideas of "sociology of knowledge" to examine if and how concepts from this field could be included in future debates of transdisciplinary research. We believe that Transdisciplinarity will continue to play an important role in development studies and will gain momentum. Most people working within the transdisciplinary domain have a concrete epistemological interest and are not primarily concerned with sociology of knowledge. Since Transdisciplinarity is a work in progress, we believe that our research may be valuable in the field to gain a better understanding of "knowledge", a term that is widely used in transdisciplinary debates.

Keywords: *sociology of knowledge, transdisciplinarity, KNOTS Summer School*

1. Introduction & Goal Statement

The sociology of knowledge consists of many different streams and does not present itself as a unified field of study. An underlying thesis to many approaches, however, is that knowledge is social. The sociology of knowledge deals with the production, transfer and usage of knowledge within societies. The fundamental hypothesis is that knowledge is shaped upon and integrated into the social context. An integral part of transdisciplinarity is knowledge (re)production. Transdisciplinarity is concerned with reorganizing academic knowledge in order to address socially relevant issues. An essential part of the reorganization process is participatory research, which includes academic as well as non-academic actors.

Within this framework, we focus on the Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018, which is part of the KNOTS programme. In this context, our research interests are: How is knowledge produced and transferred? Are knowledge asymmetries altered through the project? How is the produced knowledge used and does it contribute to solve societal problems? After having completed our research in the Summer School, we will analyze our findings and discuss whether the objectives of the KNOTS programme in the domain of "knowledge" have been successfully accomplished. If possible, we would also like to include ideas of "sociology of knowledge" to examine if and how concepts from this field could be included in future debates of transdisciplinary research. We believe that transdisciplinarity will continue to play an important role in development studies and will gain momentum. Most people working within the transdisciplinary domain have a concrete epistemological interest and are not primarily concerned with sociology of knowledge. Since transdisciplinarity is a work in progress, we believe that our research may be valuable in the field. The goal is to gain a better understanding of "knowledge", a term that is widely used in transdisciplinary debates and that has to be put into context with power structures.

2. Theoretical Framework

Through the increasing importance of science since the 17th century, scientific production as well as the number of scientists have increased. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 241) But what does "knowledge" actually mean? Knowledge can be seen as the most abstract term of all, which makes a single accurate definition impossible (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 10; 351). Analyzing the meaning of this term, the field of sociology of knowledge is often taken into consideration, which assumes that knowledge is not solely an individual, but a social event. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 14) Thus, science is a social field and scientific knowledge the result of human action. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 235ff.) The sociology of knowledge therefore deals with the production, transfer and use of knowledge within society. The fundamental hypothesis is that knowledge is integrated in the social context. According to this, "knowledge" is socially constructed and thus everyone in society is also part of the shared and established knowledge. (cf. Berger/ Luckmann 2016: 3; 16-18) However, within the sociology of knowledge, various approaches exist, that deal with the above-mentioned topic.

A pioneer of the current knowledge-sociological assumptions is Karl Mannheim, who describes the sociology of knowledge as a "social attachment to knowledge". Science is entangled with social conditions, cultural values and norms and therefore not value-free. In his thesis of "situated knowledge" (cf. Singer 2009: 9),

he argues that scientific practice is embedded in the contexts and that sciences are produced by subjects which are historically, socially, culturally, and economically situated. We would "perceive" things from a certain socialization (a certain way of thinking and conceiving), with certain interests and worldviews in the background. Consequently, produced scientific knowledge is situated and context dependent. This leads to different thinking and social relationships, cultural traditions and social environments, different scientific interests and knowledge formations. The knowledge-sociological approach of Mannheim is based on the assumption that due to the position and integration of socially embedded locations, every individual not only has perspectives but also experiences. (cf. Singer 2005: 9; 28f.) Building on this, the so-called standpoint theories analyse the "society as a whole" (Singer 2005: 163); different experiences and ways of thinking are thus set in relation to social relations of domination, which have to be eliminated. (cf. Singer 2005: 163) Gillian (1997: 305), who writes from a feminist, post-colonial perspective, argues that knowledge is produced and shaped under certain conditions, and because of this, scientists should reflect on their own position. From a feminist perspective, no knowledge should be produced that is claimed to be universally valid, as this approach would subjugate other forms of knowledge and its producers.

Knowledge should be therefore recognized as limited and specific. (cf. Gillian 1997: 306) Due to factors such as nationality, skin color, age, gender, social status, etc., the position of the scientists entails a situated knowledge. In other words, the positionality of the researcher not only influences the whole research process, including the analysis and use of data, but also the knowledge that is created within this research. (cf. Gillian 1997: 307)

A further aspect of feminist criticism of science is that scientific practice as well as the produced knowledge is predominantly dominated by male scientists. For a long time, women have been excluded from university institutions, and thereby different perspectives and the position of objectivity got lost. Feminist critique of science calls for counter-ideologies to change common ideologies that have already been established in science. So far, despite criticism and despite the fact that the reality of inequality was largely recognized, essential points have not been changed. As before, the male dominance in science is predominant. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 253f.) Another perspective that is raised within the sociology of knowledge is the political-ethical epistemological perspective, which includes, among others, post-colonial critique. Above all, this seems to be relevant to the research question regarding power structures within knowledge production, which will be discussed in more detail in one of the next paragraphs.

As already indicated, the sociology of knowledge deals not only with the understanding of "knowledge" per se, but also with the so-called "knowledge production", which involves the production of socially recognized knowledge. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 261) In this regard, Knoblauch (2014: 285f.) addresses that knowledge can be divided into general knowledge and specialized knowledge: While general knowledge is accessible to all, specialized knowledge is institutionally established and transmitted by individuals. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 279) However, over the years, it has come to a fundamental change of knowledge production. Knoblauch (2014: 280f.) describes this process as a shift from "Mode 1" to "Mode 2". This represents the transition from knowledge, which is primarily organized in a disciplinary way ("Mode 1"), to a transdisciplinary knowledge ("Mode 2"). With "Mode 2", knowledge production would have a more social

character, because interactions of a large number of actors is required. Moreover, according to Nowotny, who deals with transdisciplinarity and "Mode 2" in detail, "Mode 2" would refer to three attributes: 1. The involvement and dialogues between a large number of different actors and their different perspectives. 2. The introduction of substantial heterogeneity of skills and expertise into the "problem solving process" of several actors, and 3. Transdisciplinarity. (cf. Nowotny) In general, there would be a connection of places, fields and disciplines. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 274) On this Novotny writes: "No discipline knows more than all disciplines". This leads to transdisciplinarity establishing itself as a new "kind" of knowledge production. Here, the concept of knowledge transfer has the following meaning: "Knowledge seeps in both directions, from science to society, as well from society to science." (Nowotny).

The above-mentioned theses clearly describe the connection between knowledge sociology and transdisciplinarity. It can be concluded that knowledge production is an important part in the context of transdisciplinarity. The main aim is to reorganize academic knowledge, which is primarily organized in a disciplinary way, in order to discuss the relevance of social problems. (cf. Pohl 2011: 619) An essential characteristic of "Mode 2 – knowledge production" is not only the involvement of the knowledge of different actors, such as from science, civil society, private and public sector, but also the participatory research, which would integrate both academic and non-academic actors. (cf. Pohl 2011: 619) In summary, it can be stated that within transdisciplinary research, knowledge is considered to be transgressive. (cf. Nowotny) Nonetheless, those researchers who work within transdisciplinarity usually have concrete epistemological interests and are not primarily concerned with the field of sociology of knowledge. Since we assume that transdisciplinarity is a "work in progress" and in future will continue to play an important role in the domain of development studies, our research project primarily analyze the communication and production of knowledge within transdisciplinary projects. That's why we focus our research on the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018', which is part of the KNOTS program. In this context, we consider the following areas of interest: How is knowledge conveyed and produced within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' in terms of transdisciplinarity? Are knowledge asymmetries reduced or intensified with a transdisciplinary project such as KNOTS?

In this context, reference may be made to Knoblauch (2014: 345), who argues that a recent development of the sociology of knowledge is post-colonialism, which sharply criticizes global asymmetries and power mechanisms. The author Mona Singer mentions that the postcolonial critique leads to a change of perspective within the sociology of knowledge, which is enrolled in the "western" form of knowledge, the deconstruction of (neo-) colonial and Eurocentric discourses, and the analysis of the history of colonialism as an epistemic force. (Singer 2005: 196) According to this, science is characterized by the dominance of "white", "male", "western" and eurocentric interests, which representatives of these approaches trace back to colonialism. Colonialism has produced a dichotomy of local and universalistic, in other words, of "non-Western" and "Western" knowledge. This would lead one to believe that local knowledge systems and traditions are obstacles that need to be overcome in favor of a "modern science" based on the model of Europe. (cf. Singer 2005: 219-221) "The West is the New World and we have to carry the old new World on our shoulders" (Reuter 2010: 55). Through the constructed dichotomies, the "Western" sciences are based on the hierarchical comparison with other cultures. Thus, the "colonial identity discourse" would

need other cultures as counterparts to define and legitimize its claim to superiority. (cf. Singer 2005: 231) Postcolonial approaches particularly criticize the eurocentric assumption that "scientific globalization" would only go in one direction, as well as the assumption that "non-Western" cultures are closed spaces in which "Western" sciences just arrive to expand their knowledge. On the contrary, "Western" sciences would not only go in one direction. (cf. Singer 2005: 231) Accordingly, a one-sided export of knowledge in imperialistic intent would not occur, but rather the "Western" sciences would appropriate knowledge, techniques and instruments of the 'new worlds' with the aim to expand its own knowledge in the center. (Singer 2005: 232)

Referring to Knoblauch (2014:287) another characteristic of postcolonial approaches is that they consider power asymmetries as intersectional and take social categories, such as "colonized", "women", "migrants", "homosexuals", etc. into account. The aim is to avoid the so called "othering" processes and to involve different groups in the research and production of knowledge. This would result in a relativization of the common "white", "western", "male" position. In addition, it must be taken into account that knowledge distribution varies with "age", "gender", "class" differences, lifestyles, etc. (cf. Knoblauch 2014: 287.)

In addition, further research questions are: How will the knowledge produced in the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' be used, and who benefits from it? To what extent does the knowledge produced in this context contribute to solving societal problems?

After participating in the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018', the results will be analyzed in relation to the research questions and discussed whether the objectives of the KNOTS project in the area of "knowledge" correspond to the outputs.

3. Research Questions

Our field of interest is the (re)production and the transfer of knowledge within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018', based on the following research questions: How is knowledge, in relation to transdisciplinarity, being produced and transferred within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018'? Do knowledge asymmetries occur, are they reduced or increased within a transdisciplinary project such as KNOTS? How will the produced knowledge within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' be used and who benefits from it? To what extent does the produced knowledge contribute to solving societal problems? As already mentioned in the theoretical framework, the results will be analyzed and discussed after attending the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018', with regard to the four research questions.

4. Research Plan

As a preparation for this research, the application for the European Commission's Erasmus + Program "Fostering Multi-lateral Knowledge Networks of Transdisciplinary Studies on Tackle Global Challenges (KNOTS)", in which the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' takes place, has been analyzed with respect to our research interests. The three main problems addressed by the KNOTS project are social inequality, migration and climate change. Complex topics as

these, which affect all KNOTS partners, require a joint transdisciplinary project to come to useful solutions. (cf. Knots application [oA]: 27) "[...] [The] most important aim of the project coordinator [is] to integrate all partners with the same intensity, to encourage participation and to value and to honor all contributions in an equal manner. [...] [A]ll partners are considered as equal and that are on an equal footing." (Knot's application [36]) This means giving all partners the opportunity to join and to participate in every step of the implementation of the project. (Knots application [o.A.]: 32)

The overall goal of the project is the creation of knowledge networks on transdisciplinarity on regional and international level. Both the production of knowledge for transdisciplinary teaching and the stimulation of the exchange between the academic and the non-academic sector should be the turning point of the project. By collaborating with academic and non-academic actors from different backgrounds and disciplines, new teaching methods will be developed, which should be used as the standard of knowledge production for multifactorial global challenges. (cf. Knots application [o.A.]: 31)

Among other things, the KNOTS proposal deals with knowledge production and knowledge transfer, knowledge asymmetries and the contribution of the project to social problems (cf. Knots application [o.A.]: 27-33). These topics will be analyzed by taking into account our research questions. Through the research questions and the methodological approach, which consists of qualitative interviews, questionnaires and participant observations, the goals and the actual results within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' will be analyzed and compared: Are the formulated goals in the KNOTS proposal fully realized within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' or do discrepancies occur?

In this context, it can be assumed that the actual state will differ from the planned state, since no project goes completely according to plan and depends on the participation of individual actors. Moreover, other factors, such as communication problems which can arise through language barriers and different (academic) backgrounds, can not be determined by project managers. As described in the theoretical framework, the knowledge of individuals depends on their social context, such as education, culture or language. In addition, knowledge asymmetries may also play a role within the KNOTS project, which can make cooperation more difficult, especially if they are not recognized as such by all actors involved.

Due to the time limitation, within this research paper, only a few goals of the KNOTS program, regarding knowledge can be discussed. Many of the KNOTS endeavors are future-oriented and should therefore be implemented sustainably in the long term. For example, strong and close cooperation between academic and non-academic actors should be promoted and encouraged. However, such future-oriented objectives are relevant to the question "How will the knowledge produced in the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' be used afterwards and who benefits from it?" The assumption is that the knowledge produced within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' will contribute to solve societal problems in the long run. (cf. Knots [o.A.]: 27)

Nevertheless, on the one hand, the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' is suitable for our research interest, because the KNOTS project itself is transdisciplinary and explicitly deals with knowledge. On the other hand, the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' will address topics such as socio-ecological

transformation, migration, social inequalities and climate change. These subject areas can only be handled efficiently by a transdisciplinary approach. In addition, the participants of the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' come from different contexts, namely students and teachers from Vietnam, Thailand, Germany, Czech Republic and Austria, as well as non-academic actors from the region, thus providing a field for our research that is especially suitable for analyzing power structures in knowledge production in a transdisciplinary project.

5. Methodology

To answer the research questions we have formulated, we have chosen three methods, which are guideline-based interviews, participatory observations and questionnaires. We will therefore use a methodological triangulation. This is "the use of multiple methods to study a research problem." (Johnson 2007:115) In particular, the so-called "between methods triangulation" (Johnson 2007: 115) would be useful in order to obtain essential information for the research process, while quantitative data would support and complement qualitative data collection. On the one hand, more meaningful results could be gained, and on the other hand a more comprehensive answer to the research question should be possible. (cf. Johnson 2007: 115f.) This is the so-called "Mixed Methods Research", which is defined by Hallie Preskill in Johnson (2007: 121) as follows: "Mixed methods research refers to the use of data collection methods that collect both quantitative and qualitative data. [...] [U]sing a mixed methods approach increases the likelihood that the sum of the data collected will be richer, more meaningful, and [...] more useful in answering the research question." In our field of interest, the aim is to conduct most of our research in a qualitative manner and to supplement the qualitative with quantitative data gained through a questionnaire.

During the 'Summer School', we will conduct interviews with three to four teachers of the participating universities and one person from the organizing team of the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018'. We want to inquire how knowledge is conveyed within the framework of the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai', how knowledge asymmetries are understood and dealt with. Possible questions could be, "Why exactly were these people chosen for this topic / who decides who facilitates which session?", "How was the material selected for the sessions?", "What criteria was used to select the format for the classes?" "Do you believe that the KNOTS project can reduce knowledge asymmetries and solve social problems within the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' and the field trips?", "What is the goal of the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' in terms (re)production and transfer of knowledge? "

The participatory observation method will be used both in the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' and during the field trips. The method is useful for gaining a better insight into our research topic and by adding additional information it supports other data collection methods. (cf. Kearns 2010: 314f.). In the setting of the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018', we will primarily observe sessions, as well as important events and insightful moments over the entire period. This should allow us to gain a broad overview. In order to gain a structured insight we will closely observe two to three teaching units in the teams consisting of two persons and then exchange our views to relativize personal assessments. This is relevant because researchers are not able to observe anything holistically, but

just pieces: What is observed always depends on one's own decisions, such as the choice of what one sees and how one classifies what has been seen. (cf. Kearns 2010: 314) The aim of the participant observation we are planning is to analyze dynamics within the lesson, such as the interactions between lecturers and students, the speech behavior and the participation of the students.

After two to three days of participatory observation at the Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018, we may, if still necessary, conduct open interviews with individual students (for example, in case of noticeable observations) with the aim of completing our generated data. For example, a conspicuous behavior could be that there are participants who dominate classroom discussions and that there are others who barely participate. The individual, open interviews could answer the question of why someone partakes little or very much in discussions and why unequal participation takes place in the classroom. The goal here is to find out if this can be attributed to personal characteristics, cultural aspects, or factors such as "age", "gender", background, etc., or a combination of these factors (intersectionality).

Afterwards, during the field trips, we examine the relationship between lecturers, students and non-academic actors. A relevant question that will accompany us during this observation process is the following: "Does an equal exchange between non-academic actors and academic actors take place during the knowledge production on the field trips?" After the completion of the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' and the Field Trips, questionnaires will be distributed to all participating students, which include standardized as well as open questions to ask them about their perception in terms of knowledge production and knowledge asymmetries. The collection of the additional data aims to ascertain the extent to which the knowledge produced in the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018' and the field trips is relevant to social problem solving on the one hand and to the individual (research) career on the other hand. The questionnaires are submitted anonymously and will be treated confidentially. This method allows a larger number of people to be questioned in order to get a more complete picture and, if necessary, to supplement the previously collected qualitative data.

We are aware of certain limitations that come with our choice of research methods. As young, female researchers from Europe, we are aware that during the interviews and the participatory observations, our positionality can influence the respondent's answers as well our perceptions. Questionnaires, on the other hand, cannot scrutinize answers and do not recognize nuances. We hope that the mixed methods approach will enable us to partially compensate the limitations generated by the respective methods.

6. Generalization

Since this research project is a case study in a limited setting, generalization of the collected data is not necessary and not possible. However, it is expected that particular assumptions, especially those of the postcolonial approaches, as described in the theoretical part of this research concept, can be found in the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018'. While a complete generalization can be precluded, single findings that are generated during the 'Summer School in Chiang Mai in 2018', could play a role in future debates about knowledge within transdisciplinarity.'

7. Timeline

Date/Place	Activity	Comments
until 9.7.2018 (Vienna)	- Submission of the research concept (rough draft) - Interview design and questionnaires - Preparation of the presentation of the research concept within the framework of the conference "Graduate Studies in the Disruptive Society" at the Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok	
10./11.7.2018	Travel: Vienna - Bangkok	
12./13.7.2018 (Bangkok)	Presentation of the research concept within the framework of the conference "Graduate Studies in the Disruptive Society" at Chulalongkorn University	Write down the feedback and comments of the colleagues so that they can be incorporated into the final version of the research concept
15.7.2018	Travel: Bangkok - Chiang Mai	
16.7.- 21.7.2018 (Chiang Mai)	Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018 - 3-4 interviews with teachers/coordinators - Participatory observation (18.7-20.7. in each case observe 1 session)	Details can be found under "5. Methodology"
22.7.- 26.7.2018	Field Trips - Participatory Observation	Field Trip No. 5. Resource Management, Sustainable Livelihood and Climate Change (2 persons) & No. 8. Dams in the Mekong and Local Livelihood (1 person)
28.7.- 30.7.2018	Summer School in Chiang Mai 2018 - Possible revision of the questionnaire - Meeting with Mr. Seemann (Discussion of the questionnaire, coordination) - Possible qualitative interviews with students	Time period to catch up with interviews with teachers that were not possible in the first phase of the Summer School in Chiang Mai in 2018
31.7.- 1.8.2018	Travel: Chiang Mai - Vienna	
August 2018	Questionnaires will be sent out by Mr. Seemann and the data will subsequently be sent to us	
Aug.-Sept 2018	Integrate feedback from Petra Dannecker / Nora Faltmann and the colleagues in the conference and the summer school in Chiang Mai 2018 into the research concept and finalize it	
15.9.2018	Submission of the research concept	
Sept. 2018	Transcription of the interviews	In case of lack of clarity or in case of missing data, people can be contacted via Skype, email, etc.
Oct. 2018 - Feb. 2019	- Preparation and analysis of the data - Writing of the research papers	
End of Feb. 2019	Submission of research papers	

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GENDER INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT OF NEPAL

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Abstract

Nepal is the 11th most disaster prone country in the world due to its geographical location on the world map; on 25th April 2015 Nepal faced one of the deadliest earthquake of 7.6 magnitudes and in response to the disaster, humanitarian agencies and institutions rushed to assist Nepal after the Government declared the country as “emergency state”. In the earthquake of 2015, factors such as social, economical and political intersected one another and made women more vulnerable in disaster. Global evidences have shown that gender-based discrimination and violence against women is often observed, perpetuated and exacerbated by disasters, which was the case in Nepal’s 2015 earthquake. Since none of the literatures and reports have studied the impact of disaster risk manage on gender and social exclusions, this qualitative paper using in-depth interview and case studies studied if the gender inequality and social exclusion (GESI) increased or decreased due to the disaster risk management during and after earthquake of 2015. With the help of the field research this qualitative research concludes that the social exclusion and gender inequality increased due to ethnicity, caste, class and gender and also because of the exclusion of social issues within the DRM framework of Nepal.

The paper aims to answer:

- *“Did the disaster risk management increase or decrease the gender inequality and social exclusions gaps of Nepal?”*

1. Introduction

If you ever go to Kathmandu Metropolitan Valley and take a stroll around the city, you will still find structures in their fallen state even after three years of the catastrophic Gorkha earthquake, which took place in 25th of April 2015. If you look closely at the remaining's of once upon a time "great architectural structure" you will find the work of Mother Nature growing on it but despite the new life growth, the fallen bricks and stones still remains untouched which acts as a constant reminder to the citizens of Nepal of the ghastly natural disaster which caused damage of great magnitude in Nepal.

Like the state of the assemblies found on the grounds, Nepalese women are found in the similar state at present in and around Kathmandu Valley. Majority of the female headed households, single women, widowed, divorced women, disable and women from lower caste are still found living in the make shift tents and tin sheds which were provided to them during the earthquake as a temporary solution until they could recover and rehabilitate themselves into their normal life but these temporary shelters have become their permanent settlements now.

Despite the inflow of hundreds of disaster risk management projects during and after the earthquake, the present state of Nepalese women is questionable. How couldn't the disaster risk management projects rehabilitate and recover women victims into their normal state three years after the earthquake?

Hence the research question "did the disaster risk management increase or decrease the gender inequality and social exclusions gaps of Nepal?" was formulated to understand the impact of disaster risk management projects and strategies on gender during relief, rescue, recovery, and rehabilitation phase of the DRM projects.

Global evidence has shown that gender-based discrimination and violence is often reinforced, perpetuated and exacerbated by disasters and in case of Nepal marginalized women face multiple form of discrimination and exclusion on the basis of their gender, race, caste, religion, ethnicity and geography even before disaster (IFRC, 2017). After the disaster the situation of women drops down to more vulnerable and it is has been brought into notice that women suffrage is higher in such situation not because of the geotonic impact of the disaster but because of their already existing situation within the community before disaster (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2005).

Before getting into detail of the paper, it is necessary to understand the Gorkha earthquakes overall impact in Nepal and also the disaster risk management of Nepal during the relief, rescue, recovery, and rehabilitation phase of the projects.

1.1 Overview of Gorkha Earthquake 2015

After 7.6-magnitude earthquake hit the Barpak Municipality of Gorkha district, the whole of Nepal was rattled and was left in a devastating state. The tragic event was later followed by 300 aftershocks greater than 4.0 magnitude (as of June 2015), four aftershocks were greater than 6.0 magnitude including one measuring up to 6.8 which was struck 17 days after the first big one with the epicenter near Mount Everest (Nepal Planning commission Secriteriate, GoN, 2015). The earthquake affected the 14 districts across Nepal namely, Gorkha, Dhading, Rasuwa, Nuwakot, Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Kaverpalanchowk, Sindhupalchowk, Dolaskha, Sindhuli, Makwanpur,

Ramechhap and Okhaldhunga amongst many others (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2017).

The recent earthquake caused destruction in huge magnitude, as of May 2015, 9,000 deaths have been recorded along with 22,000 injuries and almost a tenth of the population, which is almost 3.5 million people, were left suddenly homeless (Center for Excellence, 2017). Similarly, it has also been reported that almost 400 health facilities, 9,000 classrooms and more than 800,000 homes were damaged or destructed by the two major earthquake which occurred within the interval of one month (Center for Excellence, 2017).

It is estimated that the total value of disaster effects (damages and losses) caused by the earthquake is NPR 706 billion, which is equivalent to US\$ 7 billion (NPC, 2015). Out of the total amount the Government of Nepal estimated that about 76 per cent represents the physical assets loss and 24 per cent represents the loss in production and service provision (NPC, 2015). So far it has been estimated by the GoN that the total damage and losses was equivalent to about one third of the GDP of the country (NPC, 2015).

The impact of disaster became more prominent with time as the humanitarian challenge became immediately apparent since almost millions of Nepali populations was displaced because of the loss of their houses and also because majority of the people feared the aftershocks which reoccurred for more than 300 times after the first powerful hit, people took shelter in the temporary camps in the open public spaces (NPC, 2015). Even after three years, majority of the population who were displaced after the earthquake destroyed their homes, they are still found living within the temporary shelters which they had established during the earthquake itself (NPC, 2015).

1.2 Overview of Disaster Risk Management projects in 2015 earthquake

Like a protocol after every disaster (man-made or natural) the Government of Nepal declared the nation as “emergency state” and made an official appeal for international assistance and as a response to the request almost 134 international search and rescue (SAR) teams from 34 countries responded to the request during the emergency period (Nepal Planning commission Secriteriate, GoN, 2015). Similarly, along with SAR over 60 countries, United Nations (UN) and other International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), supported emergency relief and humanitarian missions. Furthermore, the disaster risk management was implemented on the grounds by various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and by the youths/local groups who played a vital role in terms of providing human resource, increasing accessibility and mobility during the earthquake (Nepal Planning commission Secriteriate, GoN, 2015).

During the earthquake of 2015, Disaster Management Bill was submitted just few days before the April event to the Parliament, this clearly states the situation of the country during the earthquake, during the events of earthquake Nepal did not have a constitution to abide by hence for the disaster risk response Government of Nepal was underpinned by the Natural Calamity Relief Act, 1982 during the earthquake (IFRC, 2017).

The Natural Calamity Relief Act, 1982 and Local Self Governance Act, 1999 were the two major legal provisions used during the disaster response of earthquake 2015 (MoHA, 2013). According to the 1982 Act, Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) has been provided with the role of leading government agency for immediate

rescue and relief works as well as disaster preparedness activities (MoHA, 2013). As per mandated by the Nepal Government, MoHA is entirely responsible for disaster management, the lead roles have been provided to MoHA under the 1982 act (MoHA, 2013).

Similarly, during the earthquake of 2015, they used the National Strategy for disaster risk management, which was formulated in 2009 to secure Nepal and make the country more disaster-resilient in nature by preparing other epidemic out breaks after the disaster (MoHA, 2013). Furthermore, the disaster fund for emergency response is done through the Natural Calamity Relief Fund, the Prime Minister Relief Fund and Emergency Fund which, are also mobilized for disaster response during the emergency period under the Act of 1982 (MoHA, 2013).

2. Construction of “Women” and “Gender” within Nepali society

As larger portion of the paper deals with gender inequality and social exclusion in earthquake of 2015, it is necessary to understand the position of women within Nepali society before the earthquake as to study if the intersectionality factors such as ethnicity, caste, class, age and gender play a role during the disaster risk management and also does it contribute to the present situation of women victim in Kathmandu. Also, by understanding the conceptualization of the term gender, later in the paper we will be able to argue if disaster risk management led to increment or decrement in gender inequality and social exclusions during and after the implementation of DRM projects.

2.1 What is sex and gender?

It is very necessary to have a clear concept between sex and gender before we go forward with the research, since the research is focused on the gender inequality and social exclusion the clarity of the term “gender” is very important.

Sex is the biological makeup of women and men, which is predetermined and unchangeable, while gender is the socio-cultural make up which is learned and can be changed. Therefore, the term ‘sex’ denotes the biological difference (whether someone is male or female) of women and men. The term ‘Gender’ denotes socioculturally prescribed and proscribed behavior (masculine & feminine) for men and women (Edne, 2017)

Following Stoller, feminist’s scholar Ann Oakley, she suggested that gender is not a direct product of biological sex. She defined sex as “the anatomical and psychological characteristics which signify maleness and femaleness” and gender “as socially constructed masculinity and femininity” (Simmonds, 2012).

Masculinity and femininity are defined not by biology but by social, cultural and psychological attributes which are acquired through becoming a man or a woman in a particular society at a particular time (Simmonds, 2012). The understanding of “sex and gender” has come a long way, in the early days they thought that there was only single type of genital structure, one that was exteriorized in men and inverted in women and so the differences between men and women were structured into vertical, hierarchal fashion, rather than polar, opposition way that we now understand them as (Simmonds, 2012). Hence in the 1800, people perceived gender and sex as one only later in the 19th century male and female bodies had been perceived as opposite to one another (Simmonds, 2012).

DEFINITION OF GENDER: DEFINITION OF GENDER: Gender refers to the social characteristics that distinguish the sexes. The social construction of gender is a subtle and complex process that includes tangible presentation of people (clothing and grooming), a sexual division of labor between women's and men's work, and subtle behavioral and

The concept of gender is deep rooted within the social and cultural heritage of an individual, according to their origin they encounter expectations and are exposed dissimilar treatment that tends to focus on the differences between individual within the society (Rothman, 2002). Hence, we need to understand how the society was constructed in order to understand the nature of gender and sex in the society, especially within the Nepali society. In order to help us with the worldly understanding of gender and sex I would like to lean towards Simon De Beauvoir's original feminist idea, in *Le Deuxieme Sexe* she famously states "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman" or as Toril Moi puts it, "A woman defines herself through the way she lives her embodied situation in the world or in other words, through the way in which she makes something of what the world makes of her" (Simmonds, 2012).

Further the feminist theory suggests that the materialist feminists postulate a Marxist class-like relationship, with patriarchal domination causing a social division rather than following from pre-existing sex differences. Patriarchal society is said to take certain features of male and female biology and turn them into a set of gendered characteristics that serve to empower men and females, hence a hierarchy is said to precede division (Simmonds, 2012). Hence the materialist feminists emphasize on social structural relations, treating men and women as social groups founded upon unequal, exploitative relationships (Simmonds, 2012).

2.2 What is culture?

Culture is the learned behavior of a given society, which acts like a template, in that it has a predictable form and content that shapes behavior and consciousness within that human society, and it is passed on from generation to generation (National Administrative Nursing College, 2017). This is the exact implication of the word culture in the Nepali society, through culture the nature and roles of the gender are divided, and they are expected to work within those roles provided to them.

Since Nepal is enveloped with thick cultural dominance, which is influenced in policies, religion, gender role and identity it is necessary in regard to this paper to understand how culture influences the gender identity, which will help us construct the identity of women within the Nepali society.

2.2.1 How does culture influence gender?

Gender culture is a culture of shaping girls' and boys' knowledge, attitudes, values, feelings, self-esteem and skills as prescribed by the patriarchal culture through the socialization process that starts at birth (National Administrative Nursing College, 2017). The patriarchal system has developed different norms, values, roles, responsibilities and authorities for girls and boys and men and women, which were passed on from generation to generation through different

rituals /ceremonies, dress codes, and daily dealings (National Administrative Nursing College, 2017).

2.2.2 Ethnicity, Caste, Race and Class System in Nepal

One thing Nepal proudly presents is its boisterous customs and traditions, which are greatly influenced by music, art, religion, architecture and literature. Ranging from east of Nepal to the west, from the south to the north of Nepal the culture and traditional practices varies, there are all together 125 diverse caste ethnicity groups, 100 languages spoken across the three different ecological regions of Nepal (Center for Excellence, 2017) (Nepal Planning commission Secriteriate, GoN, 2015).

There are four major castes in Nepal, they are Brahman (Priest class), Chhetri (Warrior Class), Baishya (Businessman or Craftsman/ skilled class) and Shudra (lower caste) (GESI Working Group, 2017). Other castes other than the ones which are stated above, everyone was categorized into occupational groups who are still in many parts of the country considered as impure – the “untouchable”, who today refers to themselves as Dalits (ADB, 2010).

The Muluki Ain¹ (Civil Code) of 1854 legally integrated Adivasi Janajatis (non-Hindu indigenous nationalities and Dalits) into the system, which provided them with middle-rank status by breaking the rigidity of the hierarchical caste system (ADB, 2010). In 1963 when the government of Nepal was undergoing transition into democratic governance ethnic and caste-based discrimination was brought to an end along with the absolute monarchy. But that practice limitations were only in papers, on the grounds ethnic and caste-based discrimination is still prominent and is faced by majority of the population on a regular basis, it is still embedded in culture and legislation (Center for Excellence, 2017) (GESI Working Group, 2017).

Apart from the exclusion of Dalits, the Adivasi Janajatis, the Madhesis from the Southern Plains of Nepal were not even included within the Muluki Ain civil code (ADB, 2010). The ethnic groups, which are not socially incorporated within the common ethnic groups, are unable to effectively participate in programs and discussions outside of their communities and they are deprived of crucial information such as changes in policy, preparedness and governance due to such barriers as language and illiteracy (Center for Excellence, 2017). This has led to creation of pool of vulnerable population who did not receive social protection from the laws, policies and legislation of the country. The inequalities vary from geographical location to developmental sites like for instance Nepal’s urban and rural areas, between different regions and population groups and many women and other socially excluded groups face multiple forms of discrimination, which can be based on class, caste, language, religion and sexual orientation (UN WOMEN, MOWCSW, GoN, 2017)

Even before disaster struck the grounds of Nepal, a pool of vulnerable population already existed on the basis of their race, ethnicity, culture, economic-status and gender. Hence after the earthquake of 2015, the pool of already existing vulnerable population in Nepal were further pushed towards the margin of higher risks.

2.2.3 Women in the land of male domination

When we compare Nepali women's attainment of equality in relation to domination, oppression and sub-ordination with men, yes, they have achieved a lot. They have achieved in the legal form where the new Constitution of Nepal, which was written, and published in 2015 adopted gender equality and social inclusion as one of their major objectives.

Whereas on the other hand, women in Nepal still have to achieve more since gender inequality and social exclusion still exists and the eradication of harmful cultures and practices which puts women in a difficult situation is linked with religion, caste and ethnicity. Nepal's human development outcomes have been and continue to be slowed by gender, social and geographical exclusion and inequalities (UN WOMEN, MOWCSW, GoN, 2017). According to the Gender Inequality Index (GII) indicated 0.497 in 2015, which states that the gender inequality is still very high within the society of Nepal. Similarly, in 2014 the Gender Development Index (GDI) ranks the country on place 102nd with a value of 0.912 (UN WOMEN, MOWCSW, GoN, 2017).

The foundation of Nepali society is thick with culture, beliefs and views that have larger impact on the formation of gender identity within the community. Nepali society is institutionalized, from family to society to temples, schools, and government amongst many others. One of the most salient features of institutionalization is fabricating social values and beliefs in the form of stereotypes and myths and in Nepali society women face the majority of the consequences and majority of the beliefs and myths have led to restriction and barriers to women (Rothman, 2002).

Few of the important features of institutionalization are:

1) Values: Values are standards of desirability, collective expressions of what is precious or worthless, respected or disdained, commendable or deplorable (Rothman, 2002). Values are powerful motivators as it can encourage some acts within the society while at the same time it can discourage. What we need to remember is that religion, respect and higher status is desirability of Nepal and it is prevalent throughout Nepal, hence this makes it the country's core values.

2) Beliefs: Beliefs are ideas or assumptions about the nature of social and physical reality. Beliefs define the way people and events are perceived and experienced, and shape responses to them (Rothman, 2002). Early in the twentieth century sociologist W.I Thomas summarized the implications of beliefs by noting "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences". This statement is a reminder that beliefs shape one's actions, as people act on their beliefs, regardless of their validity (Rothman, 2002).

3) Laws: Inequality is frequently formularized in the legal system of a society. Within Nepal it is a fact that the Constitution of Nepal discriminates and excludes women, despite the 2015 bill have envisioned a gender equal and socially inclusive Nepal by the laws and their policies they have excluded them again and again. This section has been discussed in the section below: Through the Eye of Law: Women

In the patriarchal society the above stipulated roles and responsibilities of women were well defined within a Nepali society, they clearly stated what men should do and what women shouldn't do and above all they were culturally legitimated (Prajapati). These gender practices, which obviously reflect women as subordinate to men, exist where the patriarchal structure and culture are (Prajapati). Acker (2006) well anchors gender in patriarchy by mentioning that a basic structural relation between women and men roots in male dominance, which is found primarily in family (Prajapati).

Hence despite development and recognition of women rights in Nepal, it is difficult to apply it on a daily life is because of illiteracy or even if they are educated they do not have decision making power because women are still perceived as a subordinate to men, men's failure is purely put upon women hence that is why women within the Nepali society are still suppressed and they are still excluded in decision making processes within the family as well as within the society.

3. DRM Framework and its impact on gender inequality and social exclusion

According to the DRM framework during the earthquake of 2015, mandatory female representation or any women focused agency has not been made part of the framework but in papers one of the major works of MoHA and NSDRMN is to stipulate trainings and dissemination of information focusing more on women and children from various different backgrounds. Apart from them, during the earthquake SGBV laws of the country were not taken into consideration, many of the SGBV cases, which were reported during the earthquake, were not taken into account since all of the agencies and institutions were focused on providing the basic emergency reliefs on the grounds.

In Nepal, all of the women and children related work is carried out by the Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare (MoWCSW), the agency hosts Department of Women and Children (DWC) in 75 districts of Nepal through the Women and Children offices (WCOs) which is within the MoWCSW but at the local level the WCOs acted as the focal agency for addressing the issues of children, women, senior citizens and persons with disabilities (IFRC, 2017).

As stated before, there is no representation of MoWCSW in the CNDRC but the WCOs are included within the district level DDRCs in all of the earthquake-affected districts (IFRC, 2017). The major responsibility of the MoWCSW in disaster was to monitor the violence against women during rescue and relief operations, and they also made adequate arrangements for the protection of women and other vulnerable groups (IFRC, 2017). Similarly, at the local level the WCOs were given the responsibility of managing and controlling the environment and make it favorable for women by mainly looking at the issues of gender-based violence. The Women and Children Department were provided with the responsibility in making strategies and plans which lead to security of women from GBV and VAW issues that was crawling in the temporary relief camps (IFRC, 2017).

All of these initiatives were taken by the respective agencies on their own, they are not part of the CNDRC protocol but despite it the agencies went and played their role in central and local level. This situation clearly states that the DRM

framework is not gender friendly and socially inclusive because the leading governing body that deals with gender and inclusion is not part of the disaster risk reduction framework and because they were not made part of the system, they were only able to do according to their capacity

After the disaster, there was various changes in policies from emergency relief activities as well as through the need assessments conducted by social mobilizers in the field while the emergency relief projects were being conducted. Through the projects and assessments, Government of Nepal established National Reconstruction Authority in 2016 as a DRM plan for recovery and future preparedness for Nepal.

The establishment of NRA by the GoN clearly stated that the major projects of the Government were focused on the reconstruction of the buildings with proper planning and development. There are two things to note here, in the NRA policy making the MoWCSW was not included, as well as the NRA put out a set of high level criteria to be part of the team, both ways the participation of women was not made inclusive. Also NRA has set out a strong message that the department would only focus on the buildings hence gender and social exclusions issues were not welcome.

In contrast to their statement, majority of the earthquake recovery DRM activities had to go through the NRA. Hence here we can see how the gender inequality and social inclusion issues were not made part of the DRM recovery phase. This was only one part of the issue; the other issue is the lack of information and education amongst women, due to which they are not aware of their rights in terms of land and property. According to the statistics the total land, which is under the name of women, is 19 per cent in total, here we can see who has the upper hand. Despite the government providing laws towards equal land rights, men still own majority of the land and asset is because of the social and cultural structure where men are given the upper hand and women are denied from making decisions. Hence now in the recovery phase majority of the women have been denied governmental funds for reconstruction due to the intersectional issues overlapping one another.

4 Analysis

4.1 Impact of DRM projects during the disaster risk management projects

During the field research 25 key informants were interviewed. The key informants were selected with the help of a focal person who was selected on the basis of criteria settings. The women were interviewed in research site (at their original setting) because along with in depth interview, observation methodology was also applied where their responses were compared with their spatial environment.

Out of the total key informants, case studies of the beneficiaries were collected with close coordination with GESI and DRM teams within Women for Human Rights, Single Women Group, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, Nepal Red Cross, CARE International and NSET. Also the representatives from each of these organizations were interviewed during the field research process. The cases studies support the key informants' woes and

the cases studies, which were collected, reported similar issues, which were stated by the 20 women key informants.

4.2 DRM impact on GESI during rescue, relief, recovery and rehabilitation phase

During the field research a lot of domestic violence cases, rape, harassment cases and exclusions cases on the basis of their social status, class, caste, ethnicity, age and disability were reported as well as various other INGOs and NGOs also provided with many case studies for the purpose of this research.

4.2.1 Bruised, Secluded and Displaced Permanently

In case of Kanchi Nepali (annex 1), who is a widow and during the field research she stated that she has been diagnosed with third stage of cancer. In her case she stated that due to DRM her and her son's relation worsened. The victim's son's action and statements states that she was being selfish and further stated that there she did not require the materials or provisions and took it away from her but even after stating the remarks, the son did not stop her mother from receiving materials, he inflicted violence on her, which created fear within her, and through fear her son controlled her. Hence at the end, she was found starving herself in order to provide her son with money or materials when he visited her in her temporary shelter; she did this all out of fear and to avoid violence.

4.2.2 No Identification Card, No Relief

The other thing to consider is that Nepali society, gives male the power to make decisions by giving them an authoritative figure. During the relief and rescue phase of DRM the male counterparts got empowered through the DRM processes and projects, how? To receive the reliefs all of the victims required having an earthquake victim card. In Nepal, in order to receive a citizenship card a woman or a young girl needs to be accompanied by a male representative in order to receive an important document such as citizenship. Such protocols shows that it is a male dominated society and that the men have the upper hand in decision making and due to which women who were excluded and marginalized by the society did have access to the relief and rescue provisions.

One of the informant's exclaimed, "may be if I was provided with education when I was young, I wouldn't have suffered this much in this life. No one ever told me that citizenship was important also I never thought of getting the paper work done because all along I thought it was not important. My husband had it, so I thought if one of us has it should be enough but after he left me here with the children and brought a second wife to get anything done for my children it is a big hurdle for me."

One of the key informants stated, *"I didn't get an earthquake victim card because I did not know the use of it. No one ever told me that it is such an important document and I learned of its importance during the earthquake. I did not receive any relief because I did not have a legal document as a proof, when I had gone to the DDC they said I need a male representative to help me get the document. Since I don't have husband and I have only two daughters, I got the citizenship through my grandson who is 16 years old."* From the statement we can understand the whole system of Nepal is focused around the male figure, the Governance system as well depends on the male representatives and do not consider woman as the head of the family. Through DRM projects during the earthquake through field

observation and interview what we can see is that the men's have gained more decision-making power.

4.2.3 DRM Forgot Pre-Post Pregnant Women during Relief Programs

While many of the NGO's disaster relief programs and projects were directed towards providing relief packages, they were not gender friendly in nature because when distributing the relief packages and one of the interviewee stated that she did not receive any help during earthquake especially after stating it to the NGO and government people who visited the grounds that she just gave birth to her child who is three years at present.

Also, it has brought into notice that women from lower caste, ethnicity and economic groups suffered more after the earthquake. During the field interview the interviewee expressed her frustration for being born in a lower caste. She stated, *"To be born in a lower caste in a community of higher caste is a curse"* she further stated, *"and if being born into a lower caste was not enough being born as a woman is even worse"*. Such strong expressions stated the situation of women during the earthquake. In the case study we can see that because she was a woman and pregnant, not just she but her unborn child suffered as well. They were denied of relief or any participation during the DRM projects that came into their village because they said that only the permanent residents of that area would be receiving it hence in her community anybody who is not from Newar, Chhettri and Brahmin clan did not receive any relief support during the earthquake.

4.2.4 Secluded Cause of Caste or Class

The victim in case study 2 (annex 2) had expressed during the interview that she never felt welcomed within the society, the people within the society always made sure to remind there who they are where they belong within the community. Till date they have not participated in any programs, whereas she heard that there were many livelihood projects and skill trainings projects focusing on women running within the village. Here we need to make a note that the DRM projects during the earthquake was influenced by the society and politics, due to which some population and groups were excluded from the DRM projects. When we asked her about the information about the DRM projects she further stated she just heard about it, no one ever told her personally.

4.2.5 Your Caste Determines Your Participation in DRM

During the field research, the key informants told that during the DRM projects the women were told beforehand that they would not receive any relief because of the community decision on not providing provision to people from outside. In this case due to disaster risk management and because they did not do an impact analysis this kind of issue was not brought into limelight and even after three years they have living in the dark since they were denied of all the participation and access to the DRM projects activities.

Majority of the United Nations Research is based on the concept of violence against women (VAW) and girls, similarly UN's Nepal Country Team gender Theme Group's 2016 report, which states that violence against women and girls is *"one of the most systematic and widespread human rights violations in the world"* which *"affects women and girls in every country, regardless of their age,*

ethnicity, socio-economic status, physical ability, sexual orientation or gender identity”.

Analyzing the case studies and assessing if the gender inequality and social exclusion has increased or decreased due to the disaster risk management during the relief and rescue phase, we can state that due to the DRM process in the relief and rescue the issue of social exclusion has increased. The increment of social inclusion is increased in DRM projects due to the ethnicity, caste and class hierarchical system within the Nepali society. Here we can state that the DRM projects during the earthquake used the international framework due to which the issues exacerbated by ethnicity, caste and class have been secluded which led to the increment of social exclusion in disaster due to DRM projects. Similarly, due to DRM projects gender inequality has increased as well, since the DRM projects only focused on the general relief and rescue materials other women such as pregnant, post-pregnant, menstruating, disable and widow women were excluded from the disaster relief. Since the disaster risk management did not focus on gender issues related to women the DRM projects lead to gender inequality because it favored and supported men more than women.

4.2.6 Establishment of Safe Space, an Outcome of DRM Projects

After the earthquake the social mobilizers of various organizations recognized the need of a safe space and shelter for women which functioned as a counseling and information center during day time because many women were not educated and they did not receive information regarding women rights and other issues. Hence the construction of a safe space was adopted by many organizations and VDC's, which would function as multipurpose women center (MPWC). One of the women who is living in a temporary shelter but who had stayed in the safe space after the earthquake until unless she could find a space to stay stated “when no one was willing to give a space to sleep, the women's group not just took me in but along with safe space I was introduced to women who shared the same situation as me which motivated me. (Shrestha, 2018)” The down fall of the MPWC was that despite empowering women to become the agent of changes, the safe space required budget to function which during the duration of the project was being funded by different international donors but what will happen to the space after the organizations stop funding them? Where will they get the money? Such are the situation of safe spaces state right now. Due to lack of fund and lack of sustainability of the project many safe spaces have closed down.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Nepali society has roles demarcated according to the gender they are born into. The country follows gendered culture, where men and women are expected to carry on certain role and responsibilities and Nepal puts women as the subordinate of men. They are given the main role of caretaker, reproduction and domestic worker, which binds her within the four walls of the house. Similarly, the international DRM framework was not able to address such issues because the international standards are generalized to mass population. Due to which during the earthquake gender inequality were taken mostly care of because since gender equality is a global issue but social inclusion was not taken into the framework, which lead to exclusion of the more vulnerable groups.

In case of disaster risk management, the gender inequality has increased because of disaster risk management is due to the policy, which provides the upper hand to the men. Due to the DRM policies and laws, they have actually installed confidence in men through the provision of earthquake victim card.

The findings from the field research and the collected cases studies suggest that women who were from the marginalized group, from low-caste or minority ethnic groups faced problems acquiring citizenship cards and relief ID cards. Few of the case studies stated that women because of their marital status were denied of their rights or were facing direct discrimination during the disaster because they were not able to establish their identities without a male relative or head of households (which again is a male gender). Also, there were cases reported, where single mothers and women were deprived of Victim identification cards despite the fact that their homes were completely destroyed.

Hence, women became more vulnerable due to the DRM policies stipulated during and after the earthquake. Also, we should take note of the fact that gender inequality and social exclusion will keep existing in Nepal's DRM is because women are not made members of the NRA or NERC, out of 94 members in the NRA 's council 2 of them are women. Until unless women are made part of decision-making process in the national level the gender inequality and social exclusions will keep existing within the DRM projects in future.

Hence according to the conceptual framework, after disaster women become more vulnerable due to disaster, religion, gender, ethnicity, caste and class. Women are more susceptible to violence in disaster is because of the attitude regarding women and the power provided to men within the community. The gender inequality and social exclusion both increased due to disaster risk management is due to the factors such as religion, male dominated culture and caste system which envelopes.

Hence if gender equal and social inclusion framework is added within the DRM policy framework as well as national DRM framework, Nepal will not develop as an inclusive and gender friendly state.

5.1 Recommendations

There are two levels of recommendations, one is through policy and the other is through local level. Below are the recommendations for the disaster risk managements to become gender equal and socially inclusive is nature.

5.1.1 Gender Equality in Policy Level: Within the DRM framework till date, women participation has been neglected.

Within the council members of the DRM as well the main governing body for gender, which is MoWSCW, has not been made inclusive hence, in order to make gender inclusive and framework they should include MoWSCW as one of the main governing councils to bring out gender friendly policies and activities during and after the earthquake.

5.1.2 Shift in attitude: First of all, majority of the DRM projects do not focus on preparedness programs, hence first they need to include preparedness as part of the DRM framework and in it they should focus on shift in the attitude where they treat women as equal. Such kinds of attitudes can be installed within the think cultured Nepali society through institutions such as Government, Schools and Work places.

5.1.3 Local Organizations and governments capacity building: During the earthquake in terms of gender, the local organizations and groups played a major role. Hence many projects of DRM should focus on capacity building of these agencies for the future. If their capacities are built through the lens of gender and social inclusion in near future the issues related to gender and social exclusion would be given better opportunity.

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Annex 1

CASE STUDY 1: BRUISED, SECLUDED AND DISPLACED PERMANENTLY

Kanchi Nepali, age 68 is still an earthquake victim. Even after three years, she was found in her temporary shelter. She is a single women, whose husband passed away after her son was born who is 35 years old today with a son of his own.

She expressed repentance while she shared how her husband treated and how much violence she endured while her husband was alive. After the death of her husband she was relieved from the fact that she did not have to face abuse and violence, but she was punished by her in-laws and the society for being a widow.

After great hardship with an infant depending on her, she worked at other people's fields and also as a maid for economical reasons. She had a hand to mouth living and she could only spare little money for her son's education. After her in-laws demise the land's ownership was transferred to her.

Hence, even though she did not have steady income, she did not have to worry about shelter but when her son got married the relationship worsened and her son started abusing her like her husband. Before the earthquake the whole family stayed together under the same roof but after the earthquake they decided to leave her behind because she was getting older and was being a burden to them (according to Kanchi).

She was 65 years old when the earthquake brought her whole house down, since she was aged and could not work anymore she survived on the money allocated to her with the help of single women group through the government but after the earthquake she was permanently displaced because of the factors stated above. The government has allocated a monthly allowance of NPR 1,000 to women holding registered single women cards, which she survived on.

Hence after the earthquake, she was living under shelters. The single women group representatives from Women for Human Rights tracked her down and helped her get the tin sheets and other few materials to build a temporary shelter. After they helped Kanchi and provided her with the materials to build the temporary shelter, her son came to her inflicted violence saying "you are so selfish, you do not care about your son and grandchild that you only got the tin sheets for yourself". After saying this he left her bruised and also took the tin sheets along with him.

She again was left with nothing; after finding her in that situation the single women's group again helped her get the provision through the DDRC and also this time helped her with human resources. After doing so they provided her with sanitary kit and little immediate emergency kit. When the son found out about it, he came back to take all of the materials and went back to his son and wife so she expressed that the DRM projects which provided her with relief packages and materials made things worse for her, she further stated that now she thinks that her son just comes to visit her to take the provisions and if she does not give him anything, he becomes angry and inflicts violence.

At present, Kanchi Nepali is being diagnosed with third stage of cancer and with the help of the women groups of which she is a registered member is being provided with allowance for her treatment, but she is not responding well to the

medication because she is starving herself out of fear that her son will visit her and if she is not able to provide him money he will again inflict violence.

Annex 2

CASE STUDY 2: NO IDENTIFICATION CARD, NO RELIEF

Ms. D.A is a divorced woman, after suffering violence from her husband and finding out that he has another wife in another district she filed a divorce and have been living on her own ever since then. After filing for divorce her husband's family as well as her maiden side of the family disowned her, she was left with no other option than living independently. Despite living on her own, the husband's side of the family keeps harassing her by saying that she is a "curse" an "ill omen" while the society keeps talking about her stating that her husband married another women because she could not conceive a child.

Her family did not keep any ties with her is because they told her that by filing a divorce she brought shame to her family, because as we are aware that Nepali society is male dominated hence her mother and father both of them disregarded any relations with her.

After the earthquake, the house where she was living collapsed and all of her belongs along with the building got crushed. She could not retrieve any of her belongings; hence she was seeking shelter in the temporary shelters in the Tudikhel.

The real problem started crawling up when she could not retrieve an earthquake victim card, she did not have a citizenship card and in order to register herself as a victim. Since both of the family had disregarded her she was not counted as a member from either side of the family. Due to which she did not receive any access to relief materials or any DRM projects assistance.

NATURAL RESOURCE SHARING: THE POSITION, PERSPECTIVE, AND PROSPECT OF ETHNIC POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS' LEADERS TOWARDS PEACE PROCESS IN MYANMAR

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Abstract

Since rich in natural resource is an easy way of making money, it is helpful for motivating a marginalized group take armed rebellion against the dominant, who controls a lion share of natural resource, especially when there is no democratic platform for political bargaining in the area. On the one hand, it is founded out that local groups' special claims on natural resources help contribute to lasting peace in regions suffering from resource-related violence such the case of Aceh province in Indonesia. There are more than 30 countries--most of them resource-rich and federalism base political system practices-- have a set of rules for natural resource sharing to the layers like national, subnational and local level governments.

Being a unitary system country, Myanmar has never practiced systematically such a formula of natural resource revenue sharing scheme, to date. The current distribution of the Union fiscal budget assigned as grants or loans to state and region, without any formula, budgets amounted around 8 percent of overall national public spending, which is still a big gap compare to ethnic groups demand to retain the majority of the revenue from their area; some demand are as high as 70 percent. Indeed, although the politics of resource control was not the root cause of armed conflict in Myanmar, nowadays, the multi-billion dollar jade trade and other natural resource incentives are contributing to ethnic armed conflict dominantly.

Recognizing this, the current peace process under the Union Peace Conference (21th Century Panglong) set this theme of resource sharing as one of its main five topic agendas to be negotiated among stakeholders. This paper discusses about the politics of nation's wealth sharing, the position, perspective and prospect of ethnic political leaders toward peace process in Myanmar.

Keywords: *resource sharing, federalism, ethnic armed groups, conflict, peace process, negotiation*

1. Introduction | Problem statement

85 percent of the total Myanmar's FDI come from natural resources based industries such as power (hydro), oil and gas, mining and tourism (Oxford Business Group, 2016) most of them are predominantly located in indigenous and ethnic areas. Despite rich in natural resource, according to Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center, Union of Myanmar functions more like a colonial state where the central government monopolizes and controls all natural resources from ethnic regions (ENAC, 2017, p. 73). The consequence is development failure and natural resource curse in the country because of misused and misappropriated much of the wealth being produced from the nation's large mineral and energy sectors (Pick et al., 2010). As an impact of ethnic armed rebellion strike against the central government to fight for their political, social and economic rights for 70 years, nowadays, there are half a million Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the country (Kramer, 2015, p. 360) and left the country to a member of Least Developed Countries and is still in the bottom line of Human Development Report rank: 145th of out 188 countries.


In order to resolve ethnic conflict and restore peace back into the nation, the military influenced semi-civilian government of President U Thein Sein and ethnic armed organizations started initiative of political dialogue since 2012. Among the five main agendas of political dialogue under the current framework of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which was signed in 2015, the issue of 'natural resources management and sharing' is one of the five topic themes of 'dialogue agendas'.

What is the current situation of negotiation in this regard? How far have they come? Is there any challenge and constraint? What are the prospects and best strategies for solving the issue of natural resource sharing in Myanmar? This paper analysis the perspectives, positions and strategies of ethnic armed organization (10 NCA signatories group) and some other ethnic political parties leaders and experts by using the method of qualitative research. Comparatively, I also explore the perspectives of their dialogue counterparts -- the government army (Tatmadaw) and the ruling government (NLD)-- to be able to measure the potential gaps and prospects.

Evaluating the previous three times events of Union Peace Conference under the name historic name of 21st Century Panlong, and as far as my limited research reached out, I observe that it is hard to find a potential equilibrium in order to narrow down the gap between two counterparts in this particular issue of NRS. Because of lack of trust, vest of interests and unpreparedness in this particular agenda of natural resource sharing, so far, the most powerful institution of Tatmadaw has shown least willingness to talk this theme, the incumbent civilian government has not put it card on the table and ethnic political leaders have not done their homework well apart from rhetoric statements and principles.

2. Conceptual framework

The concept of this paper overarches each other in three phenomenon - natural resource revenue sharing, resource conflict and conflict transformation.



Cited to Collier and Ross (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999), in his paper on the role of natural resources in armed conflict, Philippe Le Billon conceptualize that contrary to the widely held belief that abundant resources facilitate economic growth are thus positive for political stability, most empirical evidence suggests that countries dependent economically on the export of primary commodities are at a higher risk of political instability and armed conflict (Billon, 2001, p. 563). Myanmar is no exception, as Global Witness stated, multi-billion dollar jade trade contributing to ethnic armed conflict” (Witness, 2017). This concept of how resource revenues can fuel conflict, is best explained by the report of UNDP and NRGI, situating the case of Myanmar, “Where the military and some of the ‘armed ethnic groups’ are financed by either jade mine concessions or informal taxation of jade on its route to the Chinese border”. (Andrew Bauer, et al., 2016, p. 24)

The theory of conflict transformation rather than conflict management and conflict resolution, which is a new model of comprehensive, win-win, long-term, emphasizing support for groups within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of outsiders and multidimensional approach as defined by Hugh Miall (Miall, 2004, p. 4), is quite relevance to the current context of Myanmar. Relatively, Wolfstein recommends political ‘negotiation’ as it is the most adequate form of discussion that helps find solutions for contradicting interests without using force, as the writer applies to the two theories in term of peace negotiation: the Ripeness theory by William Zartman and the Transcend theory by Johan Galtung (Wolfstein, 2016, p. 76).

UNDP and NRGI argue that local groups’ special claims on natural resources help contribute to lasting peace in regions suffering from resource-related violence (Andrew Bauer, et al., 2016). The Institutions gives a case to Indonesia, the successful story of achieving peace negotiation by agreeing on resource revenue sharing in the regions of Aceh and West Papua that helped end years of violent conflict in the country⁴. Thus, in more than 30 countries—most of them resource-rich and federalism base political system, according to UNDP-NRGI, distribution of nonrenewable natural resource revenues is governed by a set of

⁴ ibi

rules that are distinct from those governing distribution of general revenues, whereby national governments transfer natural resource income to state, regional and local governments (Andrew Bauer, et al., 2016).

3. Resource politics in Myanmar: historical process and substances

Union of Myanmar was founded by the leaders of ethnic groups from Chin, Kachin, Shan and Bamar by signing the historic Panglong Agreement voluntarily in 1947 with a guarantee of internal self-determination based federal system that promise political, economic and social equality among the ethnicities in the Union. Unfortunately, General Aung San, who promised for equal development in his remarkable words, “If the Bamar receives one kyat, so that you (Shan, Kachin and Chin) will also get one kyat”, (TNI, 2017, p. 4), was assassinated after five months of the historic Agreement signed. Since then, the successive Bamar dominant government leaders never respect the Pangpong promise until today.

As a result of political dissatisfaction, Karen National Union, representing Karen ethnic group, started armed rebellion in 1947 which was followed by Karenni, Mon and Rakhine and later Kachin, Shan and Chin after 1960s. Currently, it is estimated that there are now at least 21 EAOs along with many militia groups (Kramer, 2009). The estimated military strength (troop) of total ethnic armed group is around 80,000 (Kristian Stokke et al., 2018) whereas Myanmar army of Tatmadaw is assumed to be about three to four times stronger than a combine of all those groups in term of army population. Similarly, there are currently about 54 ethnic based political parties out of 94⁵ registered political parties in Myanmar, with a policy for more political status.

What is the impact of half a century armed conflict? According to Asia Foundation 2017 report, it is stated that armed conflict in Karen State, one of the longest-running internal conflicts, caused at least 18,000 fatalities between 1949 and 2013, and violent clashes in Kachin and Shan States resulted in 16,878 and 10,236 deaths, respectively, between 1949 and 2015, saying the figures probably underestimate the true death toll (Sasiwan Chingchit et al., 2017). Apart from conflict of Rakhine state and communist movement, some ethnic leaders assume that within seven decades long ethnic conflict in Myanmar might have cost more than hundred thousand fatalities on both sides of the armies as well as civilians, most are from ethnic minority group. Approximately 118 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, containing more than 12.4 million people, are affected by conflict and tensions between EAOs and the government.⁶ Apart from casualty, pattern of armed conflict and the insecurity in engenders has negative impacts on livelihoods and poverty in conflict affected areas of the country including natural resource governance sectors (WBG, 2017), as well as rampant human rights violation and millions of migrations -- refugees and IDPs.

Basically speaking, Myanmar to date, has no systematical mechanism and formula for natural resource sharing between the central and subnational level government legally. So far, natural resources in the country have been predominantly managed and taxed by the central (Union) government through line ministries and the state-owned enterprise (SOEs) under them (Thet Aung

⁵ See Union Election Commission, Myanmar <http://www.uecmyanmar.org/pages.php>

⁶ Asia Foundation: see <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Myanmar-TStateofConflictandViolence.pdf>

Lyinn et al., 2014, p. 4). The current constitution has a list of Schedule I, II, III and V that distribute legislative and administrative power between Union, Subnational and Autonomous Areas. However, its 57 points of legislative powers delegated to subnational governments are minimal and in name only.

Although there is no specific formula and mechanism of natural resource revenue sharing in the nation's existing legal system, the current share of the Union budget assigned as grants or loans to state and region, as a form of fiscal decentralization, according to CESD and JICA report, budgets amounted to around 8 percent of overall national public spending (Gile Dickenson-Jones et al., 2016). On the other hand, on the ground, there are three institutions or actors that control the country's natural resources, namely- Tatmadaw, the government and ethnic armed organizations. Two of my interviewees -- one is an expert and another is one of the Kachin political party leaders, revealed to me that natural most of the resource sector is currently being controlled by Tatmadaw and ethnic armed group illegally rather than the government department. This is proofed in Kachin state, whereas the industry of jade mining is worth up to US\$31 billion in 2014 alone which is controlled by networks of military elites, drug lords and crony companies associated with the darkest days of junta rule(Global Witness, 2015).

Currently, stakeholders in the country are negotiating for federal system political arrangement under the agreement of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with 10 ethnic armed organizations out of 21 groups, and the process of Union Peace Conference (21st Century Panglong). The theme of 'natural resource revenue sharing' is one of the five main topic agendas of the dialogue table.

4. Methodology

In this qualitative research-based paper, the method of in-depth interview with semistructured interview is used. I interviewed 15 persons in person: seven of ethnic armed organizations' leaders out of 10 signatories of NCA, one leader of non-signatory named Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), five registered ethnic political parties' leaders that got some seats in Parliament as well as two experts and statesman representing ethnic community. Most of my interviewees from EAO/EPP are secondary or third level position/rank in each of their organization like secretary and vice-chairperson. I also did document research by collecting data and information to EAO- Signatory Office, and each of their political parties' offices and committees regarding to peace process, natural resource sharing and controlling politics throughout the history.

Participant observation is also conducted to observe the meetings and activities of ethnic armed organizations such as Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), which is the supreme body of NCA signatories EAOs groups and others. Barbara B. Kawulich defines participant observation, as the process enabling researchers to learn about the activities of the people under study in the natural setting through observing and participating in those activities (Kawulich, 2005). As I myself is a Secretary of Chin National Democratic Party and participate in peace process as the role of delegate and sometime technical support, I have firsthand information and observation about the negotiation table in several cases.

In term of limitation, since this research area is quite broad, I narrow down the scope of natural resource to the particular nonrenewable resources such as 'oil,

mineral (gems) and gas plus few renewable resources namely hydropower and teak and hardwoods due to their importance, sensitivity and environmental impactful to local minority people and peace process. The research target groups are basically ethnic political organizations' leaders whereas they can be categorized into two groups— ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and registered ethnic political parties (EPPs) as well a couple of experts. And this paper could not include the view of most of non-NCA signatories groups, seven members alliance, due to legal restraint.

5. Findings and Analysis

5.1 Positions: Development of policy

When I asked ethnic political organizations leaders about their position, preparedness and readiness in term of natural resource sharing section, they had to explain with two kinds – substance and process or strategies basis. In term of the substance, which is the position development on NRS, all of the interviewees from Shan, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, Chin, Mon, Kayah/Karenni leaders said that they have set in principle only but have not prepared with detail formula or method of the sharing system yet. P'doh Saw Tah Doh Moo, the General Secretary of Karen National Union, that has the longest armed rebellion record in Myanmar and possibly in the world, explained “Principally, we hold the position that we, subnational states should have more amount share compare to the central, then if it is agreed in peace talk, the detail formula and method as a policy level is the task of experts since it is quite technical”. One of the peace architect in the ethnic side of Myanmar behind the scene, and the founder of Euro-Burma Office (EBO), Harn Yawngwe pointed out that, “Not only ethnic groups but even the NLD has not considered about such a formula to date”, arguing that such a policy and formula may also require another step of public consultations in prior before putting on the negotiation table”.

Khun Myat Tun of the chairman of Pa-O National Liberation Organization (NPLO) justified, “NRS is not number one. We are currently being busy with handling tougher issues such as political and security issues”. In this case, the director of EBO has different view that, “Our leaders always talk about politics, but, in fact, natural resource is the key”. Nonetheless, it could also be a strategy of ethnic leaders to keep secret about their position as they might think this is premature to show their card on the table.

5.2 Strategy: collective vs. bilateral

Another concern is whether to set collective position among EPOs in particular case of natural resource sharing or if each organization should propose their own position separately. All of the interviewees of EAO and EPPs generally said that collective voice is essential to gain bigger weight of bargaining power, but when asked in detail of formula, some questioned about the practicality as each states and ethnic groups have different context in term of resource. Dr. Manam Tu Ja, chairman of Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP) and the former vice-president of Kachin Independent Army explained, “Since development is so imbalance across the country, we could not provide the wealth of natural resource equally-- we need asymmetric system, in some areas”. Sai Laeng, a leading member of Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), gave the same view that, “We should negotiate [among ethnic groups] for common

position regarding the principles, but, in term of ratio of sharing each state may have different formula”.

Thus, Harn Yawngwe, Myanmar expert, proposed thoughtful option in this regard that basic principles or macro level of themes should be negotiated collectively as a way of symmetric method, however, when it comes to micro or policy level, each of the ethnic group actors should negotiate bilaterally [asymmetrically?] in recognize to the uniqueness of each states. [In here, some of them seem to confuse or unable to differentiate between collective position and symmetric system so that they unaware that collective position can be set both ways of symmetric and asymmetric systems.] Salai Thla Hei, the coordinator of Peace Process Working Team (PPWT), which is a work-team body of EAO-signatories argued that, “Even we cannot win when we talk collective voice to Nay Pyi Taw, will it be easier to negotiate bilaterally, I don’t think so”.

5.3 Mechanism review: finding equal foot

Another question is ‘the perspective of ethnic leaders whether they feel the current peace negotiation is level/fair play or dominated by any side, and what potential leverage tools do the ethnic groups have in order to building more influential power in negotiation table. When I discussed the leaders about the current mechanism and framework under the so-called NCA and Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD)⁷, most of the EAO-signatories including General Secretary of KNU and General Secretary of CNF, both of whom are member of UPDJC—the secretariat body of Union Peace Conference -- believe that the mechanism and framework should be reviewed. However, it does not necessarily mean that framework and mechanism alone can help ethnic group equal footing in the negotiation, as the Pa-O armed leader explained, “[Building] our capacity is also crucial. Without qualification, it is nonsense to dream of upper hand”. Mr Oo Hla Saw, the leader of ANP and a member of UPDJC, also said that it is not only the mechanism that makes weaker to ethnic bloc, but there are other factors such as lack of coordination among EPO leaders especially between EAOs and EPPs and lack of capacities. Harn Yawngwe warned, “For the time being, the negotiation is not equal footing [for ethnic side], so, if you make a deal in this time, you will lose”.

In fact, the impact of imbalance of negotiation table has been witnessed since the very beginning of agenda setting stage of Union Peace Conference. For instance, natural resource sharing theme has been implicitly putting sideline by the Burman ethnic blocs of Tatmadaw and government by putting it on the sub-headline under the Land and Environment sector, which was proposed by the EAOs as the main agenda to be negotiate since the NCA drafting process through Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), which was a coalition body of 16 members ethnic armed organizations, according to Salai Thla Hei, a member of UPDJC and coordinator of PPWT. “Non dall things happen as we want, in negotiation”, he added. What is worse in later negotiation process is that natural resource sharing was discussed only in the first event of Union Peace Conference and the later conferences wisely avoided or sidelined it by prioritizing land and environment issue, which are much less impact to armed conflict and peace in

⁷ its stems of committees such as Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM), Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) and its related working committees and thematic teams

the country. A member of UPDJC said that they will try to put this topic be mainstream in the future UPC table.

Another factor that weaken the leverage of ethnic bloc is weak technical support. Although they got support from western countries as well as Japan and Australia through Peace Support Fund, Joint Peace Fund and several other means, the capacity of ethnic peace negotiators are much weaker compare to Tatmadaw and ruling government institutions especially in term of research committees and thematic teamssupport. Salai Aung Myint, Executive Director of EAO-S Office, explained by admitting that, “We cannot even equal one of their [government] ministries, we have limited in term of financial, technical and human resources”.

5.4 Knowledge gap between stakeholders

Knowledge and position gap between ethnic groups and Bamar leaders in term of natural resource sharing is extremely high, as far as the research founded out. Despite Tatmadaw, the most powerful institution among stakeholders as well as the stumbling block of peace process, has not released its position in this regard, but since the institution is a designer and protector of the existing 2008 constitution, they are seemingly enjoying the current system of zero-sharing. The position of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi led government is also unrevealed and unpredictable but half of my interviewees representing ethnic negotiators said they believe NLD and Tamadaw position will not be much different if not the same, in this particular issue of NRS. One of the armed leaders shared his opinion, “They [NLD and Tatmadaw] are no different [same ethnic race]. Bamar think in Bamar way of philosophy. They are willing to give decentralizationnot more than that”.

On the one hand, some leaders like Pa-O and Kayah think slightly positive way to NLD positions on NRS issue, believing that their position might be more or less different to Tatmadaw and nearer to ethnic positions, since NLD and ethnic groups have same common ground in democracy and want to change the 2008 constitution. In the first convention of UPC in 2016 January 14 to 16, whereas I myself attended as a delegate representing Chin National Democratic Party and participated in the sector of Natural Resource Sharing and Management, whereas the NLD delegates Mr. Nyan Win and Nan Ngan Lin discussed [its seem based on their personal opinions] that the ethnic groups demand of 70/30 ratio [70% state, 30% central] was too much and unrealistic and proposed 30 percent for ethnic states which is presumably the opposite of their counterparts’ proposal and position. However, it should not necessarily lead that there is no hope for negotiation since this is the first round of the game so that it is understandable that they are coming up with their maximum position, as a bargaining chip.

5.5 Lack of trust led to less prospect

It is no wonder when one of the ethnic armed leaders said, “We [the EAOs] never trust them [Tatmadaw and the Bamar politicians] and, equally, they trust us neither”. Lack of trust between ethnic groups and Bamar has been rooted since the precolonial period of their ancestor and kingdoms. Even though the ethnic leaders tried to put their trust to Bamar leaders and opted to the country since 1947 by building modern state-nation named Myanmar/Burma, but the promises were never kept by the Bamar dominant ethnic group throughout the successive governments. Ethnic leaders recalled their memories of the promises such as equal sharing of the wealth by Gen. Aung San which was abused, the promise of Aung San Suu Kyi “not to compete in ethnic areas” in 1990 general election that

was failed and most of ceasefire agreement papers and gentleman agreements during 1990s were broken out by the Bamar Tatmadaw. On the other side of the coin, the Tatmadaw leaders as well as several Bamar politicians deeply suspect to EAOs mutually that they are separatists, disloyal to the Union and believe that they are a threat to disintegration of the Union despite none of them have demanded for secession right since 1975 after the formation of National Democratic Front, according to Pu Zing Cung, the chairman of CNF and the then Secretary of Democratic Alliance of Burma during 1990s.

It impacts on current peace process is that, the Tatmadaw is preconditioning peace talk that EAO should agree first by signing that 'we will not separate from the Union' then the rest will be discussed later, which is contradict with EAO thinking, as they think this issue should be dealt after all others issues have been negotiated.

Sai Kyaw Nyunt, secretary of both Shan Nationalities League for Democracy party and UPDJC and U Tun Kyaw and U Tun Kyaw, general secretary of Taang National Party said the current political stumbling block -- such as secession or non-secession issue-- should be overcome first, then the rest, including NRS, will be easier to handle. However, recently, they mutually agreed not discuss the hard parts in the upcoming UPC then it be wait and see if they handle this NRS issue as the easier part. Relating to this, the ethnic negotiators should understand that NRS could be more practical and workable part if both parties have a will to resolve because it does not require for constitutional amendment whereas Tatmadaw has a veto power there.

5.6 Vest interests - personal and organizational

Harn Yawngnwe sincerely stated, "Although our leaders are negotiating about so-called political issue, the key is natural resource" elaborating that competing to control natural resource is the main factor of conflict in Myanmar. Tatmadaw does not willing to talk about this because they have got the lion share already. Mr. Harn added that, "Why would they want to change as they think they have already won in a position of strength?" In other word, since the Tatmadaw top leaders and ex-generals have huge business interests in natural resources extraction, they seem to worry and unwilling to address this topic. In the same way, several EAOs such as UWSA, MNDAA and KIA may be -- more or less -- unwilling or unimpressed by the agenda of NRS which is to be implemented legally since they have already got full percent or at least not less than the ratio that shared in international and federal countries, within their control areas.

Khun Myit Tun of PNLO leader proposed that, "Indeed, every interests and concerns should be disclosed and addressed on the negotiation table frankly. The problem now is, they (both sides) are not willing to reveal so that we cannot discuss the real important issue on the table". Sai Kyaw Nyunt, the secretary of both UPDJC and SNLD also argued in the same way that, "While we are discussing on the table of meeting room, they are fighting each other for natural resource interest on the outside, see like in Kachin state, so, the problem here is no interrelation or binding mechanism between the negotiation process and what is happening on the ground".

6. Recommendation | Conclusion

Majority of the interviewees whom are involved in peace negotiation said that they have not put much hope on current peace process giving reasons such as the ongoing fighting in ethnic areas, lack of political will from the stakeholders -- Tatmadaw, ruling government and some EAOs -- and lack of unity and coordination among ethnic groups. Mr. Oo Hla Saw, the leader of ANP and parliamentarian evaluated that expectation over peace process and Union Peace Conference from the grass root citizens has also gradually fallen down as people come to aware that the leaders who are involved in negotiations have less of political will. In response to that, the coordinator of PPST and member of UPDJC said, "It is true that peace process is stalled, even deadlock sometime and we could not move forward as people have expected, but we should not forget that this is just an opening box of 70 years long conflict. We should not give up the negotiation, otherwise the other option is war which is undesired".

Base on my analysis and findings above, I have founded out that technical support --in term of knowledge upgrade and consultation -- is critical particular to this NRS issue for ethnic negotiators since this topic is quite technical. The ethnic actors also need more affective collaboration among themselves to empower their voice by setting collective position in this case. They should also find broader coordination between non-signatories of NCA at least on policy matters who have more strength in term of military. Moreover, they should push more to their counterpart to be able to amend framework and mechanism, to create more leverage in the process. More importantly, the ethnic leaders should clearly demand the government to stop extracting all projects relating to natural resources in ethnic areas until NRS issue have been agreed in UPC.

The negotiation of NRS theme will be presumably resumed in the upcoming event of UPC (21st CP) which will be taken place on second week of July, 2018. It is to be wait and see if NLD and Tatmadaw will put their cards (at least some) on the table this time, if ethnic groups put their cards collectively or not, whether there be any political will for compromise from both parties, especially in Tatmadaw and Bamar leader's side. However, it is predictable that most of the elephants in the room will not disclose their position clearly and will not debate and bargain enthusiastically in this time as they are not well prepared a well as they think it is premature.

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN OPTIMIZING VILLAGE FUND MANAGEMENT (CASE STUDY IN KORONCONG VILLAGE, PANDEGLANG DISTRICT, BANTEN, INDONESIA)

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Abstract

Village Fund is one stimulant funding as Village Law implementation to support the village to become a subject in development that is capable of self-development, self-reliance and democracy starting from planning, implementation and supervision. This research is based on the fact that the optimization of village fund utilization is determined by the political communication. The purpose of this study is to describe political communication in order to optimize the use of village funds in the disadvantaged village, Koroncong Village Indonesia through a qualitative approach. The author uses purposive sampling method. Data collection techniques used interview techniques, observation, documentation, and questionnaires. The process of data analysis includes data reduction, data presentation, and the conclusion of observation.

It was found that the participation was obtained through political communication between village government, village elite figures, and villagers. The pattern of political communication through elite figures is an effective and efficient communication pattern in mobilizing participation in a very religious village rather than through the village government's. The result is people willing to giving participation by ideas, funds, energy, and even material development. Communities in disadvantaged villages have formal and informal leadership systems. They are more obedient to the Village Elite Figures because of the bearers of the ancestral mandate so that what is said must be obeyed including the prohibition. So, it is necessary 1) to establish a two-way leadership empowerment program between formal leaders and informal leaders, 2) training political communication to village government officials to be able to explain the policies of village funds as a whole and mobilizing the community to participate actively during socialization through religious activities and village forum, 3) Village planning training tailored to village needs, village and district potentials to be synergistic; 4) Training of public services to giving encouragement and understanding of community approach; 6) The government must give full authority and trust to the village without any, 7) The role of government is an accompaniment or facilitating, 8) Improvement in management system expertise that is holistically to enhance the creativity and pro-active, and 9) Establish a pattern of multi-discipline empowerment involving clerics, village elite figures, culture, academics, development activists, businessmen, politicians, and the

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government itself as a return to the foundational philosophical theory of the Indonesian state which is one unity between the differences (universal).

Keywords: *Political Communications, Village Fund, Village Development*

Introduction

Village Law No. 6 of 2014 brings a new paradigm in Indonesia's development with the Village as the subject of. A long history of village development that had begun since 1948, whose momentum is in the era of reform and its peak in 2014. The state raised the village and empowered the village to be the subject of development. A new milestone of a country with a bottom-up development system that was previously a top-down development (Azhar 2015). The mandate of the Village Law is that the village can become a community that builds its own territory for more develop, strong, self-reliance, and democratic, creating a strong foundation for the implementation of government and development towards a prosperous society (Eko, 2014). This spirit was born as a form of distribution of development throughout Indonesia through the development of Indonesia from the periphery listed in Nawacita Jokowi (2014). The Government has budgeted the Village Fund to be allocated to manage the village potential for economy growth and public welfare (Minister of Finance, 2017). The procedures for the use of village funds (DD), villagers and their officials have been regulated in legislation related to village financial management as stipulated in Law No. 32 In 2004. In managing the village funds, its stated in Government Regulation No. 60 of 2014 as a direction that the priority of village funds used for development and empowerment. Thus, until the end of 2017, the priority of village funds is still on development and community empowerment. The priority of utilization of village funds is for the following four programs, namely 1) development of superior product of village or rural area, development of village water tank (embung), establishment and development of Village Owned Enterprise, and provision of village sport facilities.

In the implementation of the village funding program, the development of the village community implies the approach of community participation and organizing oriented on the initiative and creativity of the community in processing village resources. Village development has a broader understanding in which the definition of village community development, integrating various government and community efforts with the purpose and objective to improve the living standards and welfare of the community. The Village Law implicitly encourages the growth of villages to become democratic and inclusive villages. This inclusive democracy is a form of inviting all villagers to take part in the process of village development. The Central Government is merely a facilitator in managing the village funds with the recruitment of village counterparts located throughout village villages in Indonesia. All village development planning and implementation processes are included in the Village Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMDesa), Village Work Plan (RKPDesa), and Village Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBDesa) In the process of implementing the development, the role of community is needed because the community itself will determine which project development that will fit the needs of the community and become a priority. The role of all stakeholders in the success of the development program is very necessary, especially how the program can be

implemented in accordance with the needs of the community. Development can be achieved well when people can participate directly. Participation is where villagers are invited to take part in decision-making, self-managed in development funds and development materials in the village as they are the ones who better understand what their needs in village development.

In fact, the problems faced in the implementation of development by using village funds, it is found that there are no significant results in the field as primary and secondary data found for instance:

1. Communications that have not gone smoothly between village governments, village elites, and communities in the provision of land grants to build infrastructure.
2. Fragmentation of interpretation of the Village Law at the village which has implications for the implementation process that is not appropriate.
3. The role of political communication of the government in carrying out the development can be said to have not patterned systematically, where communication on development programs and village funds have not really reached the target so that the implementation of development in the village seemed less planned, less sustainable, and understood by the community. It has given impact become not able to fully participate.
4. The lack of creative power of government and village communities in multiplying the local resources of the village. Village funds should be utilized to increase the self-reliance and welfare of communities through optimizing new sources of income in the form of productive investments run by village communities. In this case, there is no understanding of the use of village funds adjusted to the mandate of village.
5. Village democratization still faces administrative constraints. The central intervention that controls the village government in the use of village funds hampers the self-reliance of villages in developing their own villages. The village law recognizes the authority of the village administration in organizing and managing the interests of the community based on the rights of democratic and participatory origins of social origin, customs, and social values.
6. Village democratization is also constrained by the lack of substantive and constructive participation levels of rural communities. It is in this dimension that the government and local governments can play an active role in fostering and empowering the village community in order to improve the quality of their participation.

In the era of freedom to communicate post political reform in Indonesia, it is necessary to increase the program of political communication to support the development of Indonesia as the legal basis for freedom of communication according to the 1945 Constitution. The development of communication is needed as a medium in the delivery of policies and information to the general public. The village government is required to interact well and provide prosperity to its people. The existing development innovations in the village did not go well without good communication between the village government, community leaders, and villagers. In the administration of government, the right to communicate is often associated with political communication or the delivery of messages to audiences or people in which the policy of state power.

Based on the above description, bringing the concept of political communication, development fund management, and village development, the problem in this

research is wider innovation for village government to be prosecuted to implement good political communication strategy so that society will support every village fund program. How can villagers become the political communicators? How to invite villagers to participate in development to support village fund program?? How can this village fund program be implemented optimally? What are the evaluation for village fund program to reach its target as its mandate in the village law? What another support method to make the village community as the subject of development? What is the pattern of political communication that is adapted to the culture and condition of the village? How can the interpretation of the law be interpreted correctly?

This is due to the fact that villages formerly prior to development have received limited financial assistance and the management is still highly centralized by government agencies, but after the village fund policy is implemented now, the villages get substantial budget allocations and the management is done by themselves, it is necessary to reevaluate and reinvest policies in the implementation of village funds focusing on political communication in the use of village funds. By good political communication, not only the optimal village funding program, but also, it can reach the spirit villages become able in managing the potential of the village as well as the relationship of trust, social networking, to the mutual response in it. Village move from disadvantaged condition to developing level.

From the above explanation, the authors argue it is necessary a thought as a communication political solution to optimize the use of village funds in support of village development as follows:

- a. How is the implementation of village development using village funds in disadvantaged villages?
- b. How to feedback the benefits of rural development through the use of village fund program in disadvantaged villages?
- c. How is the appropriate political communication system in the disadvantaged villages to optimize the utilization of village fund?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Political communication in general can be interpreted in the political framework as an effort of the actor in achieving its objectives. Politics is basically nothing else is communicating to convey ideas to others. The media used in this political communication are various forms, for instance mass media and non-mass media.

In practice, the media used in this politics are mutually exclusive, not singular. According to Hamad (2010), there are several important points of political communication itself is the delivery of messages to constituents. Therefore, there are some important things that must be considered. First, the message is delivered to audiences. Second, the media intervention that presents the message. Third, how (the process) framing on the issue is built. The existence of political communication and development can be seen in the space how leaders want to carry out their vision mission in the form of policies. Nor on the other hand also the role of public control in the process until the implementation of the policy. Curran (2002), for example, states that there are three media roles in democratic political systems: First, watchdog role; media in this case as a means to monitor the activities of the state and dare to balance the position to guard the course of power. Second, information and debate; the media must be able to

bridge the two-way interest: the government and the people. In other words, the media (within the framework of democracy) should not be just a mouthpiece of one party. Third, voice of the people; media becomes a means of conveying public ideas to the state or policy makers.

Furthermore, this political communication not only describes the direct interaction between policymakers and citizens. The media, in this case, provides a bridge for one community to learn from each other. Local media in the democratization of the region for example, can be said as a tool for mutual influence of goodness.

In Indonesia itself, the existence of political communication and also the media, began to bloom post-reform. Political communication is very dynamic. The media can almost be said without any government intervention. In the context of democratization and reform in Indonesia, local media can play various roles in decentralization and strengthening regional development. According to Yusuf (2011) there are several important roles of the media in Indonesia: First, by cutting with Curran, the media exercises the role of oversight by broadcasting various forms of deviation, both at the community level, Village Representative Council (DPRD), and at the level of government bureaucracy. Secondly, it provides space for discourse of development discourse and public affairs. Third, local media can mediate ideas among political actors.

Village Fund Program

The Village Fund is a fund sourced from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget for the Village and Custom Village which is transferred through the Regency / Municipal Revenue and Expenditure Budget and is used to finance the administration of government, development, and community empowerment, and community. In accordance with the mandate of Law Number 6 Year 2014 on Village, the Government allocates the Village Fund, through the transfer mechanism to the Regency / City. Based on the allocation of funds, each district / city allocated to each village based on the number of villages with respect to population (30%), total area (20%), and poverty rate (50%). The result of the calculation is also adjusted to the geographical difficulty of each village. The budget allocation as mentioned above is sourced from the Central Expenditure by streamlining the village-based programs equally and equitably. The amount of budget allocation which is allocated directly to the Village shall be determined 10% from and beyond the gradual Transfer of Regional funds (on top).

Based on Government Regulation No. 60 Year 2014 on Village Funds Sourced from state budget, with the extent of the scope of authority of the Village and in order to optimize the use of Village Funds, the use of Village Funds is prioritized to finance the development and empowerment of village communities. The prioritization of the use of funds remains in line with the authority that is the responsibility of the Village.

Village Index Builds

Village Build Index (IDM) is a measure of the level of village development developed by the Directorate General for Development and Village Community Empowerment (PPMD), Village Ministry, Development of Underdeveloped Regions and Transmigration. IDM was developed in terms of focus sharpening

and locus in the development of priority programs (priority programs and priority activities) based on 3 approaches called as Pilar village develop Indonesia, namely: 1. Self-Reliant Village Community Network, to strengthen human quality by increasing the opportunities and options in the effort the villagers uphold their rights and dignity, and promote the promotion of their welfare, both as individuals, families, and collectivities of villagers. 2. Village Economic Growth, resource potential in the village bias is converted into an economy which involves the existence of capital, economic organization, there is added value that economically prosperous. 3. Village Cultural Circle, village development movement must be done collectivism, in which there is togetherness, fraternity, and consciousness want to make changes beyond the personal call. As a database, Village Build Index is compiled using village potential data 2015 consisting of 3 (three) dimensions: 1) social, 2) economic, and 3) ecology / culture. The three dimensions consist of variables, and each variable is reduced to an operational indicator. The number of variables in Village Build Index are 22 variables and indicators are 52 indicators. Village Build Index classifies villages in five (5) statuses, namely: 1. Very Disadvantaged Villages (Village Build Index value <0.491), 2. Disadvantaged Villages (value $0.491 < \text{Village Build Index} < 0.599$), 3. Emerging Village (value $0.599 < \text{IDM} < 0.707$) 4. Developed Village (value $0.707 < \text{Village Build Index} < 0.815$), and 5. Self-reliant Village (Village Build Index value > 0.815). Based on the review of the above law the use of village funds has been arranged in such a way as to increase village development and community empowerment, but the use of funds requires the supervision of both BPD and villagers, so that its use can provide real benefits for all villagers, welfare, as well as ecological or village environmental improvements.

METHODOLOGY

The research method used to analyze the relationship between political communications with village fund program is by using in-depth interview approach, literature review, observation, and questionnaire. For self-interviews, in-depth interviews were conducted with several village officials, village organization, community leader, and beneficiary communities. On the other hand, to analyze these findings is reinforced by literature analysis of various documents as well as secondary references. Researchers use descriptive qualitative research on the grounds that this approach is considered appropriate to describe the participation of community leaders in the implementation of village fund program which is time for 1 (one) year.

The selection of respondents based on their strategic position includes their knowledge in understanding the ecological social conditions of their environment. Respondents interviewed: Koroncong Village of Pandeglang District: Village Leader, Village Apparatus, Head of Village Organization, and Beneficiary Society. Further data analysis is done with three steps of data reduction, data presentation, conclusion and verification. Data reduction is done to classify, direct, discard the unnecessary and organize it, so that data is found to match the need to find questions or research focus. Presentation of data is done by grouping each data given by respondents about the condition of village development from their respective fields as well as information about political communication in the village. The conclusions drawn from the results of interviews observation, conducted by researchers with respondents and interviews with some community leaders and citizens.

FINDINGS

The current research will be slightly different, given the enactment of Village Law no. 6 year 2014 which gives autonomy to the village more maximally. Not only indigenous villages, but all villages in Indonesia will get a budget to run the development. Therefore, political contestation (both in power terminology) and politics in economic discourse becomes an important new study. The local politics in the village is interesting to look more deeply, because this is where the leadership of a village head is actually tested in running the village administration

As the closest institution to society, the village is required to provide optimum and satisfactory servants without any discrimination. Dictionary of Political Analysis Jack Plano: political communication is the spread of action, meaning, or message concerned with the function of a political system, involving elements of communication such as communicators, messages, and others. Most political communications are the powers of special institutions, such as mass media, government information bodies, or political parties. Nevertheless, political communications can be found in every social environment, from the scope of two people to office space, parliament, and village. Based on political views (classical, power, institutional, functional, or conflict) political communication is a communication process involving the interaction of government and society, in the process of making and implementing binding decisions on the common good for people living in a particular region.

The emergence of local leaders with their leadership styles and political communications each made many variations of village development innovations that could be disseminated and increased community participation. Simply communication as a process of delivering information, ideas, emotions, expertise, and others. Through the use of symbols such as words, pictures, figures, and others. Political communication conducted in Koroncong village is one of them, as a disadvantaged village shows the role of political communication is very important in the village funding program and village development. Village government is required to be able to convey information well to the entire community. a good communication style can directly make the situation of government activities and development in the village more rapidly. Political communication conducted by the village government in addition to as a means of interaction as well as a benchmark of the success of development in the village, because every interaction is done by the village government also makes people move and participate in the process development, and it happens otherwise if the Village Government does not have politics communication can be a rejection from society.

Community participation in village development, especially in the management of resources and funds must be realized, where the role of the government must take the responsibility to communicate directly to the public through the existing communication media. Here is the role of the government that is able to explain, direct, and make policies that really take sides to the community as decision makers. Participation can be interpreted not only to participate in the implementation, but also at the planning as well as evaluation.

Koroncong village is a disadvantaged village in a disadvantaged district, Pandeglang district, Banten province of Indonesia. The village of Koroncong is a expansion regional of the village of Sukajaya. Based on administrative data of

Village Government, the number of population registered administratively amounted to 1740 in 2017 with the number of heads of households as many as 445 heads of households including poor families amounting to 138 heads of households with livelihoods as agricultural labourers. Koroncong village consists of two subvillages and four neighbourhood. The average resident of Koroncong village was last educated in elementary and junior high school. The population of Koroncong is populated with a Muslim majority. The problem of poverty and unemployment is a problem especially in Koroncong Village. The condition of infrastructure and facilities of Koroncong village is still not developed. Villages with less internet network, roads are still damaged, and inadequate facilities and basic service infrastructure in Koroncong village.

Koroncong village needs development in irrigation networks, village roads, drainage, and bridges, and village markets. The direction of development policy is aimed at realizing the quality of human resources through the improvement of health degree, improvement of education quality, the improvement of understanding and practice of religion, the controlling of the population, the increasing of the role of youth and women in development, the improvement of labour quality and the alleviation for people with social welfare problem. Agricultural commodities such as rice, corn, and cassava are very potential for economic growth. But Koroncong Village has drought problems in the dry season. This is where we need irrigation technology and water tank to irrigate rice fields during the dry season. Also required appropriate technology and agricultural training to help the village from the threat of pests. In addition to agriculture, farming is very potential because of the condition of the village in Koroncong village.

Based on Government Regulation No. 60 of 2014 article 19, paragraph 1, Village Fund is used to finance the implementation of government, development, community empowerment and community. Village Funds as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be prioritized for development and community empowerment. In article 20, the use of Village Funds refers to the Village Mid Term Development Plan and the Village Government Work Plan. Based on the Regulation of the Minister of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration Number 22 Year 2016 on Stipulation of Priority of Village Fund Usage. The village funds in 2017 are used to finance the implementation of village-scale local programs and activities in the area of Village Development and Village Community Empowerment. In the field of village development aimed at improving the welfare of rural communities and the quality of human life and poverty alleviation, the priority of the use of village funds is directed to the implementation of village development programs and activities, including: a. Development, development and maintenance of infrastructure or physical facilities and infrastructure for livelihoods, including food and settlement security; b. development, development and maintenance of public health facilities and infrastructure; c. Development, development and maintenance of educational, social and cultural facilities and infrastructure; d. Development of community economic enterprises, including the construction and maintenance of production and distribution infrastructure facilities; or e. Development and development of renewable energy advice and environmental conservation activities. Based on the regulations of the Village Minister, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration No. 22 of 2016 on the Establishment of Village Funds Priority Usage in 2017. Guidelines for the management of transfer funds to villages in Pandeglang District are regulated through the

Regent Regulation of Pandegelang Regency. The existence of this regent regulation as a guide for the village in preparing the Revenue and Expenditure Budget Village (APBDesa).

In this section it will explain the use of village funds that villagers have made so far behind. The use of village funds in 2015-2017 in underdeveloped villages is largely utilized for the implementation of infrastructure development. Infrastructure development in 2017 carried out using village funds includes the construction of village roads, and clean water. In 2016, village funds are used to build roads, clean water, toilets, drainage, smart parks, early childhood school, and health clinic for kids. The development is done in 2015, building the village road, retaining wall, clean water, water tank (embung), village-owned enterprise (BUMDES), drainage, village sports facilities, and health clinic for kids.

Feedback from the community is quite significant positive due to changes in circumstances where facilities for basic needs support daily activities such as:

1. The easiness of bathing after the facilities of clean water and toilet facilities;
2. The book facilities for reading;
3. The child health facilities where weighing weight with adequate facilities and more comfortable. There is no need to weigh weight in the trees.
4. Retaining wall to prevent flooding.
5. The development of village-owned enterprises (BUMDES) which began to become a means of buying and selling superior products in the village;
6. Construction of water tanks (embung) for irrigation facilities, fisheries, village tourism, and opportunities for improving the village economy.

In the optimization of village funds required a good cooperation between village government and village communities. The government should be able to communicate development in which there is political communication to invite the community to participate in the development. This form of communication is so important that village funds can be optimal. Communications conducted by Koroncong Village government are able to invite the community to participate in the village fund program. Village Head with Village apparatus able to form a good communication pattern with community leaders, community, and Village Organization in Koroncong village.

Political communication conducted by the village government include 1) direct approach with the community (interpersonal communication channel), 2) approach through community leaders, 3) approaches between Village Organization, 4) Budget Village as a form of Transparency, 5) Making Board as a medium of socialization of village development programs, and 6) Through communication tools such as mobile phones. The system is still traditionally adapted to the conditions of Koroncong Village.

In inviting the community to participate in Household meetings, village government and village apparatus are able to explain and encourage the community in explaining their roles in village development. Village Government is able to explain the purpose of this deliberation to build Koroncong village. However, in the communication clarification related to the village fund program, the village government and its mandate has not been able to explain properly and correctly related to the whole village funding program starting from the objectives, funding source, the use regulation, the accountability regulation, the implementation, to the supervision of the village fund program. The community

has not been able to fully understand the program of the village fund. This can be an obstacle to the optimization of village funds as the community feels less responsibility for infrastructure development by using village funds. The kind of less responsibility is less participation.

The issue of aspiration selection in Koroncong Village was assigned entirely to the Village Deliberative Body. The role of Village Head and Village Apparatus is to explain the rules and programs of the village fund as a whole, support by District Government. This has a positive value where with the role of Village Deliberative Body in capturing the aspirations and the preparation of the Budget Plan of Revenue and Expenditure Village will be better. The role of the Village Deliberative Board as a representative of the people is able to realize the aspirations of democratic development planning in accordance with the mandate of the Village Law for the village to be the subject of development. Development planning is also in line with the voice of the community and will be directly accountable to its constituents.

In its journey, budget management will demand transparency and supervision from the community. The management of village projects based on community self-reliance seems to be one element that can strengthen community participation. Community participation in development should be truly interpreted as a contribution of aspirations, manpower, funds, and oversight that ensures that project implementation benefits the community significantly.

The relationship of the village government with community is still very solid. This condition is often the case among villages communities whose condition is still homogeneous between one society and the other so that mutual trust can still emerge. The village government is actively participating in recitation activities in every neighbourhood. This is an approach pattern adapted to the homogeneous condition of Koroncong Village where the whole community is Muslim.

However, Communication for inviting the community to participate in self-supporting development materials, the village government has not been able to convince the community to provide assistance such as land grants to support in building water tank or clean water facilities. For this matter, community leaders are better to communicate persuasive for convincing villagers to grant their land or other development materials. The community leaders are custom leaders and religious leaders. These figures are respected and heard more because of their influence in the religious context. Religious figures and customary figures are directors, spokespersons, communicators, mediators, facilitators, and integrators In Indonesia. The reality of communication in urban and village is very different. In the village, the communication system is strongly influenced by the presence of community leaders as the translator of the message, especially in the village with religious system is still a benchmark in providing information or role models. Religious leaders play a role in the interpreter because its power in understanding better than general people, the influence of traditional art and interpersonal communication more believable in terms of religion.

The outcome of this political communication also has implications for the power of village government. There are implications for the intervention of elite village in village development and village government activities. As a manifestation of the success of communication assisted by community leaders, community leaders asked several requests for instance included relatives to be village apparatus.

When village condition is disadvantaged and big amount of the level of unemployment in the village, one way to get income is to become village apparatus which every month receive monthly salary. It is the role of the Village Deliberative Body should be able to communicate well. They have to be able neutral but able to suppress the intervention of community leaders for the realization of election of village government selected based on the ability test results of candidates' village apparatus. This is how the political communication in the village affects some aspects of village government in disadvantaged villages.

In addition, all information on village funding programs is often conveyed through information boards placed in strategic places such as patrol posts, mosque and other public places. So that people can see and know directly the information and development plans in the village. Submission of information in writing in strategic place that gives a good impact for the community. In addition to the transparency is very good because they know the management of finances managed by the village government anywhere as a form of feedback made from the village government with the community running well. The village government often do in political communication using institutional structural approach by interacting with existing community organization in the village. Community organization that exist in the village not only become the object of development but they are also invited to be the subject of development in the village. It is necessary that all elements involved in village development. In addition to direct communication, direct communication is done through the medium of mobile phone communication devices so that it can provide information and invite the community every time.

Participatory approach in establishing communication between government and society is still in priority. The findings that occur in the field of village government prefer to interpersonal approach with the community so that people can participate actively in the development process that exist in the village.

The condition of the homogenous villagers has made the family bond between communities still very strong. The interaction between individuals is still so frequent that so far the community is quite active in the process of development in the village with other words gotong royong the village community here is still very good. So that any offer of development provided by the village government only as a stimulus to mobilize the spirit of mutual help people. The roles of village political communication and community leaders in village funding program is quite important. The obstacles that often arise in village in development using village fund utilization are the low quality of human resources in good development planning. The low quality of human resources is the work to be solved together. There are still many village apparatuses as village head assistants who do not have good personal capacity, communications with the community and development planning is quite a lot due to the lack of educational background so that it is felt hard skill and soft skills are still lacking in supporting their work.

CONCLUSIONS

From the above discussion can be concluded that:

1. Implementation of village funds in disadvantaged villages has different implementation patterns. The management system is more focused on the development of village infrastructure prior to the village community empowerment program. Here as the mandate of the Village Law where the use of village funds is adjusted to the condition of the village. In the disadvantaged village, village funds are used for the development of village service infrastructure to improve the quality of life of village communities in access roads, information, education and health.
2. Village funds provide direct benefits in the progress of access roads between villages so that villages feel the benefits of economic exchanges in the form of buying and selling and inter-village equipment rental at the sub-district level. The construction of this Road is very useful to facilitate access of people outside the village into Koroncong village to conduct business, selling-buying, exchange information, or interact with residents in Koroncong village. Development of Clean Water Facility provides a change and improvement of the life quality. Villagers become healthier and easier to clean themselves. 80% of physical development through village funds is beneficial for improving basic services in the village. Village empowerment programs that provide benefits to improve the ability to cultivate the potential of village communities such as women training in cooking and sewing training.
3. Political communication conducted by the village government as a means to support development in the village is very important. Interpersonal communication becomes the most frequently used option by village government in daily communication, besides communication through community leaders also in the sense of being a medium of communication that is quite effective and efficient in supporting the optimization of village fund program. Village government political skill is required to be able to act in accordance with the culture of community so that trust, norm and network that has been built in the community will be stronger, and the impact will have implications directly with development programs that use village funds that needed participation of the villagers. Village government political communication should be improved in order to be able to conduct persuasive for the implementation of development that requires participation for instance funds and materials. The role of the government in this case is less significant than the role of elite village. The existence of a pattern of confidence in the villagers that more towards the community leaders, gives implications for the government began to approach the religious, cultural, educator, village activist, and community leaders to be included in village development. The political attitudes of local people can be built by taking into account the background that characterizes the collective behavior of the local people, such as heterogeneity or homogeneity, both vertically and horizontally. And the next step is to determine the pattern of political communication in accordance with the characteristics of target communities.
4. With the continuous improvement of communication there will be participation of villagers in village funding programs and participatory village development. This is the form of village as the subject of village development.

5. However, there are some implications of the pattern of communication through community leaders to the village government. This is where the need to improve and understand the pattern of political communication to improve the optimization of village funds.
6. Suggestions given to the government are the government should start 1) establish a two-way leadership empowerment program between formal leaders (village leader and village apparatus) and informal leaders (community leader) so as to realize the mandate of the Village Law to make the village community as the subject of development, 2) The government must give full authority to the village to build its village without giving any intervention to be a self-reliant community, 3) The role of government here is only to be facilitators by the pattern of political communication capable to mobilize the village to synergize, 4) The need for an improved skill management system which is holistically system to increase the creativity and the pro-active soul of the community in developing self-supporting community in encouraging the optimization of the use of self-managed village funds, 5) Establishing a pattern of multi-discipline empowerment of science involving clerics, humanists, academics, development activists, businessmen, politicians, and the government itself as a return to the Indonesia State Philosophy (Pancasila) which is one unity between the differences (universal).

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ONE BELT, ONE ROAD, ONE ASEAN? CHANCES AND RISKS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

Southeast Asia is an important part of the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) as a direct neighbour of the People's Republic of China. On the one hand, the Chinese economic agenda can undermine the unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but it also offers opportunities to complement the regional grouping's own ambitious development plans.

ASEAN has been driving forward ambitious economic integration plans in the form of an economic community (ASEAN Economic Community, AEC). The aim is to strengthen the relatively weak regional domestic trade. While ASEAN succeeded in largely eliminating trade tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade remain an obstacle to the implementation of its plans.

In Order to stay competitive, sustain its high economic growth and implement their development plans, the ASEAN member states will need major investments, first and foremost in their infrastructure. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) adopted in 2010 is designed to address this problem. But so far, the necessary financial resources have not been available. With the help of BRI much needed funds for the development of infrastructure could be allocated. Despite a partial ambivalent perception of BRI, it is perceived predominantly positive by Southeast Asian governments, due to their financial needs for their economic development. But the process is not without controversy. Critics argue that Chinese development cooperation and investment often do not primarily serve the strengthening of local economies, but rather facilitate China's access to the countries resources or open the markets for Chinese cheap products. Beyond that, China has also been criticized for increasing local corruption and thus counteracting the implementation of good governance and human rights. On the other hand, the lack of willingness from governments to implement fair social and environmental standards for Chinese investments, led to major negative implications for local residents and the environment, as can be seen in Laos or Cambodia, for example. Furthermore, the Southeast Asian countries are getting more and more vulnerable to bilateral influence from China due to increasing debt and economic dependency. Critics are afraid, that countries like Cambodia might lose their autonomy – which will result in the further weakening of ASEAN as well.

The presentation will discuss the possible consequences of the Chinese Silk Road Initiative for regional integration and development in Southeast Asia. In this context, individual country perspectives are presented and the respective risks and opportunities in the ASEAN context are discussed.

Keywords: ASEAN, Belt and Road Initiative, China, Development, Infrastructure

1. Introduction

Southeast Asia is an important part of the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) as a direct neighbour of the People's Republic of China. Here are the first stations of the maritime Silk Road outside of China, but also important stations for the Silk Road in the country. This is why the regional organization Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an important factor for the initiative. Through maintaining stability, the regional organization has favoured economic development in the region and pursues ambitious development strategies for further regionalisation and development. China's BRI offers opportunities to complement the regional grouping's own ambitious development plans. On the other hand, the Chinese economic agenda can make the Southeast Asian states more dependent on their large neighbour in the north and thereby degrading them to the periphery of Chinese trade and undermine the unity of ASEAN. However, there are also voices that Chinese development initiatives are often associated with social or environmental risks.

2. The Way to an ASEAN Economic Community

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regionally organized group of states in Southeast Asia. The ten member states⁹ currently have about 600 million inhabitants and a combined gross domestic product of more than two trillion US Dollars (The ASEAN Secretariat 2016). It is expected to increase by six percent annually over the next two decades (Petri and Plummer 2014).

Since its foundation, the organization has enjoyed success both outside and within the region. Since 1997, the three largest economies in the region - China, Japan and South Korea - have been represented in a discussion forum by ASEAN+3 (Hong 2016). Many observers agree that in establishing new channels and platforms for communications, like ASEAN+3 or also the security-focused ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN was able to contribute to stable relations in Asia (Egberink and Van der Putten 2010). Through its involvement in other multilateral organizations and dialogue forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the grouping has become a key player in the Asia-Pacific region (Petri and Plummer 2014).

Within Southeast Asia, ASEAN has primarily been a successful peacemaker. The territorial conflicts that arose in the post-war period were largely eliminated by the establishment of the organization. The stability of the region has also made the member states attractive locations for foreign direct investment. ASEAN has thus been able to contribute to the economic development success in the region. The region's GDP has increased tenfold over the past five decades. In 2013, more foreign direct investment flowed into the five founding members of ASEAN¹⁰ alone than into China (Dosch 2016).

Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the region's geostrategic position and national development strategies contributed more to the economic success than the existence of ASEAN (Dosch 2016). One Problem for ASEAN is that its intra-regional trade is poorly developed. Considering the enormous size, strategic

⁹ Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines (The ASEAN Secretariat 2016)

¹⁰ ASEAN was founded on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand

position and economic strength of the Southeast Asian states, the organization could be much more influential. With a deepening of trade within the region and more open borders “it could attract more investment, improve its competitiveness in a range of industries, and play a larger role in international economic and trade forums” – and thus contribute to development in the countries of the region (Kurlantzick 2012). Moreover, ASEAN could find politically reliable allies and form a stronger counterweight to economic powers such as China or the USA, which will otherwise dominate regional arrangements. (Petri and Plummer 2014).

Since 2003, ASEAN has been driving forward ambitious economic integration plans in the form of an economic community (ASEAN Economy Community, AEC). The aim is to strengthen relatively weak regional domestic trade. An economic union based on the EU model and a common market for the almost half a billion people in the region should be created (DOSCH 2016: 25). Analysts have pointed out that an integrated economy would make ASEAN the seventh largest economy in the world (IDI 2016). The AEC was officially founded at the end of 2015. At the same time, the AEC Blueprint 2025, a strategic concept for the further expansion of the AEC, was adopted. Based on the articulated version of the AEC Blueprint 2015, the draft for 2025 presents a strongly integrated and coherent ASEAN economy. It aims to strengthen ASEAN's competitiveness by bringing the region further up the global value chain and strengthening the global role of the organization (Hong 2016).

3. Challenges for the Regional Integration

While ASEAN succeeded in largely eliminating trade tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade remain an obstacle to the implementation of its plans. In Order to stay competitive, sustain its high economic growth and implement their development plans, most ASEAN member states will need major investments, first and foremost in their infrastructure. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025)¹¹ adopted in 2016 is designed to address this problem. In addition to the transfer of knowledge, tourism, culture and education, its focal points are the expansion of institutional and physical connectivity. China and ASEAN countries have agreed to explore synergies between BRI and the MPAC 2025 (IDI 2016). So far, however, the necessary financial resources have not been available. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates the annual financing requirement for infrastructure in ASEAN at around 60 billion US Dollar. Although the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund was established by ADB and ASEAN in 2011, it can only cover one percent of the required financial resources annually (Asian Development Bank 2017).

Furthermore there is the challenge of strong diversity in the region. Politically, Southeast Asia is home for countries which can be an unstable democracy, a military junta or a Communist dictatorship. In view of political diversity, any attempt of deep regional integration, which necessarily requires a basic consensus on core norms and values, is considered extremely difficult (Dosch 2016). In addition, there are great differences in religion, languages and ethnicities (Sellier 2016). The strong economic disparities of the member states are considered as one of the greatest obstacles to regional integration within

¹¹ in 2016 the Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025) succeeded the MPAC 2015 (IDI 2016).

Southeast Asia (Dosch 2016). ASEAN is aware that it can only make progress in regional integration by reducing development disparities (Hong 2016). Singapore is about 140 positions apart from Myanmar or Cambodia in the ranking of nominal GDP per capita in the world, depending on statistics (Dosch 2016).

Another challenge lies in ASEAN's specific culture of intergovernmental cooperation. One of the basic principles of ASEAN member states has been the preservation of territorial sovereignty since its foundation. This led to a form of cooperation within ASEAN that is characterized by consensus orientation, soft institutions and non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states. The concept of the ASEAN Way has prevailed. According to Dosch (2016), there is broad agreement that this approach, in view of its aversion to profound, legally binding institutionalization, stands for an alternative integration and thus development strategy that is explicitly not oriented towards Western models and thus forms a counter-model to the European Union. The ASEAN Way can therefore be seen as protecting the principle of state sovereignty and ensuring non-interference in national affairs. Many political analyses therefore attest to ASEAN's crisis-prone, at best superficial collective identity (Dosch 2016).

4. China's advertising for ASEAN

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers opportunities to complement the regional grouping's ambitious development plans. The initiative aims to develop a network of market access and investment opportunities in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and Europe and promote trade and cooperation. It is the key pillar of President Xi Jinping's foreign policy. China promises the participating countries prosperity, growth and development (Sausmikrat 2017).

The initiative is not really a new idea. In support of the Going Out Strategy¹², China's policy banks have been investing successfully in other countries for more than 10 years (IDI 2016).

The Silk Roads Initiative is rather a collective term for a conglomerate of already existing, planned or even only vaguely conceived projects, which are combined by the name into an apparently large, ambitious whole (Hoering and Schaffar 2017). The Silk Roads Initiative draws on a positive historical context in which China refers to its traditional importance in Asia. The ancient Silk Road did not cause wars, nor was it the cause of colonization. Rather, it served the exchange of goods and culture between Asia and Europe. The positive connotation of the name is therefore an excellent instrument of Chinese diplomacy (Schüller and Nguyen 2015).

What is new, apart from the name, is above all the financing for the implementation of the plans. Projects within BRI will require billions of dollars in the coming years. Financing will come from a number of sources. The initiative is supported financially by the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and major state-owned banks (Hoering and Schaffar 2017).

¹² "Through this strategy, the Chinese state has promoted Chinese companies to expand overseas, utilizing surplus foreign exchange in order to increase access to global markets, natural resources and technology. The China Development Bank and the China Eximbank in particular have been major drivers of this strategy, investing billions of dollars overseas. Since the announcement of the One Belt One Road Initiative, the Chinese government has injected significant amounts of additional capital into both banks (IDI 2016)."

The establishment of the AIIB marked the largest restructuring of global multilateral development financing in decades. By mid-2016, 57 countries had registered as potential founding members. Initially, the capital was 100 billion dollars. The special feature is that China holds the largest share and 26% of the voting rights. The Bank's management will probably have far more powers to approve projects than international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, for example. All 10 ASEAN nations signed on as members of the AIIB (IDI 2016).

In autumn 2013, China's leaders first announced plans to integrate Southeast Asia into the Silk Roads Initiative. China and ASEAN have great potential for cooperation. The financial resources within BRI provide opportunities to promote infrastructure measures in the region – therefore strengthen ASEAN's development goals and complement MPAC 2025 and AEC 2025 plans. Improved connectivity could attract new foreign direct investment in the region and reduce economic disparities. BRI could thus create long-term benefits and increase the participation of ASEAN member states in global value chains (Hong 2016). For China – given the southern neighbours economic and strategic importance and the geographical proximity the region is indispensable for its plans (IDI 2016).

5. Southeast Asian Perceptions on the Belt and Road Initiative

The Chinese initiative is officially welcomed by the member states of ASEAN, but at the same time partially viewed with a certain amount of scepticism. (Schüller and Nguyen 2015). China has already played an important role as a top investor in many ASEAN countries in the transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure until now (IDI 2016). This is also connected with the newly regulated relations between China and ASEAN. Since the 1990s China and ASEAN countries forged closer ties with each other. Sino-ASEAN relations improved with the improvement of China's image in the region and the limitation of US influence. The Southeast Asian countries should be convinced that China's rise is not a threat, but also opens up new, above all economic opportunities for them (Schüller and Nguyen 2015). ASEAN's trade relations have been showing an opposite trend in recent years. While trade with the USA, the EU and Japan is growing more slowly, the volume of trade with China has increased significantly. At the same time, however, the trade deficit grew because China's exports increased rapidly over the same period and the surplus in trade with China turned into a deficit (Dosch 2016).

5.1 Risks for the Southeast Asian countries

Most countries in Southeast Asia urgently need investment in their infrastructure for their own development plans and to maintain their rapid growth. The Silk Roads Initiative can help to provide the necessary capital (Hong 2016). Two types of risks associated with Chinese infrastructure are feared among critics. On the one hand, the negative social and economic consequences, and on the other, the debt and economic dependence that partner countries can accumulate. Critics argue that Chinese development cooperation and investment often do not primarily serve the strengthening of local economies, but rather facilitate China's access to the countries resources. Beyond that, China has also been criticized for increasing local corruption and thus counteracting the implementation of good governance and human rights in countries like Cambodia. On the other hand, the lack of willingness from governments to

implement fair social and environmental standards for Chinese investments, led to major negative implications for local residents and the environment, as can be seen in Laos or Cambodia, for example. Furthermore, the Southeast Asian countries are getting more and more vulnerable to bilateral influence from China due to increasing debt and economic dependency. Critics are afraid, that countries like Cambodia might lose their autonomy (China-Programme/Stiftung Asienhaus et.al. 2017).

5.2 Ten Countries, Three Different Positions

The attitudes of ASEAN member states towards Chinese initiatives are divided by Irene Chan into three positions¹³ (Chan 2016). In the following, this classification is used and important changes since the study are adapted.

Among the enthusiastic countries are Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Cambodia and Laos have the strongest economic relations with China in Southeast Asia. Currently, Laos and Cambodia are the most important allies of China in Southeast Asia and are enthusiastically partners of the Chinese initiatives. The big neighbour to the north is the most important economic investor and development partner in these two countries. In the media and scientific narratives, the two countries are often referred to as vassals of China. This point of view is not shared by everyone, as both countries are pursuing a realpolitik to keep up economically with their neighbours such as Vietnam and Thailand. Thus, neither country has a real alternative to China according to Pang (2017). Due to its large economic dependency, China has a great influence on both countries. The interior of Laos could promote its economy and tourism through improved connectivity within the BRI framework. Nevertheless, the two countries are still unclear about the financing of infrastructure projects and whether they will be financed within the framework of the AIIB or through bilateral cooperation (Sein 2016).

In the classification of Chan, the Philippines were still among the sceptical countries. Due to recent events, we would rather suggest to classify the country among the enthusiastic states. This change took place through the election of Duterte and his foreign policy. Over 60 years the Philippines have been an important ally of the United States in Southeast Asia. Under Duterte, the Philippines have turned their backs on the USA and see China more and more as an important and economically attractive source of support (Lawrence 2017). For example, loans and development aid from Western countries and multilateral organizations are linked to conditions for democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Thailand seems to be an enthusiastic country towards BRI and wants to become the hub for mainland Southeast Asia in the initiative. Since the late 1970s, China and Thailand have established a special relationship. However, domestic instability could jeopardize its role as it has affected foreign direct investment and economic development in Thailand. Despite the political instability in Thailand, both countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a high-speed railway from Kunming to Bangkok. This project was included in China's Silkroad-Initiative (Chan 2016).

Cautiously positive states include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia could realize its own ambitious development plan through BRI - the

¹³ enthusiastic, cautiously positive and skeptical

Vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). Indonesia has an ambivalent relationship with China. On the one hand, economic cooperation with China and China's investment in Indonesia are welcomed, and on the other hand some of the population is sceptical about Chinese migrants in Indonesia. The Indonesian population demands the number of Chinese migrants to be regulated by the government and to bring only highly skilled workers into the country, as there are fears of losing jobs to unskilled workers (Herlijanto 2017). This attitude of the Indonesian population developed from the already existing antagonism in Indonesia towards ethnic Chinese. Since President Joko Widodo's time in office, there has been a rumour of a flood of unskilled Chinese workers. There has been a rumour in the social media that 10 million Chinese migrants are working in Indonesia. This could further fuel the existing antagonism towards ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Setijadi 2018). Similar to Indonesia, there are reservations about workers from China in Malaysia. Another fear is that China's large investments and loans will be used to better assert Chinese interests. This is illustrated by the example of Sri Lanka, where part of China's debt was cancelled for the lease of the port of Hambantota for 99 years (Yean 2018).

Finally, the skeptical countries are Myanmar and Vietnam. Myanmar has great strategic importance in the Silk Roads Initiative as a link between China and the Indian Ocean and as part of the Economic Corridor India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China (BCIM Economic Corridor). Oil and gas pipelines already run from Kyaukpyu on the Indian Ocean to Kunming. However, Burmese have become cautious about Chinese investments. Relations between China and Myanmar deteriorated after the country's democratization and opening in 2011, and many Chinese projects came to a standstill. Although relations were restructured after the elections in 2015, the negative reservations among the people of Myanmar about Chinese investment remain high.

Vietnam is to become a starting point for the Maritime Silk Road. The country's concerns about BRI are similar to those in Myanmar. This is for example demonstrated by a joint project of China and Vietnam in North Vietnam in a mineral sector. The Vietnamese criticise the lack of transparency and regulations. The influx of Chinese workers into the region led to anti-Chinese sentiments. Although Vietnam urgently needs investment in its infrastructure, the Vietnamese are especially sceptical about the conflict in the South China Sea (Chan 2016). The issue of safety in the South China Sea cannot be separated from the maritime Silk Road Initiative. Since the late 1970s, the territorial disputes have repeatedly caused political tensions between the parties involved, especially between China and Vietnam, and China and the Philippines. For China's increasing hunger for energy and raw materials and its geostrategic interests, the area through which almost 50 percent of global trade flows has become increasingly important in recent years (Dosch 2016). In the case of Vietnam, there is also hope that intensified maritime cooperation will defuse tensions. But so far no cooperation framework provides solid solutions to the conflict. This raises doubts whether China will really separate its economic initiatives from its security policy motives (Chan 2016).

6. Is BRI a threat to ASEAN's development strategies?

It will not be an easy task for ASEAN member states to reach a common position on BRI. The individual views on China's strategy seem too different.

It is uncertain whether ASEAN's plans to expand its infrastructure are really compatible with China's Silk Road plans. Representatives of ASEAN have expressed concerns that the Chinese ideas could compete with their own plans. ASEAN states therefore expect the AIIB to implement regional infrastructure projects with a focus on their own development goals (Schüller and Nguyen 2015).

For example, China has taken over the leadership of the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC).¹⁴ The MLC is another way for China to increase its influence on ASEAN and undermine ASEAN unity. The focus in the media and science has often been on the disputes in the South China Sea, with the result that international relations between mainland Southeast Asian countries and China have not been taken into account. Among other things, the MLC could create a common identity of China and mainland-Southeast Asia under Chinese Leadership, and therefore may undermine the unity of ASEAN as well (Busbarat 2018).

In addition, the initiative can provide China with structural advantages to help shape the economic and political future of some ASEAN countries bilaterally. The asymmetric economic relations strengthened under BRI would make China a centre and the Southeast Asian states the periphery of regional trade. The greater the economic dependency, the stronger China's leverage. Since ASEAN's approach to cooperation – the ASEAN Way – is based on consensus, any

Chinese influence on individual states can influence the organization's decision-making processes and thus undermine its unity. This would lead to the violation of a core objective of ASEAN – to keep the region free from external domination. This would weaken the negotiating position of the Southeast Asian countries (Schüller and Nguyen 2015).

The conflict in the South China Sea is a good example of ASEAN's influence on regional decisions: The via China economically dominated Cambodia, as chairman of the ASEAN Summit 2012, prevented the publication of a joint communiqué on the South China Sea. At the 2016 Summit, Laos, which then had the presidency, did not allow the question of the South China Sea to be raised (Sein 2016). David Arase also points out that China has in the past punished non-cooperative countries such as the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam by reducing Chinese market access or diplomatic isolation. Such practices cast doubt on the seriousness of Beijing's cooperation efforts (Arase 2015).

In the context of fair and sustainable development in the ASEAN region, other questions also need to be asked. If BRI is compatible with the AEC 2025 and MPAC 2025 plans, there are still challenges for development in Southeast Asia. Thus, ASEAN as an economic project can also emerge within Southeast Asia as a series of different markets that are divided between the modern outward-looking economies (ASEAN-6) and the inward-looking poorer CML countries. Analysts warned that the economic project could therefore promote unequal and unsustainable economic growth and widen the gap between rich and poor within countries (IDI 2016).

¹⁴ The MLC deals with poverty reduction, security and the economy. The MLC focus on infrastructure programs. The idea for the MLC can be traced back to an initiative by Thailand for the Lancang-Mekong Sub-Region Conference on Sustainable Development in January 2014, which China initially supported but then used the framework to announce its plans for a Mekon-Lancang Cooperation at the 17th China-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. The first MLC ministerial meeting took place in November 2015.

In addition, as already mentioned, investments can have negative social and ecological consequences within countries. In order to ensure fair and sustainable development in the context of infrastructure investment, it is important that a fair framework is created for BRI. These frameworks must require companies to take responsibility for social and environmental risks. (China-Programme/Stiftung Asienhaus et. al. 2017).

It is also important for the countries themselves to focus on the regional integration. Santasombat stresses, that “(a)s of 2017 many indicators show that such a level of economic integration will not be accomplished anytime soon. A single market and a single production base require that all members have common interests and a high degree of cooperation. In reality, however, the primacy of the domestic political economy overshadows regional integration and cooperation” (Santansombat 2018).

7. Conclusion

The different positions of the ASEAN members reflect the opportunities and risks that the Silk Roads Initiative brings: On the one hand, it promises massive investment aid for the further expansion of the infrastructure and thus a deepening of regional integration and further economic growth for the respective countries and the entire region. On the other hand, the room for maneuver for the Southeast Asian countries is threatened by increasing economic dependence on China and the risk of bilateral influence. In addition, Chinese infrastructure projects can also come with a number of social and environmental problems for local residents in the respective countries.

To counteract the possible negative effects, ASEAN must reach a common position on how to deal with the BRI. It could thus form a stronger counterweight to China and actively participate in economic cooperation as an actor. In view of economic disparities, the different interests of ASEAN member states and the need for consensus, a common position of ASEAN states does not seem likely. Finally, in order to promote an inclusive and sustainable development, a framework has to be created in which social and environmental risks must be taken into account.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE'S LIVES CONNECTED TO TOURISM IN NATIONAL PARKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Abstract

What are the problems for indigenous and local people in National Parks related to Tourism and are they connected to "Development" Programs?

Heritage tourism defines a form of travel that is intended to authentically represent the stories and people of the past. In the context of sustainable development, it has both positive economic and positive social impacts, creates and strengthens the identity of a country and contributes to the preservation of cultural heritage. UNESCO's mission is to promote world peace by encouraging cooperation among the peoples of the earth in the fields of education, science and culture, and to promote the common good of humanity. To achieve this goal, it is committed to the spread of education and culture, for example by regularly listing World Heritage sites. One of these future World Heritage sites is the Taman Negara National Park of the Malay Peninsula. Within the park boundaries of Taman Negara, the Batek People pursue their traditional semi-nomadic ways of life, which are severely curtailed by the intervention of the Malaysian government and ongoing processes of modernization and globalization. One example for that is Tourism which is a growing field in Southeast Asia and implies social and ecological problems. In the following, we like to consider tourism and its sometimes negative effects in National Parks. Those are constructed to fulfill tasks like tourism in combination with environmental protection and encouragement of economical development and local livelihoods. There are conflicts arising from the poor integration of the local population in such programs. To approach these conflicts, projects are introduced to the Tam Dao National Park in northern Vietnam by mostly western countries to protect the natural environment and improve the local livelihoods while promoting tourism. One question that we want to raise is which understanding of "Development" lies behind the concept of UNESCO World Heritage Places. Development is an everyday word, often used without questioning what it really means. Otherwise it's highly debated in the Social Science, especially because of the long-time established thinking in terms of Modernization Theory, which is related to superiority and inferiority. World Heritage contains programs to "develop people". Often, this means to integrate them into political and economical systems and "civilize" them. We want to ask if these processes are linked to a hierarchical type of thinking – like the Modernization theory – or if the UNESCO follows a more equal, alternative and maybe adjusted to local circumstances understanding of Development. Probably the understanding of Development is linked to the treatment and situation of the indigenous people in National Parks.

Keywords: *Tourism, World Heritage, Globalization, UNESCO, Development, National Parks, Indigenous People*

Introduction

This paper is an approach to consider tourism in Southeast Asian national parks in relation to development. Regarding to tourism in Southeast Asia, which is strongly influenced by western programs, the concept of “development” needs to be overthought. While tourism in fact does have positive impacts on the economy, it also raises environmental and social issues: the degradation of natural sites and forests because of the touristic overuse, increasing water and air pollutions because of intensified transport and traffic, exclusion or exploitation of local communities/ indigenous people, are only a few examples. In order to target these problems, several attempts have been set by different organizations, most of them aiming at the protection of the nature and improvement of the local livelihood while promoting development. This raises the questions, whether such (western) programs implemented in the Southeast Asian regions have a connotated idea of development or not.

The first part is a theoretical outline of the concept of “development”. The meaning underlying this word is nowadays used with a specific connotation related to the Modernization Theory. Consequently, speaking about “development” is mostly connected to economic progression and civilization. The Taman Negara National Park in Malaysia and the Tam Dao National Park are presented to provide a basis for re-thinking the concept of “development”, considering the impact of tourism in these national parks on the local population.

The topic of the second part is the Taman Negara National Park in Malaysia. As a natural site providing a remarkable high biodiversity in special flora and fauna, it is on the waiting list for the inclusion to the list of UNESCO World Heritage Sites. The status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site will influence the tourism activity in this national park because of the “upgrade” of the value. An ethnic group living within the Taman Negara National Park, the Batek, are already affected by the touristic activities in their everyday lives. Heritage Tourism has already been established there, providing new opportunities for the locals. Hence, the UNESCO as a western institution will probably influence the lives of the Batek, raising the question, what kind of “development” is to be considered here.

The third part deals with the Tam Dao National Park in Vietnam. As a protectorate, its function is to provide zones and measures for recovery and protection of the environment. Simultaneously, it is also a touristic site. Resulting from the poor administration, the local population living in the buffer zones of the national park are not sufficiently included into the planning process and touristic activities, which forces them to intrude the forbidden protected zones. In order to face this social issue, several programs have been implemented to promote eco-tourism here. The concept of eco-tourism is nature tourism combined with environmental protection and community integration. The programs are often implemented by international organizations, which again raises the question about the underlying “development” idea.

1. The concept of Development

1.1. Questioning “Development”

One question that we want to raise in this work is which understanding of “Development” lies behind the concept of UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Development is an everyday word, often used without questioning what it really means. Otherwise it’s highly debated in the Social Science, especially because of the long-time established thinking in terms of the Modernization Theory, which is related to superiority and inferiority. World Heritage contains programs to “develop people”. Often, this means to integrate them into national political and economic systems and “civilize” them. We want to ask if these processes are linked to a hierarchical type of thinking – referable to Modernization theory – or if the UNESCO follows a more equal, alternative understanding of Development, which is maybe adjusted to local circumstances. Probably this understanding of Development affects the treatment and situation of the indigenous people in National Parks.

For ZIAI Development is something to describe processes of change neutrally. At the same time, it’s the intended cause to bring positive social transformations. Therein lies an important point: Development is always grasped as something positive and desirable (ZIAI 2014: 11f.). Further it’s an attribute ascribed to some actors, whereas others lack the ability to be “developed” and - often related to this - modern. So the term Development opens a dichotomy between the regions which already have been successful and claimed the status “developed” and the ones which are “on the way“ or just failed to „improve“ there situation. What mostly is understood as adjusting towards the western model and lifestyle. Development contains a hierarchy and a stiff segmentation of the world. It is as ahistorical and apolitical as the Modernization Theory was before. Beyond that the assumptions and inscriptions of the term Development are subtle and seldomly questioned, even by actors which are willing to overcome old patterns of thinking. Development reproduces the item that it claims to eradicate (SCHLAUß und SCHISCHO 2014: 9). For ESCOBAR, the ascription as “underdeveloped” works on the introspection of the affected people (1992: 265f.).

1.2 Reference of Development, Tourism and World Heritage

Regarding our topic, tourism is said to contribute to develop a country or region and collateral the people which are living there. The wish and afford to achieve economic development exclude the negative sides, for example environmental damage through the extension of infrastructure. Other points are the resettlement of local people, the pollution of the air and water because of higher traffic density and the overuse by tourists and their activities in general.

If you look on the brighter sides of tourism, you can name the special case “Heritage Tourism”. The concept explicitly contains sustainable development and the conservation of cultural and natural resources. Sustainable development is meant as a development, which secures the livability of the current and coming generations. Simultaneously for coming generations it should obtain the chance to choose, how they want to shape their life. An inclusive aligned management of world heritage can be a chance for the local population to achieve a long lasting economic improvement. World heritage sites can create jobs, for example in rural and remote areas, where normally no firms or industry settle down.

Further, Heritage Tourism challenges the impacts from tourism in social and economic matters. It is understood as a form of traveling to explore authentic cultures and get to know foreign identities from nations, regions and their inhabitants. In this sense, (authentic) “identity” becomes a mass product and a factor of marketing to advertise with and advance the sector of tourism. Regarding development, we can raise here some questions. First, it is debatable, what understanding of authentic culture for example officials from the state and the industry of tourism advocates. Countries in Southeast Asia are highly diverse. So, there is the risk from stereo-typing and generalizing this diversity, aware and with underlying interests, or unconscious. Related to this, there is the question which program of development you enact and if you adjust measures to different cultures and groups. Second, we have to ask if development related to World Heritage is only understood in economic terms. Maybe cultural groups can improve their economic situation through tourism, but does this automatically mean improvement in, for example, education and health? The question is, if for example the UN puts attention to more than just economic benefits and if they understand development as a holistic affair. Third, it is important to look at the practical points. Through which concrete measures it is planned to achieve “development”? Can we see bottom-up processes in the concept of dealing with world heritage or is it just a top-down approach from state officials and other stakeholders? From all these points you can draw an impression if the UN follows an equal, fair and holistic way of development. With this, we mean an attempt which is shared with the affected people, realized in a dialog with them and their participation.

1.3 Theory: Discourse Analysis

Underlying, often unwitting and unrecognized assumptions and thinking patterns are visible in the used language. If written or spoken language transport much more than the intended and on first view visible sense and message.

According to FOUCAULT, discourses are a unity of practices and these practices shape systematically the items that they are talking about (1981: 74). In short and to say it from a constructivist perspective: Language creates items and facts. The way we are talking about things has strong effects. The used terms and kind of language is more effective than the real character of the item or the topic itself. Discourses function directly in practice and determine your behaviour. Important to say is, that discourses are no stiff out of context entities. First, discourses depend on former and collateral existing discourses. They shape and require each other and settle assumptions, which you take for granted in other discourses (FOUCAULT 1981:85). Second, as I said, Discourses are not stiff. Every individual drive discourse according to her or his own context, interests and aims. Each of us come every day to a decision, which knowledge we transport and how we are doing this (WINTER 2012: 135). Again, this means: Which type of language and terms are we using? We are able to exclude information, add some new ones, and regulate which points we take as important and notable. So here we come to another very important issue: Discourses reflect different positions of subjectivity (FOUCAULT 1981: 82). As I said, every actor has different aims and interests. Language makes it easy to fog your real concern behind allegedly “facts” and legitimate your operations through them. In this case, actors are aware of the power of language and they make use of this power.

Here is the task, to uncover the position behind the discourse and the reasons, why someone shapes a topic in exactly this way. (FOUCAULT 1981: 75). The

other case is, that people don't reflect the many dimensions in their used words and the links they generate. For our research, the question is always the underlying sense and what really has been said (FOUCAULT 1981:43). FOUCAULT calls the production of a relationship between two heterogeneous elements through discursive practice a "system of formations" (1981: 106). An example is if you relate indigenous people with the attribute "backward". Then you have linked these two elements together and you have created a system of formations. Discourses are made of different systems of formations, which are linked to each other. This all sounds very theoretical and abstract. But there is nothing more practical than discourses because we are faced with them every day in our whole life, in every sector and on every rank.

1.4 Method

We see different ways to catch the raised questions and get an impression about the meaning of development which the UN applies to world heritage and derived from that, advocate in general. One option could be to analyse the discourses in working papers, reports and plans from the UN regarding Development and World Heritage. How do they shape and present their own role and how do they constitute indigenous and local people? Do they both have agency and the ability to encourage development? Respectively what is written about that? The question is how equal power is distributed between them and who possess or claim the definitory power over the meaning of "development". Less interpretative is it to take a look at principles that the UN has written down about development issues. For example, from the frequency they use the term you can maybe guess how much importance they put to this point.

Besides, there is the direct spoken word. Field-trips gives us the option to speak with locals, stakeholders, officials and other people which are affected or in charge of development. That can mean that they follow plans from the government or work in NGO's and on a Grass root Level. On the other side are the inhabitants to whom development and the consequences from such program are maybe totally new. We assume that they all have other views about development and about the "right" manner towards it. In qualitative interviews we can ask them directly about their life, issues and concerns. As in every dimension of discourse analysis, the most important layer is the unsaid and the message between the lines. It's possible that for many people it's very abstract and unconcreted to speak directly about "development". A further step in the research, taken before the field-trip, could be to define a range of terms and topics which we understand as interwoven with a type of development. It can be helpful to focus on them in conversations to bypass the risk of term relativism. On the other side, it is highly important to stay open and step away from stiff assumptions and previous plans if you see in the field that they do not function and neglect their sense, when it comes to practice.

The other way to answer our questions and stress the empirical dimension is of course to look at the implementation of development. There is much you can say or write down, but in the end the most important point is how it is lived in real life. After we know what the ambitions of the different actors are, we can investigate their status of concretization. As always theory and practice are two different dimensions. Questions are for example current problems in the implementation of measures or obstacles, which haven't been anticipated.

2. UNESCO and Heritage Tourism in Malaysia

2.1 Heritage Tourism

The search for authenticity, integrity and uniqueness makes it very attractive for many, especially young people, to embark on a journey to distant lands with foreign cultures. The United States National Trust for Historic Preservation defines heritage tourism as a way of traveling to "experience the places, artifacts, and activities that authentically represent the stories and people of the past." This can include cultural as well as historical and natural resources. Culture, heritage and art have long contributed to making tourist destinations more attractive. Especially in recent years, "culture" has been used as an important marketing tool to attract travelers with a particular interest in culture and the arts. This form of travel can be described as Heritage Tourism or to German "Kultur(erbe)tourismus". Cultural attractions play an important role in tourism at all levels, from the global highlights of world culture to attractions that form local identities. Heritage Tourism has both positive economic and positive social effects, as it creates and strengthens the identity of a country, contributes to the preservation of cultural heritage and supports culture and helps to renew tourism.

Heritage Tourism has a number of goals that must be met in the context of sustainable development, such as the preservation of cultural and natural resources, the authentic experience of visitors, and the recovery of revenue from these resources. It not only deals with the identification, management and protection of cultural heritage values, but also helps to understand the impact of tourism on local communities and regions, to achieve economic and social benefits and to provide financial resources, both for protection and preservation of this heritage, as well as for marketing purposes. The relationship between tourism, identity and state is addressed by Michael PICARD (1997) and Robert WOOD (1997) in their jointly published book on cultural and ethnic tourism in Asian and Pacific societies, focusing on the relationship between tourism and the state on the one hand, and race, ethnicity and identity on the other, and in particular the way identities are made into mass products to serve the purpose of tourism development. The expansion of international tourism is changing the relationships between ethnic groups and states around the world. With the global expansion of ethnic tourism and ethnic artifacts, ethnicity itself has become standardized in a specific tourist way. The importance of ethnicity and culture in the impact of tourism is a close but often ambivalent relationship between tourism promotion and national ethnic politics.

The main question posed by PICARD (1997) and WOOD (1997) is how to reconcile ethnic divisions, symbolized by ethnic labels selected for tourism promotion, with national integration and the implementation of a national identity? According to HITCHCOCK and KING (2010: 12), the state, especially in developing countries, is engaging in the relationship between tourism and identity in order to use tourism as an increasingly important sector for strategies to promote economic growth and development based on such resources as their heritage and their culture or cultures. These resources are also used to create national identities and reconcile ethnic diversity and modern nationality. Globalization as a phenomenon of growing importance for cultural construction, identity formation and tourism development has been discussed much more explicitly in the past decade, according to HITCHCOCK (2010: 15f.) and KING (2010: 15f.). In particular, the relationships between global and local globalization and between

local and global forces were examined. Governments in this context play a key role in regulating capital and markets, as well as in presenting certain images of the nation and its populations to international tourists.

2.2 UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

The following chapter is intended to provide a rough overview of UNESCO in order to provide a general understanding of the organizational structure and its approach to the inclusion of sites in the World Heritage List.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO for short, is one of 16 United Nations specialized agencies based in Paris with a total of 195 member states. On November 16, 1945, 37 states in London signed the preamble to their constitution with the following guiding idea:

"Because wars arise in the minds of men, peace must also be anchored in the minds of men." KRILL (1968: 267)

The final constitution of UNESCO came into force on 4 November 1946. The mission of UNESCO is to maintain world peace by promoting cooperation among the peoples of the earth in the fields of education, science and culture, and to promote the common well-being of humanity.

"By preserving and protecting the World Heritage in books, works of art and monuments of history and science as well as by recommending the necessary international agreements to the states concerned."

To achieve this goal, UNESCO is committed to popular education and the spread of culture, for example by regularly publishing the list of World Heritage Sites. UNESCO's title "World Heritage" - divided into Cultural Heritage Sites and Natural Heritage Sites – is given to Sites with world significance due to their uniqueness, authenticity and integrity and which are proposed for the title by the countries in which they reside. The idea of "cultural heritage" goes back to Henri-Baptiste Grégoire, a French priest, bishop and politician. In 1954, Grégoire's text was included in the preamble of the UNESCO Constitution. According to him, "Any damage to cultural property, regardless of which people it belongs, means damaging the cultural heritage of all humanity, because each people contributes to the culture of the world."

The World Heritage Convention is based on the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. There are currently 1038 World Heritage Sites, of which 832 are Cultural Heritage Sites and 206 are Natural Heritage Sites. The basic idea of this World Heritage Convention is the "consideration that parts of the cultural and natural heritage are of exceptional importance and therefore must be preserved as part of the World Heritage of all humanity". It also pursues the idea that "the decay or collapse of every single component of the cultural or natural heritage constitutes a deplorable decline in the heritage of all peoples of the world" and that for that purpose it is necessary to establish a "Convention establishing an effective system of Community protection of cultural and natural heritage". On 16 November 1972, this Convention was adopted at the 17th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Paris.

To this end, an intergovernmental body, the so-called World Heritage Committee, was set up within the Organization, consisting of 21 States Parties representing

representatives of all continents and cultures. This body decides annually on the inclusion of sites in the World Heritage List of UNESCO. Twice a year, States Parties have the opportunity to propose a World Heritage Site to the Panel. The Panel may either, accept, reject, adjourn or request further information from the requesting State. It is also important to mention that each of these proposed sites must be on the so-called tentative list for at least two years.

The UNESCO World Heritage Committee has established a set of criteria that must be met by the proposed site in order to be included in the list of UNESCO World Heritage sites. This list only includes sites that are distinguished by their outstanding universal significance for historical, artistic or scientific reasons. At the beginning, three main features have been identified that a site must fulfill: uniqueness, authenticity and integrity. In addition, at least one or more of the ten UNESCO criteria must be met in combination with the three overarching characteristics. Since the first six criteria are particularly relevant for cultural sites, the last four criteria that are important for the natural heritage are listed below¹⁵:

Vii: The goods have outstanding natural phenomena or areas of outstanding natural beauty and aesthetic significance.

Viii: Goods represent exceptional examples of the major stages of Earth's history, including the development of life, major geological processes underway in the development of landforms, or major geomorphologic or physiographic features.

Ix: Goods are exceptional examples of significant ongoing ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of land, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems, and plant and animal communities.

X: The goods contain the most significant and most typical habitats for the in-situ conservation of biodiversity on Earth, including those that contain endangered species that are of outstanding universal value for scientific or conservation reasons.

At the beginning, we talked about Heritage Tourism and what positive effects this form of tourism has on the nation states and local people. The inclusion of a site in the UNESCO World Heritage List lends a great deal of money to tourism and the preservation of this site. In Southeast Asia, especially national parks play an important role. Their preservation and environmentally conscious travel to these sites naturally has a positive effect on them.

2.3. The Taman Negara National Park¹⁶

One of these tropical forests is the Taman Negara National Park in the Malay Peninsula. It represents, with approx. 130 million years, the oldest forest area of the world and accommodates very old and very species-rich tropical forests. It is one of the world's richest plant-growing areas with more than 3,000 different plant species. In addition to its abundance of plants, the National Park offers a vast habitat for many large animal species, such as the Malaysian Tiger, which

¹⁵ UNESCO excerpt from the guidelines for the implementation of the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage: <http://www.unesco.de/kultur/welterbe/welterfragen-und-antworten/welteraufnahmekriterien.html>, last call 03/25/2018.

¹⁶ Information given in this paragraph are based on the author's own experience during her journey to the Taman Negara National Park, in which she collected information from information tables and guides.

is threatened with extinction, the Asian elephant, the leopard and the Malaysian Tapir. Furthermore, more than 600 species of birds, 1000 species of butterflies and numerous species of insects live in this area. Due to its climatic heterogeneity, Asia accommodates an unusual variety of vegetation forms. The tree flora of the lowland forest of the National Park is very rich. According to a study in 2012, it is estimated that there are at least 280 tree species per hectare. One of the most common and striking tree species is the Tualang tree (latin: *Kompassia excelsa*), which comprises a large part of the emergent layer in the upper canopy. The tree giant measures just about 70 meters and has a diameter of about three meters at its widest point. The Taman Negara is well-stocked with a lush fern flora of 246 different species, including 26 different families. Furthermore, the Taman Negara hosts numerous endemic ginger, wild grape and palm plants, as well as special unique and endemic plant species such as the jewel orchid (latin: *Ludisia discolor*), which is prized for its attractively patterned leaves, the parasitic *Balanophora* (latin: *Balanophora fungosa*), *Syzygium* Information given in this paragraph are based on the author's own experience during her journey to the Taman Negara National Park, in which she collected information from information tables and guides. *tekuensis*, *Pyrenaria pahangensis*, *Syzygium tahanensis*, the Corpse Lily (latin: *Rafflesia arnoldii*) and the Titan Arum (latin: *Amorphophallus titanum*).

As for the physical ecosystem, there are three major mountain ranges running northwest to southeast of the National Park, namely Teku, Gunung Tahan and Gunung Tangga Dua Belas. The origin of the mountain ridges can be traced back to the Jurassic and Cretaceous periods. Both the Tembeling group and the Gagau group share similar series of rocks and geomorphologic features with other red rock sequences found in other parts of the world, such as the so-called "red beds" of the Danxia landscape form in China. Geologically speaking, the national park consists of various rock formations, mostly sedimentary rocks with smaller granite rocks.

Of course, the species-rich ecological diversity raises the question of how such a pronounced biodiversity can come about. This is because thanks to its location and the prevailing climatic conditions in the past, the area has been spared volcanic eruptions, ice ages or other natural disasters that have ever disturbed or destroyed evolution. Thus, animals and plants could develop undisturbed here.

In summary, the Taman Negara National Park has several terrestrial ecosystems – ecosystems of the solid land surface, as opposed to aquatic ecosystems that host a large number of floras and faunas, many of which are endemic - that is, distributed in a limited area, rarely, are at risk or vulnerable and therefore of outstanding national, regional and universal value. Biodiversity undergoes ecological as well as biological processes leading to a wealth of plant and animal communities, species and genetic diversity. Thus, the area represents the largest habitat for in-situ conservation of the country's land and freshwater rivers and has been on the UNESCO World Heritage Convention tentative list since 2014.

2.4 The Batek people

However, the inclusion of the National Park in the UNESCO World Heritage List is not only important for the preservation of the animal kingdom and plant

kingdom, because within the park boundaries there is still one species that is absolutely capable of protecting it: the indigenous people.

The *Batek* live as a semi-nomadic people within the park boundaries of the Taman Negara, where they pursue their traditional ways of life. It is estimated that there are only 500 to 800 tribal members left. Their language is Austronesian or Malay and the most prevalent religions among them are animism and shamanism. Their shamanistic rites consist of smoking, dances, drums, music and necromancy. The shamans or medicine men and medicine women have a highly respected status within the tribe and thus form the chiefs. The indigenous people of Malaysia have always been endangered, as modernization processes and globalization are restricting and destroying their habitat. During British colonial rule, they were always targeting of Christian proselytizing and objects of anthropological research. The 1960s integration policy of the Malaysian government, which was to include the Orang Asli (the Malaysian name for indigenous people) in the broader Malaysian population, was criticized by Robert KNOX DENTON and Kirk ENDICOTT (1997: 30), much more as an attempt to integrate them into market economy and to gain political control over indigenous peoples and to assimilate them into the ethnic category of the Malay-Muslim population. In the late 1960s, there was growing tourism in the Taman Negara, which also brought an increasing interest in work. The Batek entered into an agreement with the Malaysian government in which they led guided tours for heritage and eco-tourists to their villages, in return for food such as rice and millet, preserved foods, fresh water, and to get clothing and other utensils that could be useful for them. These include things like pots, bowls, blankets and diapers for the infants. In 1979, however, the Malaysian government put pressure on the Batek and tried to relocate them to a state-owned village, "Kuala Atok", to cultivate land there and thus be of greater use to the government. If the Batek continued their semi-nomadic existence – the government thought – they could come into contact with the jungle-based terrorist communists and be forced to provide them with economic and intelligence support. It is important to note that during the communist menace of 1948-1960 (the "Emergency") many indigenous groups helped the Communists. The real reason, however, seems to be that the authorities considered the seminomadic life to be primitive and that their production of tropical forest products and their trade with tourists did not comply with the park regulations. Over the years, the Batek have found solutions to the problems of intervention in the modern world. To maintain their mobility, they have become small business owners (jungle leaders, wage laborers etc.) and accept change only as much as they need to maintain their culture.

The example of the Taman Negara National Park shows which positive and negative aspects Heritage tourism, inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage List, as well as Globalization and Modernization can have on nature and local or indigenous people. World Heritage is something that should be protected and preserved for all humanity. It is deprived of the nation and made accessible to the whole world. Like many other Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia has a strong interest in the formation, development and promotion of its own national culture. With the Taman Negara as a UNESCO World Heritage site, they would come a great deal closer to this national culture.

3. Tourism in Vietnam – eco-tourism and community in the Tam Dao National Park

3.1 Development of tourism in Vietnam

The first tourism activities began during the colonial days, in which the French occupied Vietnam. But at first, tourism didn't develop remarkably until the implementation of the economic reforms "Đổi Mới" aiming at the creation of a socialist-oriented market economy. As a result of the liberation and opening of the country's economy, the number of foreign tourists' arrivals had been growing rapidly. Social change and the increasing living conditions also pushed the tourism activity among the Vietnamese who began to travel to different destinies in their country. To arrange the issues arising from tourism, the "Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (VNAT)" was founded and is still the main organization for tourism matters today. VNAT provides the basis for the development of tourism in the country, for example by extending infrastructure or travel conditions (WAIBEL 2004: 142 – 143).

3.2 The impacts of tourism

Tourism has great positive impact on the Vietnamese economy. Especially transportation and trade have been pushed by the touristic activities because of the travelers' demand for transportation services and local products, e.g. food, clothes and souvenirs (VORLAUFER 2009:203). As a sector that is labor-intensive, tourism creates a lot of new jobs for the local population. Besides of the jobs in construction companies, hotels, transportation, and other services, the informal sector (e.g. booths on the streets selling snacks, drinks, etc.) also benefits from tourism (VORLAUFER 2009: 205). A specific form of tourism is ethno-tourism, which has already been discussed earlier in the case of the Malay Peninsula. Ethno-tourism provides great opportunities for the ethnic groups in Vietnam as well who let tourists visit their villages, show them their everyday life, traditional rituals or sell handcrafted souvenirs (VORLAUFER 2009: 202).

However, tourism has also negative effects on several dimensions. Firstly, environmental issues are inevitable in the context of tourism development: The expansion of infrastructure and the construction of new roads, buildings and parks led to the degradation of nature. In addition to that, transportation and traffic have been intensified which increased water and air pollution. But not only natural sites suffer from the "overuse" by tourists, important cultural and historical sites may get damaged (SCHMUDE and NAMBERGER 2015: 98).

Secondly, there are social problems arising from tourism. The situation described above that locals can benefit from this is not guaranteed securely. In many regions, especially the ones inhabited by ethnic minorities, the local population are excluded from tourism programs, management and planning, or even are exploited by bigger companies. They are often forced to leave their land, so that touristic attractions, hotel buildings, parks etc. can be constructed on these grounds. These actions are problematical not only in the face of agriculture, but also regarding to the religious meaning of the grounds which they traditionally have to the groups (MCELWEE 2002: 305ff.).

3.3 The concept eco-tourism

Being aware of the growing environmental and social issues, eco-tourism was implemented to solve them. Eco-tourism can be described as sustainable nature

tourism in combination with the integration of local communities. “The International Ecotourism Society (TIES)”, an institution from the "International Tourism Collective” that promotes ecotourism, formulated the following definition:

Ecotourism is now defined as "responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment, sustains the well-being of the local people, and involves interpretation and education" [...]. Education is meant to be inclusive of both staff and guests. (TIES 2015: <https://www.ecotourism.org/news/ties-announces-ecotourism-principlesrevision>, last call: 27.09.2017)

In other words, this form of tourism creates a circuit in which the protection and the use of nature and community assort well with each other. In practice, the revenues generated by touristic activities are invested in programs for conservation and protection of the natural environment, which in turn benefits tourism (in the form of nature tourism). Additionally, the definition mentions education as an important part of eco-tourism. Obviously, education not only integrates the local community in tourism programs, but also provides a basis for the effective realization of eco-tourism. Eco-touristic programs are often established in cooperation with international organizations, e.g. NGOs, which run projects in order to push the local development and improve eco-tourism (WAIBEL 2004: 154).

The establishment of reserves and national parks creates an appropriate environment for measurements to protect and conserve the nature. Therefore, they provide a basis for ecotourism. The Vietnamese government divides the forests in the country into three categories: production forests, protection forests and special-use forests. The last one covers the following protectorates: national parks, cultural-historical sites and nature reserves (MCELWEE 2002: 296ff.). In the last decades, a number of protectorates has been established by the government covering over 2 million ha (UNEP-WCMC 2017: <https://protectedplanet.net/country/VNM>, last call: 27.09.2017).

3.4 Tam Dao National Park – environmental and social issues in the buffer zones

The Tam Dao National Park, established in 1996, is one of the biggest national parks in Vietnam covering 34.995 ha. Its location is not far away from the capital city Hanoi, which makes it to a convenient destination for travelers (HUNG 2013: 50f.). The Tam Dao National Park website listed seven main goals which the national park aims at:

- 1) conservation and protection of the forests,
- 2) protection of special and endangered plants and animals,
- 3) provision of study tours for researches by scientists and students,
- 4) distribution of education,
- 5) contribution to the area’s environmental protection,
- 6) participation in tourism
- 7) stabilization and improvement of the locals’ livelihood.

In order to fulfill these goals, the entire territory of the national park is divided into four zones: core zone, ecological rehabilitation zone, tourism and management zone, and buffer zones. Each of these zones has special regulations and conditions according to its function (HUNG 2013: 53f.).

The local population lives in the buffer zones of the Tam Dao National Park, which form the outer zones. In 2004/2005, about 193.000 people have been living within the borders of the national park, and the number grows in the course of time. The population consists of eight ethnic groups, one of them the Kinh, the Vietnamese majority group, who represents 63% of the national park's population. The other groups are ethnic minorities: the San Diu, the San Chi, the Dao, the Tay, the Nung, the Cao Lan, and the Hoa. Their livelihoods are mainly based on agriculture, forestry, and tourism (FLEISCHHAUER, JABS and KUS 2009: 43).

But social issues aroused in the buffer zones in the course of time since the establishment of the national park. Tam Dao National Park was constructed on the living grounds of the locals, who were resettled into the buffer zones. In comparison to the former area, the buffer zones provide much less space for the growing population. Consequently, people intrude the forbidden zones in the inner part of the national park (which function as the zones for nature's recovering and protection) to compensate the lacking ground for agriculture. Obviously, these actions disturb the sensitive ecosystems which originally are protected by the borders of the core zone (COE 2012: 77f.). On top of that, the management of the buffer zones is quite unstructured. In general, the entire national park is administered by the so-called co-management system which includes institutions and stakeholders on different levels in the managing process. But in the case of the buffer zone, responsibility regulations for this area are lacking. As a result, conflicts between different actors and interest groups arise that are difficult to solve. Besides, the weak structure of management hinders not only the development of tourism programs in the national park, but also the integration of the local community. This again forces the population to actions which interfere the functioning of the national park and its zones. An interworking between different management levels and local authorities is essential for the improvement of these social issues (NGUYEN, BUSH and MOL 2016: 2).

3.6 Projects for improvement

Having said this, the focus now turns on the attempts to solve the issues which are facing the Tam Dao National Park. Several projects have already been implemented by the government and other institutions concentrating on the buffer zones and the communities living in there. Three programs have been started by the Vietnamese government in order to improve the livelihoods of ethnic minorities, which also have been applied in the Tam Dao buffer zones: the National Program on Poverty Alleviation (Program No. 133), the Program for the Support of Plantation Forests and Afforestation for Very Poor Communes in Rural Areas (Program No. 135), and the 5 Million Hectares Reforestation Program (Program No. 661). The last one was initiated in 1998 aiming at the reforestation of 5 million ha, the improvement of local livelihoods, and the promotion of industrial wood production. These goals haven't been entirely fulfilled, e.g. money wasn't provided sufficiently for the local communities. But on the other hand, an improvement in infrastructure and progression in reforestation have already been achieved (HUNG 2013: 56f.).

Besides of the Vietnamese government, other institutions have attempted to improve the situation in the buffer zones. For example, the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), an institution for the promotion of sustainable global

development, started a program for tourism development in the Tam Dao National Park. As part of this program, several projects like the “B-day (=biodiversity day)” already took place within the national park, in order to promote tourism while providing awareness about environmental protection and climate change. Later on, another project was implemented by the GTZ in 2003: the “Tam Dao National Park and Buffer Zones Management Project (TDMP)”. This project aims at a better cooperation between national park management center and buffer zones to achieve the conservation of natural resources as well as improvement of the locals’ living conditions. A number of interest group could be integrated into this project which resulted in better relationships between different actors (The Hanoi Times 14.10.2009: <http://hanoitimes.com.vn/travel/attractions/2009/10/81e02fc5/tam-daonational-park-and-buffer-zone-management-project-concludes/>, last call 27.09.2017; HUNG 2013: 57f.).

Lastly, there are a few other projects conducted by foreign institutions. The “Contributing to Conservation in Tam Dao”-project by the Farmer’s Association from 2000 until 2003 promoted the cooperation between the buffer zones’ population, local administration and national park management. After that, the “Livelihoods in Environmentally-Fragile Areas Program” started in 2003 which was initiated by the Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia and the Pacific Limited (AFAP). The program created a basis for better living conditions and other measures of maintenance for locals, who are now less dependent on the illegal use of the forbidden zones (HUNG 2013: 58).

Conclusion

Tourism is undeniably and important part of the economy in Southeast Asia. In general, it pushes the economic development in the Southeast Asian countries. It is an option for (remote) areas to enhance their living conditions by generating and new sources of income, which is notable for example in Vietnam. However, this must not be provided for every local community, thinking of exploitation or exclusion. In addition to that, there are also environmental issues coming from tourism, for example the touristic overuse of natural sites which leads to degradation. Two of the approaches to these issues already implemented have been dealt in this paper: the status as a UNESCO World Heritage and ecotourism in a national park as a protectorate.

In the case of the Taman Negara National Park in Malaysia and the Batek people living within the borders of the national park, the future progresses are linked to the possible inclusion into the UNESCO World Heritage List and the tourism activities related to this status. If the Taman Negara National Park is listed as a UNESCO World Heritage, the enhanced value of Taman Negara will raise awareness about the need to protect the environment and local people. But while on the one hand this will economically benefit the livelihoods of the locals, in this case the Batek, it is on the other hand questionable, whether or not the identity in the ethnic groups will change through the capitalization of their culture and tradition. Does the economic development undermine the original ethnicity and the traditions?

Moving on to the Tam Dao National Park in Vietnam, environmental and social issues are connected to each other. The local communities living in the buffer zones of this protectorate are currently not provided with a sufficient basis for

livelihood. Besides, they are not really included into the planning and management of the national park's administration. Projects to promote ecotourism have already been started in the Tam Dao National Park recently. Numerous programs are initiated to raise awareness about environmental protection in the local population and the visitors on the one hand, and to include the local community in management and tourism programs to improve their living conditions on the other hand. This raises the question who the leaders of these improvements through ecotourism are. Are only international NGOs and other organizations responsible, or can it also arise from the core of the local and indigenous people?

Lastly, connecting the two different cases of tourism development to the theoretical discourse about "development" underlying this paper, we raise the question which people are holding agency and power in their hands and decide the issues of the people and if there are options of participation. Relating to this it is also questionable, whether or not the ideas about "development" of the different groups interacting with each other are in one line and compatible. To examine these issues, the colonial history of Southeast Asia should be noted: Are there still colonial continuities in form of an underlying type of thinking, which stresses more importance and value towards the western model and western ideas? And is this model really western or is it in line with local ideas and needs?

All in all, we want to point out that the general understanding of "development" is often limited to the western connotation of economic development. In the case of tourism in Southeast Asia, in which national economy and local/indigenous people and their livelihoods are both affected, the meaning behind "development" needs to be overthought, especially when it comes to implementing (western) programs in order to push "development" of the people.

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ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN PRESENT-DAY LAOS: ADDRESSING ISSUES OF MINORITY POLITICS AND RESETTLEMENT

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Abstract

Despite a population of just about 7 million, Laos (officially Lao People's Democratic Republic) is, in fact, one of the most ethnically diverse countries in mainland Southeast Asia. Populations from all its neighbouring countries overlap into it, and its government recognises 49 ethnicities consisting of over 160 ethnic groups. But despite the government's efforts to establish a national unity that encloses all ethnic minorities, we can't yet speak of equality/equal rights among them. Issues of conflict are bound to happen.

The Laotian government sees it as its task to encourage the various ethnic groups to strive for modernization and to improve their way of life. The contact of individual authorities with the ethnic groups was intensified to have more control over villages, and resettlement processes were initiated.

Present-day Laos remains one of the poorest countries in the world, although political and economic changes have facilitated more rapid economic growth. This development process can be traced back to and is significantly affected by ethnic issues. The ongoing progressive economic, social and political integration into the Lao state makes it increasingly difficult for minorities to escape the state's control and evade political pressure.

Our paper will therefore focus on conflict issues among highland groups and discuss several conflict management strategies that have been addressed and/or not yet taken place.

Keywords: *Ethnicity, Conflict, Lao*

Introduction

During the French colonial rule, the members of every indigenous ethnic group were divided into three different categories according to geographical elevation. This was based on the wide-spread distinction between lowland and highland groups and later adopted by the socialist government. Additionally, the system adds a new category, that of the midland groups, resulting in Lao Loum (lowlanders, making up roughly 68% of the population), Lao Theung (midlanders, making up 22% of the population), and Lao Soung (highlanders, the remaining 10%) (WINZELER 2010). Since the distinction between the categories is simply based on geography, it is possible for communities to switch due to migration and resettling in a different area. Despite not being ethnic Lao and the Lao Loum playing a more dominant role than the other categories, all three are defined as Lao to help build a national identity and establish nation-building. This is especially grave considering that ethnic minorities make up more than 40% of the country's population (ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU 2004). Recognising the challenge that such diversity can represent for nation building and political stability, the Laotian state specifically worked to advocate ethnic pluralism and equality:

In 1988, the Lao Front for National Construction was tasked with assisting the government in designing appropriate development policy in ethnic minority areas and facilitating the participation of minorities to national development plans. In 1991, principles of ethnic unity and equality were entered into the Constitution, and in 1992, an official policy aiming specifically at alleviating poverty and inequalities among ethnic minorities was established (LESTRELIN 2011).

Especially considering the effects of the Second Indochina War, during which several highland communities had fled the combat zones, it was crucial for the Laotian state to support a polyethnic society. As GOUDINEAU states:

Après 1975, il s'agit de réunifier le pays et de rendre sa polyethnicité viable. La formulation de la question ethnique au Laos suit, avec quelques variantes, celle qui en est faite au Viêt-nam, lui-même tributaire des expériences soviétiques et chinoises. On peut y lire un double souci: d'une part, savoir s'il convient ou non d'accorder une forme d'autonomie à certaines régions sur la base de critères ethniques; d'autre part, un souci positiviste, représentatif d'une manière de scientisme socialiste, relatif à la dénomination et à la classification des groupes ethniques. (2000: 19)

This ambivalent approach is supported by the government's minority politics: on the one hand, ethnic variety is promoted as cultural heritage which must be protected at all costs. On the other hand, the backwardness of ethnic groups is interfering with the country's efforts to achieve cultural transition and modernity (NEUDORFER 2007). The sustained efforts towards enhanced social justice have unfortunately not yet succeeded in striking a balance in the political organisation of the country (LESTRELIN 2011). Issues of ethnicity and conflict are bound to happen and affecting development processes in many ways, especially concerning education politics, forest soil exploitation, and resettlement processes. But since addressing all three of the aforementioned issues would go beyond the scope of this paper, we will solely focus on issues of resettlement and, as a consequence thereof, counter-territorialisation strategies.

Definition

The term *resettlement* is usually defined as the systematic relocation of a community inside a country. ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU have described internal resettlement in Laos as two processes rolled into one: the first one is *detritorialization*, which basically means communities need to leave their traditional territories and change their traditional ways of life. The second one, *re-territorialization*, and then means for those communities to move into a new territory and adapt to it. This also entails integrating into the cultural ties, if necessary (2004).

According to WINZELER (2010), BAIRD & SHOEMAKER (2005) and ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU (2004), the resettlement of village populations in Laos has been going on for a long period of time. It has turned out to be an important development strategy – mostly since 1975, when the government of the newly found Lao PDR began to strategically move ethnic minority groups out of more remote areas to lower elevations. Since the country's opening in 1975, this acculturation of minority groups has more and more progressed (CHAZÉE 1999). Several programmes and policies in the Lao PDR were and still are promoting the resettlement of mostly indigenous ethnic communities causing them to give up their way of life.

Resettlement Processes in the Lao PDR

One of the major aspects of internal resettlement executed by the Laotian government is the eradication of swidden farming cultivation (or *shifting cultivation*, also known as *slash-and-burn agriculture*)¹⁷, which is also listed in BAIRD and SHOEMAKER's report from 2005 as one of its main justifications. Indeed, more than 50% of highland villages in northern Laos have disappeared since the 1960s (ÉVRARD 2006). For example, 45% of the villages of the rural/highland areas are depending on swidden farming agriculture for their existence. However, several highland groups have been accused of forest decline due to traditional methods of shifting, and therefore made responsible for ecological destruction and the ongoing decrease of natural resources. Instead, these communities are forced to migrate to lower elevations and practice wet rice agriculture which is viewed by the state as more productive and therefore better. Switching to monocultural farming is promoted as an economic development and less harmful to the environment, protecting biodiversity and reducing deforestation. The latter is additionally supported by promoting industrial forms of forest exploitation such as commercial logging. But while, in fact, the depletion of resources has been increasing, this is not mainly caused by ethnic communities' agricultural methods, but also due to illegal deforestation by international firms, causing infertile forest grounds and erosion (NEUDORFER 2007). Nevertheless, resettlement processes due to agricultural reasons alone have affected hundreds of thousands of people:

In 1999, the [Government of Laos] estimated that 280,000 families, or 45% of the villages in the country, were dependent on shifting cultivation for their subsistence. The [Government of Laos] expected that by the year 2000-160,000 families (about 900,000 people) conducting swidden agriculture would have adopted 'sedentary occupations'. Although it is

¹⁷ The terms swidden farming and shifting cultivation are used interchangeably in this paper

unclear whether this target was met, all provinces have been affected by the swidden agriculture eradication policy, especially those in the mountainous northern and eastern parts of the country. (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2005: 7)

Some of the communities mainly depending on swidden farming methods are found in the Xekong River¹⁸ Basin, located in Southern Laos. According to BAIRD & SHOEMAKER (2008), who have conducted thorough research in the area, it has a rich variety of ethnic diversity and has been significantly affected by harsh restrictions and resettlement processes conducted by the Laotian government. Although swidden farming provided better income to these communities than different forms of agriculture, the Laotian government had established a plan to erase (or at least significantly reduce) all swidden farming by the year 2000. Major donors moved to support this endeavour, but soon found that, “while an important rationale for the initiative was to conserve upland forests, some observers [had] noted that there was simultaneously a large increase in commercial logging in these same forests, facilitated by the government and the military and involving non-transparent revenue management” (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2008:119). Nevertheless, rather than approaching the matter by carefully weighing all the factors while also considering local conditions (which, in this case, had not provided a clear indication for or against the reduction of swidden farming methods), the government applied harsh restrictions to the affected communities, and resettlement processes were initiated (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2008).

Another example are the Khmu people of Nalae district in northern Laos, who make up 11% of the country’s total population and therefore the largest minority. The state usually portrays them as poor, mainly in relation to their farming methods of shifting cultivation and subsistence agriculture. ÉVRARD has conducted research among Khmu communities and found that “each district [had] to evaluate and map out its capacity to develop wet-rice agriculture, cash crops production, and other activities, such as crafts or tourism. If the highland population [exceeded] the technical capacity of the district, the province [ordered] the surplus population to relocate to other districts” (2011: 86). Between 1975 and 1995, almost every village disappeared from the mountainous regions in the western part of the district, mainly due to resettlement processes. After 1995, however, resettlement took a new turn:

First, the local government gathered highland populations in so-called focal zones, selected for agricultural potential. Some model villages were created with foreign aid, though they were mostly short-lived. Second, the local government started resettling Khmu Rok¹⁹ populations in the eastern part of the district, which further depopulated the uplands. In 1996, there were more than seventy upland villages in Nalae district; by 2006, there were only sixteen, representing a decline from 65 to 20 percent of the total population of the district. (ÉVRARD 2011: 87)

¹⁸ Also known as Kong River or Se Kong River, but BAIRD and SHOEMAKER (2008) use the Romanization Xekong River, which shall be copied here.

¹⁹ The Khmu Rok were not affected by the first resettlement process between 1975 and 1995 due to living in the eastern part and had remained there up until this point.

This indicates the gravity of the resettlement processes undertaken by the Laotian government. Although never having referred to it as a policy per se, it becomes clear that these processes are indeed following a strategic reorganisation of space, supported by governmental rural policies. Moreover, this case provides us with better insight on how highland communities are experiencing complex processes of forced migration – or, in the words of ÉVRARD, of “deterritorialization and reterritorialization” (2011: 95). These processes are not only gravely affecting the communities’ economic situation, but they are also impacting entire social networks. People are pulled out of a well-known environment which has been established for decades and forced to resettle in an area that is unbeknownst to them. Upon migrating, they must not only form a new subsistence, but also build a whole new social network, which can take years to establish. But ÉVRARD adds yet another aspect, the, as he states, “ambivalent meaning of development and globalisation from the viewpoint of highlanders” (2011: 95). He argues that, while resettlement processes can be quite beneficial to a community, they are also creating and fostering insecurity and feelings of exclusion. This is based on the aforementioned aspect of the need for building a new environment but takes it even further: a strategy or policy which the state views as beneficial for a minority group must not necessarily mean it is. Sometimes, it is quite the contrary.

A second reason for resettlement, according to BAIRD and SHOEMAKER, is opium eradication. Laos is ranked as one of the most important opium cultivators in the world. The drug is mainly produced in the mountain villages and delivered to China. The Laotian government considers Opium to be a main factor for the north’s high poverty rates. The drug is highly addictive and enhances lethargy, which, in turn, reduces the affected communities’ work force (NEUDORFER 2007). Unfortunately, although reasonable, antagonising opium cultivation is mainly causing significant hardships to impacted communities while at the same time not promoting any alternatives to make a living (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2005). Admittedly, the contact to more remote living groups has been enhanced in order to integrate them into the state while at the same time gaining more control. Nevertheless, most of these communities have been promised support but never truly received it.

The third reason is security. If communities are considered a security threat to the state, they will be resettled to monitor and, if necessary, control their activities. Another factor is resettlement being necessary for remote communities to receive development services and have better access to markets. However, such assumptions are usually based on an ignorance of the existing natural resources forming the livelihoods of these communities. We have already briefly addressed this issue earlier when discussing the case of the Khmu in northern Laos.

Furthermore, LESTRELIN describes several strategies the Laotian state has implemented on several occasions:

In 1989, a Village Relocation and Consolidation strategy was established which advocated the merging of villages with less than 50 households. In 1998, a Focal Site approach was introduced in the National Rural Development Program, which advocated the merging of 1200 villages and the development of state services in the corresponding new sites (e.g., agricultural extension, schools, health centers, power and clean water).

More recently, in 2004, an order was issued by the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party setting the lower population limit at 500 residents for lowland villages and 200 residents for upland villages. Alongside resettlement, other regulations were designed to clarify local land rights, establish boundaries between agricultural and forest land, promote agricultural intensification and limit deforestation and land degradation – deemed to arise mainly from the traditional shifting cultivation practices of ethnic minorities; thus, in the 1990s, a Land and Forest Allocation (LFA) program was undertaken countrywide that consisted of zoning and classification of different land use types at the village level and the allocation of farmland to individual households. In 2005, the program was implemented in two-thirds of the villages officially recorded in the country. (2011: 312)

Again, this underlines the thoroughness of the policy. In all the cases described above, the given reasons for resettlement focus on better access to state services and market opportunities as the underlying rationale. Nonetheless, these evaluations embody less opportunities for the minority communities in relation to sustainable rural development or state services. Instead, they are a method for the state to strengthen its control over both those minorities and resources.

Another justification for resettlement strategies is cultural integrity and nation-building (which supplements the aspect of better access to markets and development services). Since most ethnic groups have their own customs and even languages, the Laotian government seeks to integrate more remote communities into the dominant Lao culture. This is generally perceived by government leaders as beneficial for the whole nation (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2005). Nonetheless, Studies show that resettlement and related processes in Laos are often having a major negative impact on the social systems, livelihoods and cultures of many indigenous ethnic communities and people. Because of ongoing processes to integrate more remote living communities into the Laotian state, it is, additionally, getting harder for minority groups to withdraw themselves from state control and political pressure (NEUDORFER 2007). Laos, as a country, is only thinly populated. Therefore, it is quite difficult to provide access to infrastructure and modern facilities to everyone. According to NEUDORFER, it seems more reasonable to do so by bringing the people closer to the facilities, instead of the other way around. This procedure is generally supported by international aid agencies. Nevertheless, actual resettlement processes have raised questions about whether they have been as voluntary as the government claims them to be. Mostly, they have not, especially “given the political and economic restrictions” (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2005: 3) that have been inflicted upon the communities by the Laotian government. Ethnic communities are promised a better life and the government's aid upon resettling, but these promises are seldom kept. Additionally, communities must adjust to new farming methods they are not used to. Upon failing to do so, they are facing poverty, diseases, malnutrition, and a higher rate of mortality. According to ÉVRARD, a study conducted by OSTOM (French National Scientific Research Institute through Development and Cooperation) in 1997 found that the mortality rates in resettled communities were up to 30%. When specifically asked about this, most communities believed that “their poverty [was] newly created and due in large parts of two programmes, Land and Forest Allocation, and Village Consolidation”

(ÉVRARD 1997). Most resettled groups therefore need to rely on tourism or wage labour and work in existing fields from neighbouring communities to ensure their survival (NEUDORFER 2007). There have even been some cases documented in which resettlement has led to communities migrating back to where they originally came from (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2005).

Acts of Resistance and Counter-Territorialisation

In one-party states like the Lao PDR, minorities cannot effectively use strategies of protest movements, legal challenges or alliances with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) for they would risk grave restrictions and repressions. Instead, they need to rely on more subtle ways to oppose or weaken state territorialisation. LESTRELIN explains:

[A]mong politically-marginal populations, gentle forms of resistance such as passive non-compliance, foot-dragging and deception are often preferred to open rebellion for they minimize the risk and the potential intensity of repression by opposing parties. (2011: 311)

These may also involve making compromises and fostering knowledge alliances between both minority communities and local state agents who are responsible for enforcing the state rule. Although the degree to which these relations can challenge state power and territorial ambitions remains questionable (LESTRELIN 2011), we shall discuss several strategies of minority communities in the Lao PDR.

As stated above, there are inter-ethnic disparities, which are mostly displayed in terms of political representation. To put it simply, more remote living communities or minorities in general cannot specifically influence resettlement processes that are causing them to migrate against their will if they are not formally represented in the government. Dominant positions (for example in the military or the government) are held by the ethnic Lao and the Hmong, while other ethnic groups are only represented by a very limited number of representatives on a national level. LESTRELIN states:

Successive decentralization (late 1980s) and recentralization (early 1990s) policies may have contributed to accentuating these inequalities by reducing the autonomy of local governments where the highest diversity of ethnic groups is represented. In recent years, however, renewed decentralization efforts and the creation of village clusters as new sub-district administrative units have probably contributed to restoring some balance. (2011: 312)

This depicts that, despite trying to achieve unity and equality among the various ethnic groups, the Laotian state has deliberately favoured those with the highest percentages in the total population, namely mostly the ethnic Lao. IRESON & IRESON state:

More minority men were in positions of responsibility during the first years after the revolution, but a crisis in administrative and technical efficiency prompted a government decision in the early 1980s to replace revolutionary cadre with low technical qualifications (often of minority ethnicity) with technocrats from the former Royal Lao Government and younger people trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A few

assimilated minority technocrats benefited from this policy but in general the old-regime pattern of Lao dominance in decision making has reemerged and is particularly visible in lowland interpretations of development issues and priorities. Some important officials (province chairman, vice-chairman, or party secretary) in each of several provinces are of Lao Theung or Lao S[o]ung origin, as are many lower-level officials, but only a handful of national political leaders are of minority origin. (1991: 925)

In relation to IRESO & IRESO's conducted research, the United Nations has found that the existing limits to political participation are usually caused by the fact that most minority groups live below the poverty line, have limited access to education and, therefore, have limited opportunities to play influential political and economic roles (UNDP 2002). Furthermore, economic and political resources are distributed differently among ethnic groups. Foreign aid, foreign investment, and private economic ventures are all subject to government approval. Aid and investment mainly concentrate in the lowlands because access to these resources and opportunities usually reflects existing ethnic relationships. Therefore, minorities are "de facto if not de jure socially, politically and economically excluded" (RIGG 2005: 67). Nonetheless, access to political institutions in general is not the only way for ethnic minority groups to vindicate their claims or, at least, modify those of others (who are more powerful). Rather, they must retain a significant level of agency (see ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU 2004). However, such an agency cannot be established through political institutions because minorities are usually largely excluded from them. They cannot organise formal protests, legal challenges or petitions either since the risks of repression bestowed upon them are too high. Instead, minority groups can resort to the formation of social alliances. Local communities can establish friendly relations with their district attorneys to achieve compliances with land regulations and have a say in socio-environmental changes. Therefore, local political claims usually must undergo a different past, as LESTRELIN describes:

Rather, local political claims and contestation often take the more indirect path of everyday resistance. In practice, resistance does not only involve individual and occasional acts of non-compliance to state rule. It also works through collective and organized actions aimed, in part, at minimizing the risk of state repression. (LESTRELIN 2011)

However, there is also the case of international aid organisations. BAIRD & SHOEMAKER have shown that, while those agencies – such as NGOs, International Nongovernmental Organisations (INGOs), International Organisations (IOs), and many more – are actively involved with internal resettlement processes in the Lao PDR. Unfortunately, their research has further shown that these organisations and aid agencies have basically failed to grasp the importance and impacts of internal resettlement processes on the communities and livelihoods they are meant to assist. They argue that, "despite some positive examples, most of the development agencies working in Laos are not addressing this issue with the seriousness that it deserves" (BAIRD & SHOEMAKER 2005: 38). Moreover, studies have shown international aid agencies in Laos rarely have any impact on existing plans to resettlement. Although being well-known, they do not have the means to "guarantee these people the assistance needed to help them settle downhill" (ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU 2004: 959). As they state further, this can have grave

consequences leading to uncontrolled migrations that, in turn, can again complicate the implementation of the rural development policy.

ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU suggest several things that need to be done. First, it must be made clear to state officials that swidden farming agricultural methods are contributing to the sustenance of the people, and that they do not cause harm to biodiversity and production rates. And second, more remote living communities must be provided with better access to government services for example with the building of new roads and technical assistance. However, if resettlement is unavoidable, the affected communities need thorough support upon building a new livelihood. ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU suggest:

This would allow both local administrators and foreign aid projects to gather reliable data on the economic and social transition process in resettled villages. Such data would clearly show that the cost of an ill-planned resettlement is a heavier burden (for the villagers and for the state itself) than a progressive sedentarization process in the high-lands. (2004: 959)

Additionally, international aid organisations must acknowledge that issues of resettlement are mainly a social and cultural issue, rather than a technical one. State officials and local governmental people must include this into the processes and initiatives. Therefore, programmes must be adjusted to meet the needs of the people instead of only fulfilling what is seen from a governmental perspective. Donors funding the processes need to be included as well and made aware of the consequences of their decisions since “too many cases in Southeast Asia illustrate the fact that resettlement policies are seen as a means of domesticating the upland farmers rather than bringing them sustainable development” (ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU 2005: 959). Both donors and international aid agencies still seldom have to justify their actions although it is whole villages and communities that are affected by them. A reflection and examination of their practices and decisions must be implemented, either by the agencies themselves or by those who provide the funding. Resettlement not simply refers to a process of moving from one place into another. Communities give up their livelihood in the process of deterritorialization and have to build a whole new existence from scratch while not even being allowed to rely on decade-long traditions of agricultural methods. Aid agencies must act in the best interest of the people they are serving and a better monitoring system is highly suggested.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have addressed issues of minority politics and resettlement ethnic communities are facing today. Laos is made up of a variety of different ethnic groups that have managed to maintain separate cultures and languages. But despite the Laotian government’s efforts to achieve equality among the various ethnic minorities and advocate ethnic pluralism, it is obvious that these, in most cases, do not benefit the welfare of most minorities. Rather, communities are expected to resettle from the highland regions to lower elevations; by which they are forced to leave existing social networks behind and adapt to a new way of life that is often an entryway to poverty. Over the last two decades, a large percentage of ethnic minority groups living in the highlands has been resettled.

However, up to this very day, there is no existing study that has been able to show that such resettlement has been beneficial to those communities. Instead, the number of articles, papers, and reports on the process having major negative impacts is steadily growing.

Therefore, one can hardly state that the territorialisation project devised by the Lao PDR has been successful. While usually undertaken to elicit poverty, the initiatives have rather contributed to long-term poverty, as well as many other grave and endangering aspects, such as cultural alienation and the increase social conflicts. Especially BAIRD & SHOEMAKER's findings displayed in the 2005 report indicate a drastic decline in overall well-being. Although there are cases of families who have benefited from internal resettlement and where communities themselves have desired to be resettled. However, most highland people must undertake tremendous and complex processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Therefore, despite trying to rearrange lives and landscapes in accordance with a national model, and coercive land regulations, ethnic minorities must retain a significant level of agency by establishing friendly relations with their district attorney to be included in socio-environmental changes.

As LESTRELIN puts it, a state itself cannot be viewed solely as a *monolithic entity*. Although being firmly established, boundaries between the state and society are often blurry. In the case of Laos, it is mainly the heads of the villages and their deputies who are transmitting official information to the local level, and this is exactly where counter-territorialisation can begin. Here, the disruption can materialise through the denial of the national socio-environmental project or through everyday resistance. State-society relations can shape uneven and even unexpected developments. These conclusions agree with the findings of BAIRD & SHOEMAKER, LESTRELIN, and ÉVRARD & GOUDINEAU. Their studies show us that counter-territorialisation can provide a valuable supplement to the, in most cases, rather grim looking aspects of the whole resettlement policy executed by the state of Laos. Therefore, we would like to conclude this paper with a quote we think suits best (and could not be put in better words):

Counter-territorialisation is not simply a matter of resisting territorial projects that are deemed unsustainable or undesirable. It is also a matter of exploiting and colonizing interstitial spaces within and between existing territorialisation projects. (LESTRELIN 2011:317)

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CHILD PROTECTION CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN MANDALAY REGION, MYANMAR (2014-2017)

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Abstract

Although Myanmar has become a State Party to the ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)’ in 1991, many of Myanmar’s vulnerable children are still victims of multiple violations such as violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation. Through one of the eight flagship programmes stated in the integrated social protection system (ISPS), the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) under the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement has initiated the national social work case management system for children in 27 townships across the country since 2015 and expanded to additional 10 townships in 2016 and other 9 townships in 2017. The aim of this research is studying the child protection case management system in Mandalay Region, Myanmar. For research methodology, the research uses the qualitative approach with key informant interviews to provide a multi-perspective understanding of how the case management system is working in practice and responding to individual cases. This system could be successful if it is applied with a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach linking closely, for example, with education, health, and criminal justice systems. In conclusion, social work case management is applicable as the alternative care options, provision of adequate care for children in contact with the law, and redress of specific child protection issues like sexual abuse and domestic violence. However, NGOs are critical for efficient and effective functioning of the system; insufficient human and financial resources remain the primary challenge for the effective functioning of child protection case management systems in Myanmar as well as in Mandalay Region.

Keywords: *CRC, Child Protection, Case Management System, Case Officer and/or Manager, social work case management in Myanmar*

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1. Introduction

Myanmar became a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 16 July 1991. In order to implement the rights of the child embodied in the Convention, the Government set Child Law on 14 July 1993. However, children are vulnerable through poverty, family break-down, weak social welfare and legal systems, natural disaster, ongoing armed conflict, communal violence and facing the risk of the exploitation, neglect and abuse at home, in school, community, workplace; being sexual and domestic violence; being without parental care with many living in institutions; being in contact with the law.

There have been significant changes in Myanmar political situation since elections were held in November 2010. The Government is committed to the development and protection of children from any form of abuse, neglect, violence and exploitation. The Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement (MSWRR), and specifically the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) having the responsibility of child protection, has taken some measures to offer care and protection to children and has taken some action for fulfilling children's rights within the CRC (UNICEF, 2016).

The changing political and social setting within Myanmar has created many opportunities to progress and tolerate the protection of children, including the numbers of children in institutional care, increasing rates of trafficking prevalence of child labor, and ongoing conflict and communal violence. While important advantages have been made and the Government of Myanmar has shown a strong commitment to ensuring the rights of all children are recognized, there are still serious protection concerns remaining.

The Department of Social Welfare (DSW) under the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement has initiated the national social work case management system for children in 27 townships across the country since 2015 and expanded to additional 10 townships in 2016 and other 9 townships in 2017. Thus, this paper explores how Department of Social Welfare and INGO's are implementing child protection case management system in Mandalay Region.

This research uses the qualitative methodology with grounded theory approach. Focused group discussion was conducted involving a total of five caseworkers (case supervisor and case officer) in Kyaukpadaung city. Four caregivers, three children and sixteen experts (DSW Director, UNICEF, and NGOs staff) were participated in key informant interview. The purpose of qualitative research is to obtain a series of in-depth case studies to provide a multi-perspective understanding of how the case management system is working in practice and responding to individual cases.

The integrated social services aim to facilitate access to health, education and other priority services, increasing complementarity and efficiency of services. Evidence shows that multi-disciplinary teams result in better case planning and problem solving, and can result in earlier, more effective and more efficient interventions. NGOs can performance a significant role in the development of a child protection case management system through supplementing their case management service delivery and giving support to government social workers.

Inadequate of human capacity, insufficient financial resources and the coordination gap between inter-ministries remains a critical challenge for the effective functioning of child protection case management system. In order to

implement effective child protection case management, it is essential to ensure adequate human resource and financial capacity to provide quality services.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part will discuss overview of case management system in Mandalay Region through caregiver's perceptions and experiences. The second part discusses coordination and referral mechanisms include the challenges. The conclusion will be the final part.

2. Overview the Case Management System in Mandalay Region

Child protection system approaches are acknowledged as the most effective and sustainable to protect, respond and alleviate the impact of violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation rather than issue-based approach. The systems literature defines a system as a collection of components or parts that are organized around a collective purpose or goal (Save the Children 2009, EAPRO 2009).

Child protection concept is not new for Myanmar because over the past five years, the DSW had established community-based child protection systems at twenty-five townships in Myanmar. In each township, one DSW officer has been assigned as a social work case manager. A referral mechanism developed to address child rights violations and child protection cases, including the provision of direct services to children and families have been piloted in villages within the townships. This initial program has been the energetic force behind the decision to adopt social work case management and omission as a core part of its work moving forward to Integrated Social Protection System (National Social Protection Strategic Plan, 2014).

Ministry of social welfare, relief and resettlement outline, 'case management' will be applied to the work of the Social Welfare Department in addressing an individual child's (and their families) needs and vulnerabilities. 'Case Management' will be a key part of the integrated social services offered by DSW and will rely on professional case managers for implementation (MSWRR, 2015).

Save the Children International in Myanmar define the 'case management is a service to support children in need of protection. A trained case manager assesses the situation, provides direct support, identifies resources, and coordinates access to other services.' The case manager is an advocate for the best interest of the child, ensures confidentiality, and empowers the child in all decision making. The goal of the case manager is to have the child in safe, protected, family-like environment.

At present, 10 out of 101 DSW case managers are trained with social work case management working on child protection cases at five townships in Mandalay Region. Two out of 23 mid-level officials from state/region and district DSW offices were trained as technical supervisors. Their role as case supervisors was introduced and embedded into the system since February 2016. Due to staff turnover and retirement, only 17 technical supervisors for the system build townships remain until present. This is the first ever national case management system launched and led by DSW.

Department of Social Welfare (DSW) is establishing a national case management system and allocated case manager in the township as a focal unit for responding child protection concerns coming from villages/wards that need statutory

responses such as rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, etc. Non-statutory cases are those that do not need legal response and care of the NGOs case officer. The communities need to know when the rights of children are being violated, where to report, how best to respond and whether rights violations are being addressed equitably. Therefore, Myanmar Red Cross Society takes the lead in raising child protection awareness in villages along with creating simple and concrete reporting mechanism with which community can report child protection concerns to NGOs and DSW case managers in townships.

UNICEF supports technically and financially to the vision of DSW in establishing and operating the case management system. UNICEF partnered with Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS), Save the Children and other local organization such as Rattana Metta Organization (RMO) and Yangon Kayin Baptist Women's Association (YKBWA), to support DSW in 19 out of 27 townships. UNICEF also partnered with Karuna Myanmar Social Services (KMSS) to cover nine townships in Chin State. Until now, a total of 2,876 (up to April 2018) child protection cases were handled through 37 system townships. In Mandalay Region, Save the Children assigned one Senior Technical Officer and one Technical Officer for technical supports to RMO and DSW. Two Case Supervisors and seven Case Officers of RMO staff were working closely with DSW and implementing child protection case management program at two townships, Kyaukpadaung and Chanayetharzan.

The results of case management system (CMS) in Mandalay region show a total intake of 176 child protection cases between August 2014 and April 2018 across five townships in Mandalay Regions. This figure is on the low side, comprising less than 0.04 percent of the total population of child in the five case management townships.²¹ Nevertheless, given that the program has only been in operation for four years, and that in some townships case management only started within the last six months; however, this remain a creditable achievement.

The majority of cases addressed by the CMS (n=49 or 27.8 per cent) were found to be cases classified as children in sexual abuse followed by Domestic Violence cases (n=32 or 18.2 per cent), Conflict with the law (n=28 or 15.9 per cent) and physical abuse (n=19 or 10.8 per cent). Disaggregating the data by gender also reveals that there are more girls in the Mandalay Region (54 per cent) CMS compared with the National (38.4 per cent). The dominating cases in Mandalay Region is sexual abuse while in national level are the cases of conflict with the law (n=803 or 27.9 per cent).

²¹ According to the 2014 census data, the total population of children in five case management townships aged 0-19 years was 396,566 persons.




Chart 2 (a) Cases within the CMS system by type of violence

The concern expressed above in relation to targeting child abuse is further supported by evidence on the ages of children progressing through the CMS: the majority of cases involved children age 13-15 years, with 38 per cent of all cases involving children over the age of 13. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize adequate knowledge on child protection among those who work with young children because 44 per cent of children (under the age of 12 years old) receive supports within the CMS at five townships in Mandalay region.




Chart 2 (b) Distribution of age of children within the CMS

Generally, the effective functioning of the CMS was found to vary widely across different townships and particularly within DSW offices. There are significant indications that the CMS functions better in areas where there is an NGO partner supporting DSW with case management work; and where MRCS are active in awareness raising. Among the five townships, Nyaung-U township is

significant number of case (n=91), followed by Mahaangmyay township (n=50), and both townships were starting child protection system building approach in early 2009.




Chart 2 (c) Reported cases by five townships CMS: 2014 – 2018

In addition to significant cases in Nyaung-U Township, NGOs facilitate in establishing community support groups (CSG) in village/ward to receive more community involvement. Where key nodes from the community are involved, community leaders, elders, active youth and members of the community-based organization. Providing child protection awareness training and sharing referral network with full address and contact person to them, so that they well know the child protection case and where to report it.

At present, MRCS awareness raising program was already phased-out in five townships since February 2017. DSW are taking the role in awareness rising but it has limited coverage due to its existing workload. RMO was also phased-out from Nyaung-U, Mahaangmyay and moved to new township Chanayetharzan and Kyaukpadaung in July 2017. The cases in new two townships are significantly lower than two old townships. The case supervisor has to technically support DSW in Naying-U and Mahaangmyay townships. There is no NGO partner supporting to Myain Chan DSW so far.

2.1 Caregivers' perceptions and experiences

Children's and caregivers' own views and experiences are also important of the outcome of the case management system. The qualitative data on cases was found to be diverse, varied in experiences and degrees of satisfaction. It was clear that the CMS was resolving and responding child protection cases, providing different types of support to address protection issues, including access to health and education services, support to route legal and justice systems, emotional support and counselling.

There were some examples of caregivers' who express satisfaction with support that they had received in accessing the justice system managed by DSW case managers.

*I am happy with supports of DSW and they made me feel strong. The offender is now getting a punishment. Otherwise, I don't know how to handle the situation.*²²

In particular, children who had been supported by NGO providers appeared to value the social and emotional support that they had received, with both parents and children saying that they felt stronger and happier after visitations by case officers.

*After getting the information, RMO arrived at my house to inquire about the case. And since then, they have been following-up. They have supported to get wheelchair for my grandson. They have also been providing psychological support to improve his happiness. He has become happier than before.*²³

.....

*Now my son changes his behavior, he doesn't take anything of neighborhood without permission. He helps to me in house work, cooking the rice and feeding the cow. My neighborhood perceptions also change to my son because of RMO awareness raining to them.*²⁴

....

*They come to see me every week. They gave drawing books and pens. I feel happier than before because they play with me and we are drawing together.*²⁵

These evidences that indicate DSW case managers and GNO case workers are currently undertaking different roles and responsibilities with the CMS. Whilst DSW's role appears to be liaising and negotiating with legal and government authorities, NGO partner are leading on most of the social work with children and families.

Interviews with the staff sometimes revealed that interventions after intake into the CMS had been extremely minimal (for example, supporting a domestic violence victim whose offenders are fathers of the child, difficult to explain to understand the child protection rights), or had entirely failed to address the issue at hand (for example, the parent do not want to open the case, preferable to take compensation).

*Whilst we are going to the community, they expect to get some in kind support and asking to us how can we support, especially in relation to the provision of income or financial assistance. Moreover, our budgets have limitation to support even the protection cases and it based on the case planning.*²⁶

Finally, there were many situations in which case officers seemed unsure about how to resolve or close a case, they had misunderstood the nature or support that the child or their family required:

²² Interview with caregiver, 14 May 2018.

²³ Interview with caregiver, 9 June 2018.

²⁴ Interview with caregiver, 15 May 2018.

²⁵ Interview with boy involved in non-statutory case, 15 May 2018.

²⁶ FGD with NGO staff, 15 May 2018.

*I am not sure how many years I have to take care of my grandson as he is disabled and could not become a normal child.*²⁷

2.2 Coordination and Referral Mechanisms

UNICEF and NGO partners have regular coordination meeting at the head quarter and township level. At the Yangon Head Office, UNICEF National Child Protection Officer, Save the Children Program Manager as well as Advisor and RMO senior staff meet every month to discuss the challenges, achievement in implementation of child protection case management at respective township.

Monthly Internal coordination meeting is held among the implementation partners, such as DSW, UNICEF, Save the Children, RMO and MRCS at the township level. Share the cases and update information, plan to visits to child, family and community, ask support from DSW if there is difficult to deal with village/ward authorities. Moreover, for the purpose of sharing the updated information on referral cases, constructive feedback on their services and update the service provider mapping, external coordination meetings are held quarterly with TCRC members, service providers, DSW case manager, UNICEF child protection field officer, field-based staff from Save the Children, RMO and MRCS attended.

*After refer the statutory case to DSW, we don't know the case update information. When community asks us, we have to say that we transferred the case to DSW and they will come. So, monthly internal coordination meeting is important to avoid the information gap.*²⁸

In general, relationships and cooperation between DSW case managers and NGO staff appear to be strong, working together and assisting each other to respond to cases. In areas where DSW appeared to be functioning rather more effectively, the role of NGOs was particularly likely to be characterised as helpful and supportive.

Regarding the best practice building the child protection system to protect and response effectively, there are examples of the countries in East Asia and Pacific Region that established multi-disciplinary team or one-stop crisis centre as an integrated approach to responding to child victims of abuse, violence and exploitation. Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Thailand developed hospital-based one-stop crisis centres that offer harmonised legal, counselling and medical services for adult and child victims of violence. For instance, Malaysia's Child Protection Teams (including police officer, health professional, a social welfare officer) and Thailand's Multi-disciplinary Teams (consisting of a teacher, social welfare officer, health professional, police officer and a prosecutor) were established to promote a more synchronised response to child protection cases (UNICEF EAPRO, 2014).

A one-stop crisis centre acts as a multi-disciplinary unit providing comprehensive services for survival of violence, coordinating with the police, courts, Office of the Attorney-General, emergency shelters, NGOs and the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. To avoid repeated investigations and interviews, the aim is to ensure a client-sensitive, bringing medical, forensic,

²⁷ Interview with caregiver, 9 June 2018.

²⁸ FGD with NGO Staff, 15 May, 2018.

coordinated approach, legal and social services under one intervention (UNICEF EAPRO, 2014).

General medical staff conducts an evaluation to assess the type of treatment needed and collects information when a child or woman comes into the hospital. If abuse is suspected, the case is referred to the Crisis Centre. The child or women received immediate medical care as needed, and the staff examines to decide whether it is safe for the child to return home. If there is a concern, the staff coordinates with the Children's Reception Home, village headman or district administrators to follow up on the case. While a child or woman is in the care of the hospital, the Crisis Centre staffs are only technically involved (UNICEF EAPRO, 2014).

2.3 Challenges

There are a number of resources and capacities gap which are impeding on DSW's ability to follow up on the cases compared to NGOs. A number of factors are hindering the capacity of DSW to take more cases, and to undertake the kind of social work with families and communities currently being practiced by the NGO partners. In particular case managers within DSW lack the budget and time to respond to cases that are referred to them.

I could say after RMO phase-out, only one DSW case manager are over workloads to following up all the cases. They also need someone help to visit the child as they can't drive a motorbike.²⁹

Given such constraints it is not surprising that many of the DSW case managers appeared to be lacking enthusiasm and commitment for case work. This is the main reason why DSW are failing to implement the SOPs properly and to follow-up on cases.

We are difficult to go there have a urgent meeting call by the GAD because we are living 41 miles far away and we have no office in that township. So, it is also not easy to follow-up the cases.³⁰

There is evidence that progress is being made towards building trust in and demand for the case management system at the community level. Nevertheless, a number of threats to sustainability remains. The need for greater financial investment is also critical as the case management system is brought to scale, particularly in the absent of NGO support. Insufficient of human capacity and financial resources remains the primary challenge for the effective functioning of child protection systems in Myanmar as well as in Mandalay region.

The high level of government staff (TCRC members) turn over and other competing priorities is one of the main challenges for function of case management system.

"We have to do regular advocacy and awareness on child protection because if they (TCRC chair and members) well understand the nature and important to support child rights then they transferred to another township. So we have to do advocacy again."³¹

²⁹ Interview with Child Protection Specialist of PLAN Myanmar, 14 May, 2018.

³⁰ Interview with DSW Case Manager, 14 May, 2018.

³¹ Interview with NGO senior staff, 8 May 2018.

Moreover, DSW did not have a proper plan to relocation of case supervisor and manager who got promotion and transfer to another township. There is no appropriate hand over for cases among the case managers. As a result, it negatively affects the level of trust among the children and community. Sympathetic and commitment to child protection from relevant government departments such as justice, health, education, local authority and law enforcement remain a challenge.

3. Conclusion

Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the child define that when countries ratify the Convention, they agree to review their laws relating to children, This involves assessing their social services, legal, health and educational systems, as well as levels of funding for these services. Governments are then obliged to take all necessary steps to ensure that the minimum standards set by the Convention in these areas are being met.

Moreover, Article 19 outlines that “children have the rights to be protected from all forms of violence, abuse and neglected by their parents or anyone else who looks after them. Myanmar became a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991. Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement is the focal Ministry to protect, respect and fulfil the rights of children in Myanmar. Within the Ministry, Department of Social Welfare is responsible for the delivery of child protection services.

Myanmar Child Law (1993) has been revised and it will soon be presented to Parliament of adoption. A strong legislative framework is critical to the effective delivery of child protection case management services which is consistent with international standards, and established a legal framework, duties and responsibilities of relevant bodies, procedures and enforcement for child protection.

NGOs can play an important role in the development of a child protection case management system through providing support to DSW social workers, complementing their case management service delivery, strengthening capacity for example, raising awareness in communities and encouraging trust in Government. However, understanding and commitment to child protection from relevant government departments such as justice, health, education, local authority and law enforcement are essential to achieving child protection case management as it is a multi-disciplinary project. Therefore, mobilisation training are necessary to provide justice, education and health care professionals and practitioners to raise awareness and to play their role of children suffering from violence, abuse, neglect, and exploitation.

Moreover, DSW case manager should receive training in practice and procedure, as well as coaching on more substantive elements of case management, including practical approaches to addressing and resolving cases, creative problem solving, critical thinking, counselling and communication skills. It is essential to ensure that the necessary human resources are available in order to implementation effective case management.

In conclusion, social work case management, as a child protection response, is applicable and associates efforts across the development of alternative care

options, provision of adequate care for children in contact with the law, addressing specific child protection issues like trafficking and child labor. Therefore, this is the right time to think about child protection strategic plan because of the department aim to scale up the mechanism in the future. Develop a comprehensive case management system at the decentralized level, which will address the needs of other vulnerable group, for example, women, the elderly, people with disabilities and substance users). Case management will play a vital role in responding to social issues and it is hoped that social work becomes a professional career in Myanmar.

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COSMOPOLITANISM AND NATIONALISM: IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN THAI BASIC EDUCATION

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Abstract

Identity construction is, among others, a condition of basic education. In Thailand's case, it is also an objective. Certain parts of the basic education are designed to instill thoughts, perspectives, and characters. Social studies subject group is the sole significant contributor in this endeavor. Beside History, Geography, and Economy, the Thai basic education has employed Religion and Citizenship studies. It is through these experience that each student's identity is hopefully shaped to what is deem desirable to the country.

Discourses around Thai Education which largely indicated that Thai education is promoting nationalism, specifically in the textbook contents of social studies subjects. However, the discourses only rely upon the contents of the textbook which does not cover the entire education experience. The research used cosmopolitanism as an opposing ideology to nationalism. Considering that Thailand has agreed to build awareness of ASEAN and cultivate the regional identity in its citizen as according to the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Blueprint (2009) and has also stipulated in The Twelfth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2016) that Thai education shall produce, not only Thai citizens, but also citizens of the region, and global citizens. This suggested roles of cosmopolitan values within the aim of Thai basic education.

This research studies identity construction in Thai basic education from the experiences and perspectives of students who have completed the Basic education through Mattayom Suksa year 6. While the contents remain largely based on Thai nationalism, involving Thai race, Theravada Buddhism, the royal institute, and Thai culture, the results of education do not necessarily align with the objectives. The class experiences and life experiences of each students can create conflicting awareness which the students use as benchmarks to evaluate and be aware of their own opinion and perspective.

The students' evaluation of their experiences and perspectives indicates how Thai basic education effectively constructed identity in students. The research takes interpretative approach to analyze responses of students in interview sessions. Students' own judgment of their own identity is compared with the elements of identity construction in the national curriculum and the students' experiences both inside and outside of the class.

Keywords: *Identity Construction, Basic Education, Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, Thailand*

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Introduction

“Social, Religion, and Culture” is a learning subject group among others in the basic education of Thailand. The subject group was stipulated into the basic education as an acknowledgement to need of the societal context. The purpose of the subject group according to the Ministry of Education, Thailand, as stated in the Indicators and Core Learning Objectives can be boiled down to: “How to live as a human being” with acknowledgement to the continuous fast-paced changes of the global society. It is, therefore, necessary to equip the Thai citizens with the knowledge and the mindset that can help them leading a decent life in both Thai and global societal context.

The description of the learning subject group shows emphasis in both the ability to live in the societal context of Thailand as a citizen of the nation and the ability to line in the larger global context as a global citizen. Adaptability, tolerance, and moral were mentioned as some of the quality required to achieve these goals. It can be discerned that the social, religion, and culture learning subject group is utilized as an instrument to instill in students the quality of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. On one hand, the Thai education system should be required to produce suitable citizens for the nation; ones who are adequately patriotic, who are knowledgeable in the Thai cultural know-how should their family failed to, or inadequately, taught them. So that the final product of the Thai education is a citizen who fits in perfectly with the Thai society. And on the other hand, the Thai basic education should also be required respond to the dynamic of culture and ideologies. The Thai society is not a separated entity devoid of different influences. The Thai society is composed of multiple different social unites and communities of different ethnicities, belief, and cultures. The totality of these smaller composition, in turn, intertwine with the larger sphere of many other societies that make up the world.

A dilemma can be expected from this. While the Thai basic education aims to both foster nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The two concepts can be seen as an opposition of one another. To reinforce one is to weaken the other. While the Thai basic education planned to promote both perspectives, the expected result which is how the act of education is carried out in schools should not meet with the aim of the social, religion, and culture learning subject group as stated.

Nationalism and the curriculum

The Social, Religion, and Culture learning subject group, or colloquially called the social studies subjects, as of the current year, consists of 5 subjects: 1) Religion, Moral, and Ethics; 2) Citizens’ Duty, Culture, and Way of Living in Society; 3) Economy; 4) History; 5) Geography. All five subjects are present in the curriculum for all grades from Prathom Suksa year 1 through 6 to Mattayom Suksa year 1 through 6. These subjects are presented by the national curriculum as sets of learning indicators that the schools need to fulfill by arranging into classes as the schools see fit. Beside the indicators, the ministry has also issued a set of textbooks to be used by each corresponding subject in the indicators.

A study by Sittichai Sukata and Nadhawe Bunnag (2015), Discourse Analysis of Thai Nationalism in Social Studies and Historical Textbooks has found that the content of the textbooks for the social, religion, and culture learning subject group contains narratives that associate with Thai nationalist perspectives. The

study suggested that there are 3 main aspects of nationalism that appeared in text book which are race, monarchy and culture. Religion would only appeared as part of the monarch quality but not by itself so much as to be considered a separated category. However, religion exists as a separated subject beyond the textbooks examined by the study.

On the Thai race, the study summarized the characteristic of the Thai race as portrait in the text book. The Thai race is considered to be inclusive of many ethnicities beside the main Thai ethnic and that the existence of Thai race can be traced back to a very ancient origin. The Thai race is described as crafty and adaptive people who are also selfless and moral. These are portrayed through the narrative of nation ancestors defending the sovereignty of the country.

On monarchy, the study found that the monarchs have been associated with the defense of the nation's sovereignty. On in some events where the sovereignty has been taken away, the monarch will be associated with the reclamation of the nation. Beside national security in militaristic sense, monarchy is also associated with the nation's economy which is portrayed as being built by the monarch. Being responsible for the basic livelihood has huge impact on the legitimacy of monarchy, the study added. Buddhism is associated with monarchy as being under the patronage of the monarch, creating the legitimacy for Buddhism as national religion. The study also found that there are also lesson on the brilliance of the current monarch (then, Rama IX) with the mention of the self-sufficient economy and how the monarch had helped solved the economic issues. The monarch is also portrayed as being loved and revered by the Thai people and cannot be offended. The study suggested that monarchy is presented as being heavily associated with the unity of the nation. This correspond to the interest of the government to deter criticism. Whereas accusation on the monarch is prohibited, any accusation or criticism on the nation is likewise deterred.

On culture, referring to the life style, arts, traditions, language, etiquette, and music, which the texts refers to as being appealing and appropriate. The study found that the text suggested that being a Thai means having a Thai spirit which encompass fulfillment of duty according to social position and the sacrifice for the nation. The study suggested that this is a clear indication of social reproduction. Other qualities of the Thai culture as portrayed by the text are that the culture is worthy of preservation and recognized worldwide; that the culture is adaptive, as in adapted elements from other cultures to create something unique; that the Thai traditional creations, specifically residence and cuisine, are superior to other culture. The texts also support the use of local products.

Understanding Cosmopolitanism

The most prominent definition is seeing cosmopolitan as a vision for a social development. A cosmopolitan society is a community of diversity where different races, religions, cultures, and other differentiating attributes live together in mutual respect. (Appiah 1997) It is worth noticing that in this view, the universality of morality does not include assimilation of identities. Individuals maintain their own cultures, belief, etc. Universality of morality includes only mutual respect and compassion for the wellbeing of one another.

To advocate cosmopolitanism is to advocate moral universalism. It is the belief in equality of moral obligation toward all human being, devoid of any differences:

nationality, cultural background, belief, etc. will not determine differentiations in treatment, according to the conviction. Such conviction may be achievable in a perfect world, but it is not how the real world's social dynamic works. Moral obligation can never be absolutely equal. Human always have preferences or different level of relations with other persons. This does not only occur on individual to individual basis, but also in group basis. We have more moral obligation toward persons who belong to the group we identified with. These are the dynamic between compatriots and foreigners, among others. (Appiah 2006)

To be qualify for moral obligation, a certain criteria must be met. As mentioned above, the criteria was familiarity with the persons. A people from the same race or the same countries will feel more morally obligated to one another due to familiarity to the appearances that they see regularly. This is possibly the reason why certain religions mandated dress codes or headwear: to create a sense of familiarity. Familiarity does not rely on appearances alone. Awareness and knowledge of different people can also help. Familiarity can be established as easily as learning. But there are certain cost the society must pay to establish the familiarity. (Butler 2004)

The expense is its own culture. A society must estrange themselves from their own culture, not entirely, but to a degree that other cultures can be seen as equal. (Gilroy 2004) Estrangement from culture is not a denial of culture. The term does not suggest a lack of knowledge or practices, but a step back from being too passionate. To take a step back from the devotion to one's own nation and patriotism will open up rooms to learn new culture, perhaps not to adopt, but to expand the sphere of compassion. And with it, moral obligations. This could be the most necessary step for a society to become a cosmopolitan.

Findings

The research study which this paper shall hereafter discuss was conducted with the aim to examine the student's experiences during their time undertaking Thai basic education along with their overall life experience, identities, and perspectives to determine the identity construction in Thai basic education, especially in the classes of the social, religion, and culture learning subject group. The research looked for the way that education can affect how students views themselves and the others. The research also looked for other factors that may also influences perspectives outside of the social studies' materials.

To fulfill the primary research topic of investigating the way that Thai basic education or otherwise external factors can contribute to the construction of nationalist and cosmopolitan identities in students, the research separated the investigation into two secondary topics: 1) The amount of impact that the experiences in the classes of social, religion, and culture learning subject group has on the students; and 2) The effects of the experiences in the classes of social, religion, and culture learning subject group has on the identity and perspective of students.

The research has concluded that Thai basic education experience is contributing to the construction of nationalist perspective. This is the totality of the overall experience inclusive of the classes in the social, religion, and culture learning subject group and the extra-curricular activities and the school community as a whole. The experiences from the basic education has a degree of influence to the

perspective of the students in how they understand reality about themselves and the others belonging to their own identity group and those of different identity groups.

The research also concluded that the dynamic of identity construction in classes is not an isolated situation relying entirely on the information presented in classroom. There are external factors outside of classes that contributed to the student's identity and perspective. The outside perspectives are influencing how the students evaluate information presented in class, either prior or after the class. Students has no emotional attachment to the perspectives or information from classes. The identity construction in classes still has profound effect on the students' perception, however. The effects of social studies subjects can be found in a certain degree even with students who can be expected to holds an opposing perspective.

Certain external factors outside of the classes, especially the media, are the sources of cosmopolitan perspectives. The media is inclusive of television, websites, and especially the social media platforms. The research has found that the students generally have a positive opinion on multicultural society and refrain from any negative attitude toward people of different identity as themselves. Students are being exposed to discussions around social and political discourses and issues, which provide alternative perspectives resulting in indecisiveness in their judgments. In this case, the social media platforms provide arguments in favor of the cosmopolitanism perspectives in opposition the nationalist perspectives from the schools. The social studies subjects contribute little to cosmopolitan perspective even when there are indication of schools attempting to cultivate the perspective. The extra-curricular and the school community also contribute to reinforcing nationalism.

Due to the external factors, the experiences in Thai basic education do not result in the students becoming entrenched in nationalist identity. The research has found that students acknowledge their own identity as a Thai and exhibiting affiliation with the Thai nationalist perspectives, some of which can be found present in the textbooks of the social, religion, and culture learning subject group. While at the same time, the students also keep a clear distance from being identified as a nationalist.

The research has found that the students' identities have a solid foundation with the family influences. Family, as a social unit in a larger society is the first source which inform the students of their identity. This particular event creates a baseline form of identity recognition that the students will be identify with. The other factors that affect identity construction will contribute to forming additional identities or shape the perspectives on identities already formed, resulting in prioritization or variation in levels of presence. Effectively, these events will modify the students' identity but will not expunge the baseline identities in normal circumstances.

Followings are further elaborations on implications that arose from the results of the research, organized by the category of information that the research investigated

- Secondary topic 1: The amount of impact that the experiences in the classes of social, religion, and culture learning subject group has on the students. This section evaluates the students' identity and life experience

relating to identity construction; and the students' evaluation of experiences in social-studies classes.

- Secondary topic 2: The effects of the experiences in the classes of social, religion, and culture learning subject group has on the identity and perspective of students. This sections evaluate students' self-defined identity and perspective on different identities; and students' perspective relating to the topics of content in Thai national social-studies curriculum.

Secondary Topic 1

The amount of impact that the experiences in the classes of social, religion, and culture learning subject group has on the students.

The research has found that Thai basic education is only a small factor contributing to the identity of students. The major factors seem to be the family that define the baseline identities. The baseline identities are what the students perceived as who they were from the moment that they were born, namely: a Thai and a Buddhist. Basic education is, however, an important part of the modifying factors. The modifying factors are experiences that affects perspectives of certain identities. The modifying factors will define or redefine priority of the baseline identities as well as add in new identities.

The Baseline Factor

Family was found to be the most influential to the students' identity construction. Students reported their perception to who they are as a person and their relation to the society around them to be, to a significant degree, a copy of their parents. The study has not found an instance where students deviate from this, although it is not expected to be impossible. It can be assumed that the cases that the research has studies are stable families that are doing relatively well by society standard, considering that it is within their capacity to send their children to enroll in a higher education institute. It can at least be expected that the students participating in this research are having a good relation with at least one of their parents or otherwise a parental figure who support their development. As such, it is the identity of the family that the students are most familiar and most comfortable with. Aside from the factor that the students should also be taught by the family that they also belong to the same identity groups that the parents are belonging to, the familiarity is the key condition that cement these identities as baseline identities.

Modifying Factors

Apart from the baseline identities set by the family, students' perspectives can be influences by other factors. These factors came from the students' life experiences which make up the composition of students' personal idea about how they view themselves and the others. The effects include the students' identities which can be modified, or new identities can be added altogether. However, as mentioned above, the baseline identities from the family has not been found to be abandoned due to modifying factors or otherwise, but the students' perspectives on the identities can be changed.

Media, especially social media has been the major source of influence on the students. Students reported that many concepts they mentioned were learned from social media, the news, or otherwise either online source or television broadcasting. Books, magazines, or other printed media could have had the same effect but was never mentioned.

Friends and acquaintances were also sources of influences. In the case of friends, the peer pressure of friends or mere discussion with friends can have effects on how the students' perspective. In some cases, a revered or respected figure of authority, especially religious authority can have a major influence on the student. Being personally associated with such figures can have a huge impact on reinforcing connection with the certain identities.

The school communities and how schools handle students with different identities from the majority of the students also has impact on students' perspective. The research has found that schools will support only one religion that the schools belong to. The schools provide multiple religious activities, such as sermons, field trips, or camps, while those who belongs to other religions are disregarded. There were no attempts to make any special occasions or practices of other religions apparent. The schools reactions or resolutions to any disputes between identity groups also have impact on the students' perspectives.

Education, or classes' lessons also did contribute to the students' perspectives. The influences from the classes are found to be rather subtle. Students were found to have absorbed ideas and perspectives presented by the materials of the social, religions, and culture subject group rather well. Although, the students are more likely to refer to other sources as their inspiration, the classes they took has contributed more than they had admitted to be.

The influences of the modifying factors has effects on students in varying degrees. But the totality of these factors covers almost all life experiences.

Secondary Topic 2

The effects of the experiences in the classes of social, religion, and culture learning subject group has on the identity and perspective of students.

Although students did not recognize education as primary source of influence, their opinions are largely in line with the nationalist narratives in the textbooks. Some students recognized the disputable narratives, especially around the presentation of Thai national history. But they would still be found to be in agreement to most nationalist narratives in the material.

The schools experiences in general also contributed to nationalist identity. There are cases where students are exposed to different identities than their own, but such cases did not result in the students having a cosmopolitan perspective. To exemplify, the research found a case where a Buddhist student studied in a Catholic school. The experience has improved the student's opinion on Catholics and Christians in general. But the student's opinion on Muslims were diminished. This is due to a certain dispute regarding Muslims' dress code, whereas discontent among the majority of school students toward Muslims was not properly addressed by the school, resulting in a lingering negative impression for the students. The experiences of being exposed to people of different identities

does not necessarily improve cosmopolitan perspective if the impressions were positive toward one group while negative toward the other.

Social media and other online sources contribute to student's perspective. Students who are more politically engaged online will have more variety in opinion. But even students who are less politically engaged are still aware of the issue of ultra-nationalists in online discussions. The research has found that all students refuse to be recognized as nationalists to a certain degree. Most students refused the notion instantly. Opinions express in online sources can be passionate and extreme at times. Some students express concern about the discourses on social media. It can be discerned that social life today exists both online as well as offline. Social life in social media can be important to many that the dynamic of the discourses online was closely observed. Students quickly learned to recognize social or political groups online and take care not to associate themselves with extreme groups and the identities they hold.

The Baseline Identities

As discussed earlier, the students' family has provided the most influences in the students' identities and perspectives. These identities can be recognized as the baseline identities. They are identities that are more solid and stable for the students. This is because that while other identities are adopted or realized by life experience. These are identities that belongs to their home. The most significant are as follows:

Nationality: There is a unique dynamic surrounding this particular identity. Nationality is not an identity that is defined by choice or preference alone. But there is also legality involved. Being a Thai can mean accepting oneself and being accepted in Thai society. But it can also mean being registered as a citizen of the country completed with benefit and duty that entailed citizenship. Although the identity of nationality can be regarded in two separated concepts as social oriented concept in one hand and as political oriented concept in the other, the line is not so clear for most students. Students accepts national identity as a core part of themselves by their birthright due to the fact that their family is Thai. Despite being a Thai citizen legally, their association with Thai nationality is rather sentimental and not logical.

Religion: The religion identity is also quite as solid as nationality, despite having no legal binding involved. The students accept the belief held by their family as their own. There are a varying degree of association with religion in different students. Some students are more religious than the other. There are those who reported to have little association with religious activities on their own and will only participate in any activities on others' volition. These students reported participating in religious activities with their family when they was younger and no longer participated on their own. However, they still consider themselves as a member of the religion group simply because of their family. Only those who are truly religious will express their reasons why they consider themselves as a religion group member. It could be assumed that the students who are not religious regarded religion as a family identity; a social bond that binds them with their family.

The Modified Identities

Beyond the baseline identities received from birth at home, the students has adopted or realized identities while experiencing various influential factors as discussed earlier. These influences may alter the identities that the students have already possessed or causes new identities.

The baseline identities that were modified are:

Nationality: Nationality remains seemingly the most solid identity but the perspective on the identity was wavered by interferences from outside sources. Although the basic education was designed to reinforce students' pride and positive perspectives about being a Thai national. The effects the education has was found mostly to be supplying students with information about the nationality. Students' self-identified association with the identity was found to be mostly influenced by the media. The research has found that the students were dissuaded by the news and discourses surrounding ultra-nationalists. The result was the students refused or hesitated to acknowledge themselves as a nationalist. They still acknowledge the nationality as a more passive identity, with relatively less impact on their self-identification in general.

Religion: Students reportedly experiences different degree of influences about religion. Most students' family were associated with a religion (Buddhism in all cases) expectedly to a different degree. In most cases, the students were identifying themselves with the religion only as a passive background identity, similar to nationality. The students, in most cases, did not participate in religious activities. There are only a few who actively participated in religious activities on their own. The research has found that the factors that the students who were more religious than the others were influences by either their family or by some religious authority figure revered by their family. Media, friends, or societal environments were found to have minuscule effect on how students associate themselves with religion, but play a vital part on how students view other religions. Students were found to be mostly indifferent to other religions, except for cases where students were living in the environment where the majority are holding a different religion whereas the students' opinion were found to be significantly positive.

Significant additional identities introduced beyond the baselines by the modifying factors are:

Individual: When asked to rank identities from a set of identities that describe them, the students mostly rank individual the highest on the list. Although individualism is not the first concept that comes to mind for the students, they quickly recognize its importance to their being and select the concept as their most defining identity with little reservation. The research has found that the concept was not reinforced by any influences in particular. The students could not identify the most influential sources. It can suspect that such concept as individualism is a social trend that is a result of the contemporary value that put more importance in personal opinion and feelings.

Human: This identity is a close second as the top priority identities that the students selected to associate themselves with. Although the concept eludes the students' mind when asked for identities that describe them, the students quickly accepted being a human as their identity. To associate oneself to the entire human race is possibly a sign of cosmopolitan thinking. In this regard, the

student reported that they had prioritized this particular identity because they should hold a positive view toward all human race. As such, it could be interpreted that the students were forced to accept this identification out of fear of being seen as racist.

Conclusion

The research has concluded that Thai basic education experience is contributing to the construction of nationalist perspective by itself in both the classroom experiences and the overall school community experiences. The basic education experience has an overall effect in promoting nationalist perspectives, and provide little in promoting cosmopolitan perspectives. But the experience is only effective to the students' specific opinion in some specific matters. The overall identities of the students were not affected by the education experience. The factors that have affected the students' identities were the family, as a factor that determinate the baseline identity of students; and the other life experiences from media, friends, or others that modify the students' perspectives and their associations to their current identities or result in the students recognizing themselves with new identities.

The contextual shift in how children receive information can mean a significant need for shift in the role of education and how it presents information. While Thai basic education is promoting Thai nationalism as a part of the expected outcome of Thai education to create a Thai citizen suitable for the society of the country. But the context of the society has significantly shifted. The information the student received is no longer just the information presented in class by the teachers, nor at home by the parents. The students now have easy access to other sources of information, especially the internet.

Social media is providing an engaging platform for ingesting information for the students. These platforms provided different variety of perspectives whereas students evaluate and find the balance that they can agree to and associate with themselves. This balance between discourses missing from the classroom experience. Lack of class discussion on the information presented in the material can result in the student reject the school teaching as biased propaganda if they find discussion on the topic online.

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ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION OF GARMENT INDUSTRY IN MYANMAR: A CASE STUDY OF GARMENT INDUSTRY IN HLAING THAR YAR TOWNSHIP

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Abstract

Ecological Modernization Theory proposed the school of thoughts for reconciling the goals of economic growth and environmental protection by bringing the economic incentives for the firm while the environmental management is prioritized, having the civil society, community and consumer have space to pressure toward policy making to demand better environmental performance, changing the role of state as traditional policy making to fueling the mechanisms which encourage the business to adopt the science and technology for improving environmental management.

The study used the theory of ecological modernization theory to analyze the potentials for greening the garment industry in Myanmar. It took the case of 13 garment factories which export their products by identifying the environmental concern of garment industry qualitatively, the perception of factories toward environmental sustainability. The factories managers and owners have knowledge and understanding of environmental sustainability, yet they believed the current mode of production of garment is not harmful to the environment and resources compared to heavy industry. Thus, they saw improving environmental management would not bring them much economic benefits. However, there is an area of interest from factories in terms of energy saving, better waste management will bring them the benefit of reduction in the cost and thus increasing the profit.

The process of policy making toward environmental management of industry is conventional command and control. In addition, there have been lack of capacities and resources to adequately monitor the environmental impacts from the industry. The involvement of civil society has been growing and limited in terms of influencing the environmental policy.

Keywords: *Ecological modernization, Garment Industry, environmental sustainability, environmental policy making*

1. Problem Statement

The goals of economic growth and the environment protection are always recognized in the zero-sum terms whereby the economic growth harms the natural environment (Welford and Starkey, 1996). The theory of ecological modernization proposes a potential solution to these conflicting goals of economy

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and environment with a focus on transformation of the nature of industrialization which is a driver of economic growth. The ecological crisis in the form of environmental pollution from massive growth of industry can be solved by restructuring production and consumption which is ecological modernization. Industrial development is undoubtedly seen as a driver of economic growth. According to the World Bank (2016), Myanmar economic growth has reached to 6.5 percent from the period of 2016 to 2017 and is projected to average 7.1% per year over the next three years. In the meanwhile, the industrial sector have also been recognized as a threat to natural environment. It was highlighted in Ministerial Statement on Global Environment and Energy in Transport paper (2008) that urban air pollution is largely contributed by the growth in the size of cities, economic development with increasing number of vehicles and higher level of energy consumption and urban and Industrial development with the movement of people to urban creates the air pollution. The Green Motherland Development Association in Yangon, has tested the organic compounds in water of the industrial zone in Yangon between 2013 and November 2015 which are the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) of the waste water and (COD), another indirect measurement of the amount of organic compounds in water and the results showed that the level of these organic compounds of waste water which are considered to be pollutants, in the industrial zones are higher than standard specification (the Myanmartimes, Jan 2016). In addition, the air pollution level of Myanmar is the third highest per capita in South East Asia according to WHO (the Myanmar Times, 2016). According to the estimation of the World Bank (2012), the current solid waste generation in Myanmar was 5,616 tones/day with the per capita waste generation of 0.44 kg/capita/day. Thus, all major cities area which are Yangon, Mandalay and Nay Pyi Taw have been facing tremendous challenges with regard to managing industrial waste (Premakumara, and Hengesbaugh, June 2016).

Garment Industry is one of the major components of industry sector in Myanmar and included in the prioritization for both short term and medium-term focus of industrial development of government. (Kyaw Phone Kyaw, 2016) Ecological Modernization concedes that the environmental problem are structural outcomes of capitalist society, but it rejects the radical green demand for restructuring of market economy. Industrial production processes always demand excessive energy and resources, generate massive pollutions of chemicals and creating negative externalities on the society (Evan, 2012). One key aspect of ecological modernization is about decision-making. This can be understood through the lens of “environmental governance”, in particular how decisions are taken around the choice and use of technology towards the goal of ecological modernization.

2. Research Questions

Main Question: To study the potentials for greening the garment industry in Myanmar through the lens of ecological modernization, taking a case study of Garment Industry in Hlaing Thar Yar Township in Yangon.

The sub-questions are:

1. What are the factors contributing to the environmental performance of garment industry in Myanmar?


2. What is the role of state in environmental policy making toward environmental management of Garment Industry? (actors, institutions, norms)
3. What is the role of market in demanding environmental upgrading of garment industry in Myanmar?
4. What is the role of non-state actors which forms social networks in demanding environmental upgrading of Garment Industry in Myanmar?

3. Production Processes and Environmental Concerns of Garment Industry

This chapter discusses about the production processes of garment factories related to the environmental management at the firm level which gave information on the factors contributing to the environmental performance of garment industry in Myanmar. and the associated Environmental Concerns of Garment Industry based on the semi-structured survey which was done with 12 Garment manufacturing factories in Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone of Yangon Township in Myanmar in order to answer research question 1: What are the factors contributing environmental performance garment industry? It also included the perceptions of factory owners/manager toward sustainable garment production and barriers for environmental upgrading at the firm level.

Geographical Location of Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone (combine with profile section)

Figure 1: Geographical Location of Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone



Source: Project for Capacity Development in Basic Water Environment Management and EIA System, JICA. (2015), retrieved from <http://myanmarwaterenvironment.com/index.php/en/project/>

The 12 garment factories interviewed are from Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone and Shwe Lin Ban Industrial Zone. Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone (which include zone 1,2,3,4, 6 and 7) is bounded in the east by Hlaing River, in the West

by Shwe Than Lwin Industrial Zone, in the North by Yangon-Pathein Road, and in the South by Panhlaing River. (Myanmar Industries Association, 2016) and the total area is 1087.98 acres. The total area of Hlaing Thar Yar Zone 5 is 222.933 acres and situated along the Anawyata Road, Hlaing Thar Yar Township and that of Shwe Lin Ban is 1,100 acres. (Myanmar Industrial Association, 2016)

The Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone is the largest industrial zone in Yangon with an, followed by Shwe Pyi Thar and Dagon. Hlaing Thar Yar has about 500 companies, while Shwe Pyi Thar has about 200, both of them operating different lines of manufacturing, in particular light manufacturing like garments and food processing (HKTDC, 2012). The zones are under the management of Hlaing Tharyar Industrial Zone Management Committee which is member of Myanmar Industries Association. As can be seen in figure, the Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone is located in the close proximity to the water body which is Hlaing River. (Myanmar Industries Association, 2016)

3.1 Production Processes of Garment Manufacturing Industry

The general production processes involved in manufacturing garment at the individual firm level were needed to explore for the environmental impacts of the garment manufacturing Industry. Under this part, the processes of production of garment in the factories as stated by the factory owners/managers include the following;

- Transporting,
- Storage,
- Cutting,
- Sewing,
- Pressing/Ironing,
- Washing,
- Quality Checking
- Packing, and
- Transporting (to port).

The current mode of production of garment in Myanmar is mainly CMP basis which is Cutting, Making and Packing. It started with the transportation of inputs which include the fabric, and accessories which were sent by the buyers. The inputs are transported to the port and the factories carried out transportation of them from port with vehicles. They were then stored in the factories. It involved the use of fuel and electricity. The production started with cutting which means the cutting of fabric to get it ready to be sewed. This stage involved the cut pieces and solid waste disposal. Then the sewing followed the cutting and it includes sewing and different line of machines for different parts of garment. The number of lines for sewing garment varies from 6 to 18 depending upon the size of factories and the types of garment. This stage needs the use of electricity and dispose some waste like fabric, cotton thread and the paper and plastic roll of thread.

The pressing and/or ironing stage followed and it used water, electricity, fuel and this stage needs the steam that is generated by the boiler which used the fuel

wood, water and in some case, the electricity is needed to run the generator to run the boiler. This stage was stated by the factories as the largest water using stage of production. The washing stage is needed for some types of garment. Majority of factories mentioned that very few times they required washing of the garment for having them in good shape and avoiding the elasticity of cloth at the final product stage.

The Quality Checking (QC) stage is usually after each line of sewing by using manpower and having the labor check the quality of products. However, the final QC stage for factories exporting to Japan made use of machine to check if there is some needle in the cloth and the machine required the use of electricity. Packing is simply the packing the garment products for the final transportation and it used the paper boxes and plastic bags for packing and wrapping garment products. It also has some types of plastic and paper wastes left from packing.

The final stage after packing is transporting the finished garment products to the port to send it to the buyers. It also required the use of vehicles and fuel gas. Apart from abovementioned production processes, the energy use and waste can be also seen from labor and office operation. Electricity is needed for having light in office, running the IT system like computer and internet and also for factories. There is also disposal of solid waste from the food waste of labors, sewage and other types of waste like plastic bags.

3.2 The Environmental Concerns of Garment Industry

The environmental concerns of garment industry were identified qualitatively based on the interview with factory owners/managers and experts (as identified in the methodology section) who are the actors involved in and related to garment manufacturing industry and their environmental concerns.

Based on the production process of garment, the identified types of pollution and resource use associated with the whole processes of production as mentioned above include;

1. Solid Waste
2. Waste Water
3. Air Pollution
4. Energy Use (Electricity, Fuel, Woods, Water)

These are categorized qualitatively based on the opinion of experts and factories' owners/managers. There was no actual measurement taken place in this study and this part is just to get overview of the environmental pollution from individual firms based on the perspective of chosen experts.

Solid Waste: as identified includes the cut pieces of fabrics, threads, plastics, and other broken accessories like buttons, metals, and papers, and paper boxes which are used along the production processes. Plus, the labors working at the factories made certain amount of wastes which are plastic bags, food wastes, sewages, etc.

Air Pollution: includes the air pollution comes from the gasoline and diesel used for running generators while the electricity is out and not enough. The electricity is needed for the whole operation of factories from storage to finishing.

The Boiler, a machine used for generating steams which is needed for most steps of production (pressing/ironing, finishing) and it is used by all factories. It requires the fuels (fuel woods, charcoals) and large amount of water (drinking water) so as to avoiding stains on cloth.

The vehicles are used for the labors, management, transporting goods and it requires the use of fuels and create air pollution.

Waste Water: The factories' owners and other experts stated that the garment factories have zero waste water disposed since it does not require dyeing for most of the cases since all the inputs (fabrics) came from abroad, they are ready to be sew. There are very few cases that needs the fabrics to wash or paint the logo or certain pattern on it. The factories due to having not enough technology or machines to handling the washing/dyeing in certain cases will send the cloth to other factories (dyeing and washing factories). So, the direct wastewater disposal will not be seen at the factories.

Energy Use: The electricity is consumed for the whole operation of factories from storage to packing and office operation. The fuel woods, gas and water are needed for running boiler which provide the steam for pressing and ironing the garments. The fuel is also needed for vehicles for transporting the garment products to and from the port, and the daily transportation of factory labor. The following figure illustrates the environmental concern of garment industry at each stage of production at the firm level.

4. Perception of Factories towards Environmental Management

It is important to understand the long-term goals of garment factories individually and collectively as a whole garment industry and where the environmental management (in this case, waste and energy use) stand as a barrier or opportunity for them to achieve their goals and how it fulfills the long term environmental sustainability of Garment Industry in Myanmar.

The capacities and perceptions of garment factories toward environmental concern of garment production and the management of it, is crucial for finding out the entry point and barriers for environmental reform of garment industry.

Economic Goals of Suppliers: The results of the interview showed that some of the factories were struggling to obtain stable orders since it changed over time depending upon the demand of Brands. One of the factories managers interviewed stated that;

“To have a stable order is important for all factories since it will mean we can pay for all the labor we hired and our company's profit, our job as a management staff is to maintain it, thus sometimes when we get less orders, we tried to seek other orders from bigger factories”

The factories owners are very eager to export to EU due to high prices and reputation.

Having passed for compliance or Audit is a great achievement for the factories since it will allow the factories to get more and even stable orders which will create the profits for them and grow the business.

The environmental management in the case of garment manufacturing is divided into waste and energy use in this study and the perceptions of factory owners and managers were obtained from the field survey.

The factory owners and managers in this study stated that the environmental sustainability as a component of their business by expressing their opinions on where the environmental management stand in their business.

The majority of factory owner/manager elaborated the minimal environmental impacts of their production processes of Garment Manufacturing compared to other types of industries.

One of the local factory owners (Tek Nay Wunn Ni Co ltd) stated that “Our business has no significant environmental impacts since we do not product the waste water and solid waste like other factories as you can see in the Industrial Zone and we dispose waste at the designated sites”.

Their perception toward environmental management lean toward the point where the business cause less environmental impacts in terms of waste, pollution and resource use and thus no major significant changes will be required within current production processes despite those criteria required in the Health and Safety.

It appeared that the factory owners/managers’ perceptions to environmental management as not a major priority for their business but a small component of business since the waste management and pollution are required under Health and Safety Concern.

Plus the factories stated that there would be no significant economic benefits by making improvement in current environmental management schemes since they believed they have not been causing large threat to the environment at this mode and level of production.

The Market is not signaling enough to promote development of environmentally friendly products by the Myanmar Garment Industries despite certain changes like waste management. The factory owners/managers have knowledge about eco-labeling but the tools sound to have no implications for their business since they have not been responsible for obtaining the inputs.

5. Understanding Capacities and Expertise of Factories toward environmental management

The factories stated the existing financial capitals and how the investments in making changes toward environmental management (in terms of developing alternative energy sources i.e. electricity, need large amount of capitals. The factories are not receiving the financial supports (loans and credit) from bank for their business. There exist no staff who are expert in management new technology like handling solar power.

It is hard to draw conclusions from the factory owners/managers’ perceptions to environmental sustainability but it is required to look at their environmental practices of production to understand where the environmental management stands in their business whether it is a barrier or catalyst to achieving their long term business goals.

6. Drivers for Environmental Reform of Garment Industry /Types of Pressure

In this chapter, the types of pressures that the garment manufacturing factories faced for the environmental management. It tried to answer the research question 1: What are the drivers that determine the environmental performance of garment industry in Myanmar.

6 Triad Network Model

To find out the groups/categories of actors or networks which play crucial roles in improving the environmental performance of garment manufacturing industry in Myanmar, the triad-network model was used and it was adopted from the earlier work of research done on the ecological modernization of industrial sector which are Mol (1995) for environmental reform in Chemical Industry, Tran Thi My Dieu (2003) on Food Processing Industry, and Wattanapinyo and Mol (2013) on Food Processing SMEs in Thailand. By adopting the methods from the previous studies, the changes in the environmental performances that have been triggered by various external actors and institutions in the environment of garment industry were explored in the context of Myanmar.

The three networks include groups of actors and institutions and their relationships and interaction patterns. Studying the relations and functioning of the identified networks will enable us to understand how the environmental reform could be triggered in the garment manufacturing units through these networks. The varying degrees of strengths of these networks will provide the need of each network to be empowered in order to pave the way for garment industry into environmental sustainability. The roles of each network and their relative strengths will likely to be found different based on the types of industry and countries.

A. Societal Network

The societal network in the Garment industry sector consists of the civil society organization (local and international Non-government Organizations) who are dealing with a variety of the environmental impacts of garment production, the local communities residing nearby the industrial zone, labours who are considered to be affected mostly by the external effects of garment manufacturing, and media which in this case represents the environmental media, raising public awareness of environmental issues, climate change, and industrial pollution in Myanmar.

a. Consumer

The consumer organization like consumer complaint mechanism might also be a part of societal network. Yet, since the end consumers of the garment products have no close link/contact with the suppliers/ garment producers, the garment industry in Myanmar is still missing one of its societal pressure for environmental reform.

b. NGOs/Social Movements

However, it was found that the Garment industry has not been the center of attentions of majority of environmental NGOs since they were considered to have low level of environmental impacts despite certain EU funded NGOs, working on energy efficiency and sustainable production e.g. SMART Myanmar. The majority of social movements concerned with the industrial sector includes heavy manufacturing industries such as social movements in Dawei Special Economic Zone.

According to Mol (1995) study on the Chemical Industry, there can be three forms of interactions between environmental NGOs and Industry, (1) direct interaction (2) indirect interaction, and (3) building general public awareness.

Direct interaction consists of regular communications, negotiations and product campaign, where the industry engaged directly with environmental movement and/or the public. This form of interaction was found not yet existing in the Garment Industry in Myanmar since the Garment Industry as a light manufacturing industry rarely gets attention of environmental NGOs unlike heavy manufacturing industries in Special Economic Zones.

Indirect interaction on the other hand, deals with environmental concerns via state either by advocating and enforcing changes in the production processes of industry and products by driven demands, requirements and pressure from environmental organization. (Mol, 1995)

This form of indirect interaction can be found in a number of International NGOs like SMART Myanmar, UNIDO, which have been encouraging and engaging with government for introducing the clean production in the industry, production efficiency such as energy efficiency.

The third form of construction of general public awareness on the garment industry and their environmental impacts might be found not only in NGOs but also the media has a significant role in it.

c. Media

The media (Myanmar times' reporter, Yangon) who have been reporting on the environmental issues within the country highlighted that the risks of reporting on the environmental issues regarding industrial pollution. The role of media for driving the environmental reform in the garment industry is considered as informing the public about the environmental issues, construction of public awareness, expressing the opinion of public on the environmental impacts of garment industry.

Yet, the media working on the environmental issues have also been gaining less popularity and lack of financial capacity to promote their work on environment. The journalist working on local media stated that;

“Our journal has been producing biweekly and the large number of journals are hardly sold out and there have been few number of audience. Particularly, only urban people like to buy our journal and the youth, who are the university students with particular interest on those environmental issues” (Sein Lann Myay Journal, local media)

The recent issues of industrial pollution happened in Mandalay, Myanmar, the journalists and environmental media, the general public had strong interest in

it. However, the access of information about the cause of environmental issues is limited.

The significant example of it was found during the massive death of fish in Taung Tha Man Pond in Mandalay regions, where the industries are located nearby. The journalist were requesting the information and scientific evidence of the cause of death of fish in the pond and it has gained public attention since the death was prominent and the odor from death fish affected the people in the city. The city development committee and ECD provided no significant information to the media and the access of media to information was limited. The journalist raised their concern about the risk of their security while reporting such significant issues of industrial pollution and other similar types of environmental impacts resulted from industry. (Journalist, Myanmar Times)

d. Labour

The political history of Myanmar has been known as the authoritarian and military government due to lack of freedom of speech, press, assembly and association. (T. Kudo, 2013) However, during its reform processes by the first civilian government in 2011, the labor organization law was passed to legalize the labor union. (Parliament, 2011). The labor organization law (2011) permits the freedom of association and 2012 Labor dispute law provide the dispute resolution institutions and mechanism. (ILO, 2015). According to the current labor laws, labor organizations have the right to send representatives to the Conciliation Body in settling a dispute between the employer and the worker. Similarly, they have the right to send representatives to the Conciliation Tribunals formed with the representatives from the various levels of labor organizations.

Interview with a labour right activists stated the issues of abuse of labor rights in the Garment Industry. A number of issues reported were mostly in the labour standard which are social security issues, fair working hours, formation of labour association in each factories, health and safety. Interview with a garment factory labour who has been working for a foreign owned company reported that the issues of lack of permission to form a labour association within the factor to raise the voice of labours and health and safety issues.

Majority of factories have large number of labour ranging 500 to 1000 labours, and the number of toilet available and the time allowed for labour to use it, was limited. The cleanliness of factories' environment was also reported as an issue e.g. contamination of drinking water.

The labour association was found to have the closet relationship with the garment factories and the labour force engaged in Garment industry is huge. However, they have been facing the issues of denial of their rights for forming association and effective mechanism for raising their voices despite there is a new labour organization law, lack of enforcement has been hindering it from making effective communication and negotiation with the factories.

So far, the concern made by the labour related to the environmental management of the garment manufacturing is only in the health and safety and working conditions.

e. Local Communities

Two communities were interviewed during the field survey. The interview with the local communities residing in the area nearby the industrial zone, namely Nyaung Village which exists since before the establishment of Industrial Zone and now in the closet proximity to Hlaing Thar Yar Industrial Zone 1, 2 and 3. However, the community now comprised of new members who are the labours working in the industrial sector, including the garment labour. Since the new community members in this village are the factory workers, they have economic relationship with factories relying on them for employment.

They have reported a number of industrial pollutions that they have been suffering and there was no complaint made to the factories directly by the community members. A prominent case of pollution from industry (Food Processing Factory) was quoted by the community members.

The general mechanism of complaints that can be made by the community as stated by them is through local administrative body. Once the issue of waste disposal from Pulp and Paper Factories in the residential area of village was reported and the local authority dealt with factory managers and the issue was solved.

B. Economic Network: An economic network comprised of a limited number of interacting organizations which share the economic goals as their primary motive for interactions and are structured under rules and resources. All the actors in the network are directly or indirectly related for money, utilities, information flows, authority, legal contracts, etc. The boundary of network is dynamic and might change due to changes either within the network or the environment for instance public policies, new technologies, neighbouring market, etc. (Mol, 1995)

The Economic network includes a group of actors who are concerned about economic interests (market, financial return, trade) which are the Brand Associations, MGMA, Agents/middlemen, bank and other financial institution which influence the environmental reform of garment industry in Myanmar.

C. Policy Network: tried to focus on the actors aspects of policy making, implementation of policies, rules and regulations which govern the relations between state and industry to influence the transformation of environmental management (environmental reform) of garment industry in the context of Myanmar. It includes certain government bodies such as Ministry of Industry, Directorate of Industrial Supervision and Inspection, Myanmar Investment Commission.

Regional Government Body/Departments for Implementation of Environmental Policy and monitoring which have responsibility for the Hlaing Tharyar Industrial Zone where the study was conducted, include Yangon Environmental Conservation Department (ECD) and Yangon City Development Center (YCDC).

7. Assessment of the Role of Market in the Case of Myanmar's Garment Industry for the potential of environmental reform (with EM) through Ecological Modernization Theory

The Ecological modernization theory argued that the economic actors and market dynamics which include producers, customers, consumers, credit institution and insurance companies have increasing importance in social carriers of ecological restructuring and reform. (Mol, 1995)

A case of EM exploring the application of EM theory if the policy strategies of EM and Market dynamics play crucial role in driving the environmental reform/greening of SMEs in the context of architectural and building industry in the UK and the perception of factory owners for the sustainability of business case. (Revell A., 2007)

This part of analysis will discuss about the role of market actors in greening the garment industry in Myanmar and their relative strength compared to other drivers which are political drivers (rules and regulations, monitoring) and social drivers.

The Projected growth in number of factories and the correlation between the size of business and the environmental impacts (i.e. resource use, waste and pollution: I will discuss in this subtopic about how the projected increase in the number of factories in the future can cause the increase in the intensity of impacts and the likelihoods of increase in environmental impacts and resource consumption. The implication of the increase in the size of business for the higher level of resource consumption and environmental impacts (i.e. waste and pollution).

The factories in the study, are mainly medium (less than 300 labors) and large enterprises (greater than 300 labors). There are 2 local firms, one Joint Venture firm and 10 foreign owned firms.

According to interview with expert opinions on factors influencing environmental performance of garment industry in Myanmar include the types of owner either local or foreign owned, foreign owned ones were found to be having better waste management which indicated the capacities of firms to deal with such management of waste, pollution and resource use. The local factories tend to have lower level of capacities to deal with waste management and pollution.

The higher the increase in the size of the business, the higher the amount of resource need and use. Talking with medium sized firms which have lower than 300 labors in the interview, the size of boilers which is required for pressing and ironing of garment is not considered to be big which will require inspection done by YCDC and EI for safety. Interview with YCDC has mentioned boilers as one of the major environmental concerns of garment factories.

A. Market: The highlight obtained from factories' owners and managers was that the encouragement from market were seen for environmentally friendly behaviors among the garment manufacturing factories.

The market was considered to be one of the most important signals to the Garment Manufacturing factories/business and its environmental reform since it has been giving an incentive to make an environmentally sustainable product but this was found to be very limited and varies upon the types of market.

The garment factories are not considered to causing huge amount of damage to the environment compared to other types of manufacturing industry. Thus, the factories do not need to show any attempt to make any much further improvement in the environmental performance of their factories. But the assumption in this study is that the projected growth in the garment manufacturing industry and the negative effect of size of business that can have on resource consumption, waste and pollution. The implication for this can be focused in the next discussion about how the garment industry would be encouraged for

The factories interviewed stated the competition within the industry among similar business. However, the market is not signaling the garment manufacturers to be able to fetch significant economic benefits by improving their environmental performance or environmentally sound products because the current level of environmental impacts as considered by various experts (based on the interview in this study) is considered to be relatively lower than other manufacturing sectors.

B. The Role of Brand/Buyers: In this part, I will discuss about the roles of Brands as two contexts. The Brand has two key roles for encouraging the environmental performance of garment industry under CMP. First it encourages the sustainability by eco-labeling about the information of garment products for the customers and uses the audit system to assess the environmental and social standard of their suppliers.

By giving the scores for performance level of garment manufacturing factories in the compliance system (HIgg, BSCI, Global Standard), the brand tries to create incentive and stimulate factories to maintain/increase their social and environmental performance.

The majority of environmental concern like waste, water drainage, clean environment are for the sake of health and safety of labor rather than for the actual improvement of environmental performance.

It can be considered as there is a demand for environmentally friendly garment products as driven by the Brand based on the interview with one of the sustainability managers of a well-known European Brand. Thus, the Brand has stated that the role of brand to gain sustainability through the eco-labeling for informing the customers about the information about the inputs e.g. how are the cotton grown. Plus, for the production of garment which has taken place in a different place which is different from the place the inputs were brought and the brand uses implementation the compliance system to assess the social and environmental performance of garment industry.

However, the brand has no direct relationship with government and policy makers (that is environmental regulators, inspectors, policy makers) and the brand itself coordinate with other large NGOs to support energy efficiency and clean production.

Depending upon the types of buyers/brands, the firms were not found to be competing for getting more market share based on their environmental performance or environmentally friendly products.

Regarding to the potential growth in the number of garment factories in the future, this aspect can have certain level of implication for the impacts of tools like compliance/audit (HIgg, BSCI, etc.) which were used by brand to assess social and environmental standard of factories. In this case, it is an informal subcontract system where the brands/clients will not be unable to detect any environmental/social standard in these small factories.

However, the factories are still putting the environmental agenda not in the priority since it will reduce their short-term economic benefits. In this case, it is meant for renewable energy as interviewed with factories owners/managers.

The larger the size of companies/business, the increase in requirement for better social and environmental performance of it. The larger the size of the business

and the higher the level of environmental and social standard required for Compliance system/Audit. The two major pressures existed for garment factories found in this study were considered to be environmental regulations (to a lesser extent) and the environmental audit asked by Brands/their clients which is one of the market drivers.

C. The Role of Compliance System in Environmental Reform: the various types of buyers/ types of brands//the origin of buyers has different types of requirements for their suppliers which are the garment manufacturing factories. The buyers from EU which the factories mentioned include Lyndex, Triumph, Adidas, H and M, NEXT. The name of compliance includes BSCI, Global Standard, NEXT, AEON, etc.

BSCI: The Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) is a supply chain management system that supports companies to drive social compliance and improvements within the factories and farms in their global supply chains. BSCI implements the principle international labour standards protecting workers' rights such as International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions and declarations, the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and guidelines for multinational enterprises of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (BSCI website) It sets out 11 core labour rights, which participants and their business partners commit to implementing within their supply chains in a step-by-step development approach.

This social compliance system seems to have significant of Improvement in the Environmental Performance of Garment Industry. Since it takes considerations of environment in its code of conduct. The interviewed factories mentioned that they made changes in the drainage system and waste management to comply with it.

In the code of conduct of BSCI, a healthy and safe working environment are needed to ensure which consider the waste management and pollution which can have impacts on the health of labors. The protection of environment is a part of its code of conduct. The factories interviewed responded that the BSCI is required for getting orders from European buyers which are UK, Switzerland, and Germany. The compliance system give score to the factories as (A+, B+, C, D, etc.) depends on their performance and a general compliance last from 2 to 4 years. The Brand Association interviewed articulated how they care about sustainability in the supply chain by allocating more orders to high performers so as to motivate them to increase their environmental and social performance through the compliance system.

8. Nature of Environmental Regulations and the role of State

The environmental regulations led by state can have two types of forms (1) command and control measures (e.g. emission std), and taxation, charges and permit to make a mechanism for internalizing the environmental costs in terms of pollution or extraction of natural resources.

By this means, the firms who are polluting more and enjoying the surplus while the other firms are pollution less will be charged and the costs will be internalized

and these firms will make investment in better efficient technology or produce less wastes. (Vlachou, 2004)

State intervention would first change the social relations of production by setting standards to alleviate pollution or resource depletion or by issuing taxes and permits to capture rent from polluting or resource depleting capitals. Then, polluting would either not be legitimate and eligible anymore (standards set by command and control measures) or it would have to be accounted for as an additional cost in the production process (taxes or permits). All these measures would initiate attempts from individual capitals at polluting less or using less resources, which would demand additional labor time (e.g., additional labor power or additional means of production) (Sandler, 1994, p. 5). This would lead formerly polluting or resource depleting capitals to consider as productive any pollution abatement expenditure or investment on technology to address resource scarcity

Another form of state intervention could be in the form of provision of subsidies or other forms of encouraging incentives in order to allow the individual firms to adopt the green technology in their production processes. This form of environmental regulation is usually on a voluntary basis. Integration of green technology in the production process will allow the enterprises in saving the means of production such as energy and raw materials. By this mean, the individual firms which adopted the green technology efficiently, will achieve the efficiency gain ahead of the other competitor firms and gain benefit as an early mover. (Vlachou, 2005)

The early movers/innovators will be able to enjoy the competitive advantage in the same sector and thus this form of voluntary approaches will be able to facilitate the competition. (Genrdon, 2014) The command and control nature of environmental regulations can be seen in the laws and policies of environmental protection in Myanmar. At the very fundamental level of 2008 Myanmar's constitution, the state has the sole power of control over natural resources and environment above and below the ground. The 2008 constitution said that the union shall protect the natural resources and environment and every citizen has responsibilities to assist environmental conservation.

The government established National Commission for Environmental Affairs (NCEA) in 1990 and it served as the focal point for coordination among the different agencies for environmental matters. The primary objectives of NCEA are to make the environmental policies or natural resources utilization and prevention of degradation of environment, to establish environmental regulations and standards to prevent pollution and laying out planning and strategies to implement policies and promotion of environmental awareness. (Forest Department, 1994)

The NCEA enacted the National Environmental Policy in 1994. The 1994 National Environmental Policy (NEP) said that the state and its citizens are responsible for preservation and protection of natural resources and environment for the future. The primary goal of NEP was to integrate environmental rationale into the development activities. Setting the policy for environmental protection in 1990 can be seen as a breakthrough in Myanmar. (MONREC, 2016)

There is no incentive mechanisms found and or stated in the ECL to promote encouragement of new technologies and tax incentives. Generally, the rules and laws stated that the firms/business have to comply environmental quality standard stipulated by the committee and ministry. Those who violate the regulations, will be charged for the pollution.

The Environmental Conservation Rules (2014) state that the MONREC will form environmental management fund for the matters of environmental conservation within country, and the ministry of natural resources and environmental conservation will determine the conditions and amount to be paid by the polluter with the approval of NECC to be used for environmental conservation works within country. The MONREC has the power to determine the types of project or business activities which will require to undertake environmental impact assessment. All the activities/projects which are responsible to do so will have to prepare environmental management plan. (Myanmar's Environmental Conservation Rules, 2014)

The theory of EM suggested the Environmental regulations can help solve the environmental issues of Industrialization by making the industry more competitive if the regulations will do encouragement for development of innovative technologies and production techniques. At the broader analysis level, government policies and regulations have a role for promotion of innovation in environmental management by the manufacturing industry to embark on ecological modernization. (Mol, 1995)

Reviewing the Myanmar's Environmental regulations give insights that despite the strict command and control nature of environmental legislations, there exists no enforcement mechanisms and effective implementation schemes. The flexible forms of environmental regulations can rarely be seen in the currently existing rules and laws. There have been lack of statement found in the existing regulations for the promotion of innovation in technology in terms of encouragement of science, banking and financing which are important for the Investment in the new technology and other forms of voluntary mechanisms.

The ECL and draft NEP has stated that polluter pay principle will be implemented so as to charge the large polluters to allocate the fund to more environmental management and for supporting the budget and capacities needed for improving the environmental governance.

The ministry shall also make implementation of these rules and develop monitoring plans. However, considering the capacities of currently existing and responsible department which is mainly for the industrial and business related sector, the effective implementation of rules and laws is limited due to insufficient capacities which are manpower, budget, and technical skills.

Currently, the ECD has 115 members under the MONREC including regional ECD. The actual number staff in Yangon regional ECD was only 7 for the technical staff.

According to interview with the director of central ECD, the ECD department will have more number of staff in the upcoming year and the department related to green economy will soon be founded upon approval of amended National Environmental Policy in 2017

THE STATE WELFARE CARDS OF THAILAND: CAN IT ALLEVIATE POVERTY EFFICIENTLY?

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Abstract

In 2017, the government of Thailand has implemented the State Welfare Card policy requiring low-income earners to register with the state to receive an allowance in order to help them. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the design of the policy reflects that policymakers understand poverty in limited dimensions which results in both ineffective outcome and implementation of the policy. The paper will use the concepts of (1) poverty and (2) social construction and policy design to analyze the policy. Both document research and a semi-structured interview with a target population of the program in two provinces with different contexts and government officers are the methodologies of the study. Finally, the paper concludes that the design of the policy concerns only income poverty. Even though the target population of the program perceived deprivation in a similar way, they agreed that the policy does not work effectively in alleviating poverty since the allowance can reduce some of the household expenditure but does not a response to the cause of poverty. The methods to track the target population also reflect the lack of understanding of poverty of policymakers and reduce the efficiency of the program in reducing poverty. Apart from that, the accuracy of data of poor people collected by the government is another crucial problem that should be concerned and resolved.

Keywords: *poverty, poverty reduction, state welfare cards*

1. Introduction

It is more than a decade that Thailand joins the battle against poverty which is now one of the crucial development goals of the United Nations. The government of Thailand and policymakers have designed and implemented policies with several concepts and theories in order to reduce poverty including the recent policy called the State Welfare Card program. It required poor people who met the criteria to register with the state, so they can receive allowance and job training to overcome poverty (Fiscal Policy Office, 2018).

However, what is poverty? the concept is controversial and can also be changed through the time and social contexts. Meanwhile, the program provokes debate on its efficiency across the country from the design through the implementation level because of several reasons. The propose of this paper, hence, is to analyze and assess the efficiency of the policy in reducing poverty as well as identify some gap in the implementation level by using the framework of social construction

³⁴ Kornkanok Kotrakool is an ex foreign news reporter in the Thai TV channel currently finishing her master degree in anternational development studies, in the topic about the new policy 'state welfare card.'

and policy design. The paper will study how the policymakers and the poor, as target population of the policy, perceive poverty then evaluate how well the policy practically reduces poverty.

The main argument is that policymakers understand poverty in limited dimensions even some of their perceptions seem to be similar to how target population perceives deprivation. Consequently, the policy cannot work efficiently in alleviating poverty. The paper will provide a brief review on the conceptual framework which includes the concept of poverty and the theory of social construction and policy design, methodology and then analyzes the State Welfare by comparing the perceptions toward poverty of key stakeholders and define the gaps of implementing this policy.

2. Conceptual framework

The paper will combine two key concepts to analyze the State Welfare Card policy which is (1) social construction and policy design and (2) poverty

2.1 Social construction and policy design

The framework of the social construction of target populations and policy design was first proposed during the late 1980s by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram to explain why public policies cannot meet their purpose, solve public problems and support democracy and equal citizenships (Ingram, Schneider, & DeLeon, 2007). It used the theory of social construction which they perceived as the reality that can be shaped in various ways to understand the impact of socially constructed values of target population on policy designs. The values can be both negative and positive which they argued that it partly affected the efficiency of policy implementation and constructed some values to the society (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Hence, this paper uses this concept to analyze and assess the State Welfare Card policy of Thailand though the perception toward poverty of policymakers and target population which in this case is poor people.

2.2 Poverty definition

The definition of poverty is various and able to change through historical and social contexts. Basically, poverty can be defined in either absolute or relative terms.

According to UNESCO (n.d), absolute poverty is typically the relation between minimum incomes that people need to have to meet basic needs but lacks concern in quality of living or social inequality. The criticism leads to the explanation of poverty in the relative concept which recognizes the relation of one's economic status and another member of the society, in another word, they feel relatively poorer than other members of the society. Relative poverty can be understood in three perspective: (1) income approach or when one has income less than country's poverty line, (2) basic need approach which considers income as well as necessary basic service that prevents people from becoming poor and (3) capability approach perceiving poverty as lack of capability to live a decent life (UNESCO, n.d)

As perspective towards poverty is varied and complexed, several organizations and institutions working on development including the crucial ones like United Nations and World Bank recognized poverty as a multidimensional problem

(United Nations, n.d). While in the Thai context, Jitsuchon (2001) pointed out that three groups of stakeholders: academics, poor people, and policymakers, defined poverty differently. The expert will concern about the cause of poverty and relative poverty, while the poor use their experience in their daily life to simply explain deprivation. On the other hands, policymakers focus on understanding and measuring the incidence of poverty, and income poverty have been a dominating idea in the process of policy-making since the 1960s. This impacts how policymakers at a different level to design poverty measurement and policy to alleviate deprivation.

3. Research Method

The paper combined two methods to study the State Welfare Card policy which is (1) document research and (2) semi-structured interview.

The documented research will base on the primary information from governmental documents about the program including announcements, guideline, measures, statistics and presentations from 2017, the beginning of the program, to understand how policymakers perceive poverty and the impact of that perceive on policy design. On the other hand, the paper will explore how poor people in two different areas, defined by the government see poverty to compare and analyze how effective the policy works in reducing poverty.

The fieldwork data were collected during June in Bangkok and Sisaket. Bangkok was selected because it is the capital and business center of Thailand while Sisaket is considered as one of the most vulnerable provinces and ranked as the top 3 provinces that have the highest number of people who can be defined as poor (Fiscal Policy Office, 2017). It is to compare poverty in two different contexts as one is the capital with more facility, infrastructure, average income, and expense, while another has less of everything mentioned to see if the policy works efficiently in all area or not.

There are various limitations of this paper including the limited numbers of time and participants, the policy that is still changed and has just started the second phase. Thus, the studies focus on the first phase of the program more than another.

3.1 Summary of the State Welfare Card policy

The policy has been approved 2016 and first launched in 2017 (Fiscal Policy Office, 2016) requiring poor people to register with the state, so the state can provide them some support to reduce poverty and improve their quality of life. Then, those who passed the criteria will receive 'state welfare cards'— the cash cards by the state which provide them some allowance as well as the life development program (Comptroller General's Department, 2017).

To track the poor, the government set the special criteria to define. People who can register as poor have to 1) have Thai nationality and be 18 years old or more 2) be jobless, or have income less than 100,000 Baht last year, 3) have neither saving account nor bonds value more than 100,000 Baht and 4) have utility space of houses lower than 100 square meters, and lower than 16,000 square meters

when combining with land for agriculture, while for apartments not over 35 square meters (Fiscal Policy Office, 2017).

The allowance basically consisted of (1) cash for consumer spending about 200 – 300 Baht per month that can be used at the shop having EDC machine and registering with the program, (2) transportation fee including buses, sky trains, subway, and trains 1,500 Baht per month for public transportation fee and (3) cash for buying cooking gas 45 Baht per three months. The government will refill the balance of the cards every month, but it cannot be collected, meaning that if cardholders do not buy anything in one month, they will lose their rights in that month.

Besides, the program also provides job training for those who want to. The center and local government offices will set teams and account officers to analyze the situation of cardholders and design the plan to improving their quality of life by providing job training and hunting. Those who join this part will receive more allowance for consumer spending (Fiscal Policy Office, 2018).

4. Finding and analysis

4.1 Poverty in perceptions of policymakers

Policymakers of the program are likely to focus on poverty in economic dimension. This based on the criteria to define the poor which mostly are an economic asset: income, saving accounts, and houses and lands as basic needs. The income poverty still plays important roles in the criteria of the program since they use the income to identify poor and categorize them to provide a different amount of allowance for consumer expenditure. According to Fiscal Policy Office (2017), people who want to register with the program must have an annual income of fewer than 100,000 Baht per year. Those who their incomes are between 30,000 – 100,000 Baht will receive 200 Baht consumer allowance, while people who earn less than 30,000 Baht per year will be paid 300 Baht. The range of income in the criteria is above the recent poverty line of Thailand which are 2,667 Baht per month (Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 2016); hence, the near poor or those who has consumption expenditure 20 percent above the poverty line (Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 2016) are included in this policy.

The proportions of allowance in the cards additionally reflect the perception toward poverty of policymakers. Fiscal Policy Office (2017) clearly stated that the key strategies to help people overcome poverty are (1) decrease their expenditure and (2) increase their income. Therefore, allowance for purchasing consumer goods is provided, but it is less than the proportion of public transportation fee. The cards consist of (1) 500 Baht for fee of buses by Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) and sky trains, (2) 500 Baht for fee of minibuses by Transport Co., Ltd which is the state-owned company and (3) 500 Baht for train fee (Comptroller General's Department, 2017). The total amount of public transport is 1,500 Baht per month—higher than the allowance for grocery about 5 – 8 time. In contrast, BMTA buses and sky trains mostly are located in Bangkok Metropolitan Area. Hence, it can be concluded that policymakers issued the proportion of allowance based on Bangkok and urban context and probably perceive public transportation fee as an expenditure that needs to reduce, so people can have a better quality of life.

Policymakers, thus, recognize poverty in broader approaches than income. Apart from allowance, they also added life development plans which help cardholders to increase skill and career-related knowledge in the second phase of the program (Fiscal Policy Office, 2018). As mentioned in official manuals of the program that allowance only cannot help the poor overcome deprivation sustainably, policymakers. The guidebook the life development program of state welfare cardholders clearly stated that to develop the quality of life of cardholders in a sustainable way, the state has increased the opportunities for cardholders to (1) get jobs, (2) receive occupational training and retraining as well as basic education, (3) access to basic needs including houses and arable lands and (4) access to formal or legal loan for occupations (Fiscal Policy Office, 2018). To promote people to join the training, the government offers extra 200 Baht allowance per month for the poor who agree to receive the training.

However, the State Welfare Card policy quite see poverty as an individual problem rather than structural one. Fiscal Policy Office (2018) mentioned in the guideline of the second phase of the program that providing allowance is like give fish to people who cannot completely solve poverty problem, but the government should 'teach how to catch fish and giving fishing equipment' or find the cause of poverty and offer individual support instead. Yet, policymakers seem not aware social contexts and poverty in a more structural sense such as the economic situation of the country and unemployment rate—or the situation when the government gives fish, fishery knowledge, and fishing equipment, but there is not fish in the pond, or the pond is dry.

Another point to be remarked is the strategy to reduce poverty in the program did not concern on the diverse conditions of poverty. From the field research, it is found that some cardholders are old, and have to take care children or even patients at their houses, so they cannot join the life development program or job trainings to boost capability and earn more income. Meanwhile, several cardholders have to work and cannot join the job training program or get more jobs to increase their income.

Besides, even the program tends to reduce deprivation by one of the strategies that the World Bank proposed: promoting opportunities (Gillis, Shoup, & Sicat, 2001), it does empower poor people very much. Gillis et al. (2001) elaborate that facilitating empowerment of poor people should be included because the policies and implementation will be more responsive to people needs if the poor can participate in the political process and public decision-making as a part of society. However, the State Welfare Cards limited their freedom of choices in spending money. Cardholders have to spend their allowance with the shops that register with the program and have electronic data capture machine (EDC machine), which means they cannot buy cheaper goods with unregistered shops on their choice. Meanwhile, for life development plan, the power of decision belongs to account officers of each cardholder, not themselves. This somehow reflects that the government perceives poor people as those who have less ability to make a decision and put more restriction on the cards.

Therefore, the State Welfare Card policy reflects that the perceptions toward poverty of the policymakers have been extended to more dimension of poverty, yet the heterogeneity of poverty is still ignored and resulted in the contradiction in the design of the policy. One example is when they tried to integrate approaches to design the policy but seem to ignore structural poverty or social and economic conditions of different areas of Thailand.

Poverty in perceptions of the target population in Bangkok and Sisaket

Basically, target population in two provinces simply defined poverty in the same way as the condition when you do not have income, job, or food to eat, as well as lands for agricultural and good health. The most frequent response from them are: not enough/have nothing to eat. Target population seems to perceive poverty in the same way as the policymakers: income poverty and jobs are key instruments to overcome poverty. They also relate the condition of bodies with poverty and jobs, since the illness and aging prevent them from working for a living. This is in accordance with Jitsuchon (2001) explanation that poor people tend to characterize poverty based on factors from their everyday life and most characteristics can be categorized as either cause or definition of poverty, or both.

Another remark is poverty as a legacy. Some interviewees refer to the relation between the economic status of their parents, themselves, and their children. The explanation was their family had no asset or money to pay for tuition fee, so they had no capital or education to find decent jobs. Consequently, when they have children, their children cannot access to education, or asset to invest, and this vicious cycle will repeat itself with their children too.

In terms of differences of poverty in two areas: Bangkok and Sisaket, the response can be both similar and different. From the first perspective, cardholders understand poverty as absolute poverty condition or have nothing to eat, so there are poor people everywhere, and they are poor in the same ways. On the other hand, cardholders who recognized the differences explain poverty in a more relative way. The condition of poverty in Sisaket as a representation of rural areas seems to be less savage than in Bangkok because at least the accessibility of natural resource and the possession of lands for agriculture provide them some food. They are seen as farmers who have some own lands or rent lands, so they spend the less daily cost of living than Bangkok since they work on their fields. On the other hand, in perceptions of the target population, poor people in Bangkok have more difficult lives than Sisaket, as they have more cost of living from the housing through transportation, and the situation seems to worsen as consumer goods are quite expensive, in an exchange with opportunities for a high-salary job. Therefore, the basic needs for living in Sisaket is not money but can be lands and accessibility to food in nature; meanwhile, in Bangkok, money is very important.

The efficiency of the State Welfare Card policy on poverty reduction

As the perceptions toward poverty of policymakers and target population are quite similar, most cardholders agree that the policy can somehow help them reducing poverty. However, Bangkok and Sisaket referred to satisfaction with cards in different ways. Bangkok target population responded that the card could reduce or not reduce poverty, explaining that the amount of allowance in the cards is very limited, so yes, it decreased monthly spending on consumer good, but cannot lift support them in lifting their economic status. They are not that happy with the cards, yet to have cards is better than have nothing. Meanwhile, Sisaket poor people tend to be more satisfied with the cards even they accepted that the allowance is not enough.

The response of some cardholders implied that the perception of policymakers still lacks understanding of poverty in the perceptions of poor people in the society. For the life development plan, people are still in doubt what to do next if they do not have money to invest even though cardholders can inform account

officers that they may want a loan (Fiscal Policy Office, 2018). It is because they do not have collaterals.

The grocery goods that most people buy from the registered shops in two provinces are cooking oil, monosodium glutamate, fish sauce, sugar, and milk. Some poor in Bangkok may buy rice, but in Sisaket, they rarely purchase. Poor people in Bangkok remarked that prices of goods sold in the registered shops are quite high, comparing to supermarkets in their neighborhood. For example, the price of one bottle of cooking oil in a supermarket may range from 28 to 35 Baht while in some registered shops, the price started at 40 Baht. They argued that because this is the cards to help poor people, goods in the shops should be even cheaper. Meanwhile, Sisaket did not mention about price much because there are few supermarkets in Sisaket and they are not in their neighborhood area, so cardholders in Sisaket have fewer places to compare prices. For the locations of the register shops, Bangkok poor people seem to concern about this point more especially for those who do not have their own vehicles and have to choose public transportation since, in some areas, there are only a few shops and may not be close to their houses. In contrast, even the average distance from cardholders' houses to the shop is 1 to 7 kilometers; they feel it is not too far for them. This is because they depend on their own vehicles due to too limited public transportation service in the rural area.

The proportion of allowance signifies that urban poor, especially in Bangkok Metropolitan Region, tend to benefit from this program more due to the largest amount of public transportation fee. In contrast, poor people in Sisaket seems to feel more positive about this program even though they rarely have chance to use that proportion, due to the fact that buses and sky trains are mostly located Bangkok, because they perceive that they have less household expenditure, so 200-300 Baht in their conditions tend to lower that spending more, while poor people in Bangkok admitted that they have higher expenditure, so that small amount of allowance is not enough to impact their life. Additionally, as the proportion of buses fee relies on special chips which are still developed, poor people in Bangkok can barely benefit from this proportion, while for trains and buses between provinces, they barely have money to travel.

A large amount of public transportation fee in the cards does not make Sisaket have negative feeling for Bangkok. They recognized that Bangkok has a higher cost of living and have to depend on public transportation, while in Sisaket, they do not have to pay for public transportation fee.

Challenges of the policy implementation

Some respondents questioned the accuracy of poverty profiling in this policy and how to measure poverty. After registering the program and deciding to join the training, account officers (AO) will take care of cardholders as an advisor and checkers, which no one can guarantee the quality of data. One participant in the studies mentioned that there were several elderlies whom AO registered as want to join job training and find extra jobs, but in fact, they did not want to and cannot do due to their health condition. Another case is one elderly cardholder insisted that she did not register for the State Welfare Card, but someone manage it for her. In terms of poverty measurement, the recent criteria may not effective enough as some poor people with special conditions such as have to take care

bedridden patients or elderly may even not be able to register and spend days contacting with the government officers.

Another challenge is the adoption of technology, which in this case is the cash card. Some elderly respondents admitted they needed some help with using the cards because they were confused. Many cardholders even questioned the importance of using cards and commented that it would be better if the government transferred cash to them instead.

Besides, several people still have not understood or received enough information about the program as some of the interviewees did not know that there is public transportation fee included in this card.

5. Conclusion and recommendation

The perception toward poverty of policymakers in the State Welfare Card is quite generalized and contradicted. Income poverty is still a dominated idea in defining poverty, considering from the criteria, but the instrument to reduce poverty, the policymakers tried to increase opportunities and capability of cardholders instead. Therefore, it can be concluded that policymakers shaped policy by combining broader dimensions of deprivation and integrating strategies to tackle, yet, they overlooked poverty in structural senses and different conditions of urban and rural areas.

For poor people, they perceive poverty in an economic sense and relate it to the condition of having enough food to eat or not. They will explain it in a less complicated way based on their personal experience (Jitsuchon, 2001). Apart from that, they also mentioned income, capital, illness, unemployment, education, lands and houses which all of these can be categorized as both characteristic of poverty as well as the cause of it. Besides, respondents point out the differences between Bangkok and Sisaket that the poor in Bangkok is more vulnerable than Sisaket because it is very difficult to survive with our money, while in rural areas, poor can gain food from their farms or natural resources. Still, both groups highlight the importance of income.

To assess the policy by comparing perceptions and policy design, poor people in the urban and local are perceived poverty similar way: not enough income or food. Since their explanation is quite simply, the perception of them is in accordance with income poverty of the policymakers. Therefore, target population agrees that the program partly helps them alleviate poverty, or at least, reduce expenditure but cannot eradicate due to the limited amount of allowance. They finally suggested that the government should increase allowance or transfer cash instead of cash cards.

Moreover, the result of the policy seems to be different from the expectation of the design since cardholders in Bangkok tend to feel more positive with the cards form a proportion of public transportation fee and the concentration of public transportation system in Bangkok. On contradictory, Sisaket poor people are likely to be more satisfied because they have an allowance to reduce their low consumer expenditure, while Bangkok, the public transportation is not fully ready to be used.

The policy might concern only expenditure and job opportunities because the government has implemented several programs to tackle poverty including

universal healthcare and educational loan (Trakarnvanich, 2010). Therefore, it only focuses on the income approach.

Also, there are various factors reducing the efficiency of this program, not only the perception of poverty by the policymakers, including the quality and accuracy of poverty data, budget, technology and political condition of Thailand. Here are my recommendations for this policy:

1. If the government still want to use this policy as target-population programs, the government should adopt technology and set central data networks which are accessible everywhere and can be updated in real-time to increase the accuracy of data
2. Local governments, agencies, and representative of poor people should be allowed to participate more in the process of policy design, so we can have more responsive and efficient policies to solve public problems.

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RESEARCH CONCEPT: ENGAGEMENT AND INVOLVEMENT OF NON-ACADEMIC ACTORS IN TRANSDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH

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Abstract

The implementation of transdisciplinary approaches within research projects are valued by scholars of different scientific backgrounds for their ability to foster collaborations between scientific disciplines and to jointly tackle socially as well as environmentally relevant issues. Thus, transdisciplinarity has been facilitated not only by academia but also by public funding bodies. One example is the Erasmus+ CBHE Project KNOTS which promotes multi-lateral knowledge networks of transdisciplinary studies to tackle global challenges since its establishment in October 2016. Funded by the European Commission's Erasmus+ programme, the project aims to establish transdisciplinary platforms addressing issues of migration, inequality and environment in the region Southeast Asia.

One significant point of reference in transdisciplinary research is the co-production of knowledge, called Mode-2. In contrast to the traditional science production model, namely Mode-1, which separates sciences, policy and society, Mode-2 emphasises connections between science/researchers and society/practitioners (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 18). Hence, academic, as well as non-academic actors, are involved in the knowledge production process to pursue an increasing relevance and usability of scientific findings for society and policy-makers. Depending on different research designs, the intensity of non-academic actors' engagement might vary. Rosendahl et al., for instance, differentiate between four types: (i) information, (ii) consultation, (iii) collaboration, and (iv) empowerment of practitioners (ibid. 24). With respect to the KNOTS project, the following research question evolves: How are non-academic actors engaged in the knowledge production process within the KNOTS project?

In the course of this study particular attention will be given to this year's Summer School and Field Trips held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, from July 17th - 30th. A holistic approach will encompass the close examination of the interaction between scholars and practitioners in all project phases through qualitative research methods. This includes the analysis of the selection process of non-academic actors, their preparation for the participation in summer school and field trip activities, as well as their contribution towards the evaluation of research results. Throughout the research, the ideal integration of the public-private sector - as advocated in the literature and as communicated by the KNOTS project - will serve as a 'best practice' roadmap. Hereby, we aspire to generate further understanding of the challenges, barriers and potentials of the co-production of knowledge within transdisciplinary research projects.

Keywords: *transdisciplinary research, co-production of knowledge, non-academic actors, qualitative research*¹. *Research Aim*

1. Research Aim

As the world is facing increasingly complex issues, inter alia climate change, global health, and social inequality, the demand for new ways of approaching these subjects is striking. Various scholars agree that scientific questions within the frame of a certain discipline often do not address grand societal challenges which rather require cross-disciplinary collaboration (Mauser et al. 2013, 422). Hence, transdisciplinary research approaches with their promises to tackle socially relevant issues have gained increasing popularity among scholars of different scientific backgrounds (Djenontin and Meadow 2018, 885). Their implementation within research projects are being facilitated not only by academia but also by public funding bodies. Although there is no common understanding of transdisciplinarity in the sense of a consensual definition, a limited number of features used to characterise transdisciplinarity is presented in the literature (Pohl 2011, 619). Following Pohl, these include “(1) the focus on socially relevant issues, (2) transcending and integrating disciplinary paradigms, (3) doing participatory research and (4) the search for a unity of knowledge beyond disciplines” (ibid.). Depending on the weighting of these four features, different styles of transdisciplinary research can be identified. Pohl, for example, distinguishes between three concepts: Concept A primarily focuses on transcending disciplinary boundaries by the means of integration in order to address socially relevant issues. Therefore, academic knowledge is to be re-organised and re-assessed with the aim to overcome the (narrowly) disciplinary perspective (ibid.). Concept B is following the same approach as concept A but is adding a participatory component by including non-academic actors. Concept C also starts from concept A, however, adds the search for a unity of knowledge (ibid., 619–20). This study puts concept B and its participatory approach at the centre of research interest, and thus addresses the challenge of the non-academic actors’ engagement in the knowledge production process within the Erasmus+ CBHE Project KNOTS (Fostering multi-lateral knowledge networks of transdisciplinary studies to tackle global challenges). Hereby, the following research question will guide our research: *How are non-academic actors involved and engaged in the knowledge production process within the KNOTS project?*

Funded by the European Commission's Erasmus+ programme, the KNOTS project aims to establish transdisciplinary platforms addressing issues of migration, inequality and environment in the region Southeast Asia. The partners involved purpose (1) to develop and apply transdisciplinary teaching methodologies and learning material, (2) to establish innovative cooperation networks between and among academic and non-academic actors, and (3) to facilitate institutional and human resource potentials of the participating Higher Education Institutions (KNOTS n.d.). In order to achieve the project’s goal, several activities, inter alia summer schools and field trips, workshops (e.g. train-the-trainer), development of teaching manuals and teaching methodologies, have already been and further will be carried out. In the course of this study particular attention will be given to this year’s summer school and field trips held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, from July 17th to 31st. A holistic approach will encompass the close examination of the interaction between scholars and practitioners in all project phases through qualitative research methods. This includes the analysis of the selection process of non-academic actors, their preparation for the participation in summer school and field trip activities, as well as their

contribution towards the evaluation of research results. Throughout the research, the ideal integration of the public-private sector – as advocated in the literature and as communicated by the KNOTS project – will serve as a ‘best practice’ roadmap. Hereby, we aspire to generate further understanding of the challenges, barriers and potentials of the co-production of knowledge within transdisciplinary research projects.

2. Theoretical Framework

Engagement and Involvement of Non-Academic Actors

Due to an increased number of researches carried out in a context of application, a great importance is awarded to the involvement of academic as well as non-academic actors at different stages of the research process. It has been emphasised that the demand for further scientific evidence should derive from societal challenges (Djenontin and Meadow 2018; Mauser et al. 2013; Rosendahl et al. 2015). Co-production of knowledge, called Mode-2, is one significant point of reference in transdisciplinary research. In contrast to the traditional science production model, namely Mode-1, which separates sciences, policy and society, Mode-2 emphasises connections between science/researchers and society/practitioners (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 18). The involvement of different stakeholders aims at increasing the relevance and usability of scientific findings for society and policy-makers which is defined as “socially robust knowledge” (Djenontin and Meadow 2018, 885; Nowotny 2006). According to Rosendahl et al., Mode-2 is furthermore characterised by an openness, not only towards multiple interactions between a larger number of experts and actors in general but also towards different form of knowledge. Science is stepping out of the academic field in order to “meet the public” (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 18). In doing so, it enables a two-way communication where the so-called public can communicate people’s interests, concerns and perspectives (ibid.). At best, research findings are able to assist societies at making informed decisions (Mauser et al. 2013, 422).

Depending on different research designs, the intensity of non-academic actors’ engagement might vary. Rosendahl et al. refer to the classification into four types by Brandt et al. (2013): (1) information, (2) consultation, (3) collaboration, and (4) empowerment (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 24). Here, information and empowerment are to be viewed as opposing extremes. While collaboration means that the practitioners have a notable influence on the outcome, empowerment concedes the authority to the non-academic actors (ibid.). Djenontin and Meadow furthermore identify variables of knowledge co-production work. Both authors stress that non-academic actors should not only participate in the actual process of activities implementation and outcomes generating but their engagement should already start with the first context setting and team composition (ibid., 889–98). Subsequently, all actors need to be included in the process of co-conceptualisation, co-definition of methods as well as co-planning (ibid., 891). According to Djenontin and Meadow, an integration of non-academics into project planning efforts, such as managing financial decisions, would furthermore concede responsibilities and ownership (ibid. 892–93).

Origins of Participatory Research

As already mentioned, participatory research constitutes a central pillar of transdisciplinary research, however, it is no new invention and not unique to

transdisciplinarity. The shift from an exogenous, top-down to an endogenous, bottom-up paradigm in research and development already occurred throughout the last three decades (Hayward, Simpson, and Wood 2004, 95). Following Patricia Maguire (1987), participatory research has emerged from movements within international development, adult education and social sciences (Maguire 1987, 32). These movements had put processes and purposes of their respective fields into question. One central question they have been asking was “whether their work is a force for the continued domination or for the liberation of oppressed and marginalized people” (ibid.). Maguire links the emergence of participatory research approaches with three trends: (1) the radical and reformist re-conceptualisation of international development assistance, (2) the reframing of adult education as an empowering approach, and (3) an ongoing debate within the social sciences – challenging the dominant social science paradigm (ibid.). In the context of development assistance, the failed policies hadn’t produced the expected results but rather had led to other problems which had entailed a structural crisis around the 1970s (Maguire 1987, 33; Rahnema 2010, 128). Practices and models in place were questioned, and thus policy makers and administrators called for new strategies and approaches. Leading the failure of development projects back to the exclusion of affected people, the idea of involving local people arose (ibid.). The latter should fully participate in development decisions, processes and benefits (Maguire 1987, 33). The participatory approach, in general, aims at radically changing instead of merely describing and interpreting social reality. Hereby, reality transformation should not be achieved for but rather in collaboration with affected people. Human self-determination, emancipation and personal as well as social transformation were placed as central goals of social science research (ibid., 29). According to Maguire, participatory research combines activities of investigation, education and action:

“It is a method of social investigation of problems, involving participation of oppressed and ordinary people in problem posing and solving. It is an educational process for the researcher and participants, who analyse the structural causes of named problems through collective discussion and interaction. Finally, it is a way for researchers and oppressed people to join in solidarity to take collective action, both short and long term, for radical social change” (ibid., 30).

Here, the author stresses the connection between research and action in participatory research. The knowledge production on social reality is directly linked to concrete action on reality (ibid.). These activities are to be understood as collective processes. Participation, thus, facilitates group ownership of information as people are “acting as subjects of their own research process” (ibid., 31). Non-academic actors are also involved in the decision-making process on how and to what extent to use and apply the jointly produced knowledge to their everyday lives (ibid.). This enables the transformation of power structures and the empowerment of affected people (ibid., 32).

Underlying Assumptions

As shown in the previous two subchapters, participation is believed to hold a transformative as well as an emancipatory momentum. This follows the premise “that knowledge has become the single most important basis of power and control” (ibid., 37). As problematised in the literature on transdisciplinarity, scientific knowledge has become the only legitimate form of knowledge. Thus, non-academic actors are mostly not viewed as knowledgeable in the scientific

sense, and rather subjected to research interests and process as objects and things (ibid., 38). Participatory research, however, believes that both parties – academic as well as non-academic actors – are able to contribute knowledge and experience to the research process (ibid., 39). This is based on the assumption that our all doing implies a political nature and, thus, has implications for the distribution of power in society (ibid., 36). In order to coproduce knowledge, participatory researchers (have to) abandon “the dominant research tenets of detachment and unilateral control of the research process and products” (ibid., 39). Hence, the power and control of decision-making can be passed on to the participants. As argued in the literature on transdisciplinarity, it is assumed that the involving of research subjects as partners throughout the entire research process fosters an equal distribution of research benefits. Co-produced knowledge, therefore, can directly be channelled into policies and decision-making processes (ibid., 40).

Challenges

Many scholars refer to participatory research, however, only few give a precise definition of this concept. Therefore, different understandings of co-production are in place. Nowotny, for example, is linking Mode-2 with loose organisational structures, flat hierarchies, and openended chains of command (Nowotny 2006), whereas Rosendahl et al. reject the assumption of “equal footing” of collaboration between different actors (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 23). Rather than emerging as joint initiatives of all actors, transdisciplinary projects are, according to the authors, often initiated by scientists (Maguire 1987, 45; Rosendahl et al. 2015, 23). The latter, thus, retain control over the research process as a whole. Hence, researchers often still assume a powerful position over non-academic actors, and, thereby, reproduce and strengthen power asymmetries (Rosendahl et al. 2015, 23–24). Rosendahl et al., therefore, stress the importance of reflexivity. Since all actors – scientific as well as non-scientific – are holding a position within a social matrix, which comes along with different values and different perspectives on the issue at stake, power and control over the object need to be reflected (“How are the involved stakeholders positioned? What power is derived from that position? How do the different stakeholders try to influence knowledge co-production?”) (ibid., 18). Even though transdisciplinarity is explicitly inviting researchers and objects of knowledge, such as nonacademic actors, to collaborate, the question of access to the process of knowledge coproduction needs to be raised. Rosendahl et al. criticise the structural discrimination of marginalised groups’ perspectives in such a setting. Due to lacking resources, like time, money or professional assistance, marginalised groups are less likely to participate and, therefore, cannot voice their perspectives (ibid., 25). Hence, Hayward et al. (2004) stress that “the extent to which a participatory approach may be considered useful depends to a large degree on the participants, practitioners and academics developing a more critical understanding of the problematic nature of participatory philosophy and practice” (Hayward, Simpson, and Wood 2004, 96).

3. Research Interest

Research Questions

To answer the research question on “How are non-academic actors involved and engaged in the knowledge production process within the KNOTS project?” the following sub-questions will serve for further precision by including different perspectives into the research:

- How are non-academic actors involved and engaged within the different project phases?
- How is non-academic participation ideal-typically understood in the literature? How does the KNOTS project communicate co-production of knowledge? How do the various (non-)academic actors understand participation and what are their expectations towards the research project?
- What kind of hierarchy mechanisms can be found in the cooperation between academic and non-academic actors as well as within the group of non-academic participants?

Research Methods

The present study is based on the methodology of Grounded Theory according to Strauss and Corbin (1996). Here, particular importance is given to the methods of theoretical sensitive coding, theoretical sampling and continuous comparison (Legewie and Schervier-Legewie 2004). The latter is used throughout the entire circular research process of data collection and evaluation in order to iteratively gain an understanding of the investigated phenomenon. The analysis of the collected data is guided by the three-stage process of open, axial, and selective coding, in which the empirical findings iteratively are abstracted into a grounded theory (Legewie and Schervier-Legewie 2004; Strauss and Corbin 1996, 44). Following the theoretical sampling, further relevant cases are included to cover the variance within the study field. The assessment of the relevance of specific cases is based in the preceding analysis processes (Mey and Mruck 2011, 12). The iterative theory formation process continues until the onset of the – usually ideal – theoretical saturation; i.e. when all minimum and maximum differences in a field have been tapped (ibid.). In this process, the research questions listed above are continuously adapted and specified.

In an ideal-typical research process based on the Grounded Theory research style, the definition of the research area – here, the engagement of non-academic actors in transdisciplinary research projects – is followed by a circular process of data collection and analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1996, 8, 23). In view of the structural limitation (including linguistic barriers, time restrictions, lack of access to data sources) within the framework of the KNOTS Summer School and field trips in Chiang Mai, we have opted for a flexible set of different methods, namely, participant observation, semi-structured guided interview and content analysis. The methods will be implemented in accordance to the engagement within different parts of the summer school. In order to analyse the initial contact, a content analysis of the email (and oral) correspondence as well as interviews with the organisers will give insight to how non-academic actors were selected and involved in the finding of the research interests. Additionally, we hope to understand how non-academic actors were enlightened and prepared for their participation in a transdisciplinary research project. The participation in the field trips and presentations shall be assessed via participant observation as well as –

if possible – semi-structured guided interviews. This will depend on time resources and the availability of translators.

Field Access and Theoretical Sampling

In order to gain access to potential (interview) partners, the contact with non-academic actors can be established directly within the field trips, as well as indirectly through the mediation of the organisers of the summer school in Chiang Mai. Following the theoretical sampling of the Grounded Theory, the contrasting of evolving categories along minimal and maximal differences can be ensured through the examination of various non-academic actors within the framework of the KNOTS Summer School (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2014, 185; Witzel and Reiter 2012, 61). For this reason, the three researchers will attend different field trip sites.

Method A: Participant Observation

In the course of this research method, the researchers are moving between uninvolved distance and "going native". As researchers and – at the same time – participants of the KNOTS Summer School, we are aware of and already familiar with this ambivalent position (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2014, 49). To maximise our knowledge gain, it is necessary to accompany at least three different field trips. In order to guarantee the comparability of the observations, we follow the observation protocol of Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (*ibid.*, 50–51). Here, the location, time and sequence of the observed processes are recorded. Furthermore, a distinction is made between observations, context information, methodological and role reflections and theoretical reflections. In addition, topics of particular relevance to the present study are defined previously to the data collection. One example is the specifically targeted examination of hierarchies within the group of non-academic actors as well as between them and academics.

Method B: Semi-structured Guided Interview

The method of the guideline interview promises, in addition to participant observation, to address socially relevant issues with regard to the participation of non-academic actors in transdisciplinary research projects. In contrast to other survey alternatives, the guided interview is suitable for our research interest which is less concerned with autobiographical aspects rather than problem-centred on the narratives on participation (Flick 1995, 178–79; Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2014, 127). As already indicated in the name, the researchers use a previously constructed guideline to flexibly link inductive and deductive moments within the interview. The pre-structuring of content promises the generation of narrations relevant to the subject and, simultaneously, to reveal the subjective (problem) view of the interviewee. This procedure ensures that all research-relevant topics are addressed and enables researchers to react flexibly to the course of the conversation (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2014, 132). The guidelines are based on the exemplary structure proposed by Helfrich (Helfferich 2011, 186). Accordingly, there are introductory narrative prompts (key question) at the beginning, which are supplemented by a catalogue of thematically interesting aspects. The latter are listed to adapt the question formulation to the course of the conversation (subject checklist). In addition, questions without content are listed which focus on the further detailing of already mentioned and the initiation of new aspects (maintenance and control issues) (*ibid.*, 181).

Overall, the guided interview, especially with regard to the time limitations of the research project and the involvement of three researchers, seems to be suitable for investigating the participation of non-academic actors (Dannecker and Voßemer 2014, 158–59; Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2014, 127).

Method C: Content Analysis

The content analysis method is used to draw conclusions from linguistic material to nonlinguistic phenomena (Lamnek and Krell 2016, 434–35). In the current study, the content analysis will examine the interaction between the organisers of the KNOTS Summer School in Chiang Mai and the respective non-academic actors. For this purpose, written communication via email will serve as an empirical basis for the evaluations. It is of great importance to take into account both explicit statements as well as implicit information, such as emotions, (hidden) intentions and strategies. Furthermore, the preparation for and education of non-academic actors to participate in the transdisciplinary KNOTS research project is of interest. In addition, particular attention is given to respective expectations regarding the goals, implementation and framework conditions of participation. The procedure according to the reductive, qualitative content analysis by Maryring (1983, 1985, 2002) will guide our research, hereby, selecting and categorising the empirical data material in an explorative manner (Lamnek and Krell 2016, 482).

4. Standardisation and Quality Control

To ensure that this research is relevant and authentic, it is crucial to establish a framework of quality criteria which allows this research to be placed into context, be categorised and compared. Mitchell and Willetts (2009) identify seven basic quality criteria for the conduction of transdisciplinary research. Firstly, and most importantly, every research should aim to contribute to the existing body of knowledge. Within a transdisciplinary context, 'knowledge' should be interpreted broadly and the societal impact has also to be considered. Secondly, the research aim, methods and interpretation should form a coherent line of argumentation and be geared to each other. This becomes more relevant as more stakeholders are involved in the research project. Thirdly, there is the need to reflect and evaluate one's own epistemological view, and at the same time engage respectfully with other stakeholders differing views as these differences will inevitably become apparent. Finally, transdisciplinary researchers need to train their ability to communicate with the different 'languages' of each discipline as well as different societal circles, and present their research effectively to different audiences (Mitchell and Willetts 2009, 17–18).

Qualitative research especially is often accused of being random and arbitrarily due to its lack of reproducibility. Even within qualitative research establishing quality criteria is discussed, especially from postmodern critiques (Steinke 2007, 321). However, formulating concrete criteria in a transdisciplinary context gets even more complicated because each discipline and each stakeholder may have different ideas and long established disciplinary traditions of how research quality can be ensured (Mitchell and Willetts 2009, 1). Since qualitative research is not reproducible, Steinke proposes a method, called intersubjective replicability, in order to make findings verifiable, and to facilitate their comparability with other research. Its aim is to enable other researchers to precisely trace the original researcher's steps and thought process. In order to

allow this, transparent and accurate documentation of all steps in the research process is crucial. Without documentation, contextualising and retracing the research process is impossible (Steinke 2007, 324). We will, therefore, add a detailed description of each step we took in planning, conducting and evaluating to our research paper. Another aspect Steinke stresses is the importance of feedback loops and 'peer debriefing' (ibid., 326). Here, the embeddedness of our research group into a greater circle of researchers, who are part of this research seminar and to a great majority also participate in the summer school in Chiang Mai, might be beneficial. By the means of conversation with the other participants and our seminar lecturers, a constant stream of external feedback is available to us throughout the whole research process.

Generalisation objective

Drawing general conclusions is an often-proclaimed aim of traditional research because it allows other researchers to make assumptions for future projects. To generalise ones' findings is a central part of qualitative research, however, in order to avoid premature generalisation, conclusions must be constructed very carefully. Considering constructivist and criticalrealistic critique, which assumes every event as only understandable within its own time and context, and that through the process of falsification a universal generalisation is impossible, Mayring argues a prolific middle way which emphasises the importance of generalisation by particularly defining research aspects that can and cannot be generalised (Mayring 2007, para. 13). As this is a descriptive study, we will describe how non-academic actors are involved and engaged in the knowledge production process within the KNOTS project in depth, and thoroughly contextualise it in order to allow future generalisations. Additionally, as transdisciplinary research is still evolving, and has not yet developed a standardized methodology, our study holds the potential to inform future transdisciplinary research on how participation and the involvement of non-academic-actors could look like (ibid., para. 15).

Following the Grounded Theory, we will draw generalisable conclusions through theoretical sampling. As we are tied to the KNOTS Summer School schedule, an inductive review and theory-building loop until we reach saturation will be unfeasible. Therefore, we will supplement theoretical sampling with triangulation.

Triangulation

Triangulation is a process to combine two or more different methods, frameworks or evaluation tools to determine the third unknown point that is the research interest. The idea of using multiple approaches is to counter potential weaknesses and bias each of those methods entail (ibid., 320). Triangulation aims to create a more reliable, valid and unbiased data set that can be analysed and interpreted confidently. Triangulation can be used at different stages throughout the research. There are some narrow interpretations of triangulation that only address the mixing of methods during the data-collection process. However, it can also mean the hybridisation of two or more data sources, two different researchers or two analytical tools. The process of using not just one but several kinds of triangulation, as we plan to do within this research, is referred to as multiple triangulation (Thurmond 2001, 253).

We will be using three different types of triangulation: data source triangulation, investigator triangulation, and methodologic triangulation. Data source

triangulation refers to the use of either different space, time or persons when collecting data. Triangulating data sources not only leads to a greater amount of data but also increases the quality of the collected data. Without giving too much weight to quantities, information is more reliable when coming from two or more different sets of data. Our data collection process will take place over two weeks in multiple locations, and we will collect data from different field trip sites and different people. There is the constant risk of collecting too much data that it cannot be interpreted due to time and resource restrictions (ibid., 255–56). Investigator triangulation intends the research to be conducted by more than just one researcher. The idea is to reduce the impact of researcher bias as well as “keeping the team honest” (ibid., 255) and, therefore, increase the research value. That closely correlates with quality criteria recommended when using the Grounded Theory as an evaluation tool, as well as general ideas of collaboration, within a transdisciplinary research approach. Therefore, we will put an emphasis on working closely together as a research group, and regularly reflect on our methods and our research process. Furthermore, we will interpret and evaluate the collected data as well as our findings together. However, more researchers also increase the risk of conflict within the research team, and greater similarities between researchers might amplify existing bias instead of countering them. The number of researchers also changes the way some methods work. For example, a participant might give different answers in an interview situation with several researchers than in a one-on-one dialogue (ibid., 256). Arguably, we are also using theoretical triangulation as the deployment of various lenses and research interests – not just ours but, in a participatory effort, also those of our research subjects and other stakeholders – is at the centre of all transdisciplinary research ideas.

Finally, we will use a mixed-method or multimethod approach when collecting our data. It will be a within-method triangulation, meaning we will use different qualitative methods such as non-participant and participant observations, interviews and content analysis. We will not be using quantitative methods, nor will we combine different research designs. Using different methods can help to unveil information that would not have come to light within just one method. Furthermore, its results are more reliable when, for example, conclusions drawn from participant observations are reinforced by statements given in interviews. Nevertheless, each method on its own needs to be carried out with diligence as the adding of another method cannot make up for or hide inadequately conducted research. Triangulation does not mean the random adding of methods and ideas with a ‘the more, the better’ mentality. The adding of each method needs to be carefully evaluated and examined for its added value and its necessity needs to be apparent (ibid., 254–55).

5. Critical Reflection of the Research

Transparency and self-reflection of the whole research process is at the core of the Grounded Theory research style – especially regarding the collected data and its analysis (Schultz 2014, 75–76). It must be taken into account that collected data is part of dominant discourses which influence our preconception (ibid., 88). Thus, critical reflection on data is required in order to identify ambivalences and different positions (ibid., 92). The following section will discuss important steps of a critical self-reflection of the role as a researcher, of the sampling and of the research process as a whole (data gathering and analyses).

Role as a Researcher

From the beginning of the research, content-related as well as theoretical prior knowledge of the researchers need to be reflected and made transparent in the ongoing research process (Schultz 2014, 88; Strübing 2014, 470). Furthermore, the socio-economic status as well as individual characteristics of researchers must be critically examined. During the participant observation, for example, researchers need to reflect how their participation could influence the area of research. In the specific case of our research, our position within a global context of research also needs to be taken into account.

Sampling

With respect to our given research context – this year’s KNOTS Summer School and Field Trips – the selection process of non-academic actors by the hosts (Chiang Mai University) is at core of critical reflection: How and based on which criteria were the eight different field trip sites chosen? Already existing relationships between the Chiang Mai University and various practitioners need to be examined, especially with regard to how the non-academic actors were prepared for the KNOTS Summer School and Field Trips and to their prior knowledge or understanding of transdisciplinary research. As the extent and the kind of nonacademic actors’ engagement is at centre of our research interest, another focus will be put on the beneficiaries of participating for the non-academic actors: How were the practitioners involved in the agenda setting for the field trips? Were the leading research interests for the field trips jointly identified, and how are those aligned with the work of the practitioners?

Research Process (Data Gathering and Analyses)

Since our chosen research methods were not tested on their practical applicability, and whether they are expedient for our research interest yet, the research methods need to be reflected throughout the data gathering process and, if necessary, be adapted to the given context. With respect to the data analyses, attention must to be paid to that the different coding steps are being made transparent and documented in detail. The transparency of the decision-making process for a certain key category is of central significance. In the case that multiple key categories are be guiding the analyses process, this decision should be sufficiently explained (Schultz 2014, 86)

6. Time Frame and Resources

As this study focus on this year’s KNOTS Summer School and Field Trips held in Chiang Mai (Thailand), which will take place from July 17th to 31st 2018, the time frame for data gathering is already given. The agenda is planned as followed: During the first week, the participants – students from European as well as Southeast Asian universities – will have the opportunity to learn about transdisciplinary research methods. The lectures and discussions will focus on three major topics: Migration, Environmental Change and Social Inequality. The following Field Trips to eight different sites in Northern Thailand will enable the students to apply the previous acquired transdisciplinary research methods and to carry out research. Our team is composed of three researchers which allows us to analyse the interaction between scholars and practitioners throughout all project phases from different perspectives. During the summer school, we will

jointly observe how the project partners advocate the participation of non-academic actors. With regard to the field trips, we will each join a different site in order to compare the extent of practitioners' involvement and engagement in practice. The following timeline provides a rough overview of the planning, survey and evaluation of the research project:

	Mar – June 2018	Jul – Aug 2018 (KNOTS Summer School, Chiang Mai)	Oct 2018– Mar 2019
Preparation phase: development of theoretical content and methodological framework			
Field phase: data collection and analysis			
Theory formation and reflection			
Finalisation of the elaborated grounded theory			

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PATTERN AND FACTORS OF MIGRATION ON TAMBON BANNANG SATA AT THE LOCAL LEVEL DURING THE TIME OF CONFLICT

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Abstract

Current momentum of conflict in three Southern border provinces of Thailand emerged around 2004 causing immense loss of lives and wealth of the region. Since 2004, there have been a significant number of migrations of people in the Southern border provinces. Among areas in region, Tambon Bannang Sata has had the most violence. Mobility in this district has also been very high compared to the rest of the country. Its migration average rate is almost five times of national migration rate, and four times of migration rate in the whole Southern region. Many organizations claim that the main factor of migration in this area is the violence conflict. However, this research assumes that people migrate with several different reasons, and some of those reasons could relate to the human insecurity. This research also assumes factors of migration vary according to different religion groups. In order to better understanding of phenomenon of migration, this research aim to study the reasons and the factors that compliment to people's migration in this particular district. Collected from in-depth interview with 25 respondents from those to have moved out of, those who moved in and those who stay in Tambon Bannang Sata, findings show that Factors of migration both communities are mainly mixed of social factors, economic factors, personal preference and violence. Social factors include attachment to hometown, family, marriage and education. Economic factors are high paid jobs, job or land availability. There are also a few who move to make up votes for political parties that they support. Migration of Muslims and Buddhists in Bannang Sata is significantly different. Buddhists are more likely to move out and feel affected by the violence more than Muslims. Number of Buddhists move in is very rare. All of found cases are Buddhists who married local Muslims and changed their religion after moving in. Among the mixed factors, violence weighs much more for Buddhist respondents as all of them admitted violence was an important factor of their migration. While there were also few Muslims move to avoid being accused responsible for the violence, or move out of fear of Thai authority's interrogation, most of them affirmed that violence has not been part of their factors of migration at all. Most of Muslims in the district migrate with spouses after marriage.

Keywords: migration, southern violence, conflict factors pattern

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Introduction

Three Southern provinces, known as the Deep South, are where conflicts and violence reemerged around 2004. Only during 2004 -2005 alone, there were 6,543 deaths and 11,919 injuries, with an estimated 15,374 incidents occurring (IDMC, 2011). Among areas in the Deep South, Tambon Bannang Sata has had the most violence since 2004. According to DSID, more than ten incidents take place in Bannang Sata in the course of three months on average.

Mobility in Tambon Bannang Sata has also been very high compared to the rest of the country. In the course of 14 years, 2004-2017, migration average rate in Tambon Bannang Sata is 10.83 percent from in-migration rate 5.25 percent and out-migration rate 5.58 percent. It is almost five times of national migration rate (1.1 percent), and four times of migration rate in Southern region (1.36).

In such intense situations, it would not be surprised that many people left the region. According to IDMC, since 2004, at least 30 percent of Buddhists and 10 percent of Malay Muslims may have left their homes. Estimation of Institute for National Strategic Studies also indicates that around 20 percent of Buddhist population has abandoned its land after the conflict. However, there has not been any study on the pattern and the real factors of this high number of migration and how much it really is related to conflict. Many organizations claim that the main reason is the violence conflict. However this study assumed that people migrate with several different reasons and factors which are vary according to different religion groups. It would make better understanding of phenomenon of migration, to study the reasons and the factors that compliment to their migration might be needed.

This research is to answer two questions; what the pattern of migration in Tambon Bannang Sata after conflict in 2004 is, and what factors of migration in Tambon Bannang Sata after conflict in 2004 are. Therefore,

Migration

Migration is defined broadly as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. The movement can occur in any distance, voluntary or involuntary, external and internal. (Lee, 2018) This does not include the continual movements of nomads and migratory workers and temporary moves like travelling because the move is not to settle in a long-term residence.

Hyman and Gleave (1978) divide migrants into two groups; first, migrants who are primarily motivated by employment and income, and second, migrants who are primarily motivated by housing factors. This can mean seeking better surroundings or seeking to be closer to friends and relatives. Migration can also be divided by scope of movement; transnational migration and internal migration. Transnational migrants are those who were born in one country and migrate cross border to the other country. This kind of migration involves largely notion of citizenship, migration laws and national immigration system. Internal migration, in the other hands, occurs within national border. It is usually from rural to urban.

Migration can also be categorized by migrants' agency --- ability to initiating, executing, and controlling their actions. Voluntary migration is usually driven by economic incentives, social services and opportunity (Adhikari, 2011). Forced migration is when people are forced to move against their wills. They have little

agency to choose whether destination or travelling means (Adhikari, 2011). This type of movement is categorized into three groups. First, a person who moves from their home to another place because of natural disaster or civil disturbance may be described as a refugee. In 2013, it was estimated that around 51.2 million people fell into this category (UNFPA, 2015). Second group usually refers to forced migration that happens within the same country, a person is called a displaced person. Lastly, a person seeking refuge from political, religious or other forms of persecution is usually described as an asylum seeker.

People move for various factors and variables. John Atkinson argues that migration decision process consists of the multiplicative interaction of four variables; availability, motive, expectancy, and incentive (as cited in Sell & DeJong, 1978). These four variable decision and destination choices are moderated by individuals which can be based on economics, politics or other societal reasoning. There are many theories explaining incentive of migration.

Osmosis theory explains the whole phenomenon of human migration by the biophysical phenomenon of osmosis where people tend to move to the area until it reaches stabilization periods, and if it passes to concentration period, people will start to move out. However, this theory cannot be used to explain migration trend after industrialization where people move from rural to concentrate urban.

Neoclassical economic theory, however, provides explanation that it is due to wage difference between two locations. Labor tends to flow from low-wage areas to high-wage areas, or from rural to urban. However, new economics of labor migration argues that migration flows cannot be explained solely at the level of individual workers and their economic incentives, but that wider social entities must be considered as well. One of which is the household. Migration would help household through remittances. These remittances can also have a broader effect on the economy of the sending country as a whole as they bring in more capital (Jennissen, 2007). In some countries, remittance is an economic staple.

Relative deprivation theory argues that not only one's household is counted but awareness of the income difference between neighbors or other households is also an important factor in migration. According to Jennissen (2007), the incentive to migrate is a lot higher in areas that have a high level of economic inequality. Successful migrants will set an example for neighbors and inspire them to migrate.

The human capital approach in migration decision making theory is one of the theories cited by many writers. Migration is basically personal investment which will be made only if future monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits, which can be personal and individualistic, are justified (Sell & DeJong, 1978). This utility can be also explained by Push and Pull theory in which 'push' and 'pull' factors influencing voluntary out-migration. Push factors force people out of their traditional localities while pull factors are factors attracting people to move to new ones.

Zelinsky (cited by Sell & DeJong, 1978) lists individual preferences as values, pleasures, self-improvement, social and physical habitat, and general lifestyle. Many people also move from countries which were former European colonies or countries of people that has the same religion because they have relatives or cultural connection

However even with the same cost-benefits calculation, not everyone has the same mobility. People need a certain minimum of social and economic resources in

order to be able to migrate. Hence, irregular migration is higher in low development country. Migration can reflect a person high need of better life as well as higher access to resources. Network is one of the variables that provide persons access to more resources and information as well as chances to find employment and accommodation. Bunmak (2017) argues that migrant networks facilitate migration, especially through in informal channels. The costs and risks of movement for members of networks are lower because the experiences accumulated by earlier groups are available to for them (as cited in Bunmak, 2017). Those who have access to migrant networks are therefore more likely to be safer and to adapt more easily to the new culture than those without networks.

Current Violence

Violence in the Deep South of Thailand can be traced back as far as Ayutthaya period. The current momentum has been prolonged for 15 years. According to monthly report of Deep South Incident Database (DSID), from January 2004 to April 2017, there is in total 19,279 insurgency-related incidents. The intensity is up and down which was peak in 2007 (2,409 incidents) and in 2012 (1,851 incidents) as shown below. However, if we look separately by month, the most intense month is in January 2012, higher than any month in 2007.

Though the insurgency claims to fight for the rights of the Malay Muslims, data shows that majority or 60 percent of death is Malay Muslim (Abuza, 2011). According to DSW, most of this number is civilians killed by insurgency. Buddhists however were more injured. According to Institute for National Strategic Studies, there were 4,207 Buddhists injured compared to 2,389 Muslims. While 40 percent of death is Buddhist, they are from 15 percent of the population in the Deep South. Although, many of the death and incidents are unclear whether they are directly related to insurgency. There are many political rivalries, disputes over business and criminalities which some state officers are reported to engage in (Abuza, 2011).

Bannang Sata

Bannang Sata was part of Bacho, one of the main seven Malayu historical districts during King Rama V period. Tambon Bannang Sata is a Tambon in Amphoe Bannang Sata of Yala provinces. It is the area of 178.5 square kilometers. There are 17,387 people registered in 3,869 households. Population density is 97.41 people per square kilometer.

Muslims made up approximately 80 percent of total population, most of which speak Malayu language. Another 20 percent is Buddhist population, most of which have Chinese background.¹ There is one Buddhist temple --- Wat Nerancharawas and 18 mosques.

Considering conflict in Tambon level, Tambon Bannang Sata has the most incidents, 9 incidents in the course of three months on average. Well-known incidents in Tambon Bannang Sata is, for example, Ban Kasod School burning On April 4 2007. The Whole two building was burned down. Nine days later, another building was burned down again. Classes were then taken in temporary tents.

On April 5, 2013, car bomb attack on the vehicle of Yala deputy governor Isra Thongthawat on the national highway 410. The incident caused him and Chavalit Chairuek, a provincial disaster management official, to death. December 17th,

2017, bus burning was taken place on the same road in Moo 5 area. A group of armed men laid nails on the road to stop the bus from Bangkok to Betong. It then forced passengers out of the bus before burning the whole bus down. House burning was reported 500 meters away on the same day.

Migration of people in the Deep South

Many organizations claim that violence has led to migration and displacement. Estimation of Institute for National Strategic Studies indicates that around 20 percent of Buddhist population has abandoned its land. According to IDMC, since 2004, at least 30 percent of Buddhists and 10 percent of Malay Muslims may have left their homes. There are those who moved out of the southern region and those who moved into the relatively safer area in the region. Abuza (2011) asserts that insurgents have intentionally attempted to drive Buddhists out of region, especially rural areas. Buddhists, who decide to remain, are living with fear of being targeted. Government tries to ensure their security by setting heavily armed enclaves.

However, there is also evident presented by the Asia Foundation that that Muslims and Buddhists who are leaving the conflict area is not significantly different. Burke, Tweedie, and Poocharoen (2013) point that Buddhists being driven out is as not true as the claims that the government is intentionally occupying the Deep South with Buddhist population. Historical migration flows of Thailand's majority population into the Deep South are far less significant than in Mindanao, where the indigenous population has become a minority over time, or in Aceh, where government transmigration schemes were implemented on a major scale. Study shows that the overall Buddhist population has gradually declined over the past 20 years. This trend was going on way before of violence in 2004s.

METHODOLOGY

This is an area-based study on pattern and factor of migration in Tambon Bannang Sata, Yala province. Migration is a complex phenomenon that makes quantitative methods inadequate. Therefore, qualitative methods will be used to collect and analyze the data in this study. Assumed that people from different religion groups have different factors to migrate, data will collect from both religion groups

Data will be collected from two source; official documents and in-depth interviews. For document Research, this study uses two secondary data source from government officials; Population Migration Survey Report 2016 from National Statistical Office and Registration and population from Registration Administration Bureau.

In-depth interview was conducted with 28 reachable participants who willing to give interview from both religion groups, which include; those who have moved out of Tambon Bannang Sata, those who stay in Tambon Bannang Sata, and, those who move to Tambon Bannang Sata, Buddhists and Muslims.

Data will be analyzed with content analysis. Pattern of migration will be analyzed by finding relation of religious based groups, period and characteristics of migration. Theories of migration will be used to explain push and pull factors


of each groups' migration in different period of time. Human security's concept of fear and want will be weighed on how much they are related to factors of migration in the area.

RESULT

Migration Situation in Tambon Bannang Sata

Migration average rate in Tambon Bannang Sata in the course of 14 years, 2004-2017, is 10.83 percent from in-migration rate 5.25 percent and out-migration rate 5.58 percent. Considering this number, human mobility in Tambon Bannang Sata is very high, almost five times of national migration rate (1.1 percent), and four times of migration rate in Southern region (1.36 percent).

However, it was higher four years before conflict time. Migration average rate in Tambon Ban from 2004-2003 is 13.55 percent from 7.44 percent in-migration and 5.91 percent out-migration. Migration, especially in-migration, was drastically increased since 1997 and was peak in 2000 before declining as show in the Figure 1. It rose again in 2007, the year where violence is the most intensive, especially the out-migration that rose surpass the in-migration number this year. Out-migration has been more than in-migration form that year on. It is interesting that number of in-migration and out-migration is actually going in the same trend and not much different. Also, number of in-migration is 2000-2007 has very interesting pattern as it rises and declines every other year. According to Nipattama's observation, many Buddhists have moved out of area.



Factors of migration in Tambon Bannang Sata

1. Out-migration

In-depth interview was conducted with 12 respondents who has moved out of Bannang Sata which consist of 8 Buddhist and 4 Muslims as following.

No.	Gender	Religion	Occupation	Type of Migration	Reasons/Factors	Experience/ directly aggescted from conflict personally	Current Settlement	Against will
1	F	Buddhist	Retired civil servant (teacher)	Temporary live many place before permanentl y settled in Mueang Yala	- husband's work assignment (police) -has lands in Mueang Yala	warned by ex-student who join the group to leave the town - have to stay in safe house whenever her husband was duty	Within the Deep South	no
2	F	Buddhist	Retired civil servant (teacher)	Permanent	Move to hometown	none	Outside the Deep South	no
3	M	Buddhist	Retired civil servant (teacher)	Permanent	threatened to move	none	Outside the Deep Southno	yes
4	M	Buddhist	Retired civil servant (teacher)	Permanent	- want to live in city - for safety reason -closed to children	taught in Tanopute School when it was burn down	Outside the Deep South	no
5	F	Buddhist	Retired civil servant (teacher)	Temporary to Pattalung, and permanentl y reside in Mueang Yala	- take care of sick father in law	many bomb, arson and harassment at sister's house	Within the Deep South	no
6	F	Muslim	Company employee	Temporary	- college - job	none	Outside the Deep South	no
7	M	Muslim	Civil servant (teacher)	Permanent	- better school for children	none	Within the Deep South	no
8	F	Buddhist	Retired civil servant (teacher)	Temporary live in Bangkok, and will permanentl y reside in Nakhon Si Thammar	- for safety reason - move to husband's hometown - take care of grandchild	Bomb in front of school where she was teaching	Outside the Deep South	no

No.	Gender	Religion	Occupation	Type of Migration	Reasons/Factors	Experience/aggected from conflict personally	Current Settlement	Against will
9	F	Buddhist	Civil servant (teacher)	Permanent	move to hometown	none	Outside the Deep South	no
10	F	Buddhist	Civil servant (teacher)	Not sure	- to work in a better school - for safety reason	none	Outside the Deep South	no
11	F	Muslim	Civil servant (teacher)	Not sure	Marriage	None	Within the Deep South	no
12	F	Muslim	Civil servant (teacher)	Permanent	move to hometown	none	Within the Deep South	no

People move with different reasons. According to interviews, many of respondents said that moving is different between civil servants and regular people. Many of civil servants were not originally from Bannang Sata, they entered into service there which some of them could not choose. After a few years working, they would find opportunity to move back to their home town. For those who are not servants, all of them move into their spouses' home in nearby areas after getting married and still visit their family often.

Buddhists most likely move further than Muslims. Six of eight Buddhist respondents move to Nakhon Si Thammarat, Pratum Thani, Prachuob Kirikan, Pattalung, Songkla and Bangkok while only one of Muslim respondents move outside the Deep South and it is only temporary and she is also finding her new job closer to Bannang Sata. Family is always important factors for Buddhists. Many of them moved back to their hometown and one of them moved to her husband's hometown to take care of her sick father in law. Many of them moved to live with their children. Free of family concern in Bannang Sata and connection in other provinces allowed people to move further. Many of them have spouses from other provinces. It also shows that being with family is also important to them.

Though violence was not the main factor to move for some Buddhists, all of them express fear of being in Bannang Sata. They were more certain about not going back to the district than Muslim respondents. Though some Buddhist respondents still reside in other part of the Deep South (in the down town area), they all moved their children outside the Deep South and encourage their children not to come back. One respondent sent her son as far as England. One of respondents said she had always tried to convince her sister who still lived in Bannang Sata to move along.

All of the Buddhist respondents who have moved out of the Deep South were teachers. They all mentioned of teachers being targeted. One of them said “At the time (of moving), teachers were targeted. We could not wear official uniforms...” One of Buddhist respondents was a school’s deputy director. He shared experience of being put head-money, he explains “There has always been insurgency as long as I remember, not just these ten years. Many of them were my students. They live on the mountain. There were killings of teachers, but I was not afraid. My students always let me know when something would happen. They always made sure I was safe. Until 2004, they told me the group put 30,000 baht head-money on regular Buddhists and 100,000 on me because I am in high position, they warned me that they cannot protect me anymore, I better moved away, so I did.” Two of other respondents also said that they had good relationship with some of their Muslim students who later joined the insurgency and received similar warning.

Though many moved out of fear of the violence, only one moved urgently. Others said they were gradually came to the decision and moved when opportunity came. Four of them moved after they were retired, one of which moved after she was able to buy cheap land in Nakhon Si Thammarat with the help of her husband’s connection. All except for one did not feel like they were forced or if they did not have other choices. However, most of them felt that insurgents and some Muslims intentionally pressured Buddhists to move out. They expressed concern that “There used to be many Buddhists living on the main road all the way to Betong, how many houses you can count now?” Many of them understood that Buddhist population made up 80 percent before the violence arose. One said “we were put in the situation that we felt like strangers. We just sit around, could not talk to anybody, lease and lease people speak Thai on street.” One of respondents said her sister who has a shop in the downtown of Bannang Sata was harassed very often, she said “sometimes, groups of teen men came to the shop and said that this house will soon be theirs. They went around Buddhist household to say which houses they want.” Many respondents confirmed that there were many Buddhists left Bannang Sata without selling their lands or houses because they were threatened and not able to access their lands.

Third reason is to pursue certain life style. One mentioned “We were old. We wanted to do little farming, something that could keep us busy after retirement. We always wanted to have our own farm...” Many also mentioned that they wanted to live in the city and wanted their children to access to good education.

For Muslims respondents, they mostly moved because of their family; getting marriage and moving back to hometown. All of married Muslim respondents married people from the Deep South. Therefore, they did not have to move far way. Many respondents have negative idea about moving outside of the Deep South because they were worried of not able to visit family and friends often and also not able to practice religion as they wish.

Income is another important factor. Among Muslim respondents, one moved outside the Deep South for better income. She is currently working in CP Company in Bangkok. However, she said “I want to go back home to be with my family but I will go back only if I can find a decent job with good income.” When asked about her expected income, she answered “I am here, I make 25,000 Baht but I will take 15,000 Baht if I can go back home. But it does not seem possible in Bannang Sata. I graduated in economics, it suits private company more than

governmental office but there is no private company in Yala that wants economists or will give 15,000.”

None of them expressed that they were afraid of the situation, even those who were teacher. All of them mentioned similarly that the situation is not much related to them and that if anything happen to them, it was destined. Most of them asserted that they had never heard of anyone move out of fear. However, one of the in-migration respondents suggested that there were many Muslims moved out of Bannang Sata because they were tired of being suspected and interrogation, especially after tour bus burning incident where 79 men got arrested. He explained “...because authority always tries to accuse them. You know tour bus burning incidents right? Muslims in Kasod village cannot live with peace after that. Whole community became suspected. Witnesses said the guys who did it were wearing black outfits. Authority would raid into their houses and arrest any guys who own black cloths. When they arrest, it’s not just asking questions, they would beat you before anything. If you answer “I don’t know” they would beat you again, people cannot do anything to flight them. It’s too much. Villagers don’t have dignity or honor anymore. They had to burn all their black cloths because they were afraid of interrogation. They were afraid to go out to work. They thought they could get arrested and would never have chance to be back home again. They could not have normal life. So many people moved, they told me they just didn’t want to get beaten up. But what happens is that when you moved, authority will believe right away that you are the operator and you become wanted.

When asked why they think people from other religion moved, only two Muslim respondents recognized that many Buddhists move out of fear, others did not know or believed that none of Muslims and Buddhists move out of fear. One said “I have never seen anyone saying they move because of conflict. Most of the time, people move because they get married or because their children. People are not scared because it is our home.”

In the other hand, some Buddhists respondents strongly believed that Muslims’ migration is to spread their influence or even to take over the area. One said “when Muslims moved, they have hope. We both know this well what they are looking for. They want to turn Thailand to what they like. They want to take over, I do not need to explain more, it is clear. There was not anyone wearing Hijab outfit in Satun before, now they are everywhere”

After moving most of Buddhist respondents said they have better lives though they do miss Bannang Sata. Only one Buddhist respondent said he has always been very sad since moving. He said “the first month I moved, I felt life everything was blurry, I could not see anything clearly. I felt almost like I was not conscience. Every day I went to the gas station where the bus from the South stops, just to listen to people speaking in Southern language, when I heard people speaking Southern language, I cried. For Muslim respondents, all of them said moving did not make any difference to their lives. They felt like home.

2. In-migration

In-depth interview was conducted with 10 respondents who has moved in Bannang Satat which consist of 3 Buddhist and 7 Muslims as following.

No.	Gender	Religion	Occupation	Type of Migration	Reasons/ Factors	Experience/ directly aggected from conflict personally	Current Settlement	Against will
1	F	Muslim	Housewife	Permanent	- Move to live close to family - Education for children	gun firing between insurgence and solder at relatives' house	Within deep South	no
2	M	Buddhist	Civil servant (soldier)	Temporary	Assigned by work	Been in many battles and gun firing	Outside the Deep South	no
3	F	Buddhist converted to Muslim after moving	Civil servant	Permanent	Marriage	none	Outside of deep south	no
4	M	Muslim	Islamic teacher	Permanent	Marriage	being put in blacklist	within deep south	no
5	M	Muslim	Teacher	Permanent	Found job in this area	being put in blacklist	within deep south	no
6	F	Muslim	Farmer	Permanent	Marriage	no	within deep south	no
7	F	Muslim	Farmer	Permanent	Marriage	no	within deep south	no
8	M	Muslim	Civil servant (Police)	Temporary	Entered into service here	Been in many battles and gun firing	within deep south	no
9	F	Muslim	Farmer	Permanent	Marriage	Been in an bomb incident	within deep south	no
10	F	Buddhist converted to Muslim after moving	Permanent	Marriage	no	Outside of deep south	no	10

It was extremely rare to find any Buddhists moved to Bannang Sata. Most of them are soldier working in the area temporary and constantly moving which would not be able to consider it as migration according to Lee's definition of migration. (Lee, 2018). There are two respondents who were Buddhists converted to Muslims after getting marriage with Muslim locals. Like out- migration, civil servants and regular people moved with different factors. Many civil servants moved in because they entered service or assigned to work in this district, while

marriage is the most frequent factors of regular people who migrated to Bannang Sata. Six of respondents moved in due to marriage. All of the respondents observed that marriage is the main factors of in- migration in this district. However, there was also one respondent who moved to live with her parent who move there 25 years before. She explained “25 years ago, my parents and three from my mother’s siblings bought fellow land in Bannang Sata and turned them to farm land. They were very first group” when asked why they chose Bannang Sata, she answered “There was pretty much no place left in Moyo. Ngo kapo (a village in Bannang Sata) was all forest, land was cheap, but it required hard work.” After spending few years in Mueng Yala, her mother built extended part of the house and asked her to live together in Bannang Sata, so she did.

The factor that is very import to some of respondents is income. Moving to Bannang Sata, one of respondent could have some income working in the farm while her husband was working in the city. She said “In Bannang Sata, I can work in my mother’s farm and get the share. In the city, I did do anything. I was just a housewife. I graduated only secondary school. What else could I do?” When researcher asked in what condition can make her leave, she jokingly said “maybe I will move if they burn my farm. If we have no money, if we have to starve then we probably should move.” The same reason keeps her daughter in Bangkok.

Many seemed to prioritize education. Some of them had moved multiple times before within the Deepto seek better school for their children. However, “good education” that she was looking for is “...modern Islamic private school...”

One respondent gave very interesting information. He said high number of people movement was due to election of local power. There are also a few who move to make up votes for local political figure that they support. He said “every time when it is closed to election, there will be people registered in the village. I don’t know who they are or where they are from. They did not physically move here, just by names. When we have to check our names on the board, we always find strangers’ names. After election, I think they will just go back.”

All of the respondents asserted that violent conflict did not have any impact on her decision to move in. Although many of them have experienced extreme incident, they did not seem to be afraid. One said “it has already happened in some place but I did not think about it.” Some respondents seemed used to and were able to talk about the incidents so casually “there are bombs, killing and burn the body, killing and cut the head off, shooting soldiers. The scariest one was when a fish seller was shot, the killer killed him and cut the body into pieces and dumped one pieces in here and there, everywhere. We heard about it often, we are not afraid anymore. But one time it happened right at my aunt’s house in Tambon Tabing Tee Ngee (one of the Tambons in Amphoe Bannang Sata), I got quite scared.” She explained the incidents more “The house was around the foothill, insurgents were on the hill behind the house and Thai soldiers fired guns from the road in the front of our house. They fires guns to each other for hours and the house was in the middle. We could not sleep. It was loud. Everyone went to the first floor and lied down to the ground all night. In the morning, when we went of the house, we found many bullets, shells and bullets marks on the road and in the front lawn. But no one was hurt. We talked about it all day but that was it. The next day everything came to normal.”

3. Someone who stay in Bannang Sata

In-depth interview was conducted with 6 respondents who was born and living in Bannang Sata. The number consists of 2 Buddhist and 4 Muslims. According to the interview, being close to family and hometown is very important to respondents of this group.

There were mainly three reasons of why these respondents want to stay in Bannang Sata. First, they feel attached to the area. One explained “there are many relatives here. My mother was also born in Bannang Sata. We have resided in Bannang Sata for a long time, for generations...” When asked whether she consider improve her profession by gaining experience outside Yala, she insisted that “I rather want to improve my hometown. There are not any people graduated in something like this in Pa Wang (a village in Bannang Sata). I should be able to do something if I live here.”

Second is family obligation. Many mentioned about taking care of their parents. One said “My parents are old now. My father is 67 and my mother is 62. I want to take care of them. If I am not here, they will live on their own. My sister is also not here. My father is retired, my mother was retired but now she goes back to teach since the new teacher rehiring policy (โครงการจ้างคืนครูเกษียณอายุ). She is old but still working. At least I can help her at home.”

The reason she did not study in Bangkok was also that she wanted to be able to visit home and see her family if anything bad happened. One respondent said she got accepted in King Mongkut's Institute of Technology Ladkrabang but she chose not to study there because it was too far from home, she instead reapplied for Prince of Songkla University. For her and her family, being in Bangkok is unsafe, she said “I did not go (to Bangkok) because my parents thought it was not safe for me to be there alone. If anything happened whether to me or my parents, it would be hard to go to see each other.

The last reason is religion. It was the main reason for one respondent to choose her primary school and university as in the Seep South, she can find Halal foods and practice her religion easier.

All of respondents said they have never considered moving out even though impact of conflict has been clearly visible. One said “it was clear, after the conflict, villages became very quiet. It is absolutely quiet after Maqhib prayer (Muslim's late evening prayer time). Some other village might be livelier but Pa Wang is a forest area. We do not know who is hiding on the roadside. When it is dark no one come out of homes. Sitting in the house and hearing guns fire has been normal”

One of the respondents was in a bomb incident in front of the School she was studying and her mother was teaching. The violence also has affected her life throughout her secondary school years where she was studying in Mueang Yala and had time travel to her home in Bannang because road was always blocked by insurgents that she had to rent a flat. She explains “Sometimes if we had to do something till late, we would stay at the flat as well. We would not want to drive at night.” When asked what time was considered late and what would happen if they drove back home late, she said “7 p.m. was already too late. The road to Bannang Sata was dark and roadside was all forest. Sometimes they block the road with tree trunks and nails. We did not know what would happen but it was best to prevent.”

One of Buddhists respondents have also experience harassment from groups of teen men. She said many of her relatives told her to move out but she refused, she said “Our house is in the best location, it is in front of school. It is the property that my parents worked for and I don’t want to lose it. Bannang Sata is my home if all Buddhist moves out, how can the rest live? We have to support each other.”

DISCUSSION

Bannang Seta has very high migration flow even after it has been declined. In-migration drops surpass out-migration in 2007, however, it is still considered higher than national rate. It means that many people still moved to Bannang Sata. It could be that despite of conflict, Bannang Sata has plenty of land and resource available. It was why Saluema’s parents move there 25 years ago. It can explain in osmosis theory, they moved from Amphoe Mayo, a concentrated area, to start new land. This is what osmosis theory considered natural determination. Before conflict reemerged migration rate in Bannang Sata rose dramatically might be the phase of diffusion. Conflict from 2003, however, is considered as human intervention.

Family is the main factors in all three cases. Most of migration is to live close to their family or relatives. Some moved to live with their parents, their spouses and their children. However, Buddhists were most likely more exposed to outside society. They married to people from outside the region. Their family members are in many provinces. They are relatively wealthy as many of them are able to buy homes or condominium for their children to live in Bangkok. One of them was even able to send her children to study in England. As a result, moving to other provinces is not new or hard for them to adjust.

Most Muslims, however, have many religious restrictions as well as cultural practice like arrange marriage and language that make it harder for them to get married outside the Deep South. Those who are wealthier and able to afford to expose to outside world more, all seems to adjust themselves easier. One of Muslim respondents who is relatively wealthy has many of her nieces and nephews studying in Arab countries. She has moved many times before to seek “good school” for their children. Her parents moved before too. Therefore, being far away from home is not a scary thing. In the other hands for those who come from family that has not moved, studying in Bangkok is too much for them. Being away from home can seem dangerous and hard. Although many of them actually concerns about their safety but moving away is not choice because it has not been practiced in the family and they do not really have the connection.

Education and income seem to be a very important factor for many regardless to religion. Even for the one who prioritized being close to home had to negotiate it. One respondent went to Hadyai and Phuket, even for short period of time, for university and jobs as it seemed like a better choice than Bangkok. However, Buddhists and some Muslims have different concepts of good education. Many Muslims respondents identify good education as private schools that provide both religious and general education.

Most of Buddhists decision to move might be influenced largely by conflict but not to the point of being “displacement.” In most case, they had time to plan and decide. Their movement was not only due to push factor, they also have a lot of pull factors such as being with husband’s relatives, cheap land, and to pursue life style in the city life and farming, which in this case is pleasures and lifestyle.

All of them have experienced the violence at some point but each perceive danger and fear differently. Buddhist teacher perceived themselves as a target, so their fear was more. While experience of some Muslim respondents was actually quite serious have her relatives' house in the middle of battle but she seemed very calm about it as long as it does not affect her income. However, it shows that even when people seem satisfied and secured, it does not mean that they have good quality of life.

CONCLUSION

Factors of migration both communities are mainly mixed of social factors, economic factors, personal preference and violence. Social factors include attachment to hometown, family, marriage and education. Economic factors are high paid jobs, job or land availability. There are also a few who move to make up votes for political parties that they support. Migration of Muslims and Buddhists in Bannang Sata is significantly different. Buddhists are more likely to move further and feel affected by the violence more than Muslims. Number of Buddhists move in is very rare. Most of found cases are Buddhists who married local Muslims and changed their religion after moving in. Among the mixed factors, violence weighs much more for Buddhist respondents as all of them admitted violence was an important factor of their migration. While there were also few Muslims move to avoid being accused responsible for the violence, or move out of fear of Thai authority's interrogation, most of them affirmed that violence has not been part of their factors of migration at all. Most of Muslims in the district migrate with spouses after marriage.

Both of Buddhists and Muslims get affected by the violent conflict however they perceive it differently. Although many Buddhists experience harassment and pressure to move out which Muslims did not experience. It seemed like there was gap of understanding and interaction between the two communities of what other experience. Apparently people from the two community have not communicated much especially on the frustration and pressure that other experience. High number of people moving out does not merely represent vulnerability and insecurity of people. Many both Buddhists and Muslims move with other factors like family, education, income, lifestyle and connection. In the other hand, some people do not migrate because they get used to live in danger and they thought it was normal life condition.

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THE DISPARITIES OF PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN THAI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NGOS WORKERS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING VICTIMS

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Abstract

Thailand has been a source, transit, and destination hub for a complex network of human trafficking that mainly subjects men, women, and children to forced labour and sex³⁶ trafficking. Victims from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, and India either being forced, coerced, defrauded into sex industries and cheap labour market, namely fishing industries, domestic work, and factories and construction work; or being trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Russia, South Korea, Middle East, the U.S and countries in Western Europe. Thailand is also a focal point for the United Nations, the U.S government, and the global activist community in their efforts to bring attention to and combat the global phenomenon of human trafficking. It has also been consistently critiqued for not doing enough to aid human trafficking victims. In fact, in the last U.S TIP report, the U.S government suggested Thailand needed to do more to reach out to the public in its efforts to combat trafficking and provide aid to the victims. This study does not look at the efforts undertaken by the Thai government or civil society, but rather how human trafficking victims are perceived with in the circle of Thai Government Officials and NGOs Workers. It analyses the English – based news articles published in the Bangkok during the temporal period of 2004 - 2017, which were retrieved from Nexium (formerly Lexis-Nexus) database; as well as the semi-structure interviews with Thai Government Officials and NGOs Workers; by utilizing a conceptual framework the authors' developed from the existing literature on human trafficking discourse and perception of trafficking victims. The study concludes that academics, activists, civil society, and policymakers need to study and understand more about perceptions and how both human trafficking and its victims are perceived by Thai Government Officials and NGOs Workers in order to develop a more strategic, holistic approach to combating human trafficking and aiding trafficking victims.

Key Words: *Human Trafficking, Thailand, Perceptions, Trafficking Victims, Thai Government Officials, NGOs Workers*

Introduction

Thailand has been a source, transit, and destination hub for a complex network of human trafficking that mainly subjects men, women, and children to forced

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labour and sex trafficking. Victims from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, and India either being forced, coerced, defrauded into sex industries and cheap labour market, namely fishing industries, domestic work, and factories and construction work; or being trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Russia, South Korea, Middle East, the U.S and countries in Western Europe (Agency, 2016). Thailand is also a focal point for the United Nations, the U.S. government, and the global activist community in their efforts to bring attention to and combat the global phenomenon of human trafficking. Thailand has been struggled to combat human trafficking, oscillating between Tier 2 Watchlist and Tier 3 in the U.S TVPA ranking system. Beginning in 2001, the U.S. Department of State was required by the U.S Congress through the 2000 U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act to release a comprehensive report on the condition of human trafficking in countries around the world and their efforts to combat the phenomenon. The U.S government believes that by fulfilling this mandate, it will have the power to influence and assist “foreign countries in drafting laws to prohibit and punish acts of trafficking, and to strengthen investigation and prosecution of traffickers” (Introduction to 2007 Trafficking in Person Report, 2007); of which is a very strong security approach toward prohibition. In the prohibitionist approach, the common belief is that human trafficking activities lead to moral degradation and societal disruption. Therefore, any form of human trafficking activities needs to be prohibited to combat and prevent their spread and abuse. Modern slavery, especially sex industry in the context of the U.S, as well as the network used for its trafficking and distribution, also need to be controlled. This approach requires strong establishment of system of control and legal authority from international level to nation/state level (Pope, 2010). Since then, TIP report and TVPA ranking system have been promoted by the U.S government toward the global community, as the common standard to measure progress in combating human trafficking worldwide, given the global role of U.S government in security issues and the comprehensive detail provided in the report (Gallagher, 2011). Despite having improvement in the legal framework in previous reports, Thailand ranking has been worsened since 2008 and fell to the bottom in 2015 (Tier 3 Watch List) with some improvement in the year of 2016 and 2017. This pushed Thailand into a major legal reform and enforcement in the year of 2015 and 2017, in order to improve their TVPA ranking. In recognition to these efforts, in the last two U.S. TIP reports, the U.S. government put Thailand back to Tier 2 Watch List and recommended the Thai Government to specifically need to do more to seek cooperation from the public (Persons, 2017). This shows how much influences the TIP report and TVPA ranking system have over the policy and decision-making process in Thailand regarding human trafficking.

Despite claiming to move toward right-based approach in combating human trafficking, Thailand Anti-Human Trafficking Law continues to align more and more with the U.S Anti-Human Trafficking Law and its prohibition approach (Human Trafficking, 2017) in viewing human trafficking as national security issues; with more severe punishments and the introduction of life and death sentences in the 2015 amendment. And there is no provision and detail in identifying and assisting human trafficking victims, as well as cooperation mechanism for stakeholders. This is problematic, especially for the current Thai government, if they want to abide the recommendation from the 2017 TIP report to seek more cooperation from the public. As seeking public cooperation requires the Thai government to go beyond civil society to walk hand-in-hand with the

ordinary individual, and that is only going to be possible with an understanding of how the ordinary people, hereby called as “public sphere”, perceives human trafficking and, more importantly, human trafficking victims. The understanding of perception of human trafficking victims will shape the boundaries within which Thai policymakers, civil society, and activists can cooperate to effectively combat human trafficking and to aid victims better.

Part one provides readers with an overview of the literature on human trafficking in Southeast Asia and Thailand, paying specific attention to its emphasis on human trafficking victims. Part two builds on the existing literature to develop a conceptual framework for analysing perception of trafficking victims, which can be applied to other cases. Part three provides readers with the study’s findings from the Bangkok Post’s content analysis.

Perceiving Human Trafficking Victims: A Review of the Literature

Victims of human trafficking are rarely the focus of academic study on human trafficking in Southeast Asia, let alone on studies covering Thailand.³⁷ Much of the existing literature on Thailand focuses on the nature and condition of human trafficking and the states’ responses either overtime or within a specific temporal period. A lack of focus on the victim, as an actor, is problematic because to truly understand the process and means for combating trafficking, we need to understand the different types of actors involved, particularly the victims and how they are perceived and understood. Perceptions shape how human trafficking is approached academically and politically and set the boundaries upon which actions can be taken to combat the phenomenon.

Although Southeast Asian trafficking victims are not the primary focus we can gain an insight on how they are perceived or, rather, framed within academia from the cited literature. First, there is greater emphasis placed on female rather

³⁷ R Arora, ‘Female Migration and Labor in Thailand: When Law and Society Continue to Exclude You,’ *UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs*, vol. 21:1 (2017): 70-97; S Stephens, ‘Show, Don’t Tell: How Thailand Can and Must Make Advancements in the Fight Against Human Trafficking in the Thai Fishing Industry,’ *Emory International Law Review*, vol. 31:3 (2017): 477-503; N Pocock, L Kiss, S Oram, and C Zimmerman, ‘Labour Trafficking among Men and Boys in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Exploitation, Violence, Occupational Health Risks and Injuries,’ *Plos ONE*, vol. 11:12 (2016): 1-21, DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0168500; D Wongs, ‘Traficord and its Participation in the Promotion of Human Rights to Counter Human Trafficking in Thailand,’ *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, vol. 31:3 (2016): 501-524; J Sylwester, ‘Fishers of Men: The Neglected Effects of Environment Depletion on Labor Trafficking in the Thai Fishing Industry,’ *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal*, vol. 23:2 (2014): 423-459; Y Chalamwong, J Meepien, and K Hongprayoon, ‘Management of Cross-border Migration: Thailand as a Case of Net Immigration,’ *Asian Journal of Social Science*, vol. 40:4 (2014): 447-463, DOI:10.1163/15685314-12341251; R Huijsmans and S Baker, ‘Child Trafficking: ‘Worst Form’ of Child Labour, or Worst Approach to Young Migrants?,’ *Development & Change*, vol. 43(4) (2012): 919-946, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2012.01786.x; R Huijsmans, ‘The Theatre of Human Trafficking: A Global Discourse on Lao Stages,’ *International Journal of Social Quality*, vol. 1:2 (2011): 66-84; DOI:10.3167/IJSQ.2011.010206; L Jones, D Engstrom, P Hilliard, and D Sungakawan, ‘Human trafficking between Thailand and Japan: lessons in recruitment, transit and control,’ *International Journal of Social Welfare*, vol. 20:2 (2011): 203-211, DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2009.00669.x; P Stanslas, ‘Transborder Human Trafficking in Malaysian Waters: Addressing the Root Causes,’ *Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce*, vol. 41:4 (2010): 595-606; R Jayagupta, ‘The Thai Government’s Repatriation and Reintegration Programmes: Responding to Trafficked Female Commercial Sex Workers from the Greater Mekong Subregion,’ *International Migration*, vol. 47:2 (2009): 227-253, DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00498.x; and, N Myint, ‘Migration and trafficking: putting human rights into action,’ *Forced Migration Review*, vol. 1:30 (2008): 38-39.

than male or transgender trafficking victims. Second, sex trafficking receives more attention than labour trafficking. This is unfortunate because most of the male trafficking victims are employed in low-skilled, labour intensive industries, and there are limited state programs providing rehabilitative and reintegration services to them once they have been rescued from trafficking. Third, reference to trafficking victims is minimal. Instead, “migrants who have been trafficked” is more commonly used. The use of “victim” was more readily used in studies focusing on rescued women and children; and, in other cases, whose testimony had been described either when discussing the nature of trafficking conditions in the selected countries, when highlighting the type and nature of exploitation, or when describing the living and working conditions. All these studies tended to be more humanistic, playing to rights discourse and the emotive appeal of academics, activists, policymakers, and the lay community rather than to national security discourse and the security community. The humanistic narrative, it is argued, increases the victims’ visibility and awareness to the trafficking phenomenon. Again though, the limited focus on the female narrows who the reader perceives as a victim and vulnerable to trafficking. Fourth, migrants are further demarcated by whether they are regular or irregular migrants, and the latter is typically considered to be more vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation. Fifth, a lack of reference to “victims” and instead to “migrants” and the “irregular migrants who are more susceptible to being trafficked” blurs the perceptual frames of “trafficking victim” and “migrant.” Sixth, understanding, and at times sympathy, is provided for migration but no distinction is made between “trafficking” and “smuggling.” Trafficking is typically used rather than smuggling. Yet, most of the studies which cite victim narratives highlight migrants and victims who willingly went with the recruiter or agent, which means that in a court of law, the “trafficker” would not be charged with trafficking (so long as the individual was over the age of 18) but rather smuggling. Therefore, the failure to make the conceptual distinction between the two hinders the actual framing of the “victim” and an understanding of the trafficking process. Finally, the impact of migration is discussed both positively and negatively. Migrants are viewed as having a positive impact on the economy due to the lower costs of production (cheaper labour), allowing for more affordable goods on the domestic market, and enabling companies to have competitive edge on exports for global markets. This image is balanced by framing the nature of labour exploitation, poor working conditions, and lack of rights afforded to migrants, particularly those who are either irregular or working in labour sectors which having little regulatory protections such as domestic work and the sex and entertainment industry. Migrants are viewed as having a negative impact in the studies when discussing national security, nationalism, and social and health costs.

A lack of focus on perception within the human trafficking literature is problematic.³⁸ There is a small body of literature focusing on perception of refugees, internally displaced persons, asylees and migrants, but only within the

³⁸ S Son, ‘Identity, security and the nation: understanding the South Korean response to North Korean defectors,’ *Asian Ethnicity*, vol. 17:2 (2016): 171-184, DOI: 10.1080/14631369.2016.1151236; D Chatty and N Mansour, ‘Displaced Iraqis: Predicaments and Perceptions in Exile in the Middle East,’ *Refuge*, vol. 28:1 (2011): 97-107; F Fozdar and S Torezani, ‘Discrimination and Well-being: Perceptions of Refugees in Western Australia,’ *International Migration Review*, vol. 42:1 (2008): 30-63, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00113.x; and, L d’Haenens and M de Lange, ‘Framing of asylum seekers in Dutch regional newspapers,’ *Media, Culture, & Society*, vol. 23:6 (2001): 847-860.

context of South Korea, Iraq, Australia, and the Netherlands. In the study on South Korea, the author utilizes a constructivist understanding of national identity and its role in policy formation and change to analyse selected government policy documents and statements, academic studies, and press releases and media statements to categorize how North Koreans are perceived within South Korea; to identify the shifts in perception along a positive-negative identity continuum (developed from the categorization); and, to analyse them in relation to key changes in government policy toward unification³⁹. In the study on displaced Iraqis, the authors examine the perception, interests, and perceived predicaments in relation to the way in which they are perceived by international actors who are responsible for either oversight, providing aid, or developing policy toward them; and, the areas of perceptual convergence and divergence found within the existing academic literature and the international community.⁴⁰ The authors do not use a theoretical lens for analysis of the data. Utilizing survey data collected in 2004 from 150 refugees, the study on Australia explores the paradox of perceived high levels of discrimination experienced by migrants to Australia and their positive reporting of well-being.⁴¹ Finally, in the study on the Netherlands, the authors utilize Semetko and Valenburg's five frames, namely the conflict frame, human interest frame, economic consequences frame, morality frame, and responsibility frame, to develop 20 questions and use a yes-no and open-ended approach to analyse how asylum seekers are framed in selected Dutch regional newspapers.⁴² The study does not per se conceptually examine how asylum seekers are perceived but, rather, whether the coverage was positive or negative in relation to the five frames. Although these studies do not focus on the trafficking phenomenon or human trafficking victims their focus on and approach to perception are important because it is from them which this study will build to develop a conceptual framework for analysing perception of trafficking victims in Thailand.

A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Perception of Trafficking Victims in Thailand

Building on the works of Huijismas (2011)⁴³ and Huijismas and Baker (2012)⁴⁴ on human trafficking discourse and the cited literature on perception and human trafficking victims, this study begins with the following five assumptions:

- First, the framing of human trafficking as modern-day slavery occupies a space in the global public imaginary as a human rights violation and, thus, combating it is perceived to be a moral obligation that is beyond critique⁴⁵.
- Second, the global human trafficking discourse is adopted and adapted by states willingly.
- Third, there are two dominant human trafficking discourses—one that is human rights oriented (also referred to in the literature as the liberal view) and one that is rooted in national security discourse (entailing

³⁹ Son, "Identity, security and the nation", 171.

⁴⁰ Chatty and Mansour, "Displaced Iraqis", 97.

⁴¹ Fozdar and Torezani, "Discrimination and Well-being", 30-63.

⁴² d'Haenens and de Lange, "Framing of Asylum Seeker", 847-860.

⁴³ Huijismans, "The Theatre of Trafficking", 66-84.

⁴⁴ Huijismans and Baker, "Child Trafficking", 914-946.

⁴⁵ Huijismans and Baker, "Child Trafficking", 921.

references to security, law and order, national sovereignty, and national identity)

- Fourth, the predominance of the human rights or liberal discourse and the way human trafficking is framed creates a moralistic imagery that is beyond reproach, which problematizes a full understanding of the phenomenon and the actors involved, particularly the victims; narrows discussions on how to combat trafficking and promotes short-term rather than long-term strategies; and, contributes to conceptual haziness.
- Fifth, there is conceptual haziness of trafficking and migration and trafficking victims and migrants, and because of that there is conceptual haziness between regulation and the protection and promotion of human rights.⁴⁶

With those assumptions in mind, this study examines the discourse on human trafficking victims in Thailand in the top leading English-based newspaper, namely the Bangkok Post. Country-based media sources are used as one of several data sources compiled for the annual U.S. Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports. Thailand was selected because of it being a major source, destination, and transit country for trafficking victims in Southeast Asia, as well as for the consistent critique in the U.S. TIP reports that it does not do enough to aid them. Understanding how trafficking victims are, therefore, perceived is important. This study will be a valuable contribution to the existing literature because scant attention is paid to trafficking victims. There is, of course, some literature on victims and their accounts produced by NGOs which are, as the literature review highlighted, used to highlight the condition or nature of exploitation of trafficking in Thailand. The problem is that the public do not read these studies or the NGO reports. Rather, they read, listen to, and learn from the media. Thus, how victims are covered matters because the imaginary created shapes public perception. Academics, activists, policymakers and practitioners need to study how the public understands the phenomenon if they truly want to seek and facilitate public cooperation.

Temporally, the initial selection of news articles corresponded to the first year in which the U.S. Department of State began issuing the TIP reports to the present (April 1, 2001 to December 31, 2017).⁴⁷ All articles were retrieved using the Nexi-Uni (formerly Lexis-Nexus) database, using the search terms “Thailand” and “Human Trafficking”. A search of the Bangkok Post yielded 372 articles and, of them, 262 were selected for analysis based on the headline. Articles on human trafficking in Thailand were not prevalent until 2004, and even afterwards the reporting was sparse. Truly, it was not until 2013 when there was more frequent reporting on the phenomenon. 2015 was the peak year for the coverage on human trafficking, which is particularly interesting given that 2014 was the year Thailand was downgraded to Tier 3 in the U.S. TVPA ranking system and there was a change in government. April 1 to March 31 are the actual reporting months for the annual reports, and the Royal Thai Army’s military intervention on May 22,

⁴⁶ Huijsmans, “The Theatre of Trafficking”, 66.

⁴⁷ Actual U.S. reporting months for the reports are April 1 to March 31. The reports are then usually released between June and July. The 2015 TIP Report’s release was delayed following controversy over the political nature of the TVPA system and Malaysia’s upgrade. The U.S. government did release a separate statement at the time of its release recognizing the efforts Thailand had undertaken between March and June 2015. Thailand’s military government did not comment on the political controversy, but it was covered by the press and opinion articles were published. The media was also questioned over its perceived over-coverage of human trafficking.

2014 led to the installation of a new, military-led transitional government, which remains in place at the time of this writing. Thailand remained at a Tier 3 in 2015 but the U.S. government did note in a separate addendum that the military government's efforts undertaken between January and March 2015 were recognized and would be included in the 2016 U.S. TIP report. In 2016, Thailand was moved back to the Tier 2 Watchlist. Media coverage on human trafficking dwindled in 2017, but it was still higher than the coverage in 2013. Thailand remained on the Tier 2 Watchlist in 2017.

All articles were analysed using a six-step analytical process. First, they were read through once without any coding to familiarize each author with the text. A double-layer review was employed, with the first author completing one set separately in its entirety (each phase) without the other having viewed the context and then switching sets. It was felt that this approach would serve as a check to any unknown bias. After reading through the text for familiarity, the articles were read to classify the type of discourse; that is, where it was liberal discourse, national security discourse, or a combination of the two. Third, they were analysed according to the type of frames employed. The frame typologies used by d'Haenens and de Lange (2001) were adopted but slightly modified⁴⁸. They include a conflict frame, human interest frame, economic consequences frame, morality frame, and responsibility frame.⁴⁹ Fourth, the frames were then analysed to construct images of trafficking victims around the points of convergence. Fifth, the images were analysed to identify temporal shifts based on perceptual keys or signals.⁵⁰ Finally, the constructed images were then analysed for conceptual haziness.

The following research questions guided the analysis: 1) What was the gender breakdown according to references to "trafficking victims" and "migrants"? 2) Was there a bias toward female victims, as suggested in the literature? 3) How were the victims framed? 4) Was there conceptual fuzziness evident in the usage of terms trafficking victims and migrants and trafficking and smuggling?

Analysing Perceptions of Human Trafficking and Trafficking Victims

The human trafficking discourse surrounding the victims evolved over time. Between 2004 and 2017, 17 per cent of the articles selected for analysis were classified as liberal. As will be recalled from the selected literature, the liberal discursive frame views human trafficking through a human rights prism, thereby making actions undertaken a moral obligation. The remaining articles (83 per cent) were national security oriented. A national security discursive frame views human trafficking as a matter of law, security and order, national sovereignty, and national identity. Actions undertaken, therefore, are not per se perceived as a moral obligation but, rather, a sense of responsibility or duty to protect. Activists and NGOs tended to use liberal discourse more frequently than the

⁴⁸ d'Haenens and de Lange, "Framing of Asylum Seeker", 850.

⁴⁹ In d'Haenens and de Lange's work, a conflict frame emphasized some sort of conflict which was presented or framed in a way that promoted a winning or losing mentality (either we do this or else); a human-interest frame emphasized emotion; an economic consequence frame emphasized economic impact; a morality frame emphasized some sort of moral charge of specific code of behaviour; and, a responsibility frame emphasized the need to act.

⁵⁰ A perceptual key refers to a word or set of words which are used consistently over time, while a perceptual shift refers to a change in frame. A perceptual signal or discursive signal refers to whether a positive or negative tone was employed.

government. The latter used national security discourse more frequently. From these two discursive frames and utilizing the way the media frames trafficking victims (according to the conflict, human interest, economic consequences, responsibility frames), perceived images of the trafficking victims in Thailand can be constructed around the convergence of discourse on the victim narrative, the nature of trafficking, and the actions undertaken to combat the phenomenon and aid the victim. All media articles containing victim narratives balanced the story with factual or authoritative information on human trafficking and situate both within the larger context of human trafficking in the region or across the globe. Readers should keep in mind that the images constructed below are based on and emerged from the news data available between 2004 and 2017. There are specific cases which deviate from the points of convergence, but the purpose of this analytical exercise is simply to understand how trafficking victims are perceived.

A trafficking victim, as depicted in the media coverage, can be a person, migrant, refugee, asylee, boat person, or slave, who has been trafficked or smuggled for the domestic, labour, and sex and entertainment industries. Narratives of females and sex trafficking victims were covered more than males and labour trafficking victims. In fact, it was inferred from the way they were framed that labour trafficking victims were predominantly male, while sex trafficking victims were predominantly female. Child trafficking victims were rarely covered and simply lost in the larger narrative, unless of course, the story itself was so shocking that it caught the public's attention, and thus was covered several times. An example which comes to mind were of the nine Lao teenage migrants who were found locked in cages, where they had to defecate in bags because of there not being any bathrooms. Sex trafficking narratives tend to focus more on the Thai narrative whilst the non-Thai or the foreign "migrant" received more attention in the labour and child trafficking victim narratives. In one sense, the coverage of the Thai victim is positive because of the overwhelming perception that the victim is a foreigner. On the other hand, the lack of the foreign sex trafficking victim narrative keeps the "other" or, rather, the foreign victim as a distant other; someone to sympathize with but not someone whom the "native" can relate to. There was no attempt to highlight the similarities between the two or even show the narrative as "one." Yet, when taking a closer look at the narratives, they are similar once references to nationality or use of the terms "migrant", "refugee", "asylee", or "boat person" are removed.

A sex trafficking victim is typically framed as a foreign migrant or a Thai native from the poor Northern border areas, who either chooses or is forced into the sex industry because of her family's socioeconomic conditions. The socio-political conditions of Myanmar women who end up in the sex trade in either Thailand or Malaysia are also referenced when discussing why an individual sought, or the parents encouraged her, to leave home. Again though, the narrative of the non-Thai tends to be neglected in the media coverage. All sex workers are exploited by their handlers and customers alike, with the former using physical and psychological violence to ensure their bondage and the latter who often do not use a condom. Many are left fearful and ashamed. The over-coverage of foreign sex workers rescued or arrested and keeping them at a distance minimizes the public debate on whether to legalize or, at least, provide some legal protection to women working in the sex and entertainment industry, which is a topic circulated in the narratives on Thai sex workers from the northern part of the country.

Labour trafficking victim narratives did not really emerge in the media until the latter part of 2014, and they dominated coverage in 2015 and 2016. The year 2015 was when the military government undertook massive labour and fishing industry reforms. There were also significant cases in both years which helped focus public attention on the migrants' plight and government's efforts. Neither the public nor government could ignore the images of bodies being carried from jungle camps, finding of mass graves along the Thai-Malay border, and involvement of high-ranking officials in the South of Thailand in the trafficking of migrants and the running of those camps. Labour exploitation, poor living conditions, physical and psychological abuse, and lack of rights were consistent themes throughout the narratives. There was even discussion on and debate about their plight and the underlying causes for their migration from Myanmar to Thailand. It was after these events that there were more references to "slaves," "slave-like conditions", and "modern-day slavery" in relation to human trafficking. The use of "refugees", "asylees", or "boat people" were typically used for the Rohingya "migrants" coming from Bangladesh and Myanmar. Rohingya "migrants" was the term used more frequently by government and security personnel prior to 2015, and among the public and the media beginning in and after 2015. Civil society organizations, NGOs, and activists still tended to use "refugees", "asylees", or "boat people" in the media. "Slaves" and "modern-day slavery" were used more in references to labour trafficking migrants working in the fishing industry and child labour migrants working either on farms or as beggars, but more so in the post-2015 period.

A child trafficking victim is typically framed as a foreign child migrant who was either brought to Thailand or sold by family members to Thais to either work as a child beggar or serve as domestic worker. Child begging narratives exceed those who served in the domestic sector. Many parents who had sold, leased, or rented their children to "others" or who had their children recruited by organized criminal gangs were unaware of the conditions their child was living in or the nature of the exploitation. Some parents, however, resold their children after authorities had returned them, and even knew of the nature of the conditions. Poverty was the driving factor in such cases. There were even a few narratives where the children preferred to be with the criminal gangs rather than at home due to the nature of the conditions or the parents' own exploitation of them.

Based on the coverage of human trafficking victims in the Thai media several conclusions can be drawn from the initial analytical assumptions. First, human trafficking does occupy a space in the Thai public imagery and all Thai governments between the years of 2004 and 2017 willingly adopted the human trafficking discourse. Second, the liberal discourse does dominate how human trafficking is framed but only within the context of trafficking victims' narratives. For human trafficking more generally, the national security discourse dominates the public imagery whilst the liberal discourse remains prevalent among the imagery of activists and NGOs. Third, combating human trafficking in Thailand is not perceived as a moral obligation but, rather, a responsibility the government must assume out of its duty to protect. This perceived duty of the government shifted to also include the public in 2017. As will be recalled from the introduction of this study, one of the recommendations of the U.S. government was that the Thai government needed to do more to reach out to the public to help in the efforts to combat human trafficking. To do more, however, requires a better understanding of the public imagery shaped by the national security discourse.

When looking at the selected articles framed using the national security discourse, some interesting findings emerged. First, 65 per cent of articles were concerned with action taken to combat human trafficking or to aid trafficking victims. 23 per cent of those articles focused on providing order, including investigations, searches, seizures, warrants, arrests, charges, and border security. Arrests and charges filed against police, military and immigration officials were included, but coverage of them occurred more frequently in the post-2015 period. 19 per cent of the coverage simply provided an overview or summary of efforts undertaken, and much of that occurred around the time of the TIP reporting period. 17 per cent of the coverage discussed planned action. This is important because the U.S. TIP report only counts actions taken. Most of those articles were also concerned with labour trafficking and the fishing industry, including better ways to deal with illegal migration and how to better protect illegal migrants so that they do not fall prey to human trafficking. Prior to 2014, sex trafficking dominated the public imagery; thus, it was the centre of actions undertaken. The nexus between the types of human trafficking (sex, labour, and child), illegal migration, and the labour sector became a focal point in the post-2015 period. 13 per cent of the coverage focused on courts, court cases, training of court personnel, and problems in the criminal justice system including obstruction of justice, tampering of witness testimony and intimidation, delays in prosecution, and the difficulty in proving the crime of trafficking. 11 per cent of the coverage focused on laws and the legislative process. Breakdowns in the implementation process and enforcement were also highlighted in the coverage on laws and the legislative process. 10 per cent of the coverage focused on security, police procedures, and reorganization of the security forces to better combat trafficking and protect victims. Finally, six per cent of the coverage was concerned with cooperation between the government, NGOs and the public; bilateral cooperation with Brunei, Cambodia, Lao, Malaysia and Myanmar; trilateral cooperation between Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia; and, regional cooperation through the ASEAN and the Mekong sub-regional body. Second, the other 35 per cent of the national security discourse articles did not focus on action but, rather, discussed specific topics including the U.S. TIP report (50%), corruption (20%), connection to transnational organised crime (9%), image of the country (8%), economic consequences (5%), media reporting on human trafficking (3%), release of investigative reports (1%), and the importance of information and communication technology (1%). Third, there is a disconnect not *per se* in the public imaginary but, rather, in the way in which the government, civil society, and the public talk to one another about human trafficking and the victims' narratives. This is most evident when taking into consideration the two dominant discursive frames. As was highlighted, civil society tends to use liberal discourse whilst the government uses national security discourse. There were very few articles which attempted to combine the two. Media tend to use authoritative sources (government and government reports) for stories; thus, the images shaping the public mind are those framed using the national security discourse. The U.S. TIP reports draw from the media sources, government reports, and NGOs as data sources. Ultimately, there is a breakdown in how each perceives the other because of the divergences in the way they are talking to one another. It seems to be a case where the actors are talking at, rather than to, one another, and this lies at the heart of the problem in gaining public attention and participation in combating human trafficking.

Another problem in gaining public attention and participation is conceptual haziness. This study confirms the assumptions that 1) there is conceptual

haziness surrounding human trafficking and migration but adds smuggling thereto, and trafficking victims and migrants; and, 2) because of that, there is conceptual haziness between regulation and the protection of human rights. First, “human trafficking” was used in place of “migration”. In all the articles which specifically talked of migrants and their journey to and through Thailand, there was only reference to human trafficking rather than to migration. Similarly, human trafficking was overwhelmingly used interchangeably with smuggling. In the instances where a distinction was made between trafficking and smuggling, it was made by the government but in the post-2014 period. Civil society, NGOs, and the media fail to make the conceptual distinction, which blurs how they are perceived by the public. Some articles referenced “human trafficking victim” or “trafficked migrant” and at the same time talked of the willingness of the victim to seek out or go with a recruiter to find work in Thailand or to be transported from Myanmar or Thailand to Malaysia. It was rare to find the term “smuggling” or “smuggled” in the same article but it is implied. Some articles highlight that once the migrants are in the country illegally they are pushed into human trafficking, but again the line between the concept of migration and trafficking are being collapsed. Second, the conceptual haziness complicates the government’s efforts to combat human trafficking and aid trafficking victims. The government, civil society, and the public cannot cooperate if they are not talking about the same thing or having a clear understanding of where to draw the conceptual lines. There must be greater public attention to unblurring the blurred lines. Finally, a combination of divergence from the discourse used and conceptual haziness complicates state efforts undertaken and how the U.S. perceives them when compiling the U.S. TIP reports. There must be a concerted effort at the state, regional and global levels to understand the nature of the discourses used, how they shape perception, and to bring conceptual clarity so that there can be a convergence of efforts undertaken to combat human trafficking and aid trafficking victims.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study highlighted how the trafficking victims are perceived within the existing academic literature on human trafficking in Southeast Asia and Thailand; developed a conceptual framework for analysing how trafficking victims are perceived, rooting it within the bodies of literature on human trafficking discourse and perception of refugees, internally displaced persons, asylees, and migrants; and, utilized the framework to study how trafficking victims are framed in Thailand’s leading, English-based newspaper, the Bangkok Post. The study finds that the divergence of perceptions based on the liberal and national security discursive frames creates a structural or foundational problem for understanding, discussing, and resolving human trafficking issues in Thailand, and hinders efforts for combating human trafficking and aiding trafficking victims. Thailand will not be able to bridge the perceptual divide and garner increased public support without waging more strategic, information, educational, and media campaigns. The government, civil society, and the media must go beyond the simple awareness campaigns waged in the past. Campaigns must be targeted to crack-open the issue, provoke debate, and provide guidance on how to act. They must also be sustained rather than being employed around the TIP reporting period. However, Thailand alone cannot overcome this perceptual divide and conceptual haziness surrounding trafficking, smuggling,

and migration and trafficking victims and migrants. The international community is equally guilty in utilizing language which blurs the phenomena under discussion.

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POLITICS OF CHANGES IN THAILAND'S UNIVERSITY ADMISSION POLICY (1999-2017)

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Abstract:

This research aims to study the significant phenomena, The Changes in Thailand's University Admission system between 1999 – 2017. During the period, the admission system has been changed for seven times. This research focuses on political factors that affect the changes in admission policy. In the context of Politics means relation among Politicians, Bureaucracy, Schools and Civil Society.

The purpose of this research is (1) to understand the causes and procedures of changes in Thailand's university admission policy. (2) to study and understand the correlation between politics and the changes in university admission system. (3) to understand the similarity and the difference of university admission policy and other policies. (4) to study efficiency and effectiveness of Thailand's university admission policy between 1999 – 2017.

The research findings indicated that in the process of Thailand's University Admission policy formation since 1999 – 2017. There is only one important organization that plays the role of the policy maker, Association of the Council of the University Presidents of Thailand. It does not appear that there are individual groups or other organizations involved in the policy making process especially the policy formation period. The bureaucratic, political sector or public sector did not have a chance to participate in the process. Association of the Council of the University Presidents of Thailand has monopolized the admission system consistently. The association conducts by a group of limited people, i.e., the president, the elite of the educational institution. The changes of university admission policy have a wide impact that is why the choice of policy should be decided by majority. The study found that changing of university admission policy also affects the educational opportunity. Every change of admission policy makes the education system more complex. Those complex systems do not affect the city students, middle classes or Elite who are able to deal with every process simply, but they do affect the rural students with lower economic cost. The university admission system in Thailand is a sophisticate version of social exclusion. The policy appears to create opportunities and options for young people. Conversely, university admission policy is just a system that helps universities to equalize the number of students they want in each university due to its oversupply of seats in universities.

Keywords: *University Admission system, Education Policy, Educational opportunity, Inequality in Education, Policy Elite, Thailand's University Admission Policy*

According to the policy formation process, the processes by which policies are formed are exceedingly complex. Agenda setting, the development of alternatives, and choices among those alternatives seem to govern by different forces.⁵¹ the processes that lead to an effective policy should provide chances of participation. Policy making process must consist of multiple sectors included prime minister, cabinet, government officer, social sector and people. The multiple sectors can help to create and shape the policy that gives benefit to all. And it can reduce the problems that may come after because the policy is linked to the people. The inappropriate policy formation process affects the efficiency and stability of the policy. The improper generated policies may result in poor policy performance and the policy also lack stability. From 1961 to present, Thailand's University Admission system has been changed the format for eight times. Each of them took an average usage three years. The number of changes and the usage times of each system clearly show that Thailand's University Admission Policies are doubtful.

From the issues that appeared, there are many questions about the changes in the University Admission System in Thailand. The main question is 'Why does the University Admission Policy change frequently?'. It is interesting to study such issues in depth. The study of higher education in Thailand often researches about quality assessment in higher education. The work directly related to the policy of recruiting students into the university which is an important time connecting the education system between high school and higher education is still very rare. In spite of the fact that these problems have been accumulated over the years and they are still occurring in Thailand today.

From 1999 to 2017, there were six main types of university admission systems. The six times of changes of university admission system are just a broad format. Considering the content of the change each year thoroughly, it was found that Thailand's University Admission Policy has changed in detail such as selection standard and scoring proportion in almost every year. The changes of university admission policy in each time affects many people and many sectors. The policy affects about 100,000 students who participate in admission system in each year,⁵² about million high school students in Thailand⁵³ every year, parents, teachers, schools and 301 universities in Thailand⁵⁴ in almost every year. From the issues that appeared, there are many questions about the changes in the University Admission System in Thailand. And the main question is 'Why does the University Admission Policy change frequently?' It is interesting to study such issues in depth via the framework of policy formation.

Moreover, the changes of university admission policies increase more complex subjects and more exams for example comparing the admission policy in 1999, there was only one kind exam to participate in but in 2017. There are more than

⁵¹ Kingdon, J. W. (2014). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*.(pp.1-89). Harlow: Pearson.

⁵² Sarubponkancudlauekbukkonkhaosuksator Nairadub Udomsuksa Admission60. (*Summary of University Admission system 2017*) . (2017, June 15). Retrieved June 20, 2018, from <https://www.admissionpremium.com/content/2687>

⁵³ Attasaunnakraenthajumnaunprachakornpee 2553-2558. (*Student ratio to population in Thailand in 2010 - 2015(Sathitikansuksa Khongpratedthai Peekansuksa 2557-2558, (Statistics of Thai Education in 2014-2015)12*). Retrieved July 29, 2018, from https://www.m-society.go.th/article_attach/19341/20693.pdf.

⁵⁴ Sarupkhomoonsathabanudpmsuksa radupparinya Jumnaektamphaklaechangwad. (*Summary of number of higher education institutions classified by province*). (2015, April). Retrieved July 28, 2018, from http://www.mua.go.th/users/bpp/main/download/other/HiEduSum_0458.pdf

four kinds of exam that the students have to take. That four exams did not include other exams that students choose to take in each university.⁵⁵

The changes in university admission policy might affect the opportunities of many students especially the poor because students have to pay to participate in every exam and process of entering the university. Not only the cost of the exams that parents have carry on their back. They also have to pay for special classes and tutorial school that important for students not less than the education in Normal school system. The higher cost of admission to higher education may lead to the gap of opportunities for students in both quantitative and qualitative way.

The reason for choosing this period to study is due to the fact that it is the time when the change in university admission policy changes occurs frequently. This research aims to study the changes in Thailand's university admission policy between 1999 to 2017 on the following issues: (1) to understand the causes and procedures of changes in Thailand's university admission policy. admission system. (2) to study and understand the correlation between politics and the changes in university admission system. (3) to understand the similarity and the difference of university admission policy and other policies. (4) to study efficiency and effectiveness of Thailand's university admission policy between 1999 – 2017.

The four-main questions of this research are (1) which political factors contributed to the change in university admission policy during the years 1999 - 2017? (2) What is the real process of changing university admission policy during 1999 – 2017? (3) The Changes in Thailand's University admission policy affects the educational opportunity of students or not? And if it is, in what way? (4) Does the Changes in Thailand's University admission policy have efficiency and effectiveness?

A study of the politics of change in Thailand's university admission policy is a Qualitative research that to the study as follows. (1) Study from relevant writings, such as research, research papers, dissertations, books, academic articles, newspapers, and information on the internet. (2) Direct interview, which is the primary data collection from those who involved in the politics of changing university admission policies. The interviewers are the government officers in Ministry of Education and Office of the Higher Education Commission who involved in the change of policy each time, students affected by changing university admission policy from schools in Bangkok and schools in Kanchanaburi, Parents, Public sector, Relevant government agencies included former government officials who has been worked at National Institute of Educational Testing Service (Public Organization) (NIETS) , University lecturers, and other people who involved in Thailand's university admission policy. (3) study the history of Thailand's university admission policy from the past and the history of relevant government agencies

The scope of this article is to study changes in university admission policy in Thailand since 1999 – 2017. During this period, there was changes in university admission system for 6 times first in 1999, 2nd in 2006, 3rd in 2010, 4th in 2013, 5th in 2015 and last in 2017. This work focuses on the political factors that affect the change in University Admission policy in 1999 – 2017. The word 'political context' refers to the interaction among Changes of university admission system, Bureaucratic, form of government and changes of government that affects

⁵⁵ Summarized from *the official website of Council of University President of Thailand*.

university policy change. This study examines the effects of changes in the university admission policy in 1999 – 2017 which resulted in inequality in the educational opportunities of Thai students.

The main theoretical frameworks used for this article are a framework for determining the agenda and the alternative for public policy formation by John W. Kingdon.⁵⁶ The framework is for studying the formation of agenda and key issues in policy making-process. The key question in the policy-making process is ‘Why is the issue so important?’ and ‘Why does the issue attract the attentions of people both inside and outside the government to take part in the process?’ This framework focuses the importance of the pre-decision thinking process.

Another important concept used in this article is the concept of Policy Elite in the research named *The Logic of the Higher Education Sector* by Rattana Sae-Lao.⁵⁷ This work describes the concept of the establishment of higher education policy in Thailand by the elites who led to the establishment of higher educational institutions in Thailand. Rattana's work indicates the important role of the policy elite in policy-making process of higher education policy in Thailand.

History of changes in Thailand’s university admission systems

The system of selecting people to study in universities in Thailand before 1961 is a system that each university created the exam independently. Then, there were some universities cooperated with each other and use the same exam that arranged by Office of Educational Council.⁵⁸ Later in 1966, Chulalongkorn University has submitted to the Cabinet to separate the university admission system. The Cabinet has approved the request of Chulalongkorn University but after that there were many problems happened such as some universities have a lot of disclaimers, so they have to call the backups. This situation made the admission process delayed. The Cabinet has resolved to return to the cohabitation system.

In 1972, there was changes in some bureaucratic systems. There was an idea to change the relationship between university and the bureaucratic system under the concept that university should have their own freedom to take charge of their own businesses.

Since then, the concept of autonomous university which is the concept that separates the university from the bureaucratic is used. The Ministry of University Affairs has established to take care but not to take control of Higher Education system.⁵⁹ In 1973, the new admission policy called “Entrance System” has launched. This Entrance system is the longest system that has been used. This system only held once a year. However Academic, educational, and many people have pointed out that this system causes many problems for example, this system allows high school students to be able to skip high school and enter university if they pass the calibration exam, leaving many students unattended in class. The content of the exam does not correspond to the content in the university in some faculties. The increasing number of exam takers and faculties

⁵⁶ Kingdon, J. W. (2014). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*.(pp.1-89). Harlow: Pearson.

⁵⁷ Sae-Lao, R. (2013). *The Logic of the Thai Higher Education Sector on Quality Assessment Policy*.(pp.23-202). COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

⁵⁸ Summarized from *the official website of Council of University President of Thailand*.

⁵⁹ Summarized from *The official website of The Office of the Higher Education Commission*.

makes the one-year-only examinations ineffective and so on. According to those problems, Ministry of University Affairs and Council of the University Presidents of Thailand discussed about changing the university admission policy.

In 1999, the revised version of the Entrance was introduced. In this form, students will be given two chances to take the exams. Students take the exams and know their scores before choosing faculties and universities. Students were able to estimate the probability that they will attend the required faculty. The major changes in this university admission system are the used of 10% of high school record to apply to the university. (Seehanart, 2018) However, the improvement of this system has brought new problems claimed by students, parents and many schools. They gave a reason that each institution has different scoring standard, so the high school grade should not be used for university admission. However, this system was used continuously for seven years.

In 2001, Council of the University Presidents of Thailand have resolved to Ministry of University Affairs that the university admission policy should have change. The Council of the University Presidents of Thailand gave statement that First of all, 30% of the student's high school grades will be used in the new admission system. So, they must be checked and approved by the Office of the Basic Education Commission to make sure they are not error. Second, the university can determine the applicant's exam and other qualifications independently. Third, the components score between 35-70% came from the O-Net score (Ordinary National Educational Test) and 0-35% from A-Net score (Advance National Educational Test), or others subject decided by the university.⁶⁰

The O-Net and A-Net exams are administered by the National Institute of Educational Testing Service (Public Organization) founded in 2001. This organization is a highly autonomous public organization.⁶¹ This university admission model proposed by Council of the University Presidents of Thailand was unanimously approved to be used in 2006.

This new university admission system is called "Admission" or known as "O-Net / A-Net system". This University entrance examination system is valid for four years. And again, the system led to many new problems. Most problems are about O-Net and A-Net exam. The students complained about the numbers of exams they have to take in one year. Furthermore, O-Net and A-Net Exam is held only once a year that makes some children miss opportunities. Then, the system of direct examination admission of each university has attracted many students to join because it provides more opportunities. Although this test will cost more than the normal exam.

In 2009, Council of the University Presidents of Thailand announced the new university admission system, which is a modified version of the old one. The A-Net exam has been canceled. And they announced the two-new type of exam named GAT and PAT. GAT or General Aptitude Test is the exam divided by two subjects, Analytical test and English. This exam can be used 0 – 50% in admission system. PAT or Professional Aptitude Test is divided into seven subjects in the proportion of 0 - 40%. Others proportion of score came from O-Net 30% and High School Score were still using for 20%. This system was used for university admission in 2010. This year, Consortium of Thai Medical School organized the

⁶⁰ Summarized from *the official website of Council of University President of Thailand*.

⁶¹ Summarized from *the official website of National Institute of Educational Testing Service*.

specific test among the group of those who want to study in the Faculty of Medicine, which consists of seven specialized subjects. As the Consortium of Thai Medical School considers that the GAT and PAT exams may not allow the institution to find the right target students.

GAT and PAT exams were taken four times in the year 2010, it was reduced to three times in 2010 and two times in 2012 and in 2012, they also launched the new kind of exam called the Seven Common Course Exams (Jed wi cha sa man). This is done by National Institute of Educational Testing Service. This exam score can be used in the direct examination in many universities.

In 2013, the new admission system, Clearing House was added in to the central admission system. This system is a direct entry system to all participating universities. Participation in the system will require a score of the Seven Common Course Exams (Jed wi cha sa man) and apply directly to the faculty. If applicants are accepted in more than one faculty, the students required to select only one and when they confirmed to the university they choose they were cut from the central admission system. This method was created to reduce the problem of seat reservations in university. The policy maker intended to reduce the problems of that students like to take the test in university all over the country. So, they tried to push student to take the Seven Common Course Exams (Jed wi cha sa man) that can be used in many universities in Thailand instead of going directly to the university.⁶²

By 2015, the university admission system in Thailand were still using the central admission model, GAT and PAT system combined with the Clearing House model. However, the seven Common Course Exams (Jed wi cha sa man) has changed the subject of the examination by adding two more exams therefore, it called the Nine Common Course Exams (Kao wi cha sa man). The policy makers thought that seven subjects may not cover some subjects so they added two more. However, in the time of Admission model, the other ways of entering the university is become more popular. The direct examination and the quota system that each university held by themselves independently was increasing. For example, direct examination of Srinakharinwirot University that held every year. In the examination of Srinakharinwirot University. There were 29,799 applicants in 76 programs. There were 10,475 people who passed the test and passed through the interview 3,079 people.⁶³ The statistic shows that the direct examination became an interesting alternative and became more important. Many students willing to take the exams directly at universities across the country.

On June 1, 2017, Council of the University Presidents of Thailand held a press conference on the new university entrance examination system. The official name is TCAS or Thai University Central Admission System. It is the new the central admission system for entering universities. The TCAS system consists of five applications. In the first round, it is selected by a portfolio. There is no need for written examination. TCAS Round 2 is a quota application. The quota of residents in the designated area. And quotas for such talented people in Art, Music, Sport ETC.

⁶² Summarized from *the official website of Council of University President of Thailand*.

⁶³ *Sathiti Yodphusamak Laepankhaorobtangtang: Rubtrongtuapai SWU Peekanseuksa 2560.(Direct Admission's statistics of applicants and the finalists in Sinakharinwirot University 2017)*. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from <https://seniorswu.in.th/swudirect-stat-60/>

on the first step in the process of selecting the key issues that lead to policy or policy formulation.

Kingdon explained that in the process of shaping the policy, the agenda must be clearly defined. The agenda means a list of issues or an issue that have been proposed by the government, officers, and other stakeholders. The group that involved in this process are divided into two groups. The Internal group included the Prime Minister or the Minister representing the leadership in the administration who will play a key role in shaping the policy, government officials that are senior officials and high ranked in the administration. The external group are interest groups, political parties or political organizations, media, academics, and groups of public opinions. In policy making process, there is a gateway for policy problems and issues around the country to flow into this gate and some cannot pass through depend on the decision of gatekeeper. The gatekeepers are very important, so it should be consisted of various groups of people.⁶⁸

In the process of Thailand's university admission policy making, the study found that the most important factors in the process is Council of the University Presidents of Thailand. This organization monopolized the whole process of policy. Before 1999, the cabinet, the minister of education, the Ministry of University Affairs and Office of education council have full authority to make admission policy. Those groups and organizations are state agencies who legally responsible for policy making process. After 1971, Council of the University Presidents of Thailand presents the concept of academic freedom. This concept means every university in Thailand has freedom to educate learners without a barrier. Including the activities, rules and general management of the university must practice with freedom under the law.

According to the concept of Academic Freedom That convince that universities should have full freedom and autonomy in managing their own business within the university, both in general management and academics to fully benefit the students.⁶⁹ Council of the University Presidents of Thailand develop the role of itself in the admission policy formation processes.

In 2003, Government Administration of department of education act order to change from the Ministry of University Affairs to the Office of the Higher Education Commission.⁷⁰ This new organization is a major turning point because the duty of the Office of the Higher Education Commission is more limited. The Board of Higher Education is responsible for proposing policies about development plans of the universities and monitoring standards for higher education.⁷¹ From the act, the authority to design the system and policy on university admission has been transferred. And the authority to design the exam and national test has been transferred to National Institute of Educational Testing Service which is a Public Organization.⁷²

At present, the authority to make change of university admission policy is under control of the Council of the University Presidents of Thailand. From interviews

⁶⁸ Colebatch, H. (2002). *Concepts in the Social Sciences: Policy* (2nd ed.). Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press.

⁶⁹ Wattanaporn Sukprot, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, April 2)

⁷⁰ Government Administration of Department of Education Act 2003

⁷¹ Summarized from *the official website of The Office of the Higher Education Commission*.

⁷² Manas Ornsung, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, May 28).

with the former officer in Council of the University Presidents of Thailand and the officer in Office of the Higher Education Commission found that a change of university admission policy came from agreements among the representatives from the main member universities at the meeting of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand. Meetings will be held several times before the conclusion. And when it come to the last process, they invite the minister of education to hear the conclusion and sign an approval. Moreover, the interviews show that the role of the Minister of Education in changing the university admission policy are setting a broad policy guideline and to put down their name to legalize the policy. One official said that the Minister's decision to approve the policy was easy due to Council of the University Presidents of Thailand is an organization that manages by professionals. So, the policy made by this organization is a reasonable policy that can be trusted. And another reason is every universities in Thailand has academic freedom that the government should not interfere. The government is only responsible for supervising and supporting them.⁷³

Aside from Council of the University Presidents of Thailand and the minister of education, public sector and press are involved in the admission policy making process. It seems like what Kingdon stated in his work, the policy formation process should consist of the people, press and the group of people who involved. In fact, the process only allows people others sector to join the process when the policy has already caused many problems. For example, In the process of making the TCAS admission system that just launched in 2017. It does not appear that other sectors participate in the policy making process. But when the problem arises, Council of the University Presidents of Thailand invites many groups of people to participate in the policy review and find solutions such as parents, students, media, webmasters and so on. In theory, the push for agenda and policy alternatives at the first place should include the people from several groups.⁷⁴

Considering about the role of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand as a policy maker, this organization is registered as a general association. Council of the University Presidents of Thailand is not a governmental agency. Why bureaucracy allow an association to influence the policy that has affected more than hundreds of thousands of people over the country every year for 18 years without questioning the legitimacy of the policy maker. In addition, the Agreement on Council of the University Presidents of Thailand in 1971 stated that there are three missions for Council of the University Presidents of Thailand to practice. The first, Council of the University Presidents was established to coordinate among universities in Thailand. The second, Council of the University Presidents must be a connector between university in Thailand and government. And the third, Council of the University Presidents is the organization who suggests the policy or attitude in broad opinions about the shared interests of the universities.⁷⁵ The above three functions, when compared with the current and the past works of the Council of the University Presidents of Thailand, it may be beyond the scope in several ways. Especially in the mission of changing Thai's university admission policy.

⁷³Wattanaporn Sukprot, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, April 2).

⁷⁴Kingdon, J. W. (2014). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*.(pp.1-89). Harlow: Pearson.

⁷⁵ Summarized from *the official website of Council of University President of Thailand*.

Political factors contributed to the changes in university admission policy

Another conceptual framework used to analyze university admission policy in Thailand is the theory of Policy Elite, based on research by Rattana Lao.⁷⁶ The early age of higher education in Thailand was intended to educate the ruling class on the new administration of the bureaucracy.⁷⁷ It indicates that the higher education policy of Thailand originated from the elites in the country. From the past to the present, the elite in Thailand, such as high ranked officers, politicians, or academics still express themselves clearly as influencers of the policy decision. Thai elites are trying to integrate with every domestic policy in many ways. And the way they create the policy is based on western knowledge that they like. The educational policy is also one of their product.

The role of Policy Elite is being used to explain policy formation system by many academics. The description of these academics to Policy Elite refers to policy influencers who have positions in the government or departments involved in a process of making policies. Policy Elite is influential and has the power to make policy decisions and take responsibility for the policies that they made. Policy Elite is usually composed of cabinets, government officers and legal organization. The form and characteristic of Policy Elite in each country might be difference, And Policy Elite in the country may not be only one group, and they can be many groups of people that push policy in many ways.⁷⁸

When talking about elite in Thailand, these people are linked to every sector and level of the country in several ways included the policy level. The elite is an influential group to support or oppose the policy. The question of this article is, if we prove in the beginning that the changes in Thailand's university admission policy was caused by Council of the University Presidents of Thailand which is the only one influence sector in this policy making process, who are the people who plays an important role in that meeting that creates the admission policy?

Council of University Presidents of Thailand is an organization that coordinates the cooperation between the participating universities. This organization was officially formed in 1972. Currently, there are 31 universities play the important role as main members. The conference of Council of University Presidents of Thailand consists of 84 members from 31 universities and another part comes from the Secretariat of Council of University Presidents of Thailand. The organization was established for three missions. The first mission is to coordinate and support all universities in all areas such as Human resource development and so on. The functions of the Council of University Presidents of Thailand must not overlap with the Ministry of University Affairs (changed to Office of the Higher Education Commission now). The second mission is to be a coordinator between universities and government. And the third mission is to give ideas about higher education policies in a broader sense or give opinions on shared interests between universities. Member universities have to pay 40,000 baht per annum.⁷⁹ When the organization start collecting money, legal status is required.

⁷⁶ Sea-Lao, R. (2013). *The Logic of the Thai Higher Education Sector on Quality Assessment Policy*.(pp.23-202). COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

⁷⁷ Wyatt, D. K. (1969). *The politics of reform in Thailand: Education in the reign of King Chulalongkorn*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

⁷⁸ Sea-Lao, R. (2013). *The Logic of the Thai Higher Education Sector on Quality Assessment Policy*.(pp.23-202). COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

⁷⁹ Summarized from *the official website of Council of University President of Thailand*.

Therefore, Council of University Presidents of Thailand was registered as the Association Council of University Presidents of Thailand. It has been effective since July 3, 1999.⁸⁰ Aside from that, there is one more person who involved in Thai's university admission policy formation process, the minister of education who responsible to approve policy.

The meeting of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand is divided into three main sessions. The first session is for the 31 main members who are the representatives of national university. Those university are the top famous university in Thailand for instance Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Mahidol University, Chiang Mai University, Mae Fah Luang University, Khonkaen University and Prince of Songkla University. The second session is the group of Rajabhat University and the third session is group of Rajamangala University of Technology.⁸¹ It can be seen that the university is clearly divided into three groups. The first group is the only one who participates in admission policy making process. When the meeting finished the conclusion will be announced to other universities. The policy will be implemented or not, it is depending on each university decision.

Most of the universities in Rajabhat and Rajamangala University have to accept the university admission policy created by the main members of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand and participate in every round of the admission system for recruiting students into their university. It appears that only 31 key policy makers are active in policy formation process but almost every university joined this system willingly even if they do not have chance to participate when they are making the rules.⁸² It seems like the Rajabhat and Rajamangala have alternatives to choose. But it is clearly that the choice is very narrow. In fact, every university wants to get students from this selection method, which is the main system for most high school students in the country to enter the higher education. The university admission policy affects almost every university in the country. Why are there only a few universities that play the role of policy leaders or policy elite by monopolized the changes of Thailand's university admission policy?

The following question is, what makes the policy elite form this kind of policy? The case of university admission policy is compiled to the theory of Top down policy making proposed by Thomas R. Dye. The theory states that most public policy in the United States is policy driven by political sector rather than public offerings.⁸³ Like Thailand, the elite are also the groups that influence things and driven the mainstream of the country to maintain their power and passing that elite power on to the generations.

University admission policies may be the other tools used by the elite to maintain their influence and power in the country. The universities such as Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University is reputed to be the number one university in the country. This kind of university is the university that produces famous people like politicians, academics, medical officers, celebrities, as well as various people who live in high society in Thailand. This type of university attracts many people. That's why the competition is higher than other

⁸⁰ Summarized from *The official website of Association of the Council of University President of Thailand*.

⁸¹ Manas Ornsung, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, May 28).

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Dye, T. R. (2001). *Top down policymaking*. New York: Chatham House Publ.

universities. For example, the TCAS admission system record in the first round was found that there were 34,993 seats in main member universities but there were 79,493 applicants. On the other hand, in the Rajabhat there were 47,854 applicants from 63,305 seats, with 15,451 seats left over.⁸⁴

The top universities can choose highly qualified high school students to enter the university. These youths are the key that makes the large university still maintain the leading status of the top university. The famous universities are the same group of university that is the policy creators of the university admission policy. It can be concluded that this prestigious university has created the format and the rules for university admission system to meet the needs of themselves. The number of exams makes the top universities have more opportunities to recruit students and to find talented students several times. The examination timelines are another way to give the top university chance to recruit more talented students into their own universities. University admission policy is a large filter designed by the policy elite. This filter design has the best results for the elite universities.

Over Supply in Thai University

Another problem that occur in Thailand's university admission system is the decreasing number of the students who applicant for the university. From the statistic of admission applicants in Thailand between 2010 – 2017, the number of seats in universities are more than the number of applicants throughout the year. For example, in the year 2017, seats in the Central Admission System were 136,030, with only 81,232 candidates.⁸⁵ The cause of the decline in the number of university students can be divided into two major causes.

Decline in fertility in Thailand is one big problem that makes the university students decreased. According to demographic statistics in Thailand, the incidence and number of children in Thailand are continuously decreasing. The number of children under 15 years old between 2005 to 2035 will be reduced from 14 million (23% of the total population) to 9 million (14%). The rapid decline in the number of young people will result in a steadily decreasing number of school-age children (ages 6-21) from 16 million in 2005 to 11 million in 2035.⁸⁶ When the population of school children decreased, the number of people entering higher education is dwindling in the same way. The number of students are decreasing while the university keep opening the new faculty and new program. This is why in the past seven years the seats in the university are left enough for everyone.

The shifting of world educational trend is also the cause of oversupply in Thai university. In the United States over the past 10 years, 500 universities have

⁸⁴ *Sathiti TCAS Robteenaung Kanrabdauy Portfolio Peekanseuksa 2560. (Statistics of TCAS system in the first round, recruitment by portfolio 2017)* (2018, February 6). Retrieved from June 20, 2018 from <https://www.admissionpremium.com/content/3290>

⁸⁵ *Sarubponkancudlauekbukkonkhaosuksator Nairadub Udomsuksa Admission60. (Summary of University Admission system 2017)*. (2017, June 15). Retrieved June 20, 2018, from <https://www.admissionpremium.com/content/2687>

⁸⁶ Patthama Wapathanapong, & Pramote Prasartkul. (n.d.). *Prachakorn Thai Nai Anakod. (Thai population in the future)*. Retrieved from <http://www.ipsr.mahidol.ac.th/IPSR/AnnualConference/ConferenceII/Article/Article02.htm>
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closed down, and it is projected that in the next 15 years, more than half of the 4,000 universities will experience financial problems.⁸⁷

From year to year, since 1990, most universities in Thailand have privatized. That means they are free to manage themselves in every way includes the financial. When fewer students are enrolled, the university needs to adjust themselves more. The lower number of students affects the financial condition of the university. Many universities came up with new marketing plan. They open special program to attract more students. Those special programs are usually cost more than the normal program in university.

Another factor contributing to oversupply in the university system in Thailand is the state funds that open to students to loans for education. It is called the student Loan Fund. This is a government agency under the supervision of the Minister of Finance. The purpose is to support and create more chance in education by providing loans for students in various ways. Students who lack funds and students who study in the fields that are essential and necessary for the development of the country. This fund covered up to university level. The repayment will take place after graduation. This resulted in the expansion of educational opportunities at the university level. This allows many students to enter the university system.

Due to the oversupply problem at universities in Thailand, universities demand a large number of students each year to maintain the university's economics condition. This may lead to more complex system of entrance examinations each year by adding more rounds of exams, adding more subjects and adding more exam fields. It gives students the opportunity to enter the university easily. Compare to the old Entrance system in 1973 – 1998, One-time selection leaves many people out of the university system and may enter a private university or wait another year to return to the test. The current system of selection to the university was made to be more times to make it seems like it provides more chance to the students. In fact, the extension of the university entrance opportunity is only a discourse. The real reason is university admission system is just a way for many universities to accommodate the arrival of many students. It's like opening multiple doors to give students the opportunity to go to the universities which is the member of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand instate of going to other educational system or private university.

The Changes in Thailand's University admission policy affects the educational opportunity of students

There have been several reasons for changes university admission policy in Thailand each year since 1999 - 2017. But one of the most popular reason they always use to support the changes is to create the more equality educational opportunities for students in Thailand. According to the announcement of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand, the main problems of the university admission system in Thailand from the past to the present are the same problems. One policy comes out to solve one problem but on the other hands causes another problem. For example, the policy of using of high school score for

⁸⁷ Hess, A. (2017, November 15). Harvard Business School professor: Half of American colleges will be bankrupt in 10 to 15 years. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/15/hbs-professor-half-of-us-colleges-will-be-bankrupt-in-10-to-15-years.html>

university admission to solve the problem that the students do not pay attention in high school class. Many students claim that using the high school score is unfair because each school might have different standard. At the beginning of the policy, there are students in Traim Udom high school and other schools in Bangkok claim the inequality. The students give the reason that their school is a high standard school. Many subjects and content of studies are different from other schools in the rural areas. The use of the results to enter the university entrance is not something that should be. However, Council of the University Presidents of Thailand has responded to students who claimed that Every School throughout Thailand are closely monitored by the Ministry of Education so, the score of each school are in the same standard and they are generally acceptable.⁸⁸ The school scoring problem that happened reflects the problem of inequalities in term of quality of Thai education especially among several school.

Not only the inequality in quality of education but also inequality in opportunity, the policy makers always state that the changes of university admission are created to solve the inequality of opportunity problems. Practically, the changes in university admission policy create more gap of inequality of educational opportunity. Thailand's university admission systems affect the educational opportunity in several ways specifically, the changes affect to poor students more than students in middle class family. The policies also affect to students in the rural areas more than student who live in the city.

The city students, middle classes or Elite are already having more opportunity in life than the poor and the rural students. By accident or not, the university admission systems shown that they provide even more chances to the people who have money. Conversely, the systems reduce the chance of the poor. Every change of university admission policy in Thailand has inevitably increased the burden for the parents and students. The exam costs in each time is an obvious example that presents the policy problems. On the Web site named Dek-D.com, the most popular education website in Thailand. There are a lot of posts and question about how the students and parents spend money on university admission systems. Many people spend money on admission exams both in the central admission and the other round not less than 5,000 to 10,000 baht. In the central admission system, students will be required to take GAT, PAT, O-Net and the Kao vi cha sa man exam. GAT and PAT exams cost 140 Baht per subject. For PAT, student can take maximum of 7 Exams. For 'Kao vi cha sa' man exam cost 100 Baht per Exam. Student can take 9 maximum subjects. Students will be required to pay about 140 - 2,820 Baht per person. Not only the cost of the exam that they have to pay, there are also many other things that cost a lot of money for instant the money they pay for tutoring and special class outside school. The tutorial school become demanded and popular because some subjects that are used in admission exam are specific subjects that are not taught at school. Students need to learn the lesson by themselves or go to the tutorial school which is more expensive but also more effective.

An interview with a university medical student about the experience before getting in the medical school revealed that she has been taken about seven exams, GAT, PAT, Kao vi cha sa man, Consortium of Thai Medical School exam and travel around the country to take exams in many universities such as

⁸⁸ Waraporn Seehanart, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, April 17).

Khonkaen University. She paid about 15,000 bath to take many exams in her last year of high school.⁸⁹

Interviews show an interest information that many children spend money on college seats before they decide whether they will attend or not. In the case of direct examinations which usually open before the examination in the central system, they always announce the result earlier so, some students are willing to pay for enrollment to confirm the seat in universities for admission. If the two are selected, there are many options to consider.

In the latest version of admission policy, TCAS is made to reduce the cost of the admission system but in realistic those problem still remain. Applying for TCAS Round 1 can be done by submitting portfolios, students can submit an unlimited number of universities. The application fee for each university are up to about 600 Baht, not excluding the money that students spend on the portfolio and shipping fee. In this system, it is found that the middle-class students apply to many universities and their parents are willing to pay.⁹⁰

From the above issues, it can be seen that the discourse of educational opportunity is just a theory created by one group without taking into account the practicality. Students who want to enter the university will do everything and grab every opportunity that is available to them. In this case, those who are not affected or who only slightly affected are children in the middle class and the elites. Parents of these middle-class students do not lose that much benefit as the poor. Although money may not be used directly to buy seats for their children in university. But money can buy more opportunities as much as they want to support their kids.

One of the arguments of Council of the University Presidents of Thailand that they use to legitimize their university admission policy is the number of seats that available for everyone. The president always said that "Our policy has an objective to provide more chance to all students and we have enough seats for everyone who want to study in the university."⁹¹ However, the idea of enough seats for everyone can be interpreted as seats at small universities in the rural like Rajabhat Universities which less popular and less competitive.

It may be seen that rural students can go to university near home and graduate equally like other people. But in fact, those students may face the trap of social exclusion after they graduate from those small institutions. For example, many jobs require staffs who graduate from the top and famous universities. The organizations use a university reputation to be one of the criteria for selecting people. The number of people graduating from those institutions has turned out to be an excess resource in labor market. Education is one important way in which people can advance their social status or maintain their social status. Educational opportunities that money can buy help the middle class and elites in Thailand to inherit their social status to their hires via education. The lower classes who have limited choices. It is difficult for them to promote their social status or make a difference in their life.

⁸⁹ Anonymous Interviewer, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, April 10).

⁹⁰ Manas Ornsung, *Thailand University Admission Policy* [Personal interview]. (2018, May 28).

⁹¹ Prasert Kanthamanon, [Interview]. (2018, June 11).

Efficiency and Effectiveness of the policy

It obviously shows that the university admission policies in Thailand are lack of efficiency. Compared to the results, investing in both budget and human resources of the Council of the University Presidents of Thailand to create university admission policy is not worth it because the policies continue to create more problems. Consider the effectiveness of the university admission policies from the policy maker point of view, it seems to be effective because it achieves the goal created by the Council of the University Presidents of Thailand. The changes of university admission policy benefit the shared interest of the main members. And the changes of university admission policy are effective in terms of reducing the lack of university seats problem that happened before.

On the other hands, the university admission policies are ineffective in many other ways. It cannot solve the old problems and moreover the policy increase more new problems includes increases of examination component, adding more important to the tutorial school, increases stress and anxiety to students and parents or reduces of educational opportunity for poor students

Conclusion

Thailand's University Admission policy formation since 1999 – 2017. There is only one important organization that plays the role of the policy maker. The study shows that the University Presidents of Thailand has monopolized the admission system. According to the democracy, the policy making process should prioritize the participation of variety group of people. Especially, the group of people who affected by the policy. The former Thailand's University Admission Policies have fail and leaved many issues in the society because the policy making process lacks participation. The changes of university admission policy have a wide impact that is why the choice of policy should be decided by the people who involved and affected by the policy. The study found that changing of university admission policy also affects the educational opportunity. Every change of admission policy makes the education system more complex and the cost to deal with such a complex system is put into the shoulder of the student. The policy appears to create opportunities and options for young people. Conversely, university admission policy is just a system that helps universities to equalize the number of students they want in each university due to its oversupply of seats in universities.

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CLMV MALE MIGRANT SEX WORKERS IN BANGKOK: LIVELIHOODS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

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Abstract

Due to the lucrative business of sex industry in Thailand, it welcomes not only the local sex workers to engage in sex industry, but also migrant sex workers from neighboring countries including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Since sex industry offers high income, it attracts not only the female migrants, but also male migrants to engage in sex services. Undoubtedly, these migrant sex workers also come with the issue of legal and illegal status in engaging sex services and their entering to Thailand. The purpose of this paper is thus to compare legal and illegal status of CLMV male sex workers' livelihoods and their coping strategies towards social protection in Thailand. The concepts applied in this research are sustainable livelihood approach, coping strategies, and social protection. The research is in qualitative method, depended on the documentary researches and conducted through fieldwork researches with 10 in-depth CLMV male migrant sex workers interviews and also key informants from government and NGOs. The paper finds that CLMV male migrant sex workers' livelihoods and their coping strategies towards social protection are confined by their (il)legal status. The paper concludes that the legal and illegal status of CLMV male migrant sex workers has the effects on their livelihoods and their coping strategies towards social protection in Thailand in the sense that they attempt to manage their legal status in immigration and labor law to maintain their career as sex worker by holding legal documentations to work disguisedly as sex worker and to be able to access social protection.

Keywords: *sex workers, migrants, livelihoods, social protection*

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Introduction

Thailand, a large tourism industry and sex tourism spotted in the area such as Bangkok, Pattaya, and Phuket, contributes approximately 6.7% of Thailand's GDP (Jabarajakirthy, Thaichon, & Sivapalan, 2017). Due to the lucrative business of sex industry in Thailand, the sex sector does not only attract the local to engage in sex services, but also migrant sex workers from neighboring countries including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam amongst the hot-spot areas as well as along the border areas. Bangkok alone made up a significant number of sex workers, accounted for 14,788 in 2017, with 5,275 male sex workers, 975 transgender sex workers, and 8,538 female sex workers (SWING Foundation, 2017). The relatively high proportion of male sex workers reflects the significant number in the present day of sex industry that more men is engaging in sex services. In fact, the clandestine sex industry has made it difficult to enumerate the exact number of either local and migrant sex workers due to the fact that sex work in Thailand is illegal, coupled with the change of direct type of sex establishment (brothels) to clandestine entertainment establishments (i.e. beer bars, karaoke, massage/ spa shops), and also the street-based (freelance) sex workers who do not work in entertainment places. In the present day, 'male' sex workers are engaging in multiple entertainment places including gay bars, go-go bars, massage parlors, and etc. (Mutchler, 2005). Male sex workers are in fact underrepresented even though there is an increase trend of such population, and with that, it thus deserves more scrutiny.

The issue of migrant sex workers is a special circumstance that requires more studies on this since their lives are confined with several conditions compared to the local sex workers. Their presence in Thailand involves with several laws including immigration, labor, and sex work-related laws that challenge their lives being sex worker in Thailand. Since sex sector is regarded to be one of the few sectors that offer high income from their restricted occupations in Thailand, the challenge is how they manage their lives under their legal and illegal status. The underlying probes are thus laid on the issue of to what extent does illegal and legal status of CLMV male migrant sex workers affect their livelihoods with their several vulnerabilities from being migrant sex worker in Thailand. The attempt to explore on their livelihoods is not only to reflect their situation of how their lives are in general, but also to see how they respond with such vulnerabilities. Understanding their livelihoods in this research will broaden the actual reality of being migrant sex worker in Thailand relating to laws, vulnerabilities, and their own coping strategies to such vulnerabilities. In this case, it should be acknowledged that one's livelihood couldn't be sustained by one's own means. Exploring their lives also relates to their social protection in Thailand since they experience several vulnerabilities. The rationale is to probe how migrant sex workers manage and cope to get social protection in Thailand since the nature of work and their (il)legal status in some way affects their social protection. For this research, the investigation on migrant sex workers' livelihoods and social protection adopts the use of sustainable livelihood approach, coping strategies, and social protection concept in order to find out how their lives as sex workers are and also how do they manage or cope to get social protection in relations to their legal and illegal status. Migrant sex workers' livelihoods are atypical in the sense that their cross-migration also often comes with the issue of violations including precarious employment status, exploitative working conditions, or social exclusion (UNDP, 2015), particularly when some opt to work as sex worker. This particular group experience triple disadvantages of

discrimination, marginalization and vulnerabilities, and the social exclusion from social security benefits (Migrant Forum in Asia, 2013). Comparing to the local sex workers, they are more prone to these conditions since they are migrants, and also have their conflict with laws. Living away from home country, coupled with being migrant sex worker, it challenges them on how to manage to get social protection in a destination country.

The paper thus attempts to fill the gap by looking at their livelihoods in relations with their legal and illegal status in Thailand. Extensive studies in fact explore sex workers' livelihoods but remains untouched in migrant sex workers' livelihoods and social protection in Thailand. To explore, the paper is in qualitative method conducted through in-depth interview with 10 CLMV male migrant sex workers and also key informant interviews from government and NGOs.

This paper will thus compare legal and illegal status of CLMV male sex workers' livelihoods and their coping strategies towards social protection in Thailand. The research attempts to investigate to what do (il)legal status of CLMV male migrant sex workers affect their livelihoods, and also to analyze how they manage, and what type of coping strategies they use in order to get social protection.

In conclusion, the paper finds that legal and illegal status has effects on their livelihoods and social protection, meaning that even though sex work in Thailand is illegal, they attempt to manage their legal status in immigration and labor law to maintain their career as sex worker by holding legal documentations such as tourist visa, work permit, and etc. They manage their lives under several vulnerabilities by positioning themselves as 'invisible' working disguisedly under some sector of work, and also protect themselves using their social network. The paper also finds that even though social protection for this particular group is limited, especially the health services, they manage their way to get social protection either from changing to work permit to get more coverage or utilizing health services from NGOs.

Theory

The concepts applied in this research are sustainable livelihood approach, coping strategies, and social protection concept. Understanding to what extent the legal and illegal status of CLMV male migrant sex workers affects their livelihoods requires the use of sustainable livelihood approach and coping strategies. These underlying concepts help answer their lives as sex workers in Bangkok in their face of vulnerabilities and also their coping strategies to respond to such difficulties. Also, social protection concept helps reflect the actual reality of CLMV male migrant sex workers and their social protection in Thailand in the sense of how they manage to get social protection in relations to their (il)legal status.




Diagram 1: Conceptual Framework

Method

The research is mainly explored through the use of qualitative method to gain insight understanding regarding CLMV male migrant sex workers' livelihoods and their social protection. The researcher depends on documentary researches from government and NGOs as well as conducts fieldwork researches through the use of in-depth interviews with 10 CLMV male migrant sex workers and key informants from government and NGOs as follows:

- Bureau of AIDS, TB, STIs (Ministry of Public Health)
- National Human Rights Commission of Thailand
- AIDS Healthcare Foundation
- Foundation for AIDS Rights
- SWING Foundation

The use of in-depth interviews with CLMV male migrant sex workers fits with the nature of migrant sex workers who are likely to keep their identity safe, and also allows the researcher flexibility to probe the anticipated issues. Since the research is sensitive in nature, having face-to-face interview will allow the researcher to ease the tension that might arise during the interview, and also benefit the researcher in terms of understanding their body language.

Due to the illicit nature of sex industry, information source is largely depended on SWING Foundation from their first-hand experience on working closely with

sex workers in all genders and nationalities. The criteria of the case study selection is set as follows:

- **Study Population:** 10 male migrant sex workers from Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam are targeted for this research.
- **Study Area:** The research takes place in Bangkok and does not limit the area in Bangkok. However, according to SWING Foundation, potential number of male migrant sex workers is located mostly in Boystown, Surawong, from their engaging in massage parlors and go-go bars.
- **Sex Establishment: Type:** For this study, the research limits only to the venue-based sex establishments from their engaging in massage parlors and go-go bars.

Approaching potential participants is supported by SWING Foundation from their capability in accessing such population. Prior to the data collection, the researcher consults with SWING Foundation regarding the objectives, scope of the research, benefits of the research, sample of questions, and characteristics of participants. SWING Foundation then accesses to the potential participants, informs them the mentioned information, and asks for their participation in the research. Once the participant agrees upon such matter, the in-depth interview is then conducted at SWING Foundation, with one-hour maximum. If potential participant is illiterate or cannot speak Thai, the research will have translator as facilitator for this matter. The researcher in advance informs the necessity of having translator to the potential participants and asks for participant's permission to allow him in the interview.

Data collection involves personal data of participant. The researcher records the voice file for each participant only if he allows for permission. Interviews are tape recorded, and transcribed into software system for qualitative data analysis. After the end of the project, voice file will be deleted to ensure the participants' confidentiality and anonymity. The researcher ensures that their rights are well taken care of by having only their verbal consent (no written consent form) as well as their responses are reported as total picture. Any information that could be able to identify participants will not appear in the research.

Limitations of the research are that accessing the potential participants is difficult, and therefore depends on the help of SWING Foundation, and also migrant sex workers are not be willing to participate in the research from their nature of work, identity, and legal status.

Results

The findings are based on documentary research and also from a case study of Myanmar male migrant sex worker.

Sex Industry in Bangkok

Due to the rapid growth of Thai economy in the past decades, it led to the change of type of sex establishments as well as the expansion of substantial sex establishments across the regions in Thailand. The direct type of sex establishment, for instance, brothels or hotels, became unpopular place for sex business. It is, in the present, changed to the clandestine sex establishments in the form of indirect type of entertainment places, for instance, beer bars, karaoke parlors, massage parlors, sauna shops, and etc. (Guest, Prohmo, Bryant, Janyam,

& Pheungsamran, 2007). Number of sex establishments is increased across the regions in Thailand from 15,601 in 2011 to 19,355 in 2015 (Department of Disease Control, 2015). Bangkok alone constituted the highest number of sex establishments accounted for 2,376 establishments with massage/ spa shops type representing the highest number of sex workers in Bangkok that reached up to 6,718 sex workers in 2015 (Department of Disease Control, 2015). In Bangkok, entertainment places concentrate mostly in Patpong, and Sukhumvit area such as Soi Cowboy, Nana Entertainment Plaza, and etc. (Boonchalaksi and Guest, 1994).

The classification of sex establishments in Thailand is changed from 6 into 24 types as follows:

1. Brothels
2. Hotels
3. Bungalows
4. Guest Houses
5. Teashops
6. Beer Bars
7. Gay Bars
8. Go-go Bars
9. Discotheque
10. Nightclubs
11. Pubs
12. Karaoke
13. Cocktail Lounge
14. Massage Parlors
15. Massage/spa Shops
16. Sauna Shops
17. Coffee Shops
18. Cafe Shops
19. Restaurants
20. Beauty Salons
21. Barber Shops
22. Online Calls
23. Public Spaces
24. Etc.

Source: Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, 2015

CLMV Male Migrant Sex Workers in Bangkok

It is found out that most of CLMV male migrant sex workers working in entertainment places is in Boystown, a gay red-light district in Bangkok. They work mostly in massage parlors, massage/ spa shops, and go-go clubs. To enumerate the exact number of CLMV male migrant sex workers, it is difficult, referring to SWING Foundation, to document due to their nature of work, identity, and also their legal status. This paper aims to represent a case study from Myanmar male migrant sex worker on his livelihood and social protection.

Participant 1:

Demographic Profile

Country of origin	Myanmar
State	Kengtung in Shan State
Ethnic group	Shan
Age	25
Education level	Myanmar: 4 th standard Thailand: grade 9 (non-formal education)
Previous work	Myanmar: farmer Thailand: 1 st job as factory worker/ 2 nd job as sex worker
Type of establishment	Massage/ spa shop
Area of establishment	Boystown
Months/ years engaging in sex work	7 years

Pre-migration and Migration Process

Due to the geographic proximity, migrants make use of the cross-border in migrating to Thailand. Myanmar migrant sex workers' migration usually depends on the land-cross border along the border areas of Thailand. Participant 1 makes use of the land-cross border since he lived in Kentung, Shan State where it is a bordering area to Thailand. In his pre-migration process, his motive of migrating to Thailand was mainly on economic purpose from his family economic difficulty. He explained that he chose Thailand because of the geographic proximity and also the language that he can speak Thai. Even though he had made a decision that he would come to Thailand, he did not plan a specific sector of work he want to do in the beginning. He did not know any information prior to his arrival in Thailand, and attempted to seek for a job only when he was here. During his migration to Thailand, since he lived in Kentung, Shan State, he and his friends around 5-6 people crossed land border in Mae Sai, Chiang Rai using public transportation to Bangkok. He spent 13-14 hours to come to Bangkok without anyone assisting. For his cost of migration, he spent around 10,000 Baht including 5,000 Baht for visa, 600 Baht for public transportation, and 5,000-6,000 Baht for passport to migrate to Thailand. He said that he needed to depend on agency in Yangon to manage his passport since there was no consular in his hometown.

Entering Sex Work

When he first came to Thailand, he did not initially engage with sex work; he instead worked as a factory worker for around 6-7 months and got paid 180 Baht a day. As mentioned, he only sought job when he was in Thailand, and knew the workplace from his friend. Due to the low paid in factory, coupled with seeing his friend sending high remittance back to his family from working in massage/ spa shop, he thus decided to change the job. In the beginning, he did not know that the massage/ spa shop also engaged with sex services. He later acknowledged the details of the job only after he talked to the manager. It was a high paid compared to the previous job making him decided to work in sex industry. His family and also the community he lived acknowledged the job he is currently engaging with, but not very supportive in the beginning. He said that a lot from his community also come to Thailand to work as sex worker.

Male Migrant Sex Worker' Livelihood

The paper attempts to explore how is his life as sex worker based on his financial, social, and human capital.

1. Financial Capital:

It appears that his livelihood as being a sex worker largely depends on his economic security. Since sex work is high paying job compared to other works, coupled with restricted jobs for migrants, it serves his need to be able to live in Thailand, and also be able to remit money to his family back home. Sex work is thus the main economic motive why he chose to shift from factory worker to sex worker. When asked regarding the satisfaction of his income, he said that that he is satisfied and makes a lot of living from this, approximately 30,000-40,000 Baht per month. He thinks that this amount of money is sufficient enough to sustain his monthly basis, and also feels economically secured working in this

massage/ spa shop. He does not spend much; he instead is more on saving since he has to remit money back home every month. He normally spends on his room rent and transportation. He believes that sex work helps improve his living standard, and prefer to keep working in sex industry until he finishes the study here in Thailand.

2. Social Capital:

His social network in Thailand is generally with sex-work community. Since he has to work for 6 days per week, it is likely that he establishes his social network within the sex-work community including his sex-work colleagues, and also the manager. He establishes his relationship with 1 Thai and 2-3 Laotian sex workers in his workplace, and go out with them sometimes on the day off. He also establishes his relationship with classmates from college and non-formal education. He said that his sex-work colleagues sometimes help him in communicating with foreign clients. When any problem arises, he prefers to seek help from a Thai sex worker friend whom he used to work in the same workplace with him.

3. Human Capital:

3.1 Education

Back to his time in Myanmar, he admitted that education was not necessary for him since there were few job opportunities in Myanmar. He did not find studying helpful for his life, and quitted his school when he was in 4th standard. However, he later finds it useful and decides to study in Thailand. He is currently studying the first year in university, and also studying grade 9 in non-formal education. He said that he wishes to do something else rather than being sex worker. He will work for sometimes and will quit doing sex work after he gets degree.

3.2 Health

When he has health problems he usually visits the clinics since he does not want to wait for a long queue in public hospitals. In his case, he is recently covered by social security benefits since he registers under the name 'domestic worker' with the help of manager. He has to pay 500 Baht per month for this benefit, and feels more secured to get covered by this.

4. Vulnerabilities

These are the vulnerabilities that might arise from being migrant sex worker including social marginalization, violence, vulnerability to HIV/ AIDS infection, and laws.

4.1 Social Marginalization

He said he probably has faced some social marginalization but does not seriously take it into account. He said that because his family and also community acknowledged the job he is engaging with, it does not make him feel exclusion from the society. He also said that migrant and local sex workers here are treated equally, and he does not find any disadvantage for being migrant sex worker. For his self-stigma, he once feels that he is worthless to engage in sex services. However, that was only the time that he felt.

4.2 Prone to Violence

He has never experienced any kind of violence including verbal, physical, or sexual violence. Also, he does not think that (il)legal status will cause him any

prone to violence. If any problem arises, he would seek help from the manager, or from his Thai sex worker friend.

4.3. Vulnerability to HIV/ AIDS infection

He always uses condom with clients. There was a case where the client offered him 10,000 Baht not to use protection, he immediately refused and talked to the manager. Another case was that the client took off the condom. He thus asked the manager for help, and he suggested him to seek advice from SWING Foundation. Even though he practices safe sex with clients, he does not practice safe sex with his partner.

4.4 Laws

He does not see that either legal or illegal status affects his livelihoods. The only difference is that he feels more secured to change from tourist visa to work permit. The only concern that he changed the documentation is that he does not want to go back home every 2-3 months to get the tourist visa. Work permit under the name domestic worker allows him to stay longer in Thailand, and will reduce the cost of travelling back home. Also, he said that he might not feel that much different since he has not yet utilized the social security benefits.

Coping Strategies

In response to vulnerabilities, he manages to cope by positioning 'invisible' (loophole strategy) and also protecting himself by using social network (protection strategy).

1. Loophole Strategy (Invisibility)

To be able to maintain sex work career, he manages to have legal status by holding tourist visa, and renewing every 2-3 months by getting back home in Myanmar. Later, he changes from tourist visa to blue Thai citizenship id card and also work permit under the name domestic worker approved the early of January 2018. He feels that changing the documentations will get him more coverage from social security benefits, and also makes him feel more secured to work disguisedly as sex worker. He also does not expose his career to his friends at college, or when he visits doctor.

2. Protection Strategy

As the nature of work involves with the vulnerability to HIV/ AIDS infection, he practices safe sex with clients. If any problem arises, he does not confront to the client directly, but rather seek help from the manager. If the problem goes serious, for instance, the client intentionally taking off the condom, he prefers to seek help from SWING Foundation.

Social Protection

Since social protection is generally limited to migrant sex workers, it is interesting to examine how they manage to get social protection both from community and national level.

1. Community Level

In peer community, he has a relative working in a factory in Bangkok. However, he rarely contacts him since they do not have the same day off. In receiving

community, he establishes relationship within his workplace (massage/ spa shop) to help him in communicating with foreign clients. He does not have any preference regarding the nationality; he instead builds on trust and makes friend with Thai and Laotian sex workers within his workplace. It is quite an intimate relationship since they have to work 6 days a week, and he sometimes goes out with them on day off. When he is in need of help, he prefers to seek help from his Thai sex worker friend who used to work in the same workplace with him. However, he usually does not seek help from anyone. If any problem arises during the working hours, he will seek help from manager, and SWING Foundation.

2. National Level

To be able to get social protection from state, he decided to change from tourist visa to work permit and blue Thai citizenship id card to get more coverage. He thinks that healthcare services are important for his livelihood since he works as sex worker. Even though he has yet never utilized any of the services, he sees that this coverage is essential in the future. He prefers to go to private clinics when he has minor health problems since it is more convenient, and faster, and prefers to utilize the coverage when it goes serious. He thinks that having social security benefits is more secured. However, he is not covered with ART/ ARV, drug to suppress HIV, and has to bear the cost of 1,900 Baht per month.

Discussion

(Il)legal Status of CLMV Male Migrant Sex Workers and Its Effect on Their Livelihoods

To maintain working in sex work, CLMV male migrant sex workers manage their legal status by holding tourist visa to be able to stay in Thailand for 2-3 months, and renew the tourist visa by going back to Myanmar. They also change from tourist visa to work permit to stay longer with the help of manager. Having (il)legal status affects their livelihoods as follows:

- **Financial Capital:** Since sex work offers high pay compared to other jobs, it is important for migrant sex workers to maintain their legal status to be able to work in sex work. It is also to reduce the cost of travelling back home every 2-3 months.
- **Social Capital:** Social network of migrant sex workers is confined by their legal and illegal status. Since sex work is illegal in Thailand, they are not willing to expose their identity to public. Their social network is limited to sex-work community; they establish relationship with sex-work colleagues and manager. They also establish social network with friends and relatives, but are reluctant to expose their identity. Even though they are holding legal documentations, for instance, tourist visa, work permit, they remain their identity confidential to avoid arrest/ deportation.
- **Human Capital:** They plan to work as sex workers for sometimes and wish to change to other jobs. They thus study either in college or non-formal education to be able to apply for jobs.

CLMV Male Migrant Sex Workers' Coping Strategies towards Social Protection

Generally, social protection system in Thailand covers to different types of group ranging from civil servants, private sector employees, informal economy workers,

children, undocumented migrant workers, and etc. Even though the Compulsory Migrant Health Insurance (CMHI) has been managed by the Ministry of Public Health since 1997 as the aim to provide health check-up and health insurance for migrant workers from Myanmar, Laos PDR, and Cambodia (ILO and UN Country Team in Thailand, 2013), the access to CMHI is only when workers apply for a work permit. Without legal registration, undocumented migrants have no rights to social security. Even though there is a positive change of health insurance for undocumented migrants to be able to purchase health insurances for themselves and their dependents from May 2013 (HISO, 2013), their illegal status against the Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act is the main barrier for them to apply for health insurance due to their fear of arrest/ deportation.

Regarding the term 'social protection', there are different views between government and NGOs. The Bureau of AIDS, TB, and STIs sees that social protection should be given only to the migrants who are legal. The only barrier that migrants cannot access to health services is mainly from their illegal status. Also, since sex work is illegal in Thailand, they also break the law, Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act. To be able to access health services in Thailand, they have to make themselves legal by enrolling national verification. Rights and protection come only when they are legal. In contrast, NGOs' view regarding social protection is linked with human rights. The former commissioner of Office of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand perceives social protection with human rights in the sense that regardless of nationality, everyone is equal and should be treated under the same system. She sees that rights should not be treated along with laws; it should be separately operated. The issue of migration is always a question of either legal or illegal status, and this thus defines how one should get. She sees that the system operating nowadays, for instance, legal/ illegal status, skilled/ low-skilled labors, creates division and exploitation. It is the system that leaves the room for exploitation, especially in sex industry. It is important to reorganize the system in which their rights are protected as equal as Thai citizen regardless their legal status. Human right is not the law; human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and human beings should also be given basic necessity, for instance, the access to health and social services, food, shelter, and medicine. Human right is not a question of nationality, being Thai or non-Thai; it is what everyone is entitled to all the rights, and the foundation of justice and peace. Foundation for AIDS Rights also sees that the laws limit migrants' rights in the way that undocumented are not provided protections, and with this, it leaves the room for exploitation. The idea of human rights is also supported by AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF) where he sees migrants should also have the rights to health. AIDS Healthcare Foundation sees the gap that migrants have limited access to health services, coupled with the cut of NAPHA extension; AHF thus works to ensure that migrants regardless of legal status are provided HIV testing and treatment for no charge. However, with limited budget, the protection for HIV infected migrants is covered for one year, AHF thus encourages migrants to make themselves legal status in order to get social protection from state. For SWING Foundation, he also sees the term social protection with human rights that everyone regardless of nationality is deserved to be treated equally including the access to health services with the same treatment standard.

Under such circumstance, migrant sex workers manage their legal status to be able to get access to social protection from state. The change of documentations from tourist visa to work permit allows them to be covered in a social security benefit. To get work permit approved, migrant sex workers make use of their social network with the manager to process the documents. In a community level, utilizing health services from NGOs is also their alternative choice. Since illegal status is the main barrier of accessing services from state, they have the option of getting social protection from NGOs, for instance, SWING Foundation, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Foundation for AIDS Rights, and etc. The issue of legal and illegal status defines how one is given social protection. The state clearly sees that rights are given only to those who are legal, while NGOs perceive the social protection with human rights, and with that, all human beings should be given the same social protection. This idea confines the coping strategies of migrant sex workers in accessing the social protection either from state or community.

Conclusion

Legal and illegal status affects CLMV male migrant sex workers' livelihoods. Since sex work is illegal in Thailand, they attempt to make themselves legal by holding tourist visa or work permit. Their vulnerabilities are overcome with their own strategies by positioning themselves as invisible by holding legal documentations, using social network, and also keeping the identity safe. Legal and illegal status also affects CLMV male migrant sex workers' coping strategies to get social protection. Those who hold tourist visa are likely to utilize health services from clinics, or pharmacy. Meanwhile, those who hold work permit is covered with social security benefits, and with that, they have more options to utilize from. The issues of (il)legal status applies to every migrant sex workers regardless of their gender. The problem found in the study does not lie on the issue of gender that entails them the different expose of vulnerability; it is in fact the issue of being "migrant" that has disadvantage from the exclusion to some certain rights in Thailand.

There are different opinions between government and NGOs regarding the social protection for migrant sex workers. NGOs uphold social protection with human rights and see that it is their rights to get access to health services regardless of legal status. On the other way around, government sees that illegal migrant sex workers should manage themselves to be legal to get the rights. Theoretically, there is a health migrant scheme for undocumented, it turns out that the system is deficient.

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SOCIAL PROTECTION OF THE MARGINALIZED INDIGENOUS FISHERY COMMUNITY: THE CASE STUDY OF URAK LAWOI TRADITIONAL DIVERS

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Abstract

The local fishing community in Thailand is often neglected by Thai society and by the Thai government. Recently, outcries against this neglect has been voiced publicly, apparent in the fact that local diving communities had requested the Ministry of Agriculture to reconsider current legislation that are deemed biased for commercial fishing industry (Prachathai, 2018).

As part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the fishery industry must seek a method of ensuring sustainable development that is inclusive of both the stresses subjected to the marine ecosystems as well as economic development.

Although much effort and research has been placed in ensuring that commercial fisheries industry operate within sustainable development guidelines, very few are dedicated to understanding the plight of the local fishermen, who operate in the informal sector. This thesis analyzes the current situation faced by the Urak Lawois, a group of indigenous sea nomads who had settled into the areas of Rawai Beach, Sirei island, and along the Adang archipelago, whose way of life which includes traditional fishing and diving methods be slowly being erased by the forces of the tourism and commercial industries.

This thesis will provide a detailed discussion of the current methods of fishing and diving that are employed by the Urak Lawois and will, concomitantly, highlight any risks that the Urak Lawois are facing due to encroachment of the commercial fishery and tourism industry which is currently threatening their way of life. Interview with key informants in two Urak Lawoi communities in Phuket reveal that the commercial fishery and tourism industry had dramatically reduced the indigenous people's access to important marine resources vital to their survival. Exacerbating their plight is the high-risk nature of their fishing practices, which has left many traditional with permanent injuries and disabilities and the fact that these indigenous people are not provided with essential social protection programmes by the Thai government. This has led to children often having to abandon their education and future to support their families.

Keywords: *Social Protection, Marginalized, Indigenous, Fishery Community, Urak Lawoi Traditional Divers*

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1) Problem Statement

The local fishing community in Thailand is often neglected in Thai society and by the Thai government. Recently, outcries against this neglected has been voiced publicly, apparent in the fact that local diving communities had requested the Ministry of Agriculture to reconsider current legislation that are deemed biased for commercial fishing industry (Prachathai 2018). As part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the fishery industry must seek a method of ensuring sustainable development that is inclusive of both the stresses subjected to the marine ecosystems as well as economic development. Although much effort and research has been placed in ensuring that commercial fisheries industry operate within sustainable development guidelines, very few are dedicated to understanding the plight of the local fishermen, who operate in the informal sector. Both analysis and policy making do not recognize the perspective that the fishing industry exists within the informal sector and requires social protection.

The current situation faced by the Urak Lawoi, who participate in deep water diving to forage for food, is a prime example of this neglect. Exacerbating the plight of the Urak Lawoi is the coastal development plans that destabilizes the living conditions of the Urak Lawoi, subjecting them to increased vulnerabilities. Hence, a consideration of ecological justice is and a topical analysis of the need for social protection for informal workers like the Urak Lawoi is essential for understanding the connection between social protection and sustainable resource management. Nowadays, the Urak Lawoi, as informal workers, are being faced with increased limitations of access to natural resources, which are vital for their survival. This has been manifested in the increased risk associated with diving deeper into waters for food.

The Urak Lawoi people are indigenous to the coastal area and island of Southwestern Thailand, their nomadic nature in food foraging and belief systems which lacks the notion of permanent possession puts these people at odds with the growing interconnections of globalization and market economy. All of the Urak Lawoi in Thailand originally lived and forage for food on the oceans of Phuket, Krabi, and Satun (Arunotai et al. 2014).

Subsequent development of the Phuket Island into a tourist destination has put the Urak Lawoi people at odds with central government authorities, effectively marginalizing these people in terms of their land rights, rights to fish, educational, and public health care. The aforementioned disputes are often covered in local Thai news. For examples, in 2016 the Bangkok Post reported a story of land disputes between the indigenous people living on Phuket's Rawai beach against a private company. It was later reported in 2017 by Prachathai that the Phuket provincial court ruled in favor of the indigenous people who were able to provide evidence of their settlement in the area of over 60 years ago, however court cases are far from being finalised. In early 2018, members of the indigenous fishing community were arrested by officers of the national park and were accused of trespassing. These fishermen stated that they had to rest in the national park areas to recover from decompression sickness but accused of trespassing and fishing within the national park. (Matichon 2018).

The case of the Urak Lawoi in the Lipe island on the Adang archipelago represents an alternate view on how conservationist policies in the form of the

declaration of the Tarutao National park has led to the marginalization of the Urak Lawoi people. The inclusion of their natural habitat to the Tarutao National Park has exacerbated the issue of habitat encroachment due to the increased contact with tourists and government officials (Wongbusarakam 2002).

Despite the fact that the Urak Lawoi people are indigenous to the Adang Archipelago, their existence and way of life is facing increasing challenges from other stakeholder driven by market economy and globalization. Although the lucrative tourism industry in the Andaman Islands has created much wealth for the investors and for the government in the form of taxes, this wealth has been concentrated within particular groups and has exacerbated the levels of relative poverty and widened the income gap for the indigenous Urak Lawois (Arunotai 2008). Aside from the growing relative poverty thrust upon the people, there are other equally important challenges that the Urak Lawoi community is facing.

As a result of the market economy forces; their homes, food source, and way of life threatened, male members of the Urak Lawoi household often have to forage deeper into more hazardous waters and risk greater instances of decompression for forage for food, which could lead to paralysis or even death (Gold et al. 2000). When this happens, the entire household unit, which is dependent of food and income for survival from the father, is at risk and is faced with unimaginable hardships. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to evaluate existing social protection programmes offered by the Thai government that are available to the Urak Lawoi community since the actions of the government has led to the marginalization of these people and their susceptible nature.

The need for new research on the Urak Lawoi traditional divers arose from Gold (1998) initial research on how the traditional divers of Urak Lawoi are faced with increasing risk from Nitrogen decompression sickness. The fact that they are the only group of indigenous people who dive with the assistance of homemade breathing apparatuses puts them a substantially more risk of decompression sickness. Gold (1998) research was very comprehensive in painting a detailed picture of the livelihoods of the Urak Lawoi but that body of research took place nearly two decades ago. Hence, an up to date research depicting the current situations of the Urak Lawoi as well as searching for a framework for social protection for these informal workers are essential.

1.2) Significance of Research

Thailand is a country that is renowned for her tourist destinations, abundant natural resources, and wonderful people. Much of the successes of Thailand's lucrative tourism industry has come at the expense of her extraordinary natural resources and has in many cases has both enriched the Thai people and marginalized those who are left behind. Although the tourism industry has created much wealth and has fueled Thailand's economic development in the past three decades, it has also widened income inequality and exacerbated relative poverty for many (Wattanakuljarus and Coxhead 2008). Aside from the effects felt by the disenfranchised Thais, much of Thailand's natural resources, particular her mangrove forests and marine ecology paid the price for this large economic development. It has been estimated that over 768,000 square kilometers of fishing ground were lost due to the economic development accompanied with tourism and industrialization (Ruyabhorn and Phantumvanit 1988). The adverse effects of the tourism industry on Thailand's natural resources is not limited to the marine ecology but also to that of the natural resources and ecological systems of other regions of Thailand (Dearden 1991).

The livelihoods of Urak Lawoi indigenous people has been greatly affected by the economic development of Thailand's tourism industry. Not only are they facing increasing threats to their nomadic lifestyle, their habitats, and access to marine natural resources, vital for the support of their foraging way of life, are becoming increasingly challenged with the growing encroachment of the economic development (Wongbusarakam 2002; Wongbusarakam 2005; Arunotai et al. 2007).

This research will add to the current gap within the academic literature by analyzing the existence (or lack, thereof) of the social protection programmes offered by the Thai government that are available to the Urak Lawoi household. This issue is important and is worthy of research because access to marine natural resources has become increasingly restricted for the Urak Lawois due to the growing encroachment of the tourism industry. This has forced the men of the Urak Lawoi community to venture deeper into more hazardous waters to forage for food for their family. This has inevitably increased the risk of decompression illness, which could lead to paralysis or death. In the Urak Lawoi household, adult men are that of the primary breadwinner, bringing food for the family. The growing restriction to the access of marine natural resources has destabilize the household unit and made Urak Lawoi families more vulnerable. Thus, it is essential to analyze the current support programmes that are available to the Urak Lawois since they have paid the price of economic development that has amassed a massive amount of wealth for other stakeholders in the region (Henderson 2007).

This research will provide an up to date picture on the livelihoods of the Urak Lawoi community, shedding further light on how growing forces of the economic development from the tourism industry has affected their lives. More importantly, this research provide advocacy for the underrepresented Urak Lawoi community. The Urak Lawois, as with many other indigenous communities, are rarely in any position of power. The situation for the Urak Lawois is further exacerbated by their nomadic way of life and the lack of the concept of permanent possession. They are often voiceless and powerless compared to other stakeholders who stands to benefit from their marginalization. This has resulted in the Urak Lawois being left out and ignored in most development plans and are unable to influenced development decisions when they, indeed, stands to lose most.

Lastly, I believe that this research can act a blueprint to suggest the necessary social protection programmes that ought to be available to the indigenous people who are victims of economic developments, seeing their homes and way of lives being ripped apart by tourism and industrialization. If these measures are not in place, escalating conflict regarding ethnicities could arise and lead to problems on a larger scale. Hence, it is absolutely vital that the current plight of the Urak Lawois be brought to light and a deeper understanding of how they can be supported be established.

1.3) Research Questions:

- 1) Based on the current settings of the life of traditional Urak Lawoi divers, what are the risks facing the individuals (micro-level) and the community (meso-level)?
- 2) How has the encroachment from the commercial fishery and tourism industries impacted the risks that the indigenous Urak Lawoi fishermen are facing?

- 3) From the key risks identified in the first question, what are the existing social protection programmes accessible to the Urak Lawoi that addresses these key risks?
 - a. How are the Urak Lawoi accessing these social protection programmes?
 - b. Are the available social protection programmes able to address all key risks currently faced by the Urak Lawoi?
 - c. What are the obstacles preventing the Urak Lawoi from accessing these social protection programmes?

1.4) Research Objectives

The objective of this research is three-fold. Through the use of purposive sampling and in-depth interviews with traditional Urak Lawoi divers in the Rawai beach and Sirei island communities, the researcher will first identify the key risks that these divers are facing in terms of the following themes, Housing & Accommodation; Nature & Environment; Economic; Health; Social; and, Political

Once these key risks have been identified, the researcher will also analyze these risks based on the responses and feedback of the key informants in order to paint a clearer picture of the severity of these risks. In order to achieve this, the researcher will first identify how their livelihoods are currently changed and affected by the encroachment of both the tourism and commercial fishing industry. Throughout this process, a detailed explanation of the Urak Lawoi traditional divers' diving and fishing practices will also be discuss in details.

These analyses will shed light on the gap of social protection that is required by the Urak Lawoi indigenous divers and will also provide an understanding of the inaccessibility of these social protection programmes to the indigenous divers. Lastly, once the gaps in the quality and access to social protection programmes has been established, the researcher will also suggest relevant social protection programmes that are necessary for the livelihoods of the Urak Lawoi traditional divers.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundation

2.1) Conceptual Framework

There is a plethora of literary work related to the analysis of social protection in different societies, however, these peer-reviewed researches are primarily focused on analyzing the conditions of social protection in developed nations (Estevez-Abe 2001; Tanzi 2002; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). Hence, its findings, although adding invaluable knowledge to the body of literature, may not present an applicable conceptual framework for the analysis of social protection for the indigenous traditional divers of Thailand. Secondly, the scope of research in the aforementioned researches are aimed at the formal sector, therefore its applicability may not be robustly extended to participants in the informal sector. For these reasons, the conceptual framework that will be utilized for the ensuing thesis will be a formed from a synergy of the framework for social protection in the Thai context (Pongapich et al. 2002) and the framework for social protection for small-scale (informal) sector (Bene et al. 2015).

More recent definitions of social protection are offered by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development

Bank (IADB), and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). It is not the researcher's attempt to provide a comprehensive review of literature of the development of the concept of social protection.

According to the ILO, social protection is more encompassing and more inclusive than social security because it includes non-statutory measure for social security and also includes aspects for social assistance and social insurance, typically provided by social security (Garcia and Gruat 2003). In the ILO's view, deployment of social protection ought not to be unilaterally deployed by a single agent but proposes that social protection be shaped by a tripartite structure where the government, employers, and workers are all involved. Simply put, social protection is the responsibility of the many not any single organization. The ILO had also developed the concept of Global Social Protection Floor, which includes the most basic and modest set of social security protection programmes and benefits for all citizens. These measures should guarantee access to, Universal access to affordable health care; Income security for children; Conditional support for impoverished citizens in the active age (ie. Employment benefits); and, Tax-Financed, universal, non- contributory pensions for citizens in the advanced age, disabled persons, and families who lost their primary breadwinners (or no longer in an employable condition).


Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003) defined social protection in terms of providing benefits to individuals or households with the aim of preventing the decline of living standards for those group of individuals. This is highly applicable to the situation of the Urak Lawois whose marginalization made them particularly vulnerable to declines in their living condition as apparent in the fact that they are increasingly faced with larger restrictions to access to natural resources. Furthermore, the Urak Lawois lack agency and are often underrepresented, increasing their vulnerability.

According to the framework proposed by Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003), social protection comprises of four key elements which are aimed at providing varying aspects of social protection. It is the application and interaction of these four elements that will prove effective in providing protection against vulnerability for the people.

1. Promotive measures programmes are primarily aimed at improving the economic and social capacity of the people. Examples of this includes social protection programmes that address low income, insufficient education, lack of health care, and reductions in poverty.
2. Preventative measure programmes are targeted to prevent deprivation and are often referred to social insurance policies provided by the state.
3. Protective measures act as a fail-safe when the promotive and preventative measures a have failed in alleviating deprivation to the people.
4. Finally, Transformative measures involve social protection programmes that are aimed at mediating the power dynamics between different groups of people. This element of social protection promotes equity, justice, and agency; ensuring equal and unbiased empowerment of all sectors of the population (something that is particularly relevant to the Urak Lawois).

The diagram shown below, adapted from Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003) describes the relationship and connections between the four elements of social protection.

Diagram 1: Types of Social Protection Measures



Source: Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003)

2.1) Social Protection in the Thai Context

According to Pongsapich et al. (2002), social protection in the Thai context can be classified into the following categories, Social Security (Social Insurance); Social Assistance; and, Labour Protection These measures of social protection are, seemingly, geared towards servicing participants in the formal sector, with little protection programmes being offered exclusively for participants in the informal sector. Social security or social insurance programmes are intended to provide insured persons with benefits regarding illnesses or injury, maternity, disability, death, child allowance, pension, and unemployment. On the other hand, social assistance programmes are designed to offer monetary and healthcare assistance. One of the most well-known programme that falls under the umbrella of social assistance is the 30 Baht Health Scheme. The table below summarizes the existing social protection programme based on the categories mentioned previously.

Table 1: Types of Social Protection Programmes in Thailand

	Social Security	Social Assistance	Labour Protection
Definition	<i>Provision of safety for individuals facing obstacles to work</i>	<i>Provision of assistance in daily life</i>	<i>Protection against unemployment</i>
Benefits	<i>Protection against death, disability, injury, etc.</i>	<i>Cash Transfer, Health Programmes, Income Generation</i>	<i>Severance Pay, Provident Fund, Employee Welfare</i>
Related Legislations	<i>1993 Social Security Act</i>	<i>Universal Coverage Scheme</i>	<i>1998 Labour Protection Act</i>

Source: Pongsapich et al. (2002)

There are various definitions and framework for social protection that has been mentioned in the body of literature but the one the researcher believes to be most relevant to the ensuing thesis draws inspiration from the work of Pongsapich et al. 2002, whose work offered a unique Thai perspective on issues of social protection. Hence, the ensuing thesis will draw inspiration from this work in the formation of not only the definition but also the conceptual framework for social protection in Thailand. Once we have established a framework for social protection programmes for the Thai context, the following section will discuss the risk framework that will be used to analyze the various types of risk faced by participants in the informal fishery sector.

Diagram 2: Graphical Representation of Social Protection Programmes for the Informal Sector in Thailand



Source: Pongsapich et al. (2002)

The diagram above provides a graphical representation of the different types of social protection programmes that are available in Thailand. These social protection measures are categorized according to the three types of social protection measures, namely, Social Security, Social Assistance, and Labour Protection. According to this graphical depiction, social protection programmes for the informal sector in Thailand are, in general, geared towards providing social assistance in terms of income allowance and medical coverage to participants in the informal sector when their ability to work has been diminished. Arguably, this is a very reactive approach in providing social protection measures to members of the informal sector since these social protection programmes are aimed at providing income relief when hardship or difficulties in obtaining sustenance has already occurred. These social protection measures are then not aimed at enabling the members of the informal sector ability to break from the cycle of poverty but only in the alleviation of their current plight.

The following section will offer a detailed discussion on the current social protection programmes that are available to Thai citizens operating within the informal sector

Table 5: Social Protection Programmes for the Informal Sector

Target Group	Types of Benefits	Institution	Responsible Body	Related Act
Insured Informal Workers	• <i>Package 1:</i> <i>Sickness, Invalidity, and Death</i>	<i>Social Security Fund</i>	<i>Ministry of Labour</i>	<i>The Social Security Act (1990); Reviewed in 2010</i>
	• <i>Package 2:</i> <i>Sickness, Invalidity, Death, Old-Age (Lump Sum)</i>	<i>(Voluntary Scheme)</i>		
Uninsured Informal Workers	<i>Medical Care</i>	<i>Universal Coverage Scheme</i>	<i>Ministry of Public Health</i>	<i>The National Health Security Act (2002)</i>
	<i>Old-Age pension / lump sum</i>	<i>National Savings Fund</i>	<i>Ministry of Finance</i>	<i>The National Savings Fund Act (2011)</i>
Disabled Persons	<i>Disability Allowance</i>	<i>Universal Non-Contributory Allowance for Disabled Persons</i>	<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	<i>The Quality of Life Promotion Act (2007), became effective in 2010</i>
		<i>Universal Non-Contributory Allowance for Persons with HIV / AIDS</i>	<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	<i>Regulation for Disbursement of the Subsistence Allowance by the Tambon Administrative Office (TAO) (2003)</i>
Persons with HIV / AIDS	<i>HIV / AIDS Allowance</i>	<i>Universal Non-Contributory Allowance for Older Persons</i>	<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	<i>Regulation for Disbursement of the Old Age Allowance by the Tambon Administrative Office (TAO) (2009)</i>
Unpension Senior Citizens	<i>Old-Age Allowance</i>	<i>Universal Non-Contributory Allowance for Older Persons</i>	<i>Ministry of Interior</i>	<i>Regulation for Disbursement of the Old Age Allowance by the Tambon Administrative Office (TAO) (2009)</i>

Source: International Labour Organization (2015)

For employees who are neither employed by the government nor by the private sector, the Social Security Act established in 1990 also provides employees within the informal sector with vital social protection programmes. Specifically, Section 40 of the Social Security Act offers income security to those not covered or insured

under Section 33 and Section 39 of the act. Section 40 of the Social Security Act offers income security in situations of injuries, invalidity, death, or unemployment. These programmes are not to be mistaken with the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) medical coverage is offered to Thai citizens, the aforementioned scheme offers income security when the individual is unable to work. One possible criticism of the scheme is the fact that government contributions into the scheme is only partially subsidized by the government and the level of subsidy is not embedded within the act and is subject to change in correspondence to the government's policy.

Another important is the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS), which was established in 2007. The UCS guarantees that, "a person shall enjoy equal rights to receive standard public health services, and the indigent shall have the right to receive free medical treatments from the state's medical facilities". It is important to note that although the literature of the act specifies "a person", this act is only applicable to Thai citizens (holders of a Thai National Identity Card) and, hence, does not apply to migrant workers, stateless persons, and ethnic minorities. The act intends to provide coverage to persons not covered by the CSMBS and SSS. The UCS offers various significant health care services to Thai individuals, inclusive of both inpatient and outpatient services. The scheme is financed by general tax income and is administered by the National Health Service office.

Income enhancement is also available to persons with disability, individuals living with HIV / AIDS, and to senior citizens. These schemes were made available by the Quality of Life Promotion Act, established in 2007 and became effective in 2010. These promotive social protection measures are intended to provide income enhancement to Thai citizens who are in situations that is challenging to find employment and are all administered by the Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO).

Social protection measures for individuals within the informal sector is vital to the development of the conceptual framework and the analysis for this research because this set of social protection measures offered by the Thai government are the only ones that are available to the subject of this research, the Urak Lawois. More importantly, since members of the informal sector do not enjoy income security that are available to the members of the government and private sectors, social protection measures could prove to be vital for the survival of members of the informal sector. The social protection programmes that are available to members of the informal sector includes medical coverage under the UCS; income enhancement for individuals with hardships working under the Quality of Life Promotion Act; income enhancement when individuals are not able to continue employment under the Social Security Act, and; pensions for retired persons in the informal sector through the National Savings Fund, which became effective in 2015. Here, the importance of the establishment of the National Savings Fund cannot be overstated since it is the very first social protection measure offered by the Thai government which extends pension benefits to individuals who are employed within the informal sector.

2.3) Literature Review

Peer-reviewed research within academia that are directly related to the study of the Urak Lawoi people and their livelihoods are not plentiful. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, preceding peer-reviewed research regarding these indigenous people are provided by Gold (1998) and Gold et al. (2000), who focused

on the health issues related the practice of assisted diving by the Urak Lawoi people. Wongbusarakam (2002), who provided a detailed analysis on the effects on tourism and resource use of the inhabitants of the Adang archipelago, of which includes the Urak Lawoi. More comprehensively, research from Hinshiranan (1997; 2001), painted a detailed depiction and provided an in depth understanding of the lives of the sea gypsies, including the Urak Lawoi. More recent publications by Arunotai et al. (2009) and Hinshiranan (2001) placed emphasis on the unique cultural heritage and knowledge possessed by the sea people.

2.4) The Urak Lawoi People

The Urak Lawoi people, together with the Moken and Moklen, are commonly referred to as sea nomads. The Urak Lawois have exhibited the largest diversity in their usage of the natural resources available to them and are also the only group to have adopted more modern technology to assist with their diving activities (Gold et al. 2000; Wongbusarakam 2002). The Urak Lawois, or known in Malaysia as orang laut- a literal translation from Malay to English means “sea people” (Hogan 1972). Together with the Moken and Moklen, the Urak Lawois are often collectively referred to as “Chao Lay”, translated to Sea People, by the Thais and “Sea Gypsies” by the first Europeans who first documented them in the early 1970’s, these collective names are, however, misleading and are misrepresentation of these three tribes (Hogan 1972; Pattermore and Hogan 1986). This is because, the only true nomadic tribe amongst the three tribes are Moken who are sea-faring by nature, while the Moklen and Urak Lawoi actually reside in sea-side villages in an adaptation to the forces of the modernization (Pattermore and Hogan 1986). This has had a predictable repercussion on their cultural distinction with the Moken, having retained much of their idiosyncratic cultural identities, while the Moklen and the Urak Lawois, residing in sea-side villages, have been subjected to much cultural influences (Hogan 1972).

Historical literature with regards to these indigenous people has created a misleading perception. Literature pertaining to the Sea gypsies first appeared in the 17th century and almost exclusively, the sea gypsies are portrayed as opportunistic pirates who live outside the laws of government, ready to take advantage of people who come across their wake (White 1922). However, this myth cannot be further from the evidence shown from documented interactions with the sea gypsies. Accounts from Bernatzik (1958) and Bernatzik and Ivanoff (2005) portray these indigenous people as often being timid and fearful of figures of authority from the central government. A close analysis of these literatures, which predates the 1950’s suggests that the distinction of the Urak Lawois as a unique group of people distinct from the Moken and Moklen only appeared after the 1950’s (Hogan 1972).

2.5) Diving Practices of Indigenous Fishermen

Gold et al. (2000) investigated the diving practices of indigenous fishermen. In their comprehensive study, the authors, with the assistance of local health officials, interviewed village chiefs along with three hundred and forty-two frequent divers in the area through questionnaire. In addition to the usage of questionnaires in their data collection, the authors also relied on field observation to draw their conclusions. Their findings suggest that the diving practices of these indigenous fishermen put them at a substantial risk of decompression sickness.

Their research spanned from early 1996 to the year 2000 and initially involved a group of 400 divers whose age ranged from 11 to 62. These indigenous people rely on food foraged from the ocean in the form of fish and shellfish for their survival. The research remarked that at first glance, the effects of diving related illnesses such as Nitrogen compression sickness becomes very apparent in the lives of the Urak Lawoi with many exhibiting various degrees of severity of the sickness. This provided further incitement for the researchers to formulate an understanding of how diving related morbidity affects the lives of the Urak Lawoi.

The research from Gold et al. (2000) also revealed that the indigenous divers originally only dived in shallow waters for food but with the onset of the large-scale fishing industry and increased tourists' activities in the area, the indigenous divers had to venture further and deeper into the ocean for food. Since they relied on fish foraged from the ocean as their main source of food, this further creates an impetus of the fishermen to find food for their families. In a reaction to this, the fishermen adapted and relied on home-made breathing apparatus to allow them to breathe underwater and more importantly, descend into deeper water for food for their families. Worryingly, results from their research indicated that over 46% of the divers ascend from a long deep dive without making a stop for their bodies to adjust to the change in pressure, putting them at a substantial risk of decompression sickness. Furthermore, over 70% of divers exceeded the no-decompression limits suggested by Paulev (1965) research for the US Navy. In addition, what makes the Urak Lawoi particularly susceptible to Nitrogen decompression sickness is due to the fact that they are the only group that dive deep into the water with the aid of primitive and homemade breathing apparatuses.

The local Thai media has also reported how the livelihoods of the Urak Lawoi people has changed due to the encroachment of the fishery in tourism industry. In 2012, the Post Today news agency interviewed the Urak Lawoi people and uncovered that the encroachment of the tourism and fishery industry has forced them to forage deeper into more hazardous water, invariably increasing the risk of Nitrogen decompression sickness. This has led to more severe cases of decompression sickness amongst the divers. At the time the interview had taken place, divers would dive into depths of approximately 30 to 50 meters underwater with the aid of primitive breathing apparatuses, the depth where Nitrogen decompressions starts to become an issue is 18 meters (Post Today 2012)

Expert opinions regarding Nitrogen decompression sickness from Vachira hospital in Phuket suggests that divers should take at least a 10-minute break during their ascent if they have dived to depths greater than 20 meters to prevent Nitrogen decompression sickness. Unfortunately, this is not part of the diving practice of the Urak Lawoi. To alleviate symptoms of Nitrogen compression sickness, treatment in a Hyperbaric chamber is required. This must be made in conjunction with abstaining from diving for at least one month. These treatments and precautionary measures are often impossible for the Urak Lawoi people to follow both due to the limited access to healthcare facilities available to them and due to the fact that they need to dive on a daily basis for sustenance (Post Today 2012).

Chapter 3: Findings & Conclusion

In the final chapter of the research, the researcher will synthesize the findings collected from in-depth interviews with the key informants together with the analysis of the current settings and access to existing social protection programmes that are available to the Urak Lawoi traditional divers to identify key risk areas based on their severity as well as suggesting social protection programmes addressing these risks.

3.1 Income & Retirement Security

Income security during the active age and retirement security during the advanced years is a very significant issue for members of the informal sector. Members of the informal sector do not enjoy as comprehensive social protection programmes compared to members of the private and public workforce. Unlike their counterparts in the private and public sector, members of the informal sector, including the Urak Lawoi traditional divers, do not have access to pension or provident funds that will either provide them with a lump sum or a continuous stream of income upon retirement. This is particularly a troubling issue for the Urak Lawois whose retirement are at risk.

The incorporation of the National Savings Fund in 2011 by the Thai government was intended to address the retirement risks that all members of the informal sector face. The national savings fund operates in a very similar way as provident funds in private companies, where members in the informal sector would make certain contributions to the fund which will be matched by the government. Those funds will be available to the members of the informal sector upon their retirement. In theory, the national savings fund seems to address the issue of the retirement income and security for members of the informal sector but, in practice, there are various obstacles to the Urak Lawois in fully utilizing this social protection programme.

During the interview with the key informants, none of the key informants were aware of the existence of the national savings fund. When asked issues regarding retirement security, the key informants simply replied that they must keep working into their advanced age. It is unclear why the Urak Lawoi traditional divers are not aware of the existence of such programmes. However, this observation points to the lack of adequate promotional channels for the availability of the national savings fund. Some of key informants who participated in the interview revealed that it is customary for the Urak Lawoi traditional divers to secure funds for retirement through the purchase of gold bars. These gold bars will be sold when the divers are no longer able to work or is in need of cash. This method of savings was only possible when the catch was good or when the divers was able to catch shell fish with valuable shells.

In the current settings of the Urak Lawoi traditional divers in the Rawai beach and Sirei island, it is very challenging for them to regularly save money for retirement, in fact it is already very challenging for them to ensure that they have enough cash to support their families. Due to the growing reduction and unpredictability of the catch, it is almost impossible for the traditional divers to predict their income, hence a programme such as the National Savings Fund that relies on fixed monthly contributions may not be possible, in practice, or best suited for the needs of the Urak Lawoi traditional divers.

Apart from the apparent issue of retirement security for the Urak Lawoi traditional divers, income security during the active age is also a significant issue

to the Urak Lawoi traditional divers due to the high-risk nature of their diving practices. Members of the public and private sector are offered this protection through the incorporation of the Social Security Act, where they are offered compensation when they are unable to work or in death. Although Section 40 of the social security act extends similar protection to members of the informal sector including the Urak Lawoi traditional divers, the protection does not come with contributions from the government. Furthermore, participation into this programme is also voluntary so unless the Urak Lawoi traditional divers are able to constantly contribute to the programme on a monthly basis, they will not be able to enjoy the protection it offers. For these reasons, the Urak Lawoi traditional divers are also unable to access these social protection measures in the same way that they aren't able to access the protection of the National Savings Fund because the requirements of these measures bore too much resemblance on the social protection measures for members of the private and public sectors, of which members of the informal sector may not be able to afford.

3.2 Economic Promotion

The vulnerability in the income stream of the Urak Lawoi traditional divers can be addressed through the use of economic promotion as a means of social protection. Currently, the proceeds from the sales of marine animals that the traditional divers are able to catch are generated from sales to dealers and wholesalers, the fact that the traditional divers rarely sell directly to end customers means that they are always at an opportunity loss. Hence, the promotion of activities, which will allow the traditional divers to sell directly to end consumers will not only increase their earnings but at the same time increase the awareness that the general public may have on the Urak Lawoi in general.

The importance for economic promotion measures for the Urak Lawoi community can also be seen from the lack of fish stalls owned by Urak Lawois or community members in the Rawai beach community and the Sirei island community. The Rawai beach has recently gained popularity as a Sea Gypsy fish market amongst tourists visiting Phuket. A large influx of tourists can be seen visiting the stretch of road parallel to the community on a daily basis, this road is home to shops for souvenirs, fresh seafood, and restaurants and are all frequented by tourists, it is evident that there is a high potential for earnings to be made here. This may paint an optimistic picture for the members of the Urak Lawoi community, but a closer scrutiny reveals that the land itself is no longer owned by the community, all of the restaurants, souvenir shops, and 18 of the 20 fish stalls are owned by people outside the community. In fact, only two fish stalls sell fish and shell fish that were caught by the traditional divers. Fish stalls that are owned by Urak Lawois can easily be distinguished from ones owned by outsiders, community-owned fish stalls are not made with much less expensive materials. The situation is relatively worse for the Sirei island community. Although the community sits beside a pristine beach front, tourist activity in the island is much less compared to the Rawai beach. Although there are some souvenir shops, their numbers and product offerings are very few. The marine animals that the traditional divers caught are almost sold exclusively to wholesalers, although they offer to buy the product in bulk, the prices that the Urak Lawoi divers received are typically below the market rate.

There is an extremely large potential for the Urak Lawoi traditional divers to promote their entrepreneurship on a community and local scale. The areas that the community are based in are prime real estate that are either already

frequented by tourists or has the potential to be. Furthermore, the opportunities that community-based entrepreneurship has is not only limited to the sales of marine animals but also extends to female members of the households where their handicraft skills and the availability of beautiful clam shells can be put into use. In this respect, a thorough promotion of entrepreneurship in the community through promotion fish stalls, souvenirs, and handicrafts product may improve the income for divers as well as offer opportunities for the female members of the household as well. In fact, some members of the communities have already begun these handicraft projects.

Image 1: Villagers in Sirei Island making souvenirs using shells of clams for tourists, taken on 12th May 2018



In the short run, it is vital that the number of fish stalls owned and operated by Urak Lawois are increased. In the long run, the community could extend their entrepreneurial activities to be more integrated to their actual diving practices such as offering underwater diving trips and other eco-tourism activities, which will allow the community to create a niche for themselves in the tourism market. Furthermore, the fish that are caught by the traditional divers could be promoted and sold as premium products that are caught in a sustainable manner and whose supply chain is free from human trafficking and forced labour unlike that of the Thai commercial fishery industry. Thailand was given the “yellow card” by the European commission for the rampant acts of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices, which has resulted in the prohibition of the imports of certain Thai products into the European markets. The researcher believes that the government should also direct attention to offering assistance in these manners, which will not only enhance the earning power and improve the income security for the traditional divers but will also allow the community

to create an entrepreneurship that has longevity and is able to support families within the community for generations to come.

3.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis of the research findings was based on the risks that the Urak Lawoi are facing as a result of the changing landscape of their livelihoods. These risks were mapped against existing social protection measures to provide more clarity in terms of the existence of social protection programmes which allows for the prevention or mitigation of these risks. The mapping of the risks as per the SRM framework that were discussed in detail in the conceptual framework section against the existing social protection programmes. This mapping suggests that while there are some social protection programmes available to the members of the informal sector, including the traditional Urak Lawoi divers, that offers income enhancement for Urak Lawoi, these measures do not address the long-term vulnerability that these indigenous divers are facing.

On a positive note, social protection measures with regards to the health and safety of the divers seems to be well covered as they benefit from the UCS and are also able to access hyperbaric chambers at the Vachira hospital to treat nitrogen decompression sickness. The access to these social protection measure under the UCS is vital to the survival of the key informants that participated in the interview, who all had used the services of the UCS and had relied on free access to hyperbaric chambers, a treatment that would be impossible for the traditional divers to afford.


However, other social protection measures such as the Social Security Act and the National Savings fund fail to deliver the same level of impact as the UCS. The Social Security Act promises to provide income security during the active age, while the National Savings Fund is intended to provide income during the advanced age, although these measures seem very effective in theory, in practice they fail to reach the target group that it was intended for. This is apparent in the fact that all of the key informants that participated in the research are either unable to participate or unaware of the existence of such programmes. The failure of these programmes in reaching the informal sectors can be argued as due to the similarity of these programmes to the ones that were designed for the formal sector who are in a situation with more regular and consistent income, a feat that is near impossible for the Urak Lawoi divers to achieve.

Lastly, the mapping of the social protection measures against the kinds of social protection shown in diagram 3 suggest that the social protection measures that are available to the traditional divers only offer short term relief in the form of income enhancement and does not empower the traditional divers with the possibility of breaking away from the cycle of poverty that they are in. This is apparent in the fact that only one social protection measure that the Urak Lawoi community have access to offers Labour protection under the definition of Pongsapich et al. (2002) and is a transformative measure, as per the definition of Sabates Wheeler (2002), which allows the members of the community to break away from the cycle of poverty. Hence, the Thai government should focus on economic promotion measures, which will not only offer short term income enhancement but promote entrepreneurial activities for the Urak Lawoi community, empowering with the ability to transform their lives and effectively break away from the cycle of poverty.

Table 11: Social Risk and Social Protection Matrix

Risk	Definition	Micro / Meso Level Risks Affecting Households / Individuals / Communities	Source of risk	Severity (Based on Key Informants' Responses)	Existing Social Protection Programme	Type of Social Protection
Housing	Threats to current means of accommodation	Land grab / land disputes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Private investors Politically connected persons 	High	None	Not Applicable
Natural / Environment	Threats leading to increased risk in the environment	Dangerous / high waves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seasonal 	Low	Universal Coverage Scheme	Protective/ Social Assistance
		Interactions with dangerous marine animal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seasonal 	Low		
		Declining fish stock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase activities from commercial fishery industry 	Low	None	Not Applicable
Economic	Threats to current means of employment / incomeUniversal	Unemployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nitrogen decompression sickness Increased Highlimitations to fishing sites Arrests made by government officials 	High	None	Not Applicable
		Loss / destruction of fishing equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confiscation government officials Intereference from misinformed tourists 	High		
		Lack of access to other means of sustenance / employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of access to training / vocational programmes 	High		
		Competition from commercial fishery industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Non-competitive economies of scale compared to the commercial fishery industry Low price of fish 	High		
		Higher costs of fishing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased costs associated with the manufacture of fish traps Increased limitations to vital raw materials Increased costs of running fishing boats 	Medium		
		Old-age (inability to continue traditional fishing)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Labour intensive practice with risk of illness increasing with age of diver 	High	National Saving Fund	Proactive/ Labour protection
Health	Threats leading to increased risk of injuries / illnesses	Injury	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased diving depths Increased limitations to existing fishing sites, leadin toexpeditions to unchartered areas Increased diving time/frequency de to increased pressure in obtaining marine resources 	High	Universal Coverage SchemeSocial Security Fund (Section 40, Voluntary)	Proactive / Social Assistance Proactive / Social Security
		Illness		High		
		Invalidity		Medium	Quality of Life Promotion Act	Proactive / Social Assistance
		Death		Low	Security Fund (Section 40, Voluntary)	Proactive / Social Security
Social	Threats leading to social inequality/ discrimination	Drugs and alcohol abuse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poverty Lack of means to break the cycle of poverty 	Low	National Education Act	Proactive / Labour Protection
		Domestic violence				
		Social exclusion				
Political	Threats leading to diminished agency/ advocacy	Discrimination on grounds of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ehnicity Nationality Gender Religion Political Affiliation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of awareness from general public Introvertness of community 	High	None	Not Applicable
		Political Marginalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited access to quality education 			

Diagram 3: Social Protection Measures for Informal Workers in Thailand



CHIN DIASPORA AND THEIR SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THAILAND: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN MYANMAR

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Abstract

Due to economic and political reasons, Chin people from the western part of Myanmar have been migrating to inner part of Myanmar and abroad, including Thailand over time. The purpose of this conference paper is to explore the social network of Chin diaspora community in Thailand and their contribution to the political and economic development of their home community in Myanmar. With that, diaspora concept of Safran (1991) and migrant's social network concept of Weber (2014) were applied in this conference paper to examine the Chin diaspora in Thailand.

The field research was conducted wither in quantitative or qualitative method – picking up 72 respondents for Likert-scale type questionnaires and in-depth interviewing some informants among the members of Chin diaspora in Thailand. It was found out that Chin people are living closely in tribal group as well as in the vicinity of the church they participate. Despite seeing each other only once a year, they are having close relationship in times of difficulties such as death in Thailand.

This conference paper concludes that (1) Chin diaspora in Thailand meet the six features of the Saffran (1991), (2) social network have played a crucial role before and after migration experience in Thailand, and (3) Chin diaspora in Thailand contribute only economically to their home community but not politically and that they will not return to Myanmar in the near future despite they do not plan to stay in Thailand permanently.

Keywords

Chin migrants, Chin diaspora in Thailand, migrant social network, diaspora implication to development in home community

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Introduction

Chin State is one of the poorest states in Myanmar (IHLCA 2011) with relatively few extractable natural resources and poor infrastructure development. Like other ethnics in Myanmar, **Chin**⁹⁴ people have been facing human rights abuses, suppression and discriminations during the military regimes, prior to political reform in 2010, in Myanmar mostly from armed organizations such as the military (Tatmadaw). Therefore, not only internal migration to urban areas in Myanmar, many Chin people have been migrating abroad. Despite geographical distance, many Chin people from Myanmar came to Thailand due to economic and political reasons. According a comprehensive survey of 100,000 Myanmar migrants in Thailand by the IOM in 2013, 0.2% of the respondents or 200 people out of 100,000 respondents are from Chin State (Gupta 2016, 18). The total number of Chin people residing in Thailand is estimated to number around 2,000 as of 2010 (Thiam 2010). Therefore, the purpose of this conference paper is to explore the social network of Chin diaspora community in Thailand and their contribution to the political and economic development of their home community in Myanmar.

As Myanmar transformed itself into democracy, the union government agreed to sign Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2012 with Chin National Front (CNF), the Chin ethnic armed organization (EAO) holding clash with the military after the 1988 nationwide uprising. Unlike the previous times of "central planning" system, the "bottom-up" approach, as proposed by the President Thein Sein Administration, states and regions are allowed to participate and take responsibility of planning and budgeting for themselves. The proposed budget plans from each states and regions are combined into the "National Comprehensive Development Plan". The then-Chin State government also has developed Comprehensive Development Plan 2016-2021 in cooperation with a local firm Myanmar Institute for Integrated Development (MIID) with financial support from DANIDA and UNICEF⁹⁵ (MIID 2014). Taking office in April 2016, the current NLD-led Chin State Government has adopted the development endeavor of its predecessor and has addressed many agendas to promote the socioeconomic status of the state, including human resource development and job creation, poverty reduction, promotion of agricultural sector, environmental conservation and infrastructure development in cooperation with many INGOs, LNGOs and CSOs⁹⁶ (Thant 2017). Nevertheless, according to the current Myanmar Investment Law⁹⁷, tax exemption is allowed for investment in Chin State in addition to many other tax incentives (Win 2017) and this is expected to create many job opportunities within the state in the near future. Thus, a question arises whether out migration from Chin State will continue to grow in the light of these development initiatives within the state and the country as a

⁹⁴ I will use the word '**Chin**' in this paper to refer different tribal groups as a whole since 'Chin' is the officially recognized name in Myanmar. Suantak, V. S. (2008) argues that despite the manifestation of Sakhong, L. H. (2003) as 'Chin as the original name for all tribes residing within Chin State, there are many different tribal groups who call themselves differently such as Asho, Laimi, Masho (Khumi), Mizo, Sho (Cho), and Zomi. He referred many colonial literary works to proof that 'Chin' is not the original name, yet 'Chin' is a given name.

⁹⁵ DANIDA stands for Danish International Development Agency, UNICEF stands for United Nations Children's Fund.

⁹⁶ INGOs stands for International Non-Governmental Organizations, LNGOs stands for Local Non-Governmental Organizations, CSOs stands for Civil Society Organizations.

⁹⁷ Myanmar Investment Law: https://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/document-files/myanmar_investment_law_official_translation_3-1-2017.pdf

whole or whether Chin people abroad will go back to their place of origin is worth considering.

As such, the main question of the conference paper is **"What are the characteristics of the Chin diaspora in Thailand and their social networks in relation to Chin State and Myanmar?"** In order to answer the main question, the following sub-questions are prepared.

- a. Do the Chin diaspora in Bangkok, Thailand meet the six features of Safran (1991)?
- b. What is their social network, their migration experiences and livelihood in Bangkok, Thailand?
- c. How does Chin diaspora in Thailand contribute to the economic and political development of Chin State and Myanmar and what are their future aspirations?

Concepts Applied

The conference paper use the concept of 'diaspora' through the lens of the tradition paradigm using the six features of Safran (1991) in order to asses and understand to what extent the Chin diaspora in Thailand meet the six features to term diaspora as proposed by Safran (1991). Moreover, the concept of 'social network' elaborated by Weber (2014) is applied in this conference paper to understand the social network of Chin diaspora in Thailand. With that, with the understanding of Chin diaspora in Thailand and their social network, the conference paper also examines their contribution to the economic and political development of their home community in Myanmar by using the concepts of Wickramasekara (2018) and Patterson (2006). Finally, the future aspirations of Chin diaspora in Thailand is assessed in contrast to the political reforms taken place in Myanmar since 2010. As such, the conceptual framework for this conference paper is developed as elaborated below:




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Research Methodology

The research was conducted both quantitative and qualitative methods. In order to get the primary data, the case studies were conducted at the Grace Church in Bang Pa-In, Ayuthaya Province, Mizo Christian Association at Mahachai, Samut Sakhong Province, and another two case studies were inside Bangkok at the Calvary Church and Myanmar Christian Assembly (MCA) churches in Sukhumvit area. The reason of having the churches as the case study point is due to the fact that more than 85% of Chin people are Christians and many of them usually go to the church on Sunday.

Structured questions developed from the key concepts and surveys was conducted at the churches. Moreover, in-depth interviews were done with informants from the focus areas and also with some senior members of the Chin diaspora in Thailand in order to get insightful information as well as to cross check the information acquired from the secondary data. In addition, the researcher visited some of the residences of the community and participated in the church programs either in Bangkok or outside Bangkok – these site visits and participations give the opportunity to find out the physical relationship of the members of Chin diaspora as well as their livelihood and situations in Thailand alike. Lastly, by doing some focus group discussions with members of the diaspora in a similar grouping such as migrant workers and students allowed the researcher to analyze the future aspiration of members of the Chin diaspora in Thailand.

Limitations of the Research

The time limitation is worth to note - the researcher had only one month for the field work and one months for analysis and documentation for this conference paper. However, the researchers' participation into the Chin diaspora community on the occasions such as church, traditional festival and having established other informal social relationship were helpful in synthesizing the information acquired. In terms of language limitation of the respondents, the researcher usually bring with him peer interpreter who can speak Chin and Burmese language in times when the respondents do not understand Burmese nor the Chin language the researcher is speaking.

Findings

Demographic data of the respondents

The conference paper is developed after surveying 72 respondents, 33 females and 28 males, among the members of Chin diaspora in Thailand. Out of the 72 respondents, 31 respondents are single and the rest, 39 respondents, were married. It was learnt that 39 out of 72 people or 57 percent of the respondents had high school level education in Myanmar while 23 percent of the total population had primary and secondary level education in Myanmar and are 12 people who had undergraduate level education and 1 respondent finished master's level education in Myanmar. With that, it was observed that 29 percent of the population is working in industry, 26 percent domestic workers, 15 percent in restaurants and the rest are working as vendors, furniture, beverage delivery, and some are dependent to their spouses. It is also found out that 53 percent of the respondents earn less than 10,000 Baht per month, 34 percent earn less than

15,000 Baht per month and only 12 percent of them earn more than 15,000 Baht per month.

Profiles of the informants

No	Name	Year Arrived in Thailand	Occupation
1	Reverend Pastor Thang Khan Khai	1995	Senior Pastor and Founder of Grace Church in Bang Pa-In
2.	Pu Ruala	1992	Leader at Mizo Christian Fellowship in Mahachai
3.	Ms. Cherry	2006	Founding Member of the Chin Christian Fellowship (CCFB) and Chin Community of Bangkok (CCB)
4.	Mr. Suh Suh	2011	Chairman of Chin Christian Fellowship – Bangkok (CCFB), Executive Recruitment Consultant at MONROE Consulting Group, Bangkok

1. Diaspora

1.1. Dispersal from their origin to other places.

It is found out that Chin people in Bangkok are living collectively in tribal group except those living in the work place, usually near the church they participate. Also, it was found out that more than 95 percent of the respondents 'strongly agreed' the Chin people have being dispersing across the world, living in countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Mizoram, the United States (US) and many other European countries.

By interviewing with the members of the Chin diaspora in different countries, Thiam (2010) estimated the populations of Chin diaspora in different countries as of 2010 are as follows:

No	City/State, Country	Estimate Number of Chin Population as of 2010
1	Mizoram State, India	80,000 to 100,000
2	Delhi, India	8,000
3	Thailand	2,000
4	Malaysia	45,000 to 50,000
5	Singapore	800
6	Philippines	200
7	South Korea	80
8	Japan	120

No	City/State, Country	Estimate Number of Chin Population as of 2010
9	Australia	3,000
10	Switzerland	20
11	Germany	200
12	England	20
13	Sweden	200
14	Norway	1,000
15	Denmark	1,000
16	The United States (US)	16,000
17	Canada	1,200

1.2. Collective memory of homeland.

In terms of the collective memory, 89% of the respondents among the Chin diaspora agreed they remember that Chin State is a cold and mountainous state in the western part of Myanmar. And 91% of them agreed that Chin people are famous for their loyalty and honesty for many years – more than 50% agreed strong to this memory.

1.3. Feeling of being alienated by the host society.

Despite having stayed in Thailand for more than 23 years and being quite established, Reverend Pastor Thang Khan Khai (Reverend Khai) said that he is being alienated in the Thai society until now. Moreover, 41 out of 67 people agreed that they are facing discrimination as foreigners in Thailand unlike other foreigners from rich countries. 82 percent of the 72 respondents agreed that they feel as strangers living in Thailand and 63 percent of them responded that they are not feeling at ease working in Thailand as this is not their country.

1.4. Respect and longingness for their homeland.

65 out of 72 people or 91 percent of the respondents 'agreed' that Chin State in Myanmar is where their loved ones such as parents, relatives and some friends are remaining and that they always want to go back to that place. Moreover, 69 out of 72 people or 97 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that they are proud of being a Chin person and they always long for their hometown in Chin State, Myanmar. Not only respecting and longing for their homeland themselves, 90 percent of the respondents agreed that they want to bring their non-Chin friends to Chin State to let them enjoy the beauty and nature of Chin State.

1.5. Belief in restoration to their place of origin when time is right.

In terms of belief restoration to the place of origin, 77 percent of the respondents believe that the authorities in Myanmar under this current government are facilitating the opportunities in Chin State and Myanmar so that Chin people abroad can come back and enjoy those opportunities. With that, 82 percent of the respondents agreed that Chin people abroad will come back to Chin State one day – 42 percent responded that they agree 'strongly'. Lastly, more than 90 percent of the respondents 'agreed' that these Chin people across the world are maintaining contacts with their relatives and families in Myanmar.

1.6. Self-definition in terms of homeland.

In terms of definition of their homeland, 95 percent of the respondents agreed that Chin State is a hilly and lovely region with fresh air, natural flowers and birds. Moreover, 84 percent of the respondents define their homeland, Chin State, as a region prosper with wild animals and forests while 95 percent of the respondents totally agreed that Chin State is the only place where they can see Taungzalot or Rhododendron flower in Myanmar.

2. Social network

2.1 Function

The first formally organized Chin association is the Zomi Christian Fellowship which was formed in 1 January 2000 at the Myanmar Christian Assembly. The aim was to do worship program in the Chin (Zomi) language, to look after when the members are sick, in trouble, to share important information and maintaining Chin identity despite staying abroad. The fellowship was formed formally, appointing, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Accountant, Auditor, Fellowship Coordinator, Praise and Worship Leader. The fellowship has worshipping programs between 14.00 – 16.00 hrs on the first and third week of each month at the MCA church (Kham 2010). It was learnt that the fellowship was gradually fade with the repatriation and movements to third countries of the its members.

Seven years later, another fellowship called Chin Christian Fellowship - Bangkok (CCFB) was formed at the MCA on 8 April 2007. The main objectives were to allow worshipping of the only-Chin-language-speak people and promotion of mutually supporting and coordination among the Chin people in Thailand. Ms. Cherry said that this fellowship was formed in order to cover a wider group of people among Chin people in Thailand, saying that Zomi refers to only one tribal group. This fellowship also has formal assignments and functions worshipping programs between 14.00 – 16.00 hrs on the second and forth weeks of the month. CCFB, as a religious fellowship, has ties with some Myanmar religious organizations – sometimes they invite pastors from Myanmar, host religious groups, and so on. Moreover, being an inclusive fellowship among Chin people, the CCFB initiated celebration of Chin National Day (CND) on 20 February 2008. The event was celebrated and participated by Chin people residing in Bangkok and its vicinity (Cherry 2010).

Later, Chin Community of Bangkok (CCB) was created by the same executive members of the CCFB and it functions as focal Chin organization in Thailand. Even though, the CND is holistically celebrated by Chin people each year in Bangkok with the leadership of CCB (Cherry 2010), some tribal groups of the Chin people in Thailand formed their own fellowship, as sub-groups, such as the Mizo Christian Fellowship in Mahachai, Samut Sakhong Province, the Matupi Fellowship at Sukhumvit area in Bangkok, Zomi Fellowship in Bang Pa-In, Ayuthaya Province. Mr. Suh Suh explained despite these sub-groups or fellowship strengthens networks within each tribal groups of Chin people in Thailand, the CND is celebrated as a whole group of Chin people almost yearly. Also, 86 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that they also have a separate celebration of the traditional events collectively in their church as well as separately by their tribal group or among the colleagues at the same workplace.

2.2 Homophily

Reverend Khai said that most of the Chin people in his church were married to each other and he said that, "We, the Chin people, enjoy the company of each other. Only Chins understand each other and laugh on our own jokes" – he added he does not mean Chin diaspora in Thailand do not deal with non-Chins. 85 percent of the respondents out of 72 people agreed that their migration to Thailand is greatly due to the preexistence and help of a Chin relative or friend in their destination ahead. 94 percent of the respondents agreed that they make new Chin friends in Thailand through their existing Chin friends in Thailand. It was found out that 63 percent of the respondents rent a room for themselves and 35 percent are sharing the room with their Chin friend. Only one person shares a room with non-Chin person and 22 percent of the respondents are staying at the accommodation that their work has offered to them.

On the other hand, Pu Ruala said that there were very few Chin people when he arrived Thailand in 1992. He added it allowed him to have a very good relationship with non-Chin friends either any ethnic of Myanmar or non-Myanmar people such as Thai. He said, "When I say friend, I mean those who are really intimate or very close. Friends to who I can go anytime I need and those come to me in the case of going to the hospital". Also, it was found out that more than 85 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that they have some close friends who are not necessarily Chin people in Thailand. Likewise, 90 percent of the respondents agreed that they are treating their non-Chin friends in Thailand as equal as their Chin friends.

2.3 Multi-ties

It was found out that Reverend Khai explained he invited his siblings, nieces and nephews to Thailand and get them some jobs – it was observed that they live around the church in Bang Pa-In. Thus, he became a church pastor to them as well as a relative and benefactor at the same time. Moreover, 91 percent of the respondents replied that they agree of having connection with their relatives and friends who are outside Thailand via online or with phone. Also, 71 percent of the respondents agreed that their relatives and friends outside Thailand have great influence to their daily life either mentally or physically such as choose of work and living in Thailand. However, 84 percent of the respondents agreed that they are having non-Chin friends either in Thailand or outside Thailand and they agreed of having good connection in person or via other means of communications such as online, phone, and so on.

2.4 Strength of ties

As mentioned earlier, despite the CND is the only event that Chin people meet as a whole once a year, Chin diaspora in Thailand have their own tribal fellowships either formal or informal and they maintain their physical network by meeting at least at the church. It was found out that 83 percent of the respondents admit that they meet with a Chin person at least once a week in Thailand. While 71 percent of the respondents agreed that they participate at the church functions not only on Sunday but also in other days, 92 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that they go to church every Sunday. It was found out that 80 percent of the respondents agreed to be going church together with their friends on holidays. Moreover, 60 percent of the respondents agreed that they discuss and share their problems and difficulties and hang out with Chin friends in Thailand often. Lastly, despite this situation, 86 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that members of the Chin diaspora in Thailand are

helping each other without separation or divides by tribal group, church, workplace, etc. in times of trouble or bad times in Thailand.

2.5 Integration

It is observed that 78 percent of the 72 respondents agreed strongly that Thailand government is having a good policy towards them – migrants. In other words, these people agreed that they are satisfied that they can stay in Thailand at this current situation. However, they are not quite optimistic to get more opportunities than the current ones – only 53 percent responded 'optimistic' to get better opportunities while almost half of the respondents replied 'hopeless'. Likewise, it was found out that only 18 percent of the respondents agree on the plan to stay in Thailand for the rest of their lives while the rest responded that they are not willing to stay in Thailand for life.

3. Implications for Development in Myanmar

3.1. Economic Contribution

3.1.1. Remittance

It is observed that 29 percent of respondents are working in industry, 26 percent as domestic workers, 15 percent in restaurants and the rest are working as vendors, furniture, beverage delivery, and some are dependent to their spouses. It is also found out that 53 percent of the respondents earn less than 10,000 Baht per month, 34 percent earn less than 15,000 Baht per month and only 12 percent of them earn more than 15,000 Baht per month. Thus, 93 percent of the respondents agreed they are independent while there is no objection. With all of the respondents agreed having relatives and family members including parents, siblings, spouse and children, who are reliant on the remittance of them, 92 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that their remittance are being used for the livelihoods and social affairs such as donation, contribution to relatives in times of joy and sadness as well as for the education of their relatives. It was learnt that the respondents prefer sending money through the brokers than the banks and prefer to send through friends than the brokers as well.

3.1.2. Skills and knowledge sharing

Pu Ruala said that rather than those working in big industries, people who worked in small firms such as construction could apply their skills back home when they return. 39 percent of the respondents agreed that some of their friends repatriated to Myanmar are making profession with the skills, knowledge and experiences they gained from Thailand – in fact only 13 out of 72 respondents totally denied that they have never seen such cases. Moreover, 72 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that they have experiences of skill and knowledge sharing to other people either in Thailand or in Myanmar the information on getting jobs, migration, work, either in person or via other communication channels such as online, phone, and so on. At the same time, 70 percent of the respondents said that they have shared their skills and knowledge to their friends and relatives in their home country – Myanmar and there were only 2 out of 72 people to deny this statement.

3.2. Political Contribution

In terms of politics, it was found out that Chin diaspora in Thailand are weak or even close to zero level of political contribution to their home community. Mr. Suh Suh, an informant, said that members of Chin diaspora in Thailand are keen on working to make money but not on politics.

3.2.1. Lobbying

It was found out that only 30 percent of the respondents or 20 out of 72 people agreed to that they have written their political opinion on social media, Facebook in particular, or have ever shared the updates from Chin politicians or activists – more than 70 percent of the respondents said that they have never done such things on social media. Despite their existence in Thailand and were not directly involved in the processes of recent polls in Myanmar, more than 70 percent of the respondents expressed that they have never urged their friends, relatives or families in Myanmar whom or which party to vote when they have conversation.

3.2.2. Mediation

56 percent of the respondents were unsure whether Chin political parties or politicians come to Thailand for meetings, recruiting or discussion of the Chin State or the Chin people's affairs. In other words, 13 percent of the respondents totally denied that there has never been such thing, 30 percent of the respondents fairly agreed that Chin politicians or political parties come to Thailand for having meetings or mediation of the affairs or recruiting. Despite 80 percent of the respondents agreeing that Chin people needs to be united more in order to gain better opportunities in the politics, economics or in social affairs in Myanmar, only 43 percent of the respondents could say that they have ever shared this ideology to their friends, relatives and family members in Myanmar either in person or by other means of communication including online, phone and so on.

3.3.3. Voting

It is observed that most of the members of Chin diaspora in Thailand arrived as illegal migrant workers, some later applied the documents that limits their movements while a few of them come to Thailand with full documents, they are not quite interested in voting as well. Thus, only 7 out of 72 respondents expressed that they voted for the (Chin) political parties in the recent elections in Myanmar, in November 2015, and the rest, 90 percent of them, did not voted for any political parties from Thailand. While more than 75 percent of the respondents acknowledged they know they had opportunities to vote from Thailand at the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok, more than 70 percent of them replied that they were not satisfied with the procedures of voting at the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok – most of the respondents said that they had no knowledge of the procedures during their conversation with the researcher. Not only that the respondents did not vote in the recent elections from Thailand, more than 75 percent of them expressed that their family members or relatives in Myanmar did not vote on behalf of them, using their IDs, either.

4. Future Aspiration

It was found out that 70 percent of the respondents were optimistic that Chin State in Myanmar is offering more opportunities nowadays compared to the past when they left it – 25 percent of the 72 respondents expressed that they had no idea on the changes. However, only 40 percent of the respondents agreed that

they may return to Myanmar in the next five years while more than 50 percent of the respondents were not sure about it – and 4 out of 72 people were sure to remain in Thailand for the next five years. 90 percent of the respondents expressed strongly that they will go back to Chin State, Myanmar, from Thailand if they were offered the opportunity or situation such as job, income, facilities and social welfares slightly lower but almost as good as in Thailand. Moreover, only 10 percent denied of going back to their home country and Chin State if they could enjoy the same opportunities as in Thailand. Thus, it was observed that apart from 8 respondents, majority of the 72 respondents expressed that they will go back to Myanmar one day despite most of them were quite settled in Thailand.

Discussion

1. Diaspora

The proposed six features of Safran (1991) to see diaspora in traditional way, are 1) dispersal from their origin to other places, 2) having collective memory of homeland, 3) their feeling of being alienated by the host society, 4) their respect and longingness for their homeland, 5) their belief in restoration to their place of origin when time is right, and 6) self-definition in terms of homeland. With this notion of diaspora, expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents at a certain place, immigrant and ethnic minorities were counted in the definition (Hickman 2005, 119).

As described in the above, despite differences in dates of arrival to Thailand, age, gender and place of residence in Myanmar, members of the Chin diaspora in Thailand are part of the dispersed Chin people across the world, who left their place of origin either by economic or political reasons, having a collective memory of their homeland and are being alienated in their host society as presented earlier. Moreover, they have their own definition of Chin State with respect and longing for it even though they are currently staying in Thailand and they believe in restoration when the time is right. Therefore, this conference paper concludes that Chin diaspora in Thailand meets the six features of Safran (1991).

2. Migrant's Social Network

As stated earlier, this conference paper uses the 'social network' concept summarized by Weber (2014) which says a "*formal and informal, local and transnational, by tendency homophilic and often multiplex ties between individual migrants who share one or more dimensions of similarity; migrant networks are to a certain degree strategic but are typically regulated by informal principles rather than formal rules, consist of different sub-networks and are made up of a core and an extension, encompassing strong and weak ties.*"

It is found out that Chin people in Thailand did not have a formal or organization until 2000. On the other hand, it is obvious that transnational ties with their relatives and friends are evident and network among Chin people in Thailand existed informally. It is obvious that church is the meeting point for Chin people in Thailand given that the first fellowship was formed in Myanmar Christian Assembly (MCA) church in Bangkok in 2000 – Zomi Christian Fellowship. Formation of another fellowship in a wider name of 'Chin' at the MCA in 2007 allows the celebration of Chin National Day (CND) in Thailand by gathering members of the Chin diaspora in Bangkok and its vicinity. Based on informal

principles or the nature of religious organization, leadership was based on voluntary rather than obligatory and it is evident that the CND was not celebrated every year.

The relatively weak ties that bonds the Chin people in Thailand through the celebration of CND paved the way for formation of the other tribal groups of Chin people in Thailand. It is seen that homogeneity among each tribal group allows them easier to form sub-networks, celebrate traditional and religious events themselves. However, due to the fact that they are minority migrant community in Thailand, it is seen that each tribal fellowship of Chin people in Thailand have strategic ties among each other by celebrating their national day once a year.

3. Implication for Development in Myanmar

By analyzing the demographic data of the Chin diaspora, it is seen that most of the respondents had the education level of high school and lower level – it reflects the work they are doing in Thailand, mostly the 3Ds job such as, industry, delivery, construction, domestic work and so on. It is found that most of them are less than 30 years old, mostly arriving to Thailand after 2011 after the transition to democracy in Myanmar. Leaving home to work abroad at young age, it is obvious that they have come to Thailand mostly for economic reason and it is seen that they send back money to their relatives back home – preferring to send money informally through the brokers than the banks. Moreover, existing local and transnational ties, it is seen that most of the members of Chin diaspora share their skills and knowledge to home community as well friends in Thailand. Therefore, it is evident that Chin diaspora in Thailand is contributing to the development of its home community by sending remittance often to their relatives in Myanmar, sharing knowledge and skills to them for time to time as well as that some of the former members of the diaspora reapply in their home community the skills and knowledge they gain in Thailand when they repatriated.

Unfortunately, it is seen that Chin diaspora in Thailand are not active in politics of their home community and do not participate in lobbying, mediation and voting from another country. Given the existing level of education, age and type of work they are doing, it is logical to see why most of the Chin diaspora members are not interested in politics – they may be thriving in the Thailand and keen more on the economic issues and politics among themselves rather than that of their home community. Also, the reason that they are not interested or active in voting may have been due to the complicated procedures for voting: requirements for application, legal documents, waiting at the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok, etc. Moreover, the transportation costs for most of the Chin diaspora members who are working with rates lower than 10,000 Bhat per month is hindering their voting.

Conclusion

This conference paper examines the characteristics of the Chin diaspora in Thailand by collecting the survey data from the areas where they are concentrated mostly – the churches either inside or outside Bangkok. The paper concludes that Chin diaspora in Thailand meet the six features of the Saffran (1991). Secondly, the paper also investigates the social network of Chin diaspora in Thailand in light of the concept of Weber (2014) by researching on the formal organization of the community, how they maintain their network among each

other and their transnational social network. It was also evident that churches play a focal point where their social network takes place in Thailand. As such, it was found out that Chin diaspora in Thailand have good relationship with non-Chin people in Thailand, in addition to the good establishment of strong and weak ties of social network among individuals, within and among the tribal groups of Chin people. Lastly, Chin diaspora in Thailand is found out to be inactive in terms of the politics of their home community in Myanmar and their political contribution to Myanmar is little – close to zero. However, given their transnational social network and due to the economic hardship of the home country, it was found out that the diaspora contributes economically by remitting incomes, sharing the skills and knowledges to their community in home country.

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DIASPORA IN DISASTER AND THE NEPALESE STATE: A CASE STUDY OF NEPALI DIASPORA IN DISASTER RECOVERY, NEPAL EARTHQUAKE 2015

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Abstract

The purpose of the research study is to identify the sub-types of Nepali diaspora by examining Diaspora's disaster supports in various phases and to explore their engagement during the Nepal's 2015 Earthquake towards long-term opportunities for re-development in Nepal. As Nepal's socio-economic condition and structure is largely based by migration, the exploration is important. The goal is therefore, to present the diaspora group as heterogeneous entity with differential skill sets, capacity and institutional affiliations coming together through allegiance of transnational networks, collective identities and various other homeland orientations to support the way affected communities gained access to resources and impacted on (reducing) vulnerabilities in the aftermath of Earthquake. The documentation and qualitative in-depth interviews with informants from Diaspora groups, government officials and local actors/volunteers provided an informed understanding of how 3 different bodies coordinated (or can) in delivering the supports while quantitative-analysis of questionnaire with Diaspora group provided an overall understanding of their perspective on engagement. The research found out diaspora of various types and classified them into three typologies (i)'Transnational Associations'- Non-Residential Nepalese organization (NRN), (ii) Diaspora-based NGOs, and (iii) Individual professionals identifying as Diaspora under research's umbrella definition. The main factors that the thesis research identified are remittances and Diaspora philanthropy (donations and supports) that have direct impact on emergency relief and response; the crucial phase in Disaster Risk Reduction, while their engagement in long-term recovery not only reduced immediate social vulnerabilities in coping in the aftermath of natural hazard like earthquake's devastations but innovative engagement such as in entrepreneurship and involvement in development projects concerning long-term reconstruction had two-fold impacts, supplemented future disaster risk preparedness as well as strengthened the diaspora's engagement in re-development

Keywords: *Nepali Diaspora, Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development, Homeland Orientations, Diaspora and Disaster Risk Reduction, Nepal Earthquake*

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Introduction

The novelty of mentioning and involving Diaspora in development nexus and currently with disaster recovery and humanitarian assistance is an increasingly springing topic but at the same time not as well-defined field of diaspora studies within academicians, researchers, international organizations and governments of origin and destination countries. In the event of increasing amount of humanitarian crisis, inflicted both by nature and man-made, humanitarian organizations have been in more than immense pressure while struggling to tend to ongoing demand for assistance which are also exacerbated by other complex international and domestic polity. However, as the humanitarian actors continue to proliferate in variety and in their own uniqueness, it is challenging and at the same time, important for humanitarian communities, governments and academia to reach out to identify and tap these unique contributions, these actors can provide.

Therefore, as diasporas are growing, and becoming more engaged in their countries of origin from engagement of Haitians in the USA during Haiti earthquake in 2010 (Esnard and Sapard, 2011), Filipino diaspora for typhoon Haiyan or the overwhelming diaspora response and support during Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOM, 2007), with improved communications, technology and mobility; to engage diaspora in humanitarian action means to involve a multitude of stakeholders with their methods of engagement in disaster recovery ranging from individual interventions to collective efforts (IOM,2015) . These efforts have substantially impacted on the realm of “disasterology”- which deals with the preconditions and consequences of disaster ⁹⁹, and around literature surrounding the deeper understanding of disasters as ‘social’ consequences analyzed also as national catastrophes¹⁰⁰ (Niehaus and Tagsold, 2011). Diaspora studies have found, often separately, the vital role of diaspora support as positive effects of remittances have been appraised to function in people’s day-to-day livelihood and comprehend the tangible and intangible mechanism of diaspora’s role in the face of natural hazards. As discussed, while some disasters are natural hazards others are exacerbated by external social vulnerabilities and lack of mainstream ‘development’ in a society or country (Wisner, 2004), case in point, Nepal. It is although true that nation-states form the most efficient institutions to react to disasters however; Nepal was weakly prepared to meet the natural catastrophes like earthquake 2015 despite ranking amongst the twenty most disaster-prone countries while positioning 11th in the most earthquake prone country in the world ¹⁰¹. Despite experts estimating the probability of massive earthquake in any given time, the government and inhabitants had very limited knowledge and resources to react and cope when the disaster struck as the situation was aggravated by lack of resilient Disaster Management policies and practicable

⁹⁹ Especially Oliver-Smith (1986, 1999, 2004) has been a leading researcher of disaster in social anthropology while others like Alexander (1997) have also made important contributions to the research of disasters as social-natural catastrophes.

¹⁰⁰ For example Alexander (1997: 25) claims: “In a sense, a disaster is symptomatic of the condition of a society’s total adaptational strategy within its social, economic, modified, and build environments.” He thus supposes that disasters are only symptoms for the condition of the very society hit by them.

¹⁰¹ In part, this is because Nepal is in a seismically active zone with a high probability for a massive earthquake. Globally, Nepal ranks 4th and 11th in terms of its relative vulnerability to climate change and earthquakes, respectively. Out of 21 cities around the world that lie in similar seismic hazard zones, Kathmandu city is at the highest risk in terms of impact on people. (NDR 2017)

<http://drportal.gov.np/uploads/document/1144.pdf>

actions. In this context, non-state actors and private initiatives, excluding international humanitarian organizations and specifically diaspora group have assisted in overcoming these vulnerabilities largely while complementing the mitigation process. These have been, however more or less neglected to short-term viability and the role of diaspora communities in disaster recovery are very less explored or coordinated with in lieu with engagement strategies and policies with governments of origin countries as well as other humanitarian actors in the migration and development theoretical framework.

The Nepalese diaspora has always been an important provider of humanitarian and development assistance during disaster relief and recovery whether through formal channels or informal aids. Nepalese Diaspora across the world mobilized to provide support to their homeland at the time of earthquake crises and post-disaster to resettle and rehabilitate. Based on secondary data, the aid that flowed in the country through official diaspora-based organization 'Non- Residential Nepalese Association' Global (NRNA) is estimated that between NPR 267 million (US\$2.69-3 million) within 2 months that disaster struck. According to NRNA-ICC, the main diaspora organization that acts as umbrella for smaller diaspora communities and Nepalese abroad all over the world, the immediate relief effort reached 10 targeted and severely affected districts and 17,000 families or 68,000 individuals (NRNA, 2015- Info graphic available in Table 4 in Chapter 4). Skilled diaspora members returned home to provide medical and other support and the local media mobilized to support these efforts. Although the full scale of the diaspora contribution is unknown, it is likely that Diasporas made a substantial contribution. While private remittances are a much larger share (estimates range between Rs.665 billion (US \$6.65 billion) in fiscal year 2015, the amount of money being sent to support community relief and development is significant; indeed, in some places it is/ was the only assistance available.

Hence, the thesis discusses the role that diaspora plays in the aftermath of disaster, including concerning the development of their home countries. It will also briefly explore the lack of opportunities at home and better prospects of life abroad that have pushed many Nepalese out of the country and try to link with why despite leaving the country out of hopelessness and better opportunities they still connect and want to *give back* when they can. And although the research focuses on the activities of the diaspora support, this research *actually* expounds the role of Nepali diaspora communities in disaster risk reduction by taking the case study of Nepal Earthquake in 2015 to present the capacity of this group as transnational non-state actors, consisting forms of social capital links that are crucial in DRR and long- term rebuilding process, and potentially bolstering re-development in Nepal.


The main investigation focused according to data collected on background of diaspora group, their demographics and classification of typologies, engagement among the different actors and stakeholders, policy practices, narratives with point of reference towards their feelings, attitudes and reasons for supporting during disaster and investigating through asking major hypothetical questions and examples and opposing ideas about the potential for diaspora group in re-development. Using this analysis helped in these data collected by reducing and simplifying them, while at the same time was helpful in producing results that could be used as measures using quantitative techniques.

In addition, content analysis gave the ability to author to structure the qualitative data collected in a way that fulfilled the accomplishment of research

objectives. It involved extensive qualitative interviews through non-probability sampling method as the research attempted to generalize from the interviews some patterns that were systematically labeled within the texts.

Overview

The paper presents discreet framework by interlinking three different concepts of - Diaspora role (migration), Disaster Risk Reduction (natural disasters) and state actors mobilization (development) together, which otherwise have been traditionally studied and tended in a compartmentalized manner, often not recognizing these interlinkages underlying the discussion and existing literature on these issues.



The research paper has highlighted concepts of motivations and mechanism of Diaspora engagement in varying degrees through assessment of Besneir's (2011) framework of 'orientation to homeland'- be it 'imagined' or 'real'- and how movements of transnational nature have created additional complexities as 'diasporic dispersal' and to understand why Diaspora engage, how they engage and why government (should or) do engage. While diasporas' 'orientation' to homeland can manifest lot of relevancies but in this study is evaluated in terms of support that are embedded materially ("a value") and ethically ("values"), and in general senses: in economic, cultural and emotional/ national sentient

(Besnier, 2011:19)- be it classic remittances or substantial money sent to people at home countries, active humanitarian roles they play during conflict and disaster, preservation of collective identities or allegiance to networks to assist and support the Diaspora situations and or mobility of new migrants in host countries (McElhinny et al.,2009).

The concept is then interlinked with the concepts of “Deterritorialized Organizational Structures” through theoretical approaches of ‘Transnationalism, and Transnational Networks of Relationships’ (Cohen, 2006, Gamlen 2006) which explain that Diaspora are no longer cemented by migration or by exclusion from territorial claim and have extended beyond geographical nation-states of territorialized institutional structures, thus allowing government from origin countries in their economic, social and political engagements. This has blurred the extreme dichotomies of ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ countries and is rather characterized by circulation and simultaneous commitment, accessibility and mobility with combined dual loyalties to two or more societies (Vertovec 2009, De Haas 2008). The framework also encompasses Diaspora-related development programmes categorizing Diaspora mechanisms, looking into not just remittances but also community development, Diaspora business linkages, Diaspora investment instruments and knowledge transfers including optimization of brain gain, return migration, financial instruments, entrepreneurial investments, hometown associations, immigration and trade and professional Diaspora networks (Johnson and Sedaca, 2004, Lowell and Georva 2004, Newland 2004) . While this is explained by the availability of Diaspora-based social networks and capitals as the thesis uses Coleman’s (1990) interpretation of social capital by its function and how the resources can be used by the actors to realize their interests as a consequence of reciprocity to expectations and group enforcement of norms.

This interlinkage of these concepts in the thesis explores ‘*why*’ diaspora engage and ‘*How*’ they can do so or have done so, case in point, of their roles in disaster support in Nepal Earthquake. And because the engagement is directly related to Diaspora in Disaster Recovery and their implications in bolstering re-development, the research overviews the social causations of Disaster, and its phases through Wisner’s (2004) concept of disaster not as an aberration, but as a signal failure of mainstream ‘development’. Social vulnerability frames disasters and their impacts within broader social contexts and processes (Tierney 2006; Wisner et al. 2004). Nepal Earthquake demonstrated the reality of the pre-existing social vulnerability of Nepal. There was not one single dimension of vulnerability that led to the social catastrophe of the earthquake; but rather the interaction of multiple dimensions—poverty, geographical difficulty, family structure, poor housing, lack of standard housing codes, migrant activities—that ultimately created the differential abilities of residents to prepare for, respond to, and recover from Nepal Earthquake 2015. This will partially assess the linkage of disaster and development whereby disaster is taken as way of creating development opportunities along with the need for mitigation as the research followed up and investigated disaster support that came through various Diasporas across different DRR phases.

Hence, in overall the conceptual framework examines what determine diasporas’ incentives to contribute to development in their countries of origin by assessing their mechanism of Diaspora engagement during disaster through conceptualizations of transnationalism and their linking forms of networks.

NEPALI DIASPORA HOMELAND ORIENTATION

1. Diaspora Background and Organizational Structure

If there is one aspect of Nepal's socio-economic condition that touches the life of just about every Nepali family today, it is migration. While some argue that it is a deliberate abdication by the political leadership of its primary responsibility of protecting its citizens citing reasons such as widespread poverty and lack of employment opportunities at home that push people even to most risky jobs abroad while some leave for better prospects of life abroad, human beings have historically been Nepal's Number One export. Today, about 6 million Nepalis, or about 22 per cent of the country's 27.8 million people, live and work outside its borders, according to Krishna Prasad Dhakal, Nepal's deputy ambassador to India. Some 3 million are in India. Another 2.1 million are in the Persian Gulf area and Malaysia (Centre for South Asian Studies, 2015). It is only after 2003, along the lines of its Indian Neighbor's initiation of the Non-Resident Indian Association, the Non-Residential Nepali Association¹⁰² (NRNA) have given a federation term for "Nepalese Diaspora" (or Nepali Diaspora). The NRNA have aspired to become the showcase for Nepalese expatriates as a way of ensuring them institutional existence and power (Brusle, 2012) as often the association uses the term 'diaspora' in an uncompromising way, as also referred to themselves as "diaspora in the making".

Historically, Nepali Diaspora can be traced (made) up of as result of when subsistence farmers fled indebtedness during the last two centuries to settle in Assam, Darjeeling and Bhutan, and young Nepali men started being recruited into [British Gurkha](#) regiments even before the Anglo-Nepal War ended in 1816, a process that continues to this day. The decade-long Maoist insurgency despite ending in 2006 haven't recovered country's infrastructure and economy pushing both rural and young people to go to foreign countries as migrant workers while with no incentives to return, most look forward to staying abroad when possible.

2. Mapping the Nepalese Diaspora

Table 3 shows the numbers of tentative Nepali Diaspora population (with significant population) all over the world. Following with, the chapter describes the basis for categories of diaspora support and the countries/ regions selected for the research purpose.

Table 3: Nepali Diaspora and Numbers

India	1,0925,00(2008)
Malaysia	700,000(2011)

¹⁰² **Non-Resident Nepali Association (NRNA)** was established with the purpose of uniting and binding the Nepali Diaspora under one umbrella on 11 October, 2003. In the course of completing 12 years of its existence NRNA has developed into a non-governmental global organization and a network of Nepali origin by establishing National Coordination Council (NCC) in 73 countries to represent its interests, concerns and commitments.(NRNA, 2012). <https://www.nrna.org/about-us>

<u>Burma</u>	700,000(2010)
<u>Qatar</u>	400,000(2010)
<u>United Arab Emirates</u>	325,000(2010)
<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	315,000(2010)
<u>United Kingdom</u>	131,000(2009) ^l
<u>Australia</u>	124,636(2011)
<u>Japan</u>	80,038(2017)
<u>United States</u>	59,490(2010) ^l
<u>South Korea</u>	50,908(2009)
<u>Canada</u>	30,780(2006)
<u>Thailand</u>	20,000(2010)

Source: Government of Nepal Diaspora Portals, and Various Organizations, Accessed on 24th Sep, 2017

Within the diaspora overview of nine different categories of supporters according to UNDP, who contribute to relief, and development; the research has analyzed 3 categories on the basis of the roles they played during the Earthquake relief and recovery as following:

1. ‘Transnational associations’ – which are not based in one country in the diaspora but draw support from several different countries to mobilize donations of funds, in-kind goods, and technical support. The research takes account of works of Non- Residential Nepalese Association (NRNA) ICC Global- with its associations in 78 countries and is a representation to umbrella all the NRN associations in various countries for Nepali diaspora all over the world and have official recognition with Nepalese government at home.
2. Local NGOs based in the diaspora - Local NGOs provide assistance to partner NGOs or social service providers in the country of origin. Some local NGOs are registered in the country that their members currently reside in (and therefore may be eligible for grant support or tax relief), but many others operate more informally, collecting resources to send to their areas of origin on an ad hoc or as needed basis (rather than providing monthly or other regular support). Most of the Nepali Diaspora groupings can be grouped into 5 different on the basis of their constituencies: Collective organizations, ethnic organizations, Hometown Associations, political organizations, professional organizations and social networks.

While, as Clan-based or hometown associations – many of which are tied to particular areas, and often to NGOs working in those areas, that their members originate from. Most collective support to relief and development is given to particular clan areas, although this is beginning to change.

3. Individual Diaspora Entities: This category involves professional skilled migrant networks of individuals or groups including Business and Philanthropic organizations opened by Nepali diaspora or any individual identifying themselves as part of Nepali diaspora without any association or connection to any Diaspora-based organization.

Natural disaster degenerated into human disaster

Nepal's geographical difficulty creates great physical hurdles for upgrading transportation, infrastructure and utilities throughout the country. Furthermore, its terrain makes it extremely difficult to connect the remote rural regions – some of which are not served by any kind of land transportation systems – during regular times, not to mention during post-disaster states of emergency. The 7.8 magnitude earthquake, which struck Nepal on April 25, 2015, is a prime example of how challenging it is to provide a reliable disaster needs assessment and implement an effective relief and emergency response in a low-income country such as Nepal. On the unsafe conditions of vulnerability and hazard gradient, Nepal ranks 4th and 11th in terms of its relative vulnerability to climate change and earthquakes, respectively. Kathmandu, its capital city out of 21 cities around the world that lie in similar seismic hazard zones, is at the highest risk in terms of impact on people. (NDR 2017) In that comparison, the geographical fragility, housing quality and coping mechanism is extensively exacerbated by its fragile economy with Nepal's average GDP per capita income of only US \$728.8 (WB, 2017), while 25.16 percent of people still live under poverty line as the increasing income distribution within the country have only fairly improved with large inequalities and disparities in the availability of infrastructure and facilities between rural and urban areas leading to uneven rapid urbanization creating imbalance among development regions and ecological regions making management of population growth very difficult for the concerned authorities with limited resources (MoUD,2015).

Diaspora Support during 3 different Disaster Risk Reduction Phase

DISASTER PHASES	Preparedness	Emergency Response	Recovery
Transnational Associations (NRNA Global)	✓	✓	✓✓
Local NGOs/ Community-clan based network organizations	✓✓	✓	✓
Individual, Professional and High- Skilled Diaspora Groups	✓✓	✓	✓

Following Table provides a comparative advantage box of where various typologies of diaspora based on the data collected have had engagement during the disaster and where their stouter points are. As the disaster support responses have been varied employing a mix of approaches from traditional to modern moving back and forth. While transnational associations like NRNA Global engaged through mutual aid agreements drawing up agreements with government and local state actors to provide resources post-earthquake in recovery and reconstruction phases after assessing the total damages, affected sites, demographics and resource needed as well as forming a formal committee for Earthquake support to manage the funds that came in to the associations than the initial two phases, local NGO-based diaspora organisations were more proactive during the emergency response as humanitarian relief provides aiding directly and in most cases mobilizing resources or through local actors to relieve pain and suffering as well as various relief assistance – food, medication, tents. They were also active in networking within their own transnational linkages; contacting organizations they were associated or relying authentic information and raising awareness to non-Nepali groups of people about the earthquake that assisted in various fund-raisers and charity events. Their orientation to hometowns' associations and with local people from affected villages was advantageous to effectively disperse specific aid that fulfilled specific needs where acutely needed in the aftermath of an emergency.

On the context, similarly, while the traditional approach where individual diaspora sending remittance- cash to victims had been imperative, they were also more preemptive in the modern methods of disaster response, making use of new technologies and tool in the disaster response such as social media and social networking playing important role in emergency response communications. The use of twitter, and the use of social networking system such as Facebook were extensively used in the emergency response. The findings discovered that this diaspora typology used various blogs, online campaigns and charity event information dissemination to rapidly publicize the need for assistance grants, while used map-based mash ups (combining data webpages) to display relevant local information that they knew or within the diaspora network communities knew. They also played very crucial role in encouraging and sharing of resource information among corporations that most likely would be involved in recovery work as some of them themselves led the project or were key informants or employed for specialized skills and home-ground adaptation. They were also actively participating through volunteerism and rescuers.

However, it is to prominently understand that most of the times, the same diaspora members within the typologies can fulfill and are actually playing 3 different roles in 3 of the typologies independently or within the framework.

This provides us with overall understanding and knowledge on how diaspora typologies can play their support roles so the success factors and challenges can be identified, leading to empirical observation so to maximize diaspora's contributions to disaster management and have further approach towards infrastructure and project identification efforts.

Diaspora Support in long-term engagement in Diaspora

	Recovery	Reconstruction	Development- Projects
Transnational Associations (NRNA Global)	✓	✓✓	✓✓
Local NGOs/ Community-clan based network organizations	✓	✓	✓✓
Individual, Professional and High- Skilled Diaspora Groups	✓✓	✓	✓

Following table shows how the diaspora's support is influential and impactful in various phases and their implications for development projects according to their typologies and roles. While Table 3 highlighted that transnational associations such as NRNA Global were more engaged in recovery phase; given their massive structural formation and membership provisions as well as institutionalized official relation with government of Nepal provided them the upper hand to engage in reconstruction of severely damaged physical structures while they rebuilt houses in massive project taking account of future disaster risks. Because they had many resources and fundraising through which they actively were advantageous to have role in structural mitigation such as construction projects, which reduced economic and social impacts as they capacitated themselves through the help of professional networks of diaspora to implement effective mitigation programmes incorporating risk reduction measures in investment projects. The local network-based diaspora organization were more focused on the emergency response as discussed earlier in chapter 4 however, their role in recovery (and rehabilitation) through smaller development projects has been substantial too. This diaspora group supported disadvantaged individuals and communities as well as those severely limited to continue their livelihoods further after the earthquake due to physical and mental challenges post Nepal post-earthquake. This shows their contribution towards human capital development and their assistance at small but basic part of disasters' like earthquake's consequences that are also sometimes in countries like Nepal neglected.

While the role of individual based diaspora showed that they can be impactful in response phase to access opportunities to relief through cash sent by diaspora members, this group also in micro-level of remittance-contributed largely for rebuilding houses (although unequally distributed given families or households without diaspora member abroad do not receive the same support). In addition, this group contributed to maximum amount of transnational networking whether it was earthquake related information communications or assisting, leading and organizing major fundraisers, rescue and response teams as well as contributed their professional skills towards bigger infrastructure development projects.

Conclusion

This research study identified Nepali diaspora as vital provider of humanitarian assistance during Nepal's Earthquake 2015 and assessed their engagement in disaster support towards potentiality for long-term development in Nepal. The research tried to answer mechanism of diaspora's engagement during the earthquake and why they engage at such time so vigorously by classifying at first their typologies and looking through lens of Besneir's (2011) concept of Diaspora's orientation towards homeland. The classification of their typologies by, (a) Introducing the background and how Nepali diaspora were formed and (b) Mapping the Nepalese Diaspora according to their numbers and destination countries, clarified how Nepal's socio-economic condition and structure is largely touched and based by migration. The categorization of diaspora into 3 typologies: (i) Transnational Associations, (ii) Local NGOs/ Hometown Associations, and (iii) Individual Diaspora Entities, established (in Chapter 3) that diaspora groups are not homogenous in terms of structure, skill sets, capacity or political or institutional affiliation to host and home country, even though, all the while demonstrating themselves as crucial constituent of Nepal.

The classification is also important because recognizing the diaspora groups as heterogeneous means to understand that Diasporas come at development very differently from other actors, such as multilateral international humanitarian actors or bilateral agencies, NGOs, etc., as well as keeping in mind vis-à-vis their differential approaches to "development" initiatives, whether, familial obligations, hometown ties, self-interest, and or humanitarian public-spirited concerns. These are explained through their alignment to homeland by their disaster support in various phases and how their preservation of collective identities or allegiance to networks assisted and supported the Diaspora supports and resource mobilization. This, the research study identifies (in chapter 4) that by having an overall understanding and knowledge on how diaspora typologies can play their support roles is crucial to ascertain various outstanding and success factors as well as challenges can be identified. However, in the diaspora engagement and disaster-relief and development continuum that the research examined for long-term engagement opportunities for re-development indicated that the diaspora engagement is confined at the grassroots level and are therefore philanthropic and not very tenable in nature with bottom-up approach without any sustainable collaboration from the state. The engagements also currently characterize arbitrary inefficiencies, incertitude in involved parties, and lack of imperatives and mutual obligations to pursue diaspora- engaging environment between home country and emigrants (as discussed in chapter 5, 'The Engagement Among the State, Diaspora and Local Communities on the Disaster Support').

The examination of Nepali diaspora's support in disaster in this research study therefore, explored the extent and ways in which people gained access to resources as result of diaspora engagement and how that impacted on (reducing) vulnerability as central to understanding of disaster and their prevention or mitigation. Diaspora as a transnationally operating migrant communities and often as 'integrated' migrants of 'developed' destination countries as revealed in findings of the study possessed the attitudes, know-hows, rights and financial capacity for not just supporting during the disaster but various other pecuniary set ups; investments, capitals, entrepreneurships, public participation in critical

debates while emerging as independent and potentially influential factors of development in Nepal.

Thus, as the research thesis hypothesized that Nepali diaspora crucially supported to cope with Nepal's 2015 Earthquake basing the assumptions that their role had been undermined in terms of engaging them in long-term development, this research attempts to loosely evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Nepali Diaspora group in disaster recovery and long-term engagement potential towards re-development by drawing informed conclusions and identifying promising practices that merit further inquiry. The thesis study concludes with scope for various other studies such as; can external pressure like diaspora supports/activism create space for local mobilization and psychological empowerment, or will it necessarily remain paternalistic, outsider and short-term in nature? To put it simpler, how can creative combinations of external pressure, local mobilization and state engagement (as proposed in the road map in chapter 5) be used in order to secure grievance resolution like disaster such as Nepal's 2015 Earthquake?

Findings and Discussion

(i) Orientation to Homeland as significant factor

The various typologies and their strong native land-inclination reasons to support highlight the dynamic relationship of Nepali diaspora and Nepal, as Besneir had framed for diaspora: having a tightly knit community manifesting supports that are embedded materially ('a value') and ethically ('values') as seen that diaspora supports that came during earthquake were both cash (financial/economic) and compassion (cultural, emotional/national sentient). As the findings demonstrated how some of the strong reasons for diaspora to support/ contribute during Earthquake disaster was influenced mainly with 70 percent respondents claiming because of their 'Love for the Homeland', 'Responsibility towards Homeland' and 'Helping Family members and friends' in relation to 30 percent who sided to basic humanitarian principles and compassion

The stimulating point that the research study found is the fact that these typologies and orientation to homeland became both cause and effects of the effectiveness of the support during disaster. As the typologies demonstrated properties of group through communal practices, physical appearances and connotations, and symbols, because of that it resulted in their support functions and how the resources were used by the diaspora actors to realize their interests as a consequence of what Coleman (2009) had argued, reciprocity to expectations and group enforcement of norms. To put it simple, their orientation to homeland was the cause of forming a categorical typology of Nepali Diaspora groups depending upon their diasporic characteristics and allegiances while because of this typology formation an understanding of inclination to homeland (in the form of humanitarian crisis) was strengthened and realized in not just emergency relief phase but during recovery and reconstruction phases. This allows an understanding of the way Nepali diaspora perceive their roles and responsibility whether during disaster supports or relating to development issues for their homeland which positively wasn't limited to just humanitarian motivations.

(ii) Diaspora's Engagement as varied in various DRR Phases

The research study furthered to investigate Nepal's earthquake as disaster and followed the Diasporas' support in different DRR phases. Nepal Earthquake demonstrated the reality of the pre-existing social vulnerability of Nepal. There was not one single dimension of vulnerability that led to the social catastrophe of the earthquake; but rather the interaction of multiple dimensions—poverty, geographical difficulty, family structure, poor housing, lack of standard housing codes, migrant activities—that ultimately created the differential abilities of residents to prepare for, respond to, and recover from Nepal Earthquake 2015. In this context, some of the research study's findings showed that while no matter what category of typologies their engagements were, diaspora supports and their engagements that came in various forms had various impacts too. The support that came in the form of remittance flows were household inclined as while it directly impacted and assisted on the livelihood and coping mechanism of affected families, it was not and necessarily did not distribute to those in need as remittances reached only the poor or middle-class families, but not the least poor, with these families often not having anyone overseas. This led to marginalization of fractional support of diaspora to only majority few while the allocation was unlikely to follow the geo-political or need-based objectives of humanitarian assistance of impartiality and humanity. Some of the diaspora supports that came and were distributed by local actors had been life-saving and perhaps the only support that came as relief in geographically-challenged affected communities, mostly as result of diaspora members having home-town association or accurate understanding of the remote affected communities.

Nepali Diaspora based on their typologies became an ambassador and facilitator of awareness, fund-raising, donations and support collecting entities whether collectively within their networks or including outside networks of their social capital (As seen from the study, engagement of nursing and doctor's associations, students, business houses, professional diaspora and their work place networks, etc) . The supports that came therefore involved multitudes of actions and were double-fold due to Nepali diaspora's linking forms of social capital and transnational networks of relationships than otherwise if they were not engaged.

(iii) Transnational Networks of relationships crucial for multifold engagement

The transnational activities of Nepali Diasporas were widespread. Today, because Diasporas are no longer cemented by migration or by exclusion beyond geographical nation-states as the flows of people, finance and knowledge have eased and been made simpler, faster and cheaper. The supports that came demonstrated Cohen's (1999) concept about how there an ascendance of new approach to migration has been that accented the ability of Nepali Diasporas to maintain these attachments to people of affected communities and general Nepali society, before and after the earthquake. The findings from the research study demonstrated ample cases where disaster support response have been varied and have employed a mix of approaches from typologies: NRNA Global as transnational association engaged through mutual aid agreements with government and local state which was more publicized, institutionalized and organized and came mostly in the recovery and reconstruction phase where supports involved as large as building well-structured earthquake proof houses for many villages that were severely affected, while NGO-based diaspora

organizations were more proactive during the emergency response as humanitarian relief- providers and rescuers and Individual Diaspora groups more towards mobilizing, networking and fulfilling specific forms of supports that were all crucial for affected communities to recuperate from the earthquake (Refer to table 3). Hence, the significant findings of the research study are that Diaspora can be influential in the model of 'disaster pressure and release' where Wisner (2011) as used in the conceptual framework argued that the social, political and economic environment is as much a cause of disasters as the natural environment.

The research study then takes an approach from the findings that most supports are confined at the grassroots level and are therefore philanthropic and not very tenable in nature with bottom-up approach without any sustainable collaboration from the state. The engagements also currently characterize arbitrary inefficiencies, incertitude in involved parties, and lack of imperatives and mutual obligations to pursue diaspora- engaging environment between home country and emigrants. The study identified the need for further understanding of this mechanism to better inform policies geared toward disaster risk reduction suggesting/assessing that and appraising the function of diaspora role in people's day-to-day livelihood and comprehending the tangible and more intangible reasons for this mechanism to perform in the face of natural hazards. The question of scale and grassroots-oriented might be put in another way: what is needed in all these matters is to distinguish- to get things sorted out. Out of these findings, the discussion that can be put forth is that for every activity there is a certain appropriate scale, and the more active and intimate the activity, the smaller the number of people that can take part, the greater is the number of such relationship arrangements that can be established and put in effect in future disaster.

Although the thesis study implies that the impacts depend on what it is trying to be done as it was evidenced that no matter what typologies of the diaspora's were, their engagements through transnational networking, activism and the pertinent notion of dual loyalties, homeland orientation and easy mobility are similar (and specified); their engagement can have various impacts. However, the question of scale is extremely crucial today, in political, social and economic affairs just as in almost everything else. So, in that sense, an immediate question that arises is: What scale is appropriate? Can policies assist in the appropriation of this scale, growth and efficiency of diaspora's networking for disaster management?

(iv) Linkages between Diaspora, disaster and Development

The research study assessed the linkage of Nepali diaspora in the disaster and development realm whereby disaster is taken as way of creating development opportunities along with the need for mitigation as the research followed up and investigated disaster support that came through various Diasporas across different DRR phases. The earthquake and Nepal's relief and recovery also brought to light other ingrained issues in terms of the way social and economic development have- and have not- extended in the country. While Nepal is amongst the twenty most disaster- prone countries and ranks 11th in the most earthquake prone country in the world; Nepal Earthquake as a natural disaster rather turned out to be more of a degeneration into human disaster exacerbated by her prevailing inability to overcome the physical hurdles resulting in limited

infrastructures, utilities and transport connections in the remote rural regions- during regular times, and catastrophically during post-disaster states of emergency and response. The phenomenon showcased that extreme natural events as such is the result of significant mainstream development as well as in understanding how vulnerability progresses in 'unsafe conditions' and are determined by people's livelihood and access (or lack of) to social protection and household resilience (Wisner et al., 2004). However, it has also showed the renewed calls for a different kind of development in the country, towards a resilient Nepal, one that involves multitude of stakeholders, actors and opportunities, in an collective efforts. As discussed earlier in Chapters, Nepal experienced the classic 'counter- cyclical' remittance flows- meaning they increased as emergency needs increased during 2015 in the aftermath of earthquake but in the fiscal year 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 plummeted (although external polity and dampened oil prices in Gulf are also the causes) (NRB, 2017). Amongst the resilient discourse, simply put- 'the ability of a system to absorb shock and maintain its structure and functions with a minimum loss and resume pre-event functionality in relatively short time' - the role of diaspora's (in transnational ability) other than migration and remittances is imperative. While remittances from diaspora group have been pivotal in fulfilling the objectives of social protection to address coping in disaster mitigating household vulnerabilities and strengthening human capital as discussed earlier in the chapters, there is no noticeable nuanced approach despite a compelling case of various opportunities and potential by the diaspora group that bolster development within the country.

Hence, the main factors that the thesis research identified are remittances and Diaspora philanthropy (donations and supports) that have direct impact on emergency relief and response; the crucial phase in Disaster Risk Reduction, while their engagement in long-term recovery not only reduced immediate social vulnerabilities in coping in the aftermath of natural hazard like earthquake's devastations but innovative engagement such as in entrepreneurship and involvement in development projects concerning long-term reconstruction had two-fold impacts, supplemented future disaster risk preparedness as well as strengthened the diaspora's engagement in re-development .

RECOMMENDATION

As cycle of migration has led to a kind of policy inertia, where the short- run benefits of remittance income have disincentivized the adoption of long- term policy solutions to rectify the country's chronic lack of economic opportunities, this need for broadening the vision in the reconstruction efforts proactively encompassing the particular group with a comprehensive plan is calculatedly achievable. For instance, as the research examined the role of diaspora support and in different forms, harnessing this very support to go beyond the mere replacement of damaged and destroyed physical structures but various development and entrepreneurial ventures can have three-fold impacts. By building institutions that are conducive to more and better job creations – as economic, social and physical forms of infrastructures like roads, health facilities, training centers, and schools are leveraged in synergies to be designed, equipped and located in the context of reconstruction paving the way for developing job-rich sectors, such as tourism, agro-processing and hospitality. This means the massive reconstruction effort is used as an opportunity to create good jobs in the

construction sector and ancillary industries on a large scale and ensure that these are accessed locally too. This ensures a country like Nepal to have structural changes in the economy accompanied by a transformation in labor market, while Nepal's Emigrational remittance- dependent economy is minimized making the country more self-dependent and encouraging returns from the Nepali Diaspora within economic mobility freedom.

A Recommendation for state actors:

- 1. Leverage Flexibility in the use of recovery funds that come from Diaspora Groups**
Two Recommendations for government and Diaspora Transnational Associations:
- 2. Utilize Diaspora Bonds in infrastructure investment to promote local and national value chains**
- 3. Bridge gap between Diaspora investors and local Enterprises**
Recommendation for all:
- 4. Craft development strategies centered on effective coordination and investing in human and social capital**

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PUBLIC RELATION AND DISSEMINATION OF THE TRANSDISCIPLINARY PROJECT "KNOTS": CONCEPT

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Abstract

Project “KNOTS” (knowledge networks of transdisciplinary studies) is a three-year multilateral project that aims to develop innovative teaching methodologies on transdisciplinary comparative research circulating around three main topics (social equality, resources, migration). Moreover, it wants to foster multi-lateral and regional collaborations networks and consists of eight partner universities from Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Thailand and Vietnam. The project wants to strengthen their capacities to act as connected reference points for transdisciplinary research and to build systematic linkages of knowledge exchange between academic and non-academic actors and sectors. This is thought to be achieved with summer-schools, workshops and an exchange of staff as well as joint teaching and research activities – the outcome should be an innovative capacity for training and development of academic and professional staff within the participating institutions. This should synthesize new kinds of knowledge and practices. According to the partners involved, this kind of project is much needed because of a not yet fully sufficient developed methodology in the teaching of comparative transdisciplinary research. This is not understood as a top-down project but is based on the concept of mutual learning between the stakeholders. Part of this project is the dissemination, meaning the public-making of research outcomes and information. For an effective dissemination a plan and milestones as well as an effective internal communication scheme is needed. This paper is a concept for an upcoming research about the dissemination of “KNOTS” in theory and practice. It aims to outline the different approaches to what is commonly understood as “public” and will continue with a detailed analysis of the dissemination activities of “KNOTS”. Part of this will be qualitative interviews with people responsible for dissemination as well as an analysis of the disseminated content. Moreover, it aims to look at the concept of “public” or dissemination in the different partner countries as well as the description of challenges and problems when it comes to the dissemination of a quite big project like “KNOTS” is.

Keywords *Transdisciplinarity, public relations, public, dissemination*

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1. Interest of research and goal-setting

The research project “KNOTS” (full title: “Fostering multi-lateral knowledge networks of transdisciplinary studies to tackle global challenges) is a three-year scheduled research project financed by the European Union with nearly one million Euro (see European Commission, 2018). The goal is the establishment of regional and international networks of transdisciplinary research as well as the development of transdisciplinary teaching methods, which are supposed to come to action in the participating institutions of higher educations afterwards. The exchange of knowledge between academic and non-academic actors also poses an important aspect to the project. Therefore, the participating higher educations institutions (in the following “HEIs”) hold tutorials, field trips and so-called “summer schools” as well as conferences together. The project follows educational (construction of teaching methodologies), scientific (founding of multi-lateral and transdisciplinary networks) and strategic (strengthening of the internationalization of HEI) goals (see Call for Proposal EAC/A04/2015, p. 31-33).

Part of this project are external communication respectively public relations or “dissemination” activities, as is specified in the “Call for Proposal” (2015, p. 38). The external communication is meant to bring the results and activities of the project to a more or less broad public – it is also a way of showing the European Union, as the financing institution, on what matters the approved funding is spent on.

This work therefore deals with the whole dissemination- respectively PR-process of the “KNOTS”-project and tries to examine the activities through a qualitative research approach. There is at the given moment not a specific research question, as there will be an open approach practiced until a good amount of data is collected. This approach aims more to a general picture than a specific aspect. The examined activities involve reports, articles, events or postings on social media (to name a few) as well as the basis for those activities, the dissemination plan. Persons involved in the dissemination process will be questioned via interviews and from those interviews there is a possibility that they will open up new approaches or perspectives that may be relevant for the following research process. At this point it has to be noted that the field of interest concerns the communicators and their products and not, how these products affect the recipients (for example, it is not examined how recipients react to a Facebook-Post published by “KNOTS” or how a report is being adopted – the additional analysis of these aspects would indeed enhance the dimensions of analysis, but at the same time require a new range of theoretical and methodological thoughts, perspectives and instruments. A level of analysis could also be imposed on the dissemination plan in terms of the practical usage of the guidelines and specifications and if they are set in practice by the participating HEIs or the degree to which they are respected and considered by the partners.

The goal of this work is therefore a comprehensive and broad analysis of the dissemination- process of the project “KNOTS” based on Interviews of people who are responsible for it as well as a content analysis of all written outputs. The outcomes of this research could potentially be used by executive personnel of the project in terms of further dissemination activities or provide an overview and propose improvements as well as practice a critique approach towards the dissemination process. The conducted interviews could surface critical thoughts or dissatisfaction among people involved in the dissemination-process, that would otherwise maybe remain unheard.

One should not make the mistake as to read this concept as finally given, not only because of the intentionally chosen open approach there is a possibility that an intense editing of the theoretical approaches or the careful sighting of the data will lead to different approaches or perspectives that turn out to be more interesting and/or senseful. Parts of the quality control and monitoring of the project “KNOTS” are moreover conducted by students of the participating HEIs, who conduct research about the project embedded in seminars. This work is the result of such a seminar. The author is actively participating in a “summer school”, a field trip and a dissemination-workshop and can therefore not be categorized as independent respectively non-participating spectator. In terms of a research transparency, this should be cleared at this point.

2. Theoretical framework

Firstly, the theoretical framework will circle around the term “public” (german: “*Öffentlichkeit*”) and discuss it from different approaches and perspectives (for example Hepp et al. (2012) about a “European Public”). Knotted to this, approaches based on communication research, namely public-relations-sciences will be discussed and tied to the previous terms, also, to enable a connection of theories and approaches coming from different directions. Exemplarily Zerfaß (2010) delivers an overview of different approaches to the thematic complex of Public Relations, which will be shortly discussed in the theoretical examination. Other authors should also be used to provide an overview on the topic. According to Röttger (2009, p. 9) has the public-relations-research only been marginally explored by the german-tongued communication science and was discovered relatively lately. And: “The partly unsharp PR-term in today’s science and practice and the sometimes very different means of understanding about public relations mirror subject- related and systematic problems of dissociation and competency claims from various scientific disciplines [...] [translation by the author] (Röttger, 2009, p. 10). Thus business- management-approaches would for example understand public-relations as a marketing tool, communication science-approaches however on the one side in their societal role and on the other side as a communications function for organisations, which “central function [lies] in the legitimation of the organisation’s interest and the organisation’s acting against all [...] stakeholders” [translation by the author] (Röttger, 2009, p. 10). This is relevant for this work because (public) universities, similar to companies or other organisations, have to inform their stakeholders (which are, in case of universities, probably found in all societal, social and political fields) about their actions and practices. The project “KNOTS” for example has to show the European Union, which provides the financing of the project, via reports or other forms or information that the money is used correctly for the intended purpose. Also, Preusse et al. (2013, p. 121-122) emphasize that in the majority of the literature concerning PR-theories one will find a legitimization of an organisation as the major goal of any PR activities.

Zerfaß (2010, p. 47) notes, that attempts to establish a systematic PR-theory increased just in the 90s. There, two main approaches are visible: Firstly organisational-theory based ones that view public relations as a communicative function of organisations or enterprises and secondly societal-theory based ones that primarily examine the function of public relations in terms of the (re-)production of “modern” societies. This work will focus on the

organisational-theoretical approach that has been elaborated by James Grunig and other authors, which is linked to a study by them which runs since 1985. According to Zerfaß (2010, p. 62-63) this study is the “crystallisation of the Anglo-American PR-research” [translation by the author]. This study is composed of interdisciplinary literature studies and empirical research among different organisations and led to a “multi-level theory, that not only discusses the planning and controlling of specific PR-programmes but also the fundamental organisation and steering of PR-functions” [translation by the author] (Zerfaß, 2010, p. 63). Grunig argues among other factors, that organisations act in a complex array of relationships, whereas the different stakeholders have different interests concerning the organisation. Nonetheless should the societal-theoretical-based approaches also be part of the theoretical framework, although playing a smaller role as the one briefly discussed above. Moreover, the approach by Szyszka (2009, p. 135) appears to be useful from a current point of view – he describes a theoretical approach based on a system theoretical thought, where public relations are described as “the network of public relationships of an organisation towards its environment [...] [translation by the author]”, and the monitoring of the effects of the communication by the organization on the environment is needed to guarantee a successful continuity. Because of the fact that the present research intention goes hand in hand with an empirical examination of the PR- respectively dissemination- activities of project “KNOTS”, it probably makes sense to primarily discuss the approach of Grunig and use the described instruments as inspiration for the systematic gathering of the public-relations activities in terms of the methodological approach. Nonetheless this has to be done carefully, because according to Zerfaß (2010, p. 72) “Grunig et al. define their scientific-theoretical fundament of their conception inconsistently. For example, they lay on action-theory and system-theory thoughts at the same time, without noticing the therefore upcoming aporias” [translation by the author].

Furthermore, the theoretical discussion should be concerned with the relation between science and public, as is found for example in Kretschmer (2017) or Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons (2001). A good and useful Overview can also be found in Bonfadelli et al. (2017). In this anthology is e.g. a text by Luthje (2017), in which she examines the question about the internal scientific communication – this could be relevant for this work because the interviews should also concern the topic of internal processes in terms of dissemination activities among the “KNOTS” project. She describes the informal communication in the scientific activities as one with unwritten rules, that are rarely reflected upon: “This is a reason for the many problems when it comes to interdisciplinary cooperation” [translation by the author] (Luthje, 2017, p. 111). This is interesting because the people involved in the dissemination-process not only come from different scientific disciplines, but also from different geographic regions. Although the project understands itself as transdisciplinary, there is potential for conflict given.

What also should be mentioned is the so-called “Third-Mission-Strategy” imposed by the University of Vienna (see Universität Wien, 2018a), which has – according to the University – two main objectives: “The targeted use of scientific findings to cope with the broad variety of societal challenges” [translated by the author] and “the transfer of technology and innovation by cooperation with the economy” [translated by the author]. The second part is not really important for “KNOTS”, whereas the first one probably is. The University of Vienna divides this “Third-Mission-Strategy” into three categories: social and societal engagement,

knowledge transfer as well as transfer of technology and innovation (see Universität Wien, 2018b). The “KNOTS” project is placed in the first category, there is also a link titled “*Beschreibung*” (meaning “description”) which leads to a two-paged document, where the project is summarized. A direct link to the “KNOTS”- Homepage does not exist (see Universität Wien, 2018c).

Concerning the theoretical basics in terms of the used methodologies (which are detailed in chapter four) it should be noted that they are operating within the area of qualitative social sciences and consist of qualitative interviews and qualitative content analysis. Descriptions to these methods are found exemplarily at Reichertz (2016, p. 184ff), Dannecker & Vossemer (2014, p. 153ff), Lamnek (2010, p. 301ff) or Deutschmann (2014, p. 94ff).

3. Research Question

As already noted will the research question purposely be formulated as open, which guarantees, that there can be reacted appropriately if changes occur. This open approach should also make sure that a broad collection of data is summoned and that a restriction of approaches does not hinder the extensive collection of data. Therefore, the research question is per June 2018 the following:

How does the project “KNOTS” form its public relations respectively dissemination in theory and practice?

4. Methodology

To answer the research question, this work will use methods from qualitative social sciences, their “programme” summarizes Lamnek (2010, p. 19) as follows: “Openness, research as communication, a processual character of research and object, reflectivity of object and analysis, explication and flexibility” [translated by the author]. Flick (2017, p. 26) names as the most important characteristics “the adequacy of methods and theories, the consideration and analysis of different perspectives as well as the reflection of the researcher concerning the research as part of the findings” [translated by the author]. One reason for a qualitative approach was the currently relatively open research process, as the quality (in terms of explanatory and informative power) of the answers by the interview partners can only be guessed by now – this requires flexibility and openness of the author. Interview partners ought to be people who are actively present in the dissemination- respectively public relations-process of the “KNOTS” project and who shape these outcomes. Probably the best opportunity for the conduction of the interviews will be during the dissemination-workshop held in Chiang Mai from 15 to 16 July, as there will be nearly all people responsible for the dissemination from all partner universities present. Questions will for example be about their thoughts concerning the previous dissemination activities, what they believe is their role, if they reflect terms like “public” or if they can formulate any criticism. To achieve this, there will be four to five guiding questions as well as some sub-questions in case the interview needs to get pushed because the interview partner ran out of words quickly. At this point it is worth noting that the author is taking part at the workshop and it could therefore be possible that the event cannot be as wholly observed as it might be intended, compared to a non-participating observation. As the author takes a

role as participant, it is likely that he will have an influence on the process of the workshop; moreover, a research distance is not given as probably various social activities like lunch or going for a drink in the evening will likely be happening around the workshop.

In the theoretical part of the paper it is intended to discuss the basic character of qualitative research as well as connections and demarcations to quantitative methods. Useful overviews are exemplarily found in Lamnek (2010), Mayring (2016), Flick (2017) or Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr (2014).

One method will be the qualitative interview: Through this information is gathered authentic-undistorted, reproduceable and intersubjectively comprehensible, which can in the following be translate to text, which can again serve as basis for interpretative approaches. Not only because of that has the qualitative interview according to Lamnek (2010, p. 301) a methodologically and methodically high status. This will be part in the theoretic framework of the final paper which is also thought to discuss the various approaches (also concerning the data analysis) and the borderlines to quantitative interviews, as e.g. drafted in Lamnek (2010, p. 301). The most senseful approach is probably, as already described, to keep the interview open respectively half-open and use about four to five guiding questions (and hold some as back-up) – the interview should be started with a more general starting question that functions as an invitation to talk (see Lamnek, 2010, p. 310). Time is an important aspect here, as open interviews are generally more time-intense as standardized (see Lamnek, 2010, p. 307). This has to be kept in mind, as the timetable during the dissemination-workshop will most likely be tight. The same counts for the psychological and physical conditions of a potential interview partner, as sitting in a seminar room for a whole day may tire the average person out and this will result in a certain unwillingness for a 15-20-minute-interview. Though these thoughts remain as considerations and the best timing for an interview has to be found out at the site of the event. An issue might also be the language aspect (although the participants of the dissemination-workshop are supposed to speak good English), in the worst case a translator is needed for the interview.

Because of the fact that the dissemination-process of “KNOTS” is done mainly in the form of written text, a qualitative content analysis is also part of this research form. This is also a reason why there was a more open approach selected, because it is, as Lamnek (2010, p. 464) notes, “accessible for modifications based on empirical results” [translated by the author]. According to Mayring (2016, p. 114) the qualitative content analysis aims to “systematically analyse texts as it edits the material step-by-step and guided by systems of categories developed along theory” [translated by the author]. He distinguishes three forms of qualitative content analysis: The summary (creation of a short overview through abstraction and reduction of the raw material), the explication (small text-parts ought to be explained and interpreted with the help of additionally researched material) and the Structuring form (development of criteria and filtering) (see Mayring, 2016, p. 115). Lamnek (2010, p. 460) refers to several intersections between quantitative and qualitative content analysis and differentiates between two forms of qualitative content analysis: The first one would only differ from a quantitative approach by partly or completely not quantifying (besides that being essentially a quantitative analysis) and the second one understands itself within the interpretative social research as a strategy of data analysis without any predetermined criteria of analysis. He goes further into detail, but these will be

elaborately discussed in the final research paper, as this concept aims at providing an overview.

As already mentioned, the dissemination workshop should also be part of the examination. The author is, as previously portrayed, part of the research object/unit and takes the role as an actively participating observer (see Lamnek, 2010, p. 511-512). The observation will be unstructured (because of the yet unknown process and the limitation due to self-participation) and open (the other participants of the workshop will be aware of the research) (see Lamnek, 2010, p. 508). The author takes the role as, to speak with the categories imposed by Lamnek (2010, p. 525), as a “participant as observer” [translated by the author], which means that “observer as well as observed [...] are aware of the given field relationship” [translated by the author]. This classification is nonetheless probably a bit too unspecific, because a researcher should “at the same time be involved and distanced” (Lamnek, 2010, p. 527). This process of creating a distance is, however, hard to accomplish as the contribution of the author – at least in very minimalistic nuances – plays a role in a successful or unsuccessful outcome of the project. As a result, the distance-creation could possibly lead to a missing adequate engagement in the project, therefore this aspect remains critical, but should still be kept in the back of one’s head to constantly remind the researcher about his simultaneous role as researcher. Lamnek (2010, p. 530) notes: “This tension between dedicated, solidary participation and distanced-reflected observation probably lets itself not dissolve in one direction or the other” [translated by the author]. However, this missing distance can also have positive effects, as Flick (2017, p. 291) notes, that “it is not only discussed as a mistake of the observer, but also as an instrument, to reflect the self-process of becoming familiar [with a specific environment] and to gain insights in the examined field which would be inaccessible in case of a maintained distance.

5. Sampling and triangulation

Related to the so-called “theoretical sampling” the sampling size is not going to be pre-determined in this paper but will be elaborated during the research process (see Lamnek, 2010, p. 168). One reason for this decision is, that e.g. a serious prediction about how many people will agree to function as interview partners or what kinds of documents, reports etc. will be available for data analysis and if and to which factor those will rise in numbers cannot be made at this point. The decision about what material will be used will be based on, as Flick (2017, p. 159) describes, “the material, which in the light of the already used materials and the resultant findings is thought to bring the biggest information” [translated by the author]. Therefore, the approach will be open and loose.

The already described and selected theoretical and methodical approaches could probably be described as diverse due to their differences, which means, that a basic triangulation has happened. Triangulation means that a phenomenon can be approached more precisely and more broadly the more theories, interpretations, local and time settings, observation groups, methods or data sources are used – compared to a lesser heterogeneity of theory and methods (see Lamnek, 2010, p. 132 & Flick, 2017, p. 519). And: “Triangulation serves as a tool to compensate the weaknesses of one approach with the strength of another” [translated by the author] (Lamnek, 2010, p. 142).

6. Resources and timeline

Resources in the personnel area are limited to one person, therefore a suitable amount of time for the analysis has to be considered. From a personal point of view of the author, there should be enough time available in the winter semester 2018/19, because most of the lectures and seminars are already finished. The use of electronic analysis assistants is uncertain at this point. If they will find usage there has to be calculated with a (manageable) amount of acquisition costs.

The timeline is drafted as follows and will probably be changed at one point or another during the upcoming months:

Timeframe	Tasks
Until end of June 2018	Completion of the Concept
July 2018	Data acquisition in Thailand
October 2018	First sighting of the raw material and begin of the theoretical discussion
Mid-November 2018	Completion of theoretical discussion
Until end of November 2018	Completion of analysis methods resp. - instruments and start of data analysis
Until end of December 2018	Finalization of the data analysis
Until end of January 2019	Further sophisticated analysis and completion of the empirical part of paper
First week of January 2019	Completion of the paper

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ABSORBANCE OF PARTICIPATION IN PARTICIPATORY IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

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Abstract

Efficiency has been identified as the objective for irrigation management of countries all over the world. Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) has been introduced in Thailand under the irrigation management reform willing to achieve the efficiency of water allocation. The participation of farmers, non-government organizations, government, and private sector in irrigation management planning, designing, construction, making decision, operation and maintenance has been promoted as the main component of the participatory project. Looking through the participatory approach and power relation, the paper will explain the power mechanism within participatory project and its determination on different levels of participation of stakeholders. The in-depth interviews and focused group interview with farmers as water users, private sectors, government department and local administrative organizations have been conducted. The relevant documents have been reviewed. It is explored that different actors exercise their power through different mechanism which results in the domination of the decision-making process in the project. In the context of Kraseaw irrigation, knowledge, social status, and education have played an important role in creating the domination of power in decision-making process. The power flow in this irrigation management project has resulted in absorbance of less powerful participants.

Keyword: *participation, participatory approach, irrigation management, power relation*

Introduction

Efficiency has been identified as the ultimate goal for irrigation management of countries all over the world. Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) has been introduced in Thailand under the irrigation management reform willing to achieve the efficiency of water allocation. The participation of farmers, non-government organizations, government, and private sector in irrigation management planning, designing, construction, making decision, operation and maintenance has been promoted as the main components of the participatory project.

Many different agencies in development have adopted the concept of participation in their development programs, but with different perceptions, motivations and objectives. However, participation has been interpreted in multiple different

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meanings. The different interpretations of participation contribute to the differences in their implementation which results in the different responses, adjustment, outcomes and impacts. Similarly, in participatory irrigation management project, participatory approach has been proposed as the main factor that will enhance the success of irrigation management both in terms of the efficiency and mitigating the conflict between water users. However, differences in understanding participation results in people's perception of their level of participation and evaluation the program. As illustrated by Pretty and Arnstein, participation covers a wide range of typology. It ranges from the passive participation where people are the information receiver to the highest level called active participation where citizen manage all responsibilities in public affairs by themselves (Arnstein, 1969), (Pretty, 1995). It is argued that the highest ladder of participation where citizen control and motivate themselves to manage the public affairs is the most effective way to manage public issues.

Participatory irrigation management has been initiated hoping to provide efficient and effective irrigation management through the participation of relevant stakeholders. It also aims to propose the self-governed water user groups where all related irrigation issues are managed by all beneficial citizens. As a result, in the context of Kraseaw reservoir, the establishment of three layers of water user organizations have been highlighted as compulsory outcomes by royal irrigation department. it is well-established that Kraseaw irrigation project has been successful in promoting participation of farmers as a water user in irrigation management. However, when there is the discussion about participation and the success of project in encouraging participation, it lacks profound understandings on participation and ladders of participation. Moreover, the context of local area has significantly contributed to all development project direction and outcomes. In addition, with differences in experiences, people perceive and understand things differently. The understandings of relevant stakeholders on participation results in their responses, their adjustment to be part of the project and their roles in irrigation management. As a result, there is a need to closely scrutinize the participation in the irrigation management and influential factors to level of citizen's participation.

The qualitative method has been applied to explore the participation in irrigation management project. The data have been collected through the documentary research, in-depth interview, focused group discussion, and observation. Four groups of key stakeholders covering government departments (Royal Irrigation Department and Agriculture department), local administration (Sub-district Administrative Organizations: SAO), private companies and farmers have been interviewed. While conducting the interview and focused group discussion, the observation has been simultaneously undertaken. Relevant documents such as annual reports, project reports and booklets have been reviewed.

This paper will explain the power mechanism within participatory project and its determination on different levels of participation of stakeholders.

It is explored that different actors exercise their power through different mechanism which results in the domination of the decision-making process in the project. In the context of Kraseaw irrigation, knowledge and social status have played an important role in creating the domination of power in decision-making process.

This paper comprises of 4 important chapters. Firstly, the definition of the concept and significant terminology will be addressed and discussed on its

implications and limitations. Secondly, the research method will be explained. Thirdly, the absorbance of participation in participatory irrigation management through the power flow will be explained and discussed. Finally, the last chapter will conclude and summarize all the discussion in the paper.

Participation

The Participation is a term that embraces a wide range of possible meanings. People consider their participation when taking part in something. Many different actors in development adopt the concept of participation in their development programs, but with different perception, motivations and objectives. The different interpretations of participation contribute to the differences in their implementation which results in the different outcomes and impacts.

Participation is associated with rights of citizenship and democracy. In general, people interchange participation in public affairs and vote(Verba, 1967) . However, participation could not be evaluated only by indirect influence through voting. The indirect mean of participation can result in the limitation to people to engagement (Richardson, 1983). Additionally, it is not inclusive since the emphasis is placed on the largest group of people where smaller group has been ignored. Equal participation in decisions- making and equality of power in determining the outcome of decisions should be considered in the public affairs (Pateman, 2000). Direct involvement of citizens in the decision-making processes in public affairs must be taken in account because it eliminates the alienation of citizens from the political process. The direct involvement also enhances the empowerment, transparency, accountability and efficiency of the project (Campbell & Im, 2016). This sort of participation will result in the improvement of policy and its outcomes since the insightful knowledge is contributed during the process of decision making. More importantly, it strengthens the cooperation and support for the implementation of the public policy.

Since participation has been identified and perceived differently, ladders of participation have become important to understand. Ladder of participation has been derived from the emergence of public participation. The ladders of participation explicitly imply the level of capability of people to be involved in public affairs. This significantly results in ability to make the decision and to determine the impact of the decision on their lives. In addition, it also implicitly contributes to the results of the development projects or relevant policies. Arnstein classified participation into 8 ladders of participation. The highest ladder is called Citizen Control where the responsibilities in demanding, decision making, and managing the program are taken by the citizens (Arnstein, **1969**). Similarly, Pretty developed a typology of participation indicating the significances of the participation to the success of the project (Pretty, **1995**). He suggested that the participation of citizen to motivate and manage the project will contribute to the success of management and delivery of public affairs.

Participatory approach has been increasingly popular in international development. It has been used as an instrument to collaborate all stakeholders into project organization reformation. With the claim of production of local knowledge, the term participatory has been employed with the intention to aggregate local community to development project. Considering liberatory perspective, participation has been considered as a substantial of transformative strategy and a mean to gathering the target group into the projects.

Participatory methods in development has been criticized on its ambiguity in institutional reform which has been referred as management technology so-called governance. Looking through the case of Tanzania, it is reported that the discourse of transformation into participatory approach is very bureaucratic. Working under the framework of governance, the participatory approach has been considered as a boundary object in development project. Without the awareness of depoliticization, the failure of participatory approach has been caused by the power imbalance where there is the domination of elite (Maia, 2010).

According with the emphasis on participatory irrigation management, it is very important to understand how the participation is evaluated since the levels of participation explicitly explain the power and capability of citizen in decision-making process and determination of the result of the issues that affect their lives. Similarly, Cornwell points out a very interesting thought addressing the engagement where a small elite group oversees the decision-making result differently from when all members of community engage in the decision-making together (Cornwall, 2008). Furthermore, despite the emphasis on those who participate, those who are excluded should also be taken to account.

Research Method

The analysis of participation and participatory approach in irrigation management have been derived from my fieldwork during May and June 2018. The fieldwork has been undertaken in Suphan Buri Province where Kraseaw reservoir and Kraseaw irrigation area has been located. Kraseaw reservoir and Kraseaw irrigation are have been selected as a case study due to their adaptation of participatory irrigation management as a pilot project.

Kraseaw Irrigation is one of large-scale pilot project that has adopted participatory approach in irrigation management. this participatory irrigation management is a part of agriculture development project hoping to resolve the consequent problems of top-down water management which covers inefficiency water allocation, emergence of conflict regarding intensive diversity of water uses, and incoherently operation and maintenance program. It has been well announced that Kraseaw irrigation project has been a successful case in adopting participatory irrigation management program. The understandings on concept and implementation helps to enrich the understandings of mechanism of participatory approach in irrigation management. This is beneficial to the development and improvement of irrigation management to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The qualitative method has been applied in the study. The data collection methods such as in-depth interview, focused interview observation and documentary research have been proceeded in exploratory of participation in participatory irrigation management project. In-depth interview and focused group discussion have been undertaken with a sample of informants. Open-ended questions have been used to facilitate the discussion and interview. The main group of key informants can be classified into 4 different groups which are government officials, local administrative organization and private companies and farmers (water users).

The observation has been employed in this study to achieve profound understandings on mechanism and process of the involvement of all stakeholders

in irrigation management. the relationship between stakeholders and the power relation among stakeholders have been observed while In-depth interview and focused group discussion have been conducted.

The documentary research has been undertaken to expose the changes of understanding on participation of participatory irrigation management program from conceptual construction to implementation on ground. The close reading of relevant documents including project report, annual reports and meeting report allow us to understand the understandings on participation which result on how stakeholder adjust, participate and reflect this irrigation management project. It also allows us to understand the knowledge package that has been affecting to the understandings and participation of stakeholders to the irrigation management.

Results and Discussion

Participatory Irrigation Management Project in Thailand

After Thailand experiencing the economic recession, agriculture sector had played a significant role as a source of income, employment and economic growth. Moreover, agriculture had also played an immensely significant role to industrial sector since manufacturing activities in that time were mostly agriculture-based exports. The agriculture-based exports covered fresh and processed fruit and vegetables, frozen seafood and frozen poultry. Realizing the importance of agriculture sector to mitigate the impact of economic recession, the Agriculture Development Project has been proposed in Thailand in 2002.

Agriculture sector has highly depended on water resources and there is an immense amount of water consumption proportion of agriculture sector. Moreover, water scarcity has increasingly emerged as the most important issues across the world along with the recognition of its tremendous impacts ranging from economic, food security and livelihood of people. Thailand as a rice-based socioeconomic country, the stress has been placed on irrigation management to solve the intense competition for water, less water availability, and severe water shortages in the dry season. The efficiency and sustainability of water consumption in agriculture sector has been increasingly discussed. In conjunction to the discussion, the approach to development of water resources development has been changed from quantitative oriented into qualitative oriented. Correspondingly, the improvement in the effectiveness of water consumption has been spotlighted in replacement of an increase of amount of water provision. Therefore, the challenge of Thailand is to develop an effective irrigation management to cover both efficiency and equity standards.

Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) has been introduced as a part of the Agriculture Development project hoping to develop the efficiency of irrigation management by increase the participation of relevant stakeholders. The core strategy of the irrigation management project is to enhance the fully participation of farmers, who get access to irrigated water resources. The participation includes planning, designing, construction, making decision, operation and maintenance. Moreover, the participatory irrigation management enhances the involvement of local administrative organizations to serve the decentralization of power in government sector.

Kraseaw Irrigation Management

After experiencing the economic recession in 1997, agriculture sector had been considered as an important sector that could help cushion the adverse social and economic impact of the crisis. As a result, Thai government has proposed an Agriculture Development Project funded by Asian Development Bank (ADB). The project included irrigation management transform. Participatory irrigation management project had been considered as a component in irrigation management reform and introduced to four pilot sites of large-scale irrigation operation. Kraseaw reservoir had been selected as one of four pilot sites of large-scale irrigation management project adopting PIM hoping to solve the problems of inefficiency of irrigation management including ineffective water allocation system, severe competition of water, diversity of water uses and dysfunctional operation and maintenance.

Kraseaw Reservoir is the earth reservoir which was constructed since 1981. Kraseaw Reservoir is located in the North West of Suphan Buri Province. Since Kraseaw stream had a very high slope, whenever it comes to rainy season (September- October), it caused sudden flood in Samchuk District. Moreover, there was a severe drought in drying season when rice farming requires a large amount of water in cultivation process. The agriculture sector had been dramatically damaged by these natural disaster events.

The Kraseaw reservoir serves to 6 key advantages. The first is to mitigate natural disaster namely flood and drought both inside and outside the irrigated area covering 350,000 Rai. Secondly, it is reported Kraseaw reservoir project serves 130,000 rai while the irrigation area of Kraseaw Reservoir comprises 110,563 Rai in 3 districts of Suphan Buri province which are Dermbang Nangbuad, Nongyasai and Samchuk. Thirdly, it serves as the tourist attraction and public park. Fourthly, there is aquaculture sector above the physical reservoir. Additionally, it is to serve industrial sector. Finally, the reservoir serves the household consumption.




Figure 1: Map of Kraseaw Irrigation Project

Kraseaw Reservoir water has been drained to 7 main drainage canals covering 6,740 water users (Public Participatory Promotion Division, **2005**). The irrigated water serves household consumption, agriculture sector and industrial sector. The irrigation service area covers 50 villages, 11 Sub-Districts from 3 districts of Suphan Buri province.

Kraseaw irrigated area comprises of a wide range of activities both agriculture sector and private sector. The agriculture activities consist of rice farming, sugar cane farming, fruit farming, vegetable farming and aquaculture whereas the private sector consists of Mitr Phol Sugar Mill, Thai Agro Energy Public Company Limited and Waterworks Authority of Danchang District. The diverse needs of water results in the conflict of severe competition to access water.

Kraseaw irrigation system has been proceeded under the Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). The participation mechanisms are identified by the Royal Irrigation Department as following.

- (1) To establish the Water User Groups which covers the irrigated area of each trench
- (2) To establish the Integrated Water Users Groups by gathering the Water User Groups at the shared main drainage canal
- (3) To establish the coordination of Water User Organization (WUO)
- (4) To establish the Joint Management Committee (JMC)

After Kraseaw irrigation adopted participatory approach in irrigation management, the Joint Management Committee (JMC) has been regarded as the centrality of the decision making on irrigation of Kraseaw Reservoir. The joint committee consists of representatives from 4 different agencies including farmers, private companies, local administrative organization and government authorities.




Figure 2: Structure of Joint Management Committee

There are 9 integrated water user group along 7 main drainage canals. Each group of integrated management groups consists of primary groups of farmers upon each trench canal. Overall, it is 278 primary groups belonging to Kraseaw irrigation project. The integrated water user group has authorized to open and close the water gate of the main drainage canals while the joint committee has the authority to manage the water allocation of Kraseaw reservoir at the beginning of each season.

There are two government department which are royal irrigation department and agriculture department. Kraseaw irrigation officials have a very significant role since the beginning of adopting participatory approach in the irrigation management. their main responsibility at the time is to establish the joint committee. After the establishment of joint committee, their main responsibility is to facilitate the irrigation management such as sharing hydrological knowledge and control the drainage water gate and reservoir gate. Another government department is agriculture department. they are invited to disseminate information about farming diseases, farmer registration and related information about agriculture activities.

In terms of local administration, executive shift of each sub- district administrative organization has been invited by royal irrigation department to be members of joint committee. They are responsible for collaboration between citizens and government office in terms of information and practical activities. Recently, they oversee the maintenance program of trench canal.

Private companies namely Mitr Phol Sugar Mill, Thai Agro Energy Public Company Limited and Waterworks Authority of Danchang District have been invited by provincial governor to be members of joint committee. Although they are not located in the irrigation area, they also have access to water from the reservoir as they are located upstream of the primary canal.

Power Flow in Irrigation Management

Participation in participatory approach has been claimed as an instrument to promote power equalization and reduce the differences of power between less powerful and more powerful stakeholders. Development organizations have been trying to promote participatory approach in development projects hoping to provide equal power to relevant stakeholders. The equalization of power is set to provide efficiency and effectiveness in public affairs. However, the local context such as power flow in the project has not been recognized during the conceptual construction and implementation of the project. Power composes of many different sources where different actors could muster and deploy it in the negotiation (Mulder, 1971). Similarly, there is a tremendous effort in growing the tree of hydrological knowledge and engagement practices in irrigation management (Daniel, 2013). Participatory approach has been proposed in reformation of irrigation management where the power of central government will be decentralized (Otsuka, 2003). The power in decision-making process of public affairs has been transformed into a more pluralistic and multilevel system.

However, each pilot site has its distinct culture and tradition which affect to participation and domination of power. In the context of Kraseaw irrigation, there is a power flow in irrigation management where different stakeholders exercise their power through different mechanism which results in the domination of the decision-making process in the project. In constructing the legitimacy for their

domination in irrigation management, different sources of power have been instrumentally used in the irrigation management project. Knowledge, social status, and education have played very important roles as a source of the domination of power in decision-making process.

There is the parallel reproduction processes of power and knowledge where knowledge is selectively deliberated and operated. The interaction between knowledge and power has never been shaped in one certain form because knowledge comes from multiple sources and different sides and dynamic. Knowledge never be disseminated separately. Yet, in this case, it comes along with local context, for instance, local economic situations, traditional belief, local connection and local wisdom.

After the economic recession, government management in public affairs has been considered dysfunctional. The propose of new approach in public affairs seems to be the best solution in mitigating the economic impacts. Involvement of other relevant stakeholders has been proposed in public affairs. The knowledge package of governance focusing on participation and collaboration from all relevant stakeholders has been disseminated. Participatory irrigation management has been proposed in the context that civic participation is in the smokescreen. Participation becomes a new term in Thailand at that time Royal irrigation department has been assigned to implement the participatory project in the area. All water users have been invited to join the workshop which provides information about participation. There is an attempt to promote a greater role of farmers and communities to oversee the public affairs which affect their lives.

Knowledge becomes an effective instrument for the formulation and accumulation of power. The technical knowledge as such hydrological knowledge has been produced by royal irrigation department who closely oversees the accumulation of hydrological knowledge. In return, being a specialized expert, they are reasonably legitimated to domination of irrigation management. It is also reasonable for their intervention by holding technical knowledge.

Local wisdom has been selectively presented in the project to grant the legitimacy to modern hydrological knowledge. The similar component of local wisdom to modern hydrological knowledge has been referred as applying the local wisdom for instance the water allocation patter and family connectivity. The solution of pattern of water allocation has been attached to local wisdom such as the water must be allocated from upstream to downstream. Correspondingly, it is reasonable that downstream water users get water for their agriculture activities after upstream water users with the claims of modern hydrological knowledge from Royal irrigation department and local wisdom from community. Yet, the main problems before adopting participatory approach in irrigation management are ineffective water allocation system of royal irrigation department and severe competitive to water consumption between upstream and downstream water users.

The common of local knowledge and modern hydrological information can often function as a smokescreen for decision maker to continue doing what they want. Therefore, it is obligated to identify and unpack local knowledge when working with knowledge system at the local level. It is also significant to identify what is included as local knowledge and what is excluded. It is important to be aware that knowledge become selectively chosen and implemented. Local wisdom can be used as an instrument to bound state and community as well as to prevent the opposition from local people. Participatory approach has been used in

standardized management (Maia, 2010) . Basically, this approach could be employed in a group of people attending in the discussion of problems to determine the situation and response. The specific form of designed institutional form has associated and facilitated with the discursive process of the participatory approach where the facilitator and assistant work with beneficiary groups through a sequence of annalistic stages. This could be claimed as a local knowledge and local ownership which implies the sustainable strategy to be perceived as local realities. However, this process serves to narrow down the knowledge and to make it acceptable for community.

James Ferguson (Ferguson, 1994) argues that the lack of awareness of reality, the development project, instead of achieving the decentralization of power, they assist the expansion of power of bureaucratic state. The development project eventually turns to be the anti-political machine. It is not only the Royal Irrigation Department that could reproduce their influence regarding their legitimacy of hydrological knowledge, the elite officials and powerful community leaders have also an influence on the irrigation management. There are various aspects of social status that leads to the domination and reproduction of power in participatory irrigation management. In the context of Kraseaw irrigation, political status has significantly contributed to the domination of decision-making process and reproduction of power.

Thailand is a hierarchy society. Government employees have been classified as being in higher level in the society comparing to farmers because of their level of formal education and job's stability. Being the officials make them become more respectful than being farmers. In the focused group discussion, it is observed that the royal irrigation officials have an influence on the way the farmers answer the question and narrate their story. The questions during the interview are answered with the few guide words from the officials.

The leaders of integrated water user are the community leaders either the headmen and representatives of the community in sub district administrative organization. Similar to government employees, community leaders have been respectful on their qualification and contribution to society. The political power that they have has an influence on the election of leader of water user group and integrated water user group. Being the leaders of integrated water user group also, in return, provide them political power. The farmers (water users) who are in the joint management committee identify the participation as when they participate in the decision making of irrigation management including planning when irrigation officials start allocating water from the reservoir which is mostly made through the vote of the committee. Their participation also includes organize the meeting of integrated water user group and voting in as a member of joint management committee.

It is observed that the only group of water who actively participated in irrigation management is the leaders the group. Farmers perceive their participation in irrigation management when they are participating in the maintenance program before the water is allocated. They receive information mostly through the loudspeaker of the community. They leave the decision making to the leader of their water user groups believing that the leaders are capable to identify their demand and need.

Private companies as perceive their participation as when they attend the meeting and join the annual ceremony of water users. they mention that since they consume a little amount of water from the reservoir, they do not have much

power to demand for water. Their roles in the meeting is to gain information about water and to spread information about their companies such as the schedule for their companies and the price of agriculture products.

Conclusion

In context of Kraseaw participatory irrigation management, power is not monopolized and controlled by only one actor. Different actors exercise their power through multiple sources. It results in the domination of the decision-making process in the project. Knowledge is one of the most important sources of power. Royal irrigation department has used their authorities as a specialized administration to reproduce power through knowledge. The act of expertise gives them legitimacy to implement the project and to influence the decision-making process. However, to mitigate the resistance of locality, local wisdom has been selectively presented as a part of irrigation management. These local knowledges share some similarities to modern technical hydrological knowledge produced by the royal irrigation management. Local knowledge has been used as an instrument to increase the legitimacy of hydrological knowledge, to mitigate the resistance to technical knowledge and to be the invitation and collaborator between state and water users. Although the water allocation pattern is similar to the past, farmers feel reasonable to wait for water because the decision has been made by majority committee.

Another important factor that influences the domination in irrigation management is social context of local area. The hierarchical system has been deeply rooted in Thailand. Government officials has been perceived as being in higher level comparing to farmers because of their formal education level and job stability. The royal irrigation officials, as a government employee, are legitimated to implement activities and to make the decision on large-scale or public affairs. Moreover, the community leaders overseeing the leader of water user group and a member of joint committee earns the legitimacy to independently make the decision on behalf of community members. As a result, the active participants are those who are the members of joint management committee. Accordingly, farmers turn to be passive participants waiting for the announcement from the joint committee and response it correspondingly. They consider their responsibility only on maintenance program.

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MYANMAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA UNDER THEIN SEIN PRESIDENCY (2011-2015)

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Abstract

This paper argues that under Thein Sein Presidency, despite the bilateral challenges and difficulties between Myanmar and China, Myanmar has chosen to retain its cordial relations with China due to ethnic reconciliation relations, economic relations, and military relations. Since 1988, Myanmar under the State Law and Order Restoration Council Government (SLORC) has been largely backed up by China owing to international diplomatic sanctions from the west, which was arisen from the 8888 Democratic Uprising. Since then, China has been one of the countries avoiding from criticizing the human rights abuses and fostering the non-interference norm. Thus, this paved the way for both Myanmar and China to have closer political, economic, and military relations for Myanmar's regime survival. During the transitional period led by Thein Sein, Naypyidaw has undertaken the democratization process, concomitantly, has created new Myanmar's foreign policy objective in order to reintegrate Myanmar into the international community. This aimed to enhance the Government's legitimacy of not being a pariah state nor China's client state, and to push Myanmar to be more dynamic in the eyes of international community. This in turn made Thein Sein cultivate balanced relations with all Major Powers including the US, the EU, Russia, and also China. It is said that the Myanmar's democratization and the improved restorations of diplomatic relations with the West has shown a sign of challenges to the long-standing Myanmar-Sino relations. Furthermore, Myanmar has also challenged China in terms of the suspension of the Myitsonne Hydropower Dam to respond the anti-Chinese sentiments at the societal and state levels, as well as, the accusation of Chinese interest groups in provoking ethnic instability along Myanmar-China borders. Nevertheless, contrastingly, Thein Sein still attempted to carry on paying high-level exchange visits and to sign more contracts and agreements with China to prevent from worsening bilateral relations and to support their prolonged Paukphaw or brotherly relations. In spite of their bilateral challenges and difficulties, Myanmar facing long-standing & conflictual internal instability has perceived China as a critical friend in mutually reaching ethnic reconciliation process. Likewise, despite having engagements with the West, namely the US, Myanmar also needs to China to sustain its long-term economic development through promoting industrialization, infrastructure development, and foreign investments, as well as to support Myanmar's military modernization by supplying military weapons and military trainings.

Keywords: *Myanmar, PR China, foreign policy, democratization, the United States, Myanmar-Sino relations*

Introduction

Since 1950s, Myanmar-Sino relationships have been retained under their “paukphaw” term, meaning substantially close brother-siblings relation between Myanmar and China. Historically, Myanmar’s foreign policy has principally embarked on the principles of independence, non-alignment and stringent neutrality, along with bilateral relations upholding “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Although the two have increasingly fostered each other mutually political, economic, and strategic relations, Myanmar’s leaders have been aware of China with skepticism owing to the Chinese intervention for supporting the Burmese Communist Party. In 1988, followed by the 8888 Uprising by the pro-democratic demonstrators and the unsuccessful election denying the Democratic Alliance led by Aung San Suu Kyi in 1990, Myanmar under the State Law and Order Restoration Council Government (SLORC) had been condemned by international community pressure with economic sanctions, notably the United States, engendering to aggravate its national economic growth and isolate Myanmar from international community. At that period, China was the one of the countries avoiding from criticizing the human rights abuses and fostering the non-interference norm. Myanmar had no choice to rely on China to admit intimate relations with China for its regime survival. Such mounting western external pressure could impact the direction of Myanmar-Sino Relations whereby markedly intimate relations have been improved among the two. Since then, China has inevitably been a major nation chiefly supporting Myanmar for their mutually interdependent political, economic, military and strategic ties.

Until 2011, the new Quasi-Civilian Government led by U Thein Sein under the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) came into power in March 2011, Thein Sein as a main mover of Myanmar’s foreign policy has readjusted through coming up new Myanmar’s foreign policy objective, which was to reintegrate Myanmar into the international community and in turn made him earnestly concentrate on the democratization process to enhance its political legitimacy and to push Myanmar to be more dynamic in the eyes of international community. In order to lift the long standing economic sanctions from the West resulting in long economic stagnation, and to respond the anti-Chinese sentiments at local and state level resulted from environmentally and socially negligent conducts by Chinese firms, Thein Sein has chosen to recalibrate relations with China, concomitantly, to actively cultivate balanced relations with other Major Powers in the Indo-Pacific region, namely US, the EU, Russia, India, Japan, and others. This in turn made Thein Sein intensely put in place democratic political and economic reforms with a view to respond the vision of Thein Sein’s foreign policy to reinforce Myanmar to be a modern developed nation that responds the aspirations of its populations for a better life and to achieve greater integration into the international community by 2020.

Although under the SLORC/SPDC Government, Myanmar has retained considerably close relations with China, Myanmar-Sino relations have confronted with ups and downs under the USDP Government. It can be said that Myanmar has challenged China in terms of the suspension of the Myitsone Dam or the accusation of Chinese interest groups involvement in provoking ethnic instability along Myanmar-China borders. Yet, contrastingly, Thein Sein still carried on paying high-level exchange visits and signed more economic contracts & agreements to prevent from deteriorating bilateral relations and to mutually support their Paukphaw relations with China. Myanmar facing long-standing &

conflictual internal stability has perceived China as a critical friend as it needs China to reach ethnic reconciliation peace process with other ethnic armed groups to secure border stability for both Myanmar and China's national interests. Even though Myanmar have restored relations with the west, its major economic proportions demand China to sustain economic assistance though promoting industrialization, infrastructure developments, energy & hydropower project investments, and so forth to further improve Myanmar's economic prosperity in the long-run. Likewise, Myanmar's military progress relies upon China to supply military weapons and training programs to modernize Myanmar's military capability. Therefore, at this transitional period of Myanmar, this paper aims to study Myanmar's foreign policy towards China and to discuss why Myanmar has chosen to retain close relations with China in the midst of the bilateral challenges and difficulties.

The background of Myanmar-Sino Bilateral Relations since the post-World War II to 2010

It is imperative to understand the historical and long relationship between Myanmar and China so as to apprehend the Myanmar's Foreign Policy towards China. U Nu President pursued an independent and non-alignment foreign policy, implying to be everybody's friend but nobody's ally. Since Independence, Myanmar-Sino Relations had been regarded as stable as Myanmar was the first non-communist state to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949. China and Myanmar agreed to sign the Sino-Burmese Joint Declaration on 29th June 1954, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. During this period, both Premier Zhou Enlai and U Nu established cordial relationship or "Paukphaw" relationship, on the basis of the strength of personal rapport between top leaders (Zhu, 2015). And in 1960, both 2 sides signed a border agreement with the PRC and a Bilateral Treaty of Friendship & Mutual Non-Aggression. In 1962, Myanmar's Foreign Policy was increasingly characterized by isolation under the Revolutionary Government of U Ne Win. From 1967, the relations appeared weakened as a result of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. This was banned by Newin Government and caused the anti-Chinese riot movements in Yangon between Burmese people and resident overseas Chinese, particularly military Maoists. Additionally,

China also backed up the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), resulting in further undermining bilateral relations. At last, both countries revoked their diplomatic ties and the bilateral relations came to the lowest level in the late 1960s. Notwithstanding, bilateral relations started to constantly improve in the 1970s as Ne Win's Government reestablished diplomatic relations with China by admitting a Chinese ambassador, making both countries continue official developmental assistance during the second half of 1980s (Yi, 2013).

During the 1988 democratic uprising suppressing civilians and the refusal of election won by Aung Saan Su Kyi, Myanmar was heavily criticized and isolated by the international community. The Western countries, notably the US and the European Union adhered strict sanctions. In order for regime survival, it is vital for Myanmar to depend on China's support. China was one of the few countries not condemning the human rights violations by the military regime. This suggested that Myanmar has paved the way for a golden opportunity for China's demands for Myanmar's natural resources comprised of energy and markets for

China-made products. China in turn reciprocated through assisting economic enhancement in terms of trade, investment, and military cooperation. Consequently, bilateral relations have substantially enhanced since then. Since 1988, Myanmar faced with the abrogation of multilateral aids from the international donors, the State Law and Order Restoration Government or SLORC adjusted its neutral policy to become “Open Door” Policy, targeting to improve Myanmar’s economic stagnation to replace the elimination of external assistance. Since then state-to-state relations have increased constantly, the reciprocal visits were made by both countries such as between Khin Nyunt and Premier Li Peng. These visits resulted in a Joint Communiqué aiming to ameliorate Myanmar-China Cooperation and the tradition of Paukphaw Friendship (Chankum, 2007). In 1997, Myanmar also signed a framework Agreement on Preferential loan with interest subsidized by the Chinese Government. Concomitantly, the SLORC government largely depended on the Chinese military support so as to professionalize and strengthen the Tatmadaw (the Military Armed Forces) Evidently, in 1994 and 1996, the SLORC Government made two important arm deals with China for counter-insurgency operations and conventional land and sea war fighting by obtaining military weapons i.e. heavy artillery, rocket launches, signals intelligences (SIGINT), and others. In 2003, the crackdown on protests in Depayin by the State Peace and Development Council or SPDC Government killed ASSK’s supporters and arrested ASSK and others. As a consequence, the USA and Western countries imposed tighter sanctions on Myanmar again. Both ASEAN and China also pressured hardships and make political reforms. The Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s visit to China in 2004 highlighted the more cordial development of bilateral relations between China and Myanmar with signing 21 agreements, contracts, and memorandum. Later Khin Nyunt was repelled due to his corruption charges. The Depayin Incident and the elimination Khin Nyunt put forward to tighter relations between the two countries instead of undermining their relations. This suggests that while the US and Western imposition of stricter sanctions, Chinese economic roles in Myanmar increasingly widened. For examples, in 2003, China offered \$US 200 million preferential loans to finance construction of one of Myanmar’s largest planned hydropower projects in Mandalay, as well as for other projects i.e. infrastructure development, energy exploitation. In 2004-2007, China Petroleum and Chemical Company and Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise of the Ministry of Energy signed a production sharing agreement to exploit an on-shore field near Kyaukphyu. During this period, economic cooperation for both sides has significantly enhanced, proved to be advantageous. Chinese enterprises have been incorporated in Myanmar’s industrial, infrastructure, and energy development. More than 800 projects were launched by Chinese firms aimed to invest in Myanmar. Also, in 2007, the Saffron Revolution made Myanmar heavily criticized by the US. The outbreak of this revolution further pushed Myanmar and China into closer cooperation. This occurred now that China and Russia’s Double Veto prevented Myanmar from the draft resolution made by the US and the UK at the UNSC. Under the SPDC Government, the increase in Chinese investment was obvious from approximately \$ 1 billion to almost \$13 billion between 2008 and 2011. Until in 2010, the year of 60th anniversary of Myanmar-China relations, both China and Myanmar again signed 15 MOUs and agreements for cooperation in economic development, technological sectors rail transportation, trade, hydropower, energy and mining. This year was marked with various reciprocal senior level state visits for fostering multi-sectoral cooperation (Haacke, 2007).

Overall, the bilateral relations concerning multifaceted dimensions appeared to be friendly. The China's assistance inevitable proved to be meaningful for Myanmar to survive from tight sanctions such as the border trades resulted in an increasing amount of revenues of trade deals. China was the key source of support and protection for Myanmar in the international community. Thanks to congruent perceptions i.e. the norm of non-interference and disregard of human rights, these common perceptions even made both countries closer and enhanced cooperation despite the asymmetrical gains. Moreover, at that time, China under Deng Xiao Ping Modernism Policy, supporting economic reforms in China, China perceived Myanmar for its strategic significance since Myanmar can become a pathway for China to access to the Bay of Bengal in Indian Ocean, henceforth, it is unsurprising why China greatly assisted Myanmar in several dimensions, particularly in economic, energy, infrastructure projects, and etc. It is believed that Myanmar is a market for Chinese commodities. Indeed, Myanmar gives an outlet for China's less-developed western provinces such as Yunnan. Myanmar gives an important location from which China could access and project its power into eastern Indian Ocean. Myanmar is part of China's "string of pearl" strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. It is in the interest of China to keep Myanmar within its strategic orbit (ကျော်စွာ၊ 2013).

Nevertheless, indeed, in the early 2000s, Myanmar government became aware of its rising reliance on China and thus sought to maintain its sovereignty and independence through diversifying its external relations with Russia, India, and ASEAN member states. For examples the decision to move the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw at high expense resulted in Chinese fears in which China did not know in advance, and nuclear reactor discussions with Russia and ties to North Korea were viewed as a means and to react its conceived undue interference by distancing itself from a particular nation to changing degree and to balance foreign relations. Myanmar was encouraged by economic interests and to balance the increasing influence of China. Myanmar in turn obtained Indian investment which was considered another way to constrain the influence of any one country. Moreover, since 2008, Myanmar has endeavored to recalibrate relations with China as there has been increasing discontent within Myanmar society concerning the domineering influence of Chinese people in the business sector and in the ethnic states. The prosperity of a class of wealthy Chinese businessmen, in part in Mandalay and Yangon, has been resented by several poorer communities owing to the common viewpoint that such businessmen became richer by unfair exploitation of Myanmar's resources (Fang, 2015). This suggests that Myanmar started recalibrating relations with China, simultaneously, will adopt more balanced foreign policy to ensure its sovereignty and Myanmar's domestic political objectives including the prioritization of national unity and domestic economic development which was considered the cornerstone of Myanmar's foreign policy to all countries since 1988. This means that although Myanmar began to be willing to engage with the west, namely, the US and the EU countries, and Japan, Myanmar will not alienate China now that Myanmar still need China to meet its economic and military interests.

Prior to explaining Myanmar's foreign policy towards China, this paper will briefly explain the fundamental characteristics of Myanmar's foreign policy characteristics under Thein Sein Presidency

The Foreign Policy Characteristics under Thein Sein Presidency (2011-2015)

Myanmar's Foreign Policy under the USDP Government is still upholding "independent, active, and non-aligned" principles.

However, its new Foreign Policy objective at this period is to "reintegrate Myanmar into the international community", to make Myanmar "active, dynamic, and international". (To cultivate friendly and balanced relations with all major powers active in the Indo-Pacific Region) Thein Sein Government has still pursued the three core principles. The core national interests affected the way Thein Sein decided the Foreign Policy, including improving national security, encouraging economic development, and supporting a peaceful and equitable world order. These are important to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the distinct adjustment under this period is that Thein Sein initiated new objective, which is the reintegration of Myanmar into the global community. The reasons for this consist of three factors; to promote government legitimacy, to promote international stage to seek more opportunities, and to eliminate the image of China's Client State. This will drive Myanmar to be more active, dynamic, and international with cultivation of friendly and balanced relations with all major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. This is crucial to make Myanmar acceptable for the global community and modern nation facilitating better life for its fellow Burmese.

In his inaugural speech on 30 March 2011, he stated:

"Our vision for Myanmar is to become a modern developed nation that meets the aspirations of its people for a better life and to achieve greater integration into the international community by 2020 (Myoe Muang, 2015)."

The directions of Myanmar's Foreign Policy towards China since 2011-2015

U Thein Sein had become the president of the Quasi-Civilian Government under the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in Myanmar in March 2011. It can be assumed that Myanmar-China relations during in the early months of Thein Sein's Government had remained friendly, smooth, and stable, whereby both sides were enthusiastic for a stronger cooperative relation. Nevertheless, by the late 2011, the Myanmar-Sino relations became sour and bitter politically, economically, and strategically. It is said that Myanmar's Foreign Policy at this period pragmatically "pursued balanced foreign policy by engaging with other Major Powers, esp. the US, while recalibrating relations with on China". This paper will explain both domestic and international factors that affected the readjustment of Myanmar's foreign policy towards China.

For the domestic factors, the first domestic factor is Thein Sein's Government desire and decision to reintegrate Myanmar into the international community. But to make this happen, it is crucial for Myanmar to pursue domestic political reforms and foreign policy readjustment with the Major Powers. Regarding to Thein Sein's perceptions, he realized that Myanmar was still a pariah state, embraced by the long-tern economic sanctions of the western countries and the isolation constraints resulted from the quashing of earlier Junta Government. He

hence aimed to cut off the long-standing isolated international relationship with a view to build a better multilateral relationship for Myanmar. According to his desire of reintegrating Myanmar into the global community, he decided to pursue the balanced foreign policy to readjust the strength structure of the Big Powers in Myanmar. This statement implies that, prior to 2011 as being suffered from western sanctions; China appeared to be the most significant country for the economic and trade relations in Myanmar. China's super strong roles made Myanmar uncertain and suspicious about the relation between China and Myanmar, particularly the external power reached the strategic intent of China in Myanmar. It is well-known for the influence of the "China Threat Theory" due to China's assertive behavior to be a regional maritime power in Indo and Pacific Region. China aimed to pursue 2 strategic intentions, one aimed to strengthen the energy security i.e. construction & gas pipelines between China and Myanmar, and the other one aimed to access through Indian Ocean region to be the sole country across the ocean. This also influenced to Thein Sein's decision, he realized a necessity to diminish Myanmar's reliance on China and China influences. Also, it is essential for Myanmar to contact with other nations to seek more opportunities and benefits (Zhu, 2015).

The second domestic factor is a rising anti-China sentiment in Myanmar. During the post-1988 period, a group of anti-China sentiment has emerged, having adverse attitudes to China. Such bad perceptions took place in both societal and state levels. For the societal level, most of the Burmese people perceived that China had attempted to obstruct progressive changes towards Democracy during the previous military governments. They realized a reason why the military government remained so long was due to China's support for the SLORC/SPDC Governments at several international forums. Burmese people were discontent about the immoral business behaviors of Chinese companies and businessmen in Myanmar. Almost China's state-owned firms disregarded the environmental and social effects, never took charge of corporate social responsibility for communities in Myanmar. Chinese companies severely exploited Myanmar's natural resources, regardless any consultative dialogues with the local people's demands. In return, villagers scarcely obtained any compensation for their property losses. This suggests that without the proper compensations and disregard to village's satisfaction, this exacerbated stronger anti-China sentiment among Burmese people. Moreover, Burmese people were dissatisfied on Chinese products, they called those products as "tayoke-set tayet-soke", meaning broken in a day. Likewise, Chinese food products were poorly hygienic, fake medicines and hazardous milk powder were inedible. Myanmar businessmen felt the asymmetrical benefits and unfair trading practices from joint ventures with Chinese firms. Burmese gained little benefits whereas the Chinese took all. More significantly, the rising number of Chinese people along with their prosperity brought about stronger dissatisfaction and intense problems among Burmese people. In June and December of 2009, when Vice-Senior General Muang Aye and Vice-President Xi Jing Ping visited each other country's country, and signed MOUs and contracts for a hydroplants project on the Ayerwaddy River and an oil and gas pipeline project. Then in June 2010, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Myanmar, the two sides signed a 1.1 Billion USD contract for copper mine in Letpadaung. The three Megaprojects regarding the hydropower dams and plants projects on the Ayerwaddy River, the oil & gas pipeline project, and the mining in Letpadaung & Tagaungtaung project have created adverse criticisms from the local people and induced anti-China hatred among Burmese population due to disregard on social and environmental sustainability. At the state level,

since 1989, both discontentment and distrust were felt by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Force) towards China. It was believed that Chinese weapons were equipped with poor standards and lack of spare parts and follow-up services. For instances, several aircrafts were unable to fly as a result of the absence of spare parts. It was said that when Myanmar requested China to give a discount, even China gave the discount, but China also removed some parts of the specification. The PLA did not train and provide technical training, consequently, pilots had to teach and train themselves. Worse than that, a number of pilots were dead owing to poor quality aircraft. This in turn made the Tatmadaw find alternative sources for military weapons such as Russia, Ukraine, and others. Moreover, both Senior General Than Shwe and Vice-Senior General Muang Aye, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of SLORC/SPDC Government, had taken in military commands which had encountered the insurgency of the Burma Communist Party or BCP mainly supported by the PRC. While U Thein Sein served in the North East Command in Lashio when he was a key, and later served a commander of Triangle Region Command. It can be suggested that senior military commanders had faced with fighting against the PRC-supported communist insurgency. It is unsurprising why these commanders have a distrustful perception towards China (Myoe, 2015).

The third internal factor is the rising concern with China's interference in Myanmar affairs. It can be said that since 1988, both the SLORC/SPDC and the USDP Government were truly concerned and specifically anxious about China's influence and interference in Myanmar affair. Despite upholding independent and non-aligned policy in foreign affairs, the Chinese influence became more intense domestically. Nonetheless, the SPDC Government having been conscious of Chinese influence was discontent as the international community presumed Myanmar as a nation under China's sphere of influence or being a China's client state. Evidently, the SPDC Government requested China to interfere in Myanmar during the incident of the 2007 monk-led demonstrations and in 2008, when the Cyclone Nagris attacked. The suppression led by government on the monk groups was heavily criticized by international community and called for international intervention due to human rights violations pictures distributed by mass media. This issue was held to bring a resolution at UNSC by the US and the UK. Yet, this was vetoed by China and Russia. This in turn made a compromise that was reached to an issue as a non-binding UNSC presidential statement. It is said that China finally admitted the latest version of the presidential statement, announced on October 11, 2007. During these negotiations, China played a vital role in organizing meetings between the Myanmar military government and the UN. Myanmar started to feel concerned on the rise of Chinese influence and the active role, played by China in Myanmar's affairs. There were also fears that Myanmar was being over-reliant upon China. Additionally, on May 2, 2008, the Cyclone Nagris attacked Myanmar. The insufficient and slow response by the SPDC Government and unwillingness to recognize the assistance from international agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide disaster relief operations, urged an international dissatisfaction. This made the international community call China to play a crucial role in lobbying the SPDC Government to admit international relief assistance and to recognize Admiral Timothy J. Keating (the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet Command to coordinate the organization of relief aid). Following the convince by China, Myanmar then permitted relief aids by international community and the NGOs. Aside from its political support in those 2 incidents, China still continued contacting with the anti-government activists

and organizations at the expense of the Myanmar Government. In the past, the SPDC was careful that Chinese authorities, especially the Yunnan organized various meetings with Myanmar dissidents in Maesot, Chiang Mai, and Ruili, even some of whom participated in touring Kunming and Beijing. Rather, China's support was considered conditional as Xi Jin Ping met Maung Aye in Beijing in June 2009 and told Myanmar that China would uphold the "fair interests of Myanmar." This made Myanmar uncomfortable, thereby providing itself a wake-call to relieve the mounting Chinese influence in Myanmar affairs (Myoe, 2015).

For the external factor, the external factor leading to the readjustment is Myanmar's rapprochement with the US. Since 1988, the sanction-related Foreign Policy by the US towards Myanmar only aggravated difficulties, resulting in the economic stagnation in Myanmar as well as downgrading ASEAN-US relations, because the US Government always refused to participate in a series of crucial meetings hosted by ASEAN, particularly in the mid-2000s (the latter part of the Bush Government). During the Obama's administration along with the US's Pivot to Asia-Pacific Region, it was significant for both the US and Myanmar to review their own foreign policies to each other in order that there will be an improved and cooperative relation, not only for Myanmar and the US, but also ASEAN and the US. Both sides were aware that the increasing assertiveness and the Rise of China in both Myanmar's affairs and the region, as a consequence, both sides had to establish good relations with each other as well as other countries in the region. Since September 2009, the State Department had announced a new strategy called "principled engagement", which would keep sanctions in place, at the same time, promoting high-level engagement with the military regime. This has been considered the main US Foreign Policy towards Myanmar since then. Followed by Hilary Clinton's visit to Myanmar in December 2011, Thein Sein said to Clinton that "Myanmar will follow consistently political reforms and to re-engage with the international community." This led to the process of exchanging ambassadors with Myanmar. On May 17, 2012, President Obama officially appointed Derek Mitchell as the first US ambassador to Myanmar for more than 20 years. This has contributed to the full normalization of diplomatic relations among both sides. Subsequently, on November 19, 2012, President Obama paid a visit in Myanmar during his Asian tour. He was the 1st President to visit Myanmar, this was politically important. According to Obama's speech at Yangon University, "today, the US has come to give the hand of friendship; the US would be your partner during the long journey." Thein Sein also stated back "because of our congruent visions and engagement policies of the Obama administration, our bilateral relations have been improving constantly (Myoe, 2015)." In 2013, Thein Sein made a visit to the US, highlighting the progress of the bilateral relations. During the visit on September 26, 2012, Thein Sein met with the secretary of state and felt thankful for opening a new chapter in US- Myanmar relations. The purpose of Myanmar's visits to the US had two important things, firstly, to improve and deepen bilateral relations, and secondly, to persuade the US to totally lift the sanctions on Myanmar in order to extend the economic and trade contacts to foster the economic development of Myanmar (Zhu, 2015).

The difficulties and challenges of political, economic, strategic, and security relations with China under Thein Sein Presidency

The impacts of Myanmar-China relations in terms of politic, economic, strategic, and border stability will be explained in this part. It can be said that Myanmar has stepped a prominent turning point in 2011 with a plethora of reform procedures. Nevertheless, Myanmar's political reforms and Balanced Foreign policies have impinged on Myanmar- China relations.

For the economic dimension, dating back between 2008 and 2011, China prioritized to largely invest in the resource extraction sector of the Myanmar economy and had supported three Mega projects, including the Myitsone Hydropower Dam project, the Lapaduang copper mine project, and the Kyaukphyu-Kunming oil & gas pipelines project. Yet such projects were controversial since none of them promoted sustainable development and put Myanmar with massive environmental and social impacts. For Thein Sein, to respond the satisfaction of the Burmese majority, the suspension of the project was necessary. It is clear that the suspension of Myitsone Hydropower Dam Project in the Kachin State on the Ayewaddy River, which is regarded as the country's principal lifeline, not only generated hiccups in Myanmar-Sino relations, but also reminded Myanmar's policy readjustment. The Myitsone Dam was built to deliver more than 90 percent of its electricity output to China and create a lake the size of Singapore in the middle of the Kachin State, sitting on an earthquake line. It was evident that environmental groups inside and outside Myanmar had already begun to protest the project prior to Thein Sein Government. Thein Sein abolished this project on September 30, 2011; even the project has been already in construction process since 2009.

This increasingly worsened their relations now that Chinese Firm, namely "China Power Investment or CPI" has already invested a considerable amount of capitals on the project and such suspension will provide them with a huge loss. However, Thein Sein decided in such a way in response to increasing public dissatisfaction towards Chinese. This means that Myanmar chose to mainly respond the public voices of population as it has embarked on its democratization process. The impacts of the Myitsone suspension led to the widespread animosity against Chinese projects, regarding CNPC oil & gas pipeline project and NORICO copper mine project straightforwardly altered Chinese investment behaviors to promote "corporate social responsibility" (Myoe, 2015).

In 2012, strong criticisms and protests were ignited to oppose NORICO copper mine firm. There was a low level protest by local villagers opposing to the extension of the Letpadaung mine which enlarged into national movement, gathering activists from urban centers and from across the border in Thailand, requiring the abrogation of the project. This is joint venture between Myanmar's large military company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd and a Chinese state-owned arms producer Wanbao. When police action opposing the protestors brought about serious injury in 2012, the Myanmar government initiated a parliamentary commission under the chairmanship of NLD leader led by ASSK to create a study of projects respecting all respects and recommended resolutions. Both partners to the project agreed to comply with commission's recommendations and came up with core revisions to the original agreement that is necessary to solve its environmental, social, and financial problems. This also made Thein Sein Government review the renegotiation of all big infrastructure agreements that had been initiated since the end of the SPDC Government to ensure that they all comply with environmental and social standards (Yi, 2013).

Investment targets from Chinese firms, estimated at \$8.25 billion in 2008-2011, shrank to under \$100 million in 2013-2014. Thein Sein and Burmese population wanted to steadily limit Chinese businesses since they were source of intensified corruption and widespread cronies among elites and ethnic militias. It is said that the impunity enjoyed by the Chinese business interests has been a foundation of the crony capitalism. For Thein Sein, to achieve a successful democratic reform, the good governance without corruption must be practiced seriously, and China might block this to occur. Furthermore, Chinese firms encountered with more competitions from America, EU, Japan, and South Korean companies that endeavored to enter into the cheapest labor cost country in Southeast Asia. There was evidence that China lost the Yangon-Naypitaw high speed railway contract to Japanese firm since Myanmar felt worrisome about the poor quality of Chinese technology, thereby losing its confidence after the Wenzhou high speed train collision in July 2011. Rather, the planned railway and highway links to Kyaukphyu remained to be dropped under Thein Sein Presidency now that Myanmar was reluctant equivocally for BOT or (Built-Operate-Transfer) terms, along with the mounting public opposition. This posed more limitations and challenges to China since China has played a principal role in the plan of the Kyaukphyu SEZ or Special Economic Zone. Evidently, the progress of the Kyaukphyu SEZ was still behind the attempts to the building of the Thilawa SEZ, a project chiefly sponsored by Japanese firms. Also, China's One Belt One Road Scheme by Xi Jin Ping has not appealed much attention towards Myanmar. In September 2015, even though the Sino-Myanmar oil & pipeline was finished and had its 1st trial operation, but there was no planned date for its further operation due to a negotiation impasse over transportation, investment, and tax terms. Myanmar's tepid attitude towards China's schemes are for example Myanmar's response towards BCIM Economic Corridor (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar), Myanmar rarely paid its attention to such a grand project mainly held by China. It can be assumed that Myanmar's unwillingness was obvious in several projects made by China, implying the need to decline the Chinese strong influence in Myanmar affairs (Haacke, 2016).

For the security dimension, China and Myanmar have the common interests in maintaining stability on its border and cooperate with each other by setting security organizations, both military and police, with efforts to cope with drug trafficking and other illegal cross-border activities, albeit with not great achievement in recent years. The border security management also contributed the Myanmar-China relation to plummet to nadir due to the instability and spillover of the internal wars that Myanmar military expelled on the border of China. It is believed that since 2009, the Myanmar Armed Force or (the Tatmadaw) fought against Kokang ethnic group and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or MNDAA, which Myanmar perceived that these groups were involved in the drug production. Such armed conflict circumstance generated displaced local population of more over 37,000 people evacuating into China from Myanmar's military offensiveness. And China also warned Myanmar to maintain border stability. These border conflicts also brought about negative impacts for Chinese economic interests, contemporaneously, the military drills nearby the China-Myanmar border. Bilateral relations reached to the lowest point in March 2015, after the Myanmar Armed Force heedlessly killed 5 Chinese citizens on the Chinese territory as it targeted to suppress the MNDAA. However, this means the violation of the territory laws. This led the Foreign and Minister Wunna Muang Lwin to apologize on behalf of the Myanmar Government and military. There were some causes why the border conflicts have become more

intensified, contributing Myanmar-China to plummet to unexpected low point in the post-Cold War period. Firstly, the growing suspicions and uncertainties of Myanmar's side regarding connections, relations, and backs up in which ethnic armed organizations along borders reaped Chinese contacts and supports. This entailed the unsuccessful completion of the country's ongoing state-building agenda whose aim is to build border stability and unity. Rather, such suspicions were increasingly intensified in 2015, the military aggression under the MNDAA obtaining Chinese supports. Second, both Myanmar and China have quarrelsome over the suitable solutions for Myanmar to cope with the armed ethnic groups along the border. China has preferred dialogue in clear terms, whereas Myanmar's military leadership has selected a mixed approach that has considered the resort to military force at the same time, selected a military solution. However, due to the MNDAA aggressiveness, Myanmar's military had opted for the use of force ultimately. Thirdly, China apparently put effort to influence the negotiation process towards a nation ceasefire; this ceasefire wanted all ethnic groups to sign the ceasefire agreement. Yet this was strongly opposed by the Myanmar Government since Chinese diplomats put pressure on the KIA or Kachin Independence Army and the UWSA or the United Wa State Army, not to sign the nationwide ceasefire (Haacke, 2016). China has opted for this way since there was evidence that China aimed to use these groups as a tool of gain leverage in order to have influence with Myanmar's domestic politics for its own interests (Clapp, 2015).

It is true that Myanmar and China have encountered with difficulties and challenges concerning various relations. Nevertheless, this paper will endeavor to explain that the uncertainties in Myanmar-Sino Relations, mainly caused by the suspension of the Myitsone Dam and the challenging democratic progress, have been replaced by the warm amity. Many claimed that under Thein Sein, their bilateral relations with China has become undermined, yet their bilateral relations indeed further improved under such transitional period. This was largely thanks to the mutual dependence of economic and strategic relations, as well as their historical proximity, referring to the norm of interference and peaceful-coexistence since 1950s. Under the mutual dependence between Myanmar and China under Thein Sein, Naypyidaw has adopted "limited alignment", meaning to steadily depend on China politically, militarily, and economically, simultaneously, Myanmar also had to adjust itself not to let other nations blame it as China's client state. Even Myanmar has retained close relations with China, Myanmar must re-image itself to gain political legitimacy from international community i.e. supporting ASEAN stance on the issue of the South China Sea or promoting democratic reforms to be recognized by the west, which could perhaps challenge China's interests. Likewise, Thein Sein visits to China in 2015 for the celebration of the 70th for the War against Fascism in Beijing signaled that Paukphaw or brotherly relations would carry on. Myanmar would still have to rely on their so-called mutual dependence in the long run to support the long-term development in terms of economic and strategy as well as the border stability. This considered that Myanmar's cooperation in economic and strategic agenda initiated by China was still present and possible for instances in "One Belt One Road" initiative as well as in Bangladesh Myanmar, China, and India Economic Corridor which could be beneficial for both sides (Harrington, 2012) & (Paribatra, 2017).

However, this paper will attempt to examine that in spite of bilateral challenges & difficulties on Myanmar-Sino relations, Myanmar has opted to retain close

relations with China due to the ethnic reconciliation between Myanmar and ethnic armed groups and the involvement of China to reach peace process along border, the economic relations between Myanmar and China to boost economic prosperity in Myanmar, the military relations between Myanmar and China to support political and military stability and military capability. This paper will provide supporting arguments why Myanmar needs China to maintain Myanmar's domestic importance regarding ethnic reconciliation between the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups, the economic relations, and the military relations.

Ethnic reconciliation process

Under Thein Sein Presidency, ethnic reconciliation could not be achieved and circumstances became aggravated and remained a source of conflict. Both Myanmar and China's peace process has been concentrated upon the armed ethnic groups along the border in Kachin and Shan states concerning the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and the Kokang Army (MNDA). For Myanmar's viewpoint, Myanmar felt suspicious and distrustful whether China truly aimed to persuade for peace and facilitate dialogues owing to certain Chinese special groups like Yucheng Group which provided financing to ethnic arms groups, as well as China's ambivalent position on the prolonged principle of non-interference. Nonetheless, China has remained a crucial player in the Myanmar peace process because ethnic groups in northern Myanmar have shared historical and cultural ties with those in China. Myanmar has accused China that has downplayed the importance of reaching peace process as China obstructed some main ethnic armed organizations not to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). China attempted to portray itself a constructive actor with escalated interest to enhance relations under Thein Sein's Government, simultaneously, the intricate linkages between China and ethnic armed groups let China host ethnic refugees during the Kokang conflict in 2015 and supported financing ethnic rebels. China's business ties in mining and logging and other illegal activities with ethnic armed groups generated wide discontent that China exploited Myanmar's resources and prolonged the war. Therefore, as soon as the conflicts between ethnic armed and the Central Government took place, both ethnic groups and special Chinese business groups were not only sympathetic but also supportive each other (Sun, 2017).

Myanmar has become a battlefield for armed ethnic groups fighting against the central government since its independence in 1948. China's role is crucial to Thein Sein's efforts to build peace and stability for Myanmar as Myanmar has to also ensure that the provincial top echelon follows the same promise as in Beijing stating that "China is willing to continue giving pivotal help for Myanmar's internal peace process" said by Chinese President Xi Jinping during the visits. In 2009 and 2015, the spillover of fighting along the Myanmar- China border resulted in an influx of thousands of refugees across the stringent controlled border areas. China in turn showed substantial discontent over the fighting as five Chinese people were dead on the Chinese side. Therefore, in order to achieve peaceful border relations and to support a more constructive joint effort under a cooperative collaboration, it is necessary for Myanmar to continue having good relations with China. Myanmar significantly relies on China to convince Yunnan authorities to be proactive and enhance their attempts to maintain peace and prevent further fighting now that instability will not only affect long-standing

border trade and the social environment. It is believed that the agreement on ceasefire could expedite improvement in border areas that have been occupied by ethnic armed groups. This thus will generate to increasing opportunities in economic development and cross-border trade for both Myanmar and China. This will also be strategically beneficial for China side now that plenty of Chinese massive projects including large oil and gas pipelines or hydropower dam projects are located along these borders. Under Thein Sein Presidency, Thein Sein believed that maintaining friendly relations nevertheless still pave the way for adequate progress to mutually support peace process and later lead to an increasingly political dialogue that will bring long-term peace for both countries and Myanmar's national reconciliation (Chongkittavorn, 2017).

Myanmar has always witnessed that China has been a major provider of predominant military, economic, and tactical assistance to the ethnic groups in Shan and Kachin States, nearby Yunnan borders. China has traditionally been friendly with Myanmar's ethnic minorities. In spite of China's promulgated constructive roles for peace process, Burmese officials have great suspicion and raise questions whether China's ambivalent position can truly play a vital role in persuading for peace and political dialogues or put more leverage on Myanmar by ethnic armed organizations. The Tatmadaw's goal was to let all ethnic armed groups sign the National Ceasefire Agreement and believed that China's support would obstruct this process. It is sometimes insufficient to let all ethnic armed groups engage in the peace dialogue to address the prolonged rooted issues if China has not still ceased to maintain backups towards those ethnic groups. Indeed, Thein Sein believed that China's cooperation in convincing KIA, UWSA, and MNDAA to sign the national Ceasefire Agreement could highly help reach peace in the entire nation. With peace, this will also make Myanmar achieve deliberate democratic reforms. Myanmar's democratic and economic transition has been one of the highlighted momentums in the 21st century, and the achievement of transition also relied upon Myanmar's domestic peace process (Dolan-Evans, 2017).

Economic relation

Since 2011, Myanmar has undertaken deepening democratic and economic reforms, bringing the rising opportunities for Myanmar and China to further engage in the economy, trade, on the one hand, while bringing challenges and uncertainties in Myanmar-Sine economic relations on the other. Although the rapid development between Myanmar and the west, bringing some challenges to China, it does not mean that Myanmar and China will always have worsening economic relations. Thein Sein still carried on maintaining cordial and cooperative relations with China. In the future prospects of economic relation, both of them still need each other; China had apparent benefits for economic relations between Myanmar and China. Likewise, Myanmar also had benefits in cooperative relations with China despite some criticisms of asymmetrical gains. Importantly, the suspension of the Myitsone Dam was not regarded as a total deteriorating relationship among the two. Such suspension was not made for the objective of sidelining with the west nor getting away from China. Obviously, after the suspension, Myanmar brought high level official visits to negotiate with China to prevent from worsening bilateral relations. This indicates that Myanmar still relied on China to uphold their mutual economic ties. To this date, China has been the top nation for over 20 years that has invested a variety of

projects in Myanmar. China firms intended to invest more increasingly in the sectors demanded by Myanmar's government. China characterized by its negative image was inevitably required by Myanmar to support its border stability, strategic projects, technological transfer, and strategic investment projects. Consequently, whether their economic bilateral relations were more or less undermined, China still had to play a vital role in supporting Myanmar's economy, yet China needed to ensure that it truly shored up the principle of win-win cooperation, enhances its political mutual trust, and importantly respected the rights of Burmese populations in Myanmar territory through reviewing its improper conduct and deficiencies. This would bring about a better relation of comprehensive, strategic, and cooperative ties between Myanmar and China in sustainable way (Bi, 2014)

Since 1988, China has pursued such preferential loans, low-interest rate loans, or debt reliefs as a tool to win friends and attract more countries to trade with them; and Myanmar is one of them. China has undeniable played a vital role in improving Myanmar's economy as the volume and values of Myanmar-China trade has grown continuously from 1988 until 2010, in particular the border trade with Yunnan Province in China. Almost Chinese economic assistances are considered substantially helpful for Myanmar. Nonetheless, Myanmar Government is aware of China's assertive ambitions, particularly unethical behavior and disregard to social rights and environmental sustainability. The looming habit of Chinese firms has adversely impacted Burmese populations. In the future, it can be assumed that despite some suspicions, Myanmar however still needs China to secure its economy as China has still remained one of Myanmar's trading partners (Myoe, 2011). Additionally, under the transition of Myanmar's domestic politics since 2011, it is noted that Myanmar has not been completely lifted sanction from the west despite the increasing restoration of diplomatic relations with the west. Moreover, Myanmar's domestic politics is still controlled by military positions despite some intensification of democratic reforms. This means the capacity to develop economic relation with the west might not reach at an effective point, when compared to that with China. Myanmar's neutral foreign policy is the basic cornerstone of Myanmar's diplomacy, meaning that Myanmar will never sideline economic relations with the west nor completely rely on economic relations with China, but practice in balanced way. This means Myanmar also relies on China for its balanced relations. Nowadays, no other countries cannot meet Myanmar's economic demands and grant developmental assistance as good as China. Plenty of Chinese investments regarding in several sectors are still indispensable for Myanmar's economy and people livelihood in the long run. Myanmar truly requires China so as to develop at a faster pace. It needs China to support large-scale infrastructure projects for instances ports, bridges, and highways. And China has been major assistant in this development. Since the past, China has assisted Myanmar in building hydropower plants, oil pipelines, and important bridges that have played an indispensable role in maintaining the nation's long-term economic stability. To these days, China has been Myanmar's largest foreign investor, far ahead of those countries in ASEAN region. However, it is true that China essentially requires ameliorating its inappropriate conduct towards Burmese population and Myanmar's natural resources if it is keen to have sustainably trustful relations with Myanmar in the future and to please with public discontents in Myanmar (Xi, 2016).

Military relation

Since 1988s, China has become the key military provider and supporter for Myanmar's military development despite Chinese weapons' inferiority. Their military ties have become more developed as the number of high-level officers' exchanges has escalated to signal that such military relations were important. Since 1988, Myanmar confronted with west boycotts has been impacted by the arms embargo; it was therefore imperative for Myanmar to militarily count on China. Along with the internal instability led by insurgent groups in the northern part of Myanmar, Myanmar realized that it needed to grossly strengthen its big-scaled modernization programs. This thus made China supply weapons including combat aircraft, warships, battle tanks, and others. China under the PLA has also played a significant role in providing training courses for weaponry programs and soft loans for arms procurement. Yet, due to inferiority of military weapons, Myanmar under the Tatmadaw opted to diversify its weapon procurement partners including Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, India, and others in 2000s. For example, the problems in spare parts and other follow-up services, as well as inefficient weaponry programs provided by the PLA led Burmese pilots to learn unsafely by themselves. Notwithstanding, in the midst of international diplomatic sanctions from the west, Myanmar has still retained close military relationship with China now that Myanmar Armed Forces could obtain advantages from Chinese arms procurement and Chinese military technology transfer and assistance in modernizing Myanmar's internal military industry (Myoe, 2011).

Under the USDP Government, thanks to the improved restoration of diplomatic relations with the west, Myanmar could find out other military partners to seek more effective and qualified weapon system. Myanmar and China could have increasingly limited military relations. In tandem with the instability along the Myanmar-China borders, China could pursue its fairly limited arms sale strategy since it was afraid of threatening ethnic groups in the northern Myanmar. Arms sales to Myanmar and other militant groups could result in spilling turmoil over to China's territory, causing difficulties for China to address. Indeed, China was unwilling to be viewed as a threat and opted to concentrate on its own national security (Swanstrom, 2015). Nevertheless, in spite of the transition of Myanmar's domestic politics, Myanmar has continuously relied on China's military assistance which might be challenged by some extent from Myanmar's democratization. Myanmar's Government is still largely dominated by military groups having security-oriented perceptions. In their points of view, internal instability caused by long-standing conflictual ethnic groups in the northern part has still remained a source of threat and conflicts. Henceforth, it is mandatory for the Tatmadaw to strengthen and modernize its military development, even it has accused that China has supported financing and arms towards those ethnic armed forces. This nevertheless requires China to back up. The developed relations between the west and Myanmar can generate Myanmar to seek and diversify its security cooperation, with a view to reduce over-dependence on China's military arms. Yet, it is noted that there has been substantial suspicion among military elites towards western governments due to several past decades of international boycotts to Myanmar and some supports to Kachin Army. This might eventually let Myanmar opt to seek military help from China since Myanmar can still acquire some benefits from that.

Conclusion

Thanks to their historical proximity concerning the norm of interference and peaceful- coexistence since 1950s, both Myanmar and China have sought to retain their Paukphaw or brotherly relations to be a symbol that both will support each other under mutual interdependence in various cooperative dimensions. During Thein Sein Presidency's democratization reforms, Myanmar must re-image itself to gain political legitimacy from international community through pursuing balanced foreign policy to all Major Powers including the US and China. On the one hand, Myanmar could represent challenges to China as there was high resentment from societal and state levels which have great suspicions to China's domineering influence in Myanmar affairs. The notable case would be the suspension of hydropower Dam caused uncertainties to China but gave victory to Burmese voices. Despite their bilateral difficulties, Myanmar has still retained good relations with China on the other hand. Although Myanmar has restored diplomatic relations with other major powers, no other countries cannot meet Myanmar's economic development demands and grant developmental assistance as good as China. Plenty of Chinese investments regarding in several sectors are still indispensable for Myanmar's economy and people livelihood in the long run. It was still difficult for Myanmar, who has pursued isolated foreign policy and been imposed international diplomatic sanctions by the west, to feel trustful to these western countries, unlike China who has supported Myanmar's regime survival for so long. And of course, Myanmar's main national priorities stated in its foreign policy are to promote economic development and to maintain peace and stability throughout the nation. This paper will support that Myanmar requires China to enhance Myanmar's key domestic factors. As Myanmar has been conflictual with several ethnic armed groups along the northern part for a long period of time, Myanmar needs China to involve since China has close cultural ties with such groups, and hope that peace will be emerged. In terms of economic development, Myanmar truly requires China so as to develop at a faster pace. It needs China to support large-scale infrastructure projects for instances ports, bridges, and highways. And China has been major assistant in this development. Since the past, China has assisted Myanmar in building hydropower plants, oil pipelines, and important bridges that have played an indispensable role in maintaining the nation's long-term economic stability. To these days, China has been Myanmar's largest foreign investor, far ahead of those countries in ASEAN region. And in terms of military, Myanmar still needs China to back up its military capability and modernizations. With these supporting reasons, if Myanmar has not maintained good relations with China, Myanmar itself could not prosper and meet their national priorities in the long run.

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DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES: A CASE STUDY OF DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC SPHERE IN DAWEI TOWNSHIP, MYANMAR

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Abstract

This research studies the impact of public sphere and decentralization on the accountability of regional government in the case study of electricity supply sector in Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region, Myanmar. In 2014, a large social movement, including signature campaign and demonstration, was occurred to strike for the electricity issue in Dawei. Since that time, people have been attempted to check their regional government to become accountable to the constituents and a protest in 2017 was a key event to claim the accountability of the government for the electricity issue. Applying the concept of decentralization and public sphere, this thesis analyzed the nature of accountability in sub-national level and to what extent the regional government allow the space for civil society and media to deliberate public issues, exploring the communicative action between the government and society. With the documentary research and field study in which in-depth interviews with civil society groups, media, activist, government officials and Member of Parliament in regional level were conducted, the thesis used qualitative research method to collect the data to answer the research questions. Evolution of electricity supply in Dawei since 1948 and the actors who involved in the sector were examined throughout the thesis as well as the timeline of political system changes in Myanmar since it was independent was also scrutinized. The research found that people can more approach to the government through the parliament or regional government after the new decentralized structural reform in 2010 compared with the military regime before 2010. With the liberalization process since 2010, the civil society groups played a role of check and balance to the government using different channels and approaches including mainstream media, social media, and social movement. As a result, the regional government responded the public demand, implementing new system of electricity supply in Dawei, through the communicative action, practicing the power that was transferred under the new political structure according to 2008 Constitution. Accountability of government was also unbundled between central government and regional government after 2010. This thesis concludes that transferring power to regional government and liberalizing civil and political spaces create communicative action, which contributes the accountability of the state.

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Keywords: *Decentralization, public sphere, communicative action, accountability*

1. Introduction

Decentralization are being demanded around the world to facilitate effectively for the geographical distance, diversity, and more accountable and responsive for the people (Smith, 1985). Myanmar is one of the countries which has a lot of diversities in terms of geographic, culture, ethnicity, and identity. Creating Executive, Legislative, and Judicial bodies, the 2008 Constitution introduced the separation of power among these three branches as well as distributed the power to Sub-national governments around the country.

As the military still takes 25% of seats in the parliament to guard the Constitution amendment, it is assumed that the current distribution of power is an end rather than starting point (Nixon et al., 2013). Nixon et al. (2013) also proved that there is the significant increasing interest in Myanmar to extend the decentralization to sub-national government through every possible political channel including constitutional change. The distribution of power by the 2008 constitution did not make a clear distinction among State and Region departments, State and Region governments, and Union governments. As a result, it is still blurry to find accountability in respective government administration bodies, especially in regional level.

Decentralization also aims to improve accountability of the government to their constituents (Smith, 1985). The successful of decentralization also relies on that the government have the accountability to the people. Decentralization cannot be accomplished unless decentralized government are not accountable to their constituents or only if they are accountable to higher level of authorities within the state institutions (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). In this situation, decentralization can be effective only when people can exercise countervailing power to ensure accountability by the decentralized government. To do so, civil and political freedoms are vital to allow the civil society and the citizens to deliberate public interest to the state.

This paper will study by choosing Dawei Township, Tanintaryi Region as a case study area to provide insight into decentralization and public sphere in local level. Electricity issue is one of the biggest problems in Dawei which a large social movement was occurred in 2014 and 2017. More than 3000 people involved at the protest in 2014 to claim for the electricity issue while more than 250 people in Dawei demonstrated to ask for the government accountability. As the electricity issue is new and hot issue for this region, it is selected as a case study in the paper to examine deeply into the decentralization and public sphere in regional governance.

The main argument of this paper is that decentralization and liberalizing civil and political freedoms creates communicative actions between the local government and the society, which leads to the accountability of the government. Firstly, this paper scrutinizes the key issues involved in electricity supply in Dawei Township to understand how the government and local people respond on them. By evaluating the powers of decentralized government to respond on

electricity issue, public sphere in which civil society groups and citizens can deliberate their voices and concerns to the authority, and communicative action between citizens and the state are examined to prove the main argument of the paper.

2. Conceptual Framework

The two conceptual frameworks are applied to answer the research question by analyzing the data through this paper. The first conceptual framework developed by Agrawal and Ribot in 1999 is used to analyze decentralization for accountability and effectiveness. The second is the framework to measure the public sphere which can make countervailing to the State to be accountable to the people. The concept of public sphere in this paper is taken from Habermas (1989), Fraser (1990), and Kocan (2008). These two concepts are used to analyze how decentralization to sub-national government and public sphere create the communicative action which leads to the accountability.

The governments under the democratic system are representative of the people as they came to power through election. If the election provides free contestation, widespread participation, and political liberties for the citizens, the government will perform for the best interest of the people (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, 1999). In Myanmar, according to 2008 Constitution, the general election is held periodically in every five years to elect the representatives in both regional parliament and union parliament though the military takes twenty five percent of seats in both of them. The regional elections, national elections, and parliamentary debate, which can attempt the check and balance to the executive branch, may also contribute the accountability of the government in Myanmar. However, this paper will not focus these factors as they are out of the scope of the primary focus in the conceptual framework of the paper.




Figure (1) Conceptual Framework for Accountability by Decentralization and Public Sphere

Based on the framework of Agrawal and Ribot (1999), four types of powers are guided to analyze how the regional government can exercise these powers to respond the public demand under the framework of the 2008 Constitution in Myanmar. The first one is the power to create new rules or modify old ones which refers the legislative power of the decentralized government. The second is the power to make decisions about how particular resources or opportunities are to be used, which is related with fiscal decentralization. The third is the power to implement and ensure the compliance to the new or altered rules, which refers the executive power of the decentralized actor. The fourth is the power to adjudicate disputes that arise in the effort to create rules and ensure compliance, which is to look at the mechanism to deal with disputes from the situation when new rules are created, or new decision is made by particular actors.

Public sphere refers the space where people can discuss the issues which can affect their everyday life and which they are concerned of, association with democratic context. It can also be defined as a space where people can debate as well as that is key element of democracy (Habermas, 1989). Habermas also elaborates the public sphere as a theater in modern society in which political participation can happen through the medium of talk and also it is a space that people can deliberate about their concerns. Kocan (2008) raised that public sphere can be seen as the space in which people can exchange of opinion and points of views towards deliberative and associative democratic process which can affect decision making although their views may have differences. Habermas (1989) also provides similar explanation that citizens perform as public body when they can discuss without any restriction, ensuring freedom of assembly and association, the freedom of expression, and raise their opinions about their interest. Fraser (1990) also argues that it should be promoted the ideal of participatory parity to accommodate the contestation among a plurality of competing publics. This paper studied the existing public sphere of Myanmar in which the way people discuss public issues and transmit their concerns to the authority in the case study of electricity providing in Dawei.

3. Research Methodology

This research will primarily include both documentary research and field research to answer the research questions. Field research will be based on qualitative research method through in-depth interview by selecting key stakeholders from civil society groups, media, activist, government officials and Member of Parliament in regional level. To find out the changes of government accountability and public spaces on papers and in practice, relevant laws, regulations and publication will be also analyzed as documentary research in this paper.

In this research, mainly state and non-state sector will be selected to interview in order to answer the research questions. For non-state sector, civil society organizations, media, journalists, and activists will be included while government officials and member of parliaments will be interviewed for state sector. Local business people and Electricity Supply Company will be also included in the interview lists but they are not primary key stakeholders of this research.

4. Key issues in the electricity supply in Dawei

Dawei people faced difficulties of accessing to electricity for many years and they received limited access of electricity supply with highly expensive price from small scale of individual and private companies by diesel engines. The government also provided limited electricity supply by diesel engines till early 2015. Currently, only 49409 household out of 104092 household can access electricity in Dawei District, which has 47.4%.¹⁰⁶

Dawei people were not happy about the expensive of electricity price and to access to electricity with time limitation for many years. Many respondents in my interview answered that the electricity price is one of the reasons that most businesses cannot set up in Dawei. Though gas extraction projects joint with foreign companies in Kanbawk, Dawei District began since around 1990s, people in Dawei did not receive benefits from it as this natural gas was exported from Kanbawk to Myaing Kalay, Karen Sate to use in government cement factories. Former member from 88 generation from my interview said that we could not discuss politics in person, even two persons, in public place under military regime till 2010 as we were always under the constant surveillance by the government. In this kind of situation, people also did not dare to criticize the government's policy and decision even for the public issues.

After political transition in 2010, people waited and saw the political space to raise about their issue. Though the Dawei is the area in which the oil and gas companies such as Total, PTTEP, and PETRONAS operates gas extraction in Dawei and export to Thailand, people in Dawei did not access electricity generated by gas. Therefore, civil society organizations in Dawei initiated a movement in 2014 to strike for electricity issue.

Regional government planned the project to provide electricity supply by gas turbines in 2014 and operated in July 2015, contracting with the private company, which can provide with 300 Ks per unit and it was fixed price. After general election in 2015, National League for Democracy (NLD) party won landside and formed the government. With the attempt of reducing the electricity price, the regional government called for tender again for electricity generation project and distribution in 2017 (Zin, 2018). There was criticism on that DDPC Company won tender for electricity distribution though people did not like its services. Because of electricity break down very often, around 300 residents in Dawei went a march by claiming to supervise and monitor GGS company for electricity generation by regional government and to provide electricity distribution by Ministry of Electricity and Energy as well as they expressed that we do not want DDPC Company which does not take accountability in electricity distribution.¹⁰⁷

The electricity issue of Dawei can be divided into two main issues with the time frame under USDP government regime between 2010 and 2015, and under the NLD government regime after 2015. Under the first term of government regime after the transition in 2010, the issue of electricity that people claimed was to access electricity generated by gas which was extracted in Dawei as well as to access electricity with the price as the same as the other regions and states. In

¹⁰⁶ Ministry of Electricity and Energy Webpage. Retrieved from <http://www.moee.gov.mm/en/ignite/page/52>

¹⁰⁷ 'Mi Pyat Thi Atwet Dawei Twin Pha Yaung Tai Mi Tun Sanda Pya' (A protest in Dawei by candle light for electricity breakdown). (July, 2017). Tanintharyi Weekly Journal.

addition, it included the resource right as they claimed that the resources from our region also should be utilized for the people of Dawei. After organizing constant social movement to strike for electricity issue, the regional government implemented new electricity supply system generated by gas, contracting with the private companies in 2014. Taking state power in 2016 after winning a landslide in general election in 2015, NLD government continued electricity supply plan that previous government installed. But NLD government made the changes in 2017 by contracting new company, GGS, for electricity generation and the same company, DDPC, for electricity distribution through the call for tender despite that local people complained about the service of DDPC. Consequently, the criticism of the government also has been increased for the lack of transparency for the tender process

5. Decentralization in Tanintharyi Region and Electricity Supply

The 2008 Constitution provided the horizontal separation of power among executive, legislative, and judicial in both central level and regional level as well as the vertical distribution of power by the Schedule Two for the legislative power and by the Schedule Five for the fiscal power. To explore the power of the sub-national government in Tanintharyi Region in the case of electricity supply, the four types of power development by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) from the conceptual framework will be applied in this section.

5.1 The power to create new rules or modify old ones

As 2008 constitution provided the legislative lists of the regional parliament, the regional parliament has the power to adopt and enact the law about the matters from the lists of Schedule Two in the constitution. Medium and small scale of electricity power production and distribution which have not any links with national grid are under the authority of State/Region Government.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, regional parliament has the power to enact the law for electricity production and distribution. On paper, Tanintharyi Region government has power to adopt the law for the electricity providing for Dawei under USDP government.

However, Phoe Thee Cho (PTC) Company, which has been providing electricity in Dawei since 2005, had to sign the contract yearly with Union Ministry of Electric until 2015 as Tanintharyi Region parliament did not adopt the law for medium and small electricity production and generation.¹⁰⁹ Tanintharyi Region parliament passed medium and small-scale electricity production and distribution law in September, 2014 only after the social movement for the electricity distribution had started since early 2014.¹¹⁰ A respondent from CSO (interview with CSO (1)) believed that drafting the Medium and Small Electricity Production and Distribution Law was one of the responses of the regional government to the social movement by civil society groups.

5.2 The power to make decisions about how a particular resources or opportunity is to be used

¹⁰⁸ Article 4 under Schedule Two of the 2008 Constitution

¹⁰⁹ Interview with senior management officer from PTC Company in May 2018

¹¹⁰ Tanintharyi Region Medium and Small Electricity Production and Distribution Law (2014, Region Parliament Law No. 21).

The 2008 Constitution mentions as ‘State or Region Government’ in making decision for the matters under the authority of sub-national government or which are assigned by the Union government.¹¹¹ As the authority of small and medium scale electricity distribution and generation is under the list of Schedule Two, Region or State legislative lists, Tanintharyi Region Government has decision making power on paper to make a new contract or modify the contract with the private company for electricity distribution. However, in practice, the regional government could not make these decisions as they did not adopt the law in regional level. Therefore, they had to follow and govern under the instructions of Union Ministry.

5.3 The power to implement and ensure compliance to the new or altered rules

For the electricity supply in Dawei, the regional government does not receive income from both distribution and generation though they have decision making power to allow private companies to operate. The company which provides for electricity distribution has to pay royalty fees of 5 Kyats per Unit to ESE for utilizing the State’s infrastructure, but it goes to the budget of Union Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MOEE) as ESE is the department of MOEE.¹¹² In addition, regional government does not have the authority to manage natural resources as it is under the authority of union government stated in Schedule One of the 2008 Constitution. Therefore, Tanintharyi Region Government does not have power to manage gas for electricity generation though it is extracted in the Tanintharyi Region.

5.4 The power to adjudicate disputes that arise in the effort to create rules and ensure compliance

There is no mechanism that regional government can practice the power of adjudication to decide the dispute when new rules are created, or new decision are made by particular actors in the case of Dawei. The 2008 Constitution provides the power of adjudication to constitution tribunal to resolve the dispute between Union and a Region, or among the Regions/States in carrying out duties and responsibilities.¹¹³ In the electricity case, the dispute between the sub-national government and the company shall be resolved by the 2016 arbitration act.¹¹⁴ According to this law, arbitration tribunal can be formed with the persons proposed by the both parties. The dispute between the regional government and the companies shall be taken places in Yangon in the case of electricity.¹¹⁵ There was no legal mechanism that provide the chance to local people to make complaints to the company for their services.

¹¹¹ Article 249,250, and 251 of the 2008 Constitution.

¹¹² Interview with region minister and officer from ESE in May 2018.

¹¹³ Article 322, the 2008 Constitution

¹¹⁴ The contract of electricity distribution agreement between Tanintharyi Region Government and Dawei Development Public Co., Ltd on June 2017. Retrieved from www.daweiwatch.com

¹¹⁵ The contract between the regional government and DDPC (Though the researcher had the chance to read it, this contract is a published document.)

6. Public sphere and communicative action on the electricity issue under USDP Government (2010 – 2015)

In 2010, the military held the general election by the 2008 Constitution, which was adopted by the junta, with the attempt of political transition. Local people could start talking in public places about the regional issues after 2010 but they could not criticize yet the government and complaint heavily as they still waited and saw the transition with the doubt.¹¹⁶ The transition from military regime to quasi-civilian government in 2010 was not only military involved constitutionally in politics but also the government was formed by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which ruled the five-year term between 2011 to 2016 (Ninh and Arnold, 2016).

People could raise their concerns and interests more bravely in public only after 2012, when the Nation League for Democracy Party led by Aung San Su Kyi, democratic icon, completed in by-election and took 43 seats in union parliament (Holliday, 2013).¹¹⁷ The government also released a large number of political prisoners in 2012 as well as abolished the pre-submitting censorship for media. Union Parliament passed the Peaceful Pcession and Peaceful Assembly Act in December 2011.¹¹⁸ However, this law still included many restrictions for the protestors, allowing limited space for the citizens. For example, those who want to organize need to submit letter for permission from township police office five days before. In addition, the detail for the protest such as the biography of the leader, time, place, poster, slogan, route, and number of participants need to be submitted. Police officer can issue permission with the approval of township administrative officer or can deny.

Though civil society groups and political conscious people were taking about electricity issue since 2013, there was not social movement mobilizing the general public. A member from CSO (6), one of the persons who led social movement for electricity issue in 2014, remarked on that they kept trying to find the solution for electricity issue, but they discussed each other in persons for that. At that time, social media, particularly Facebook, was not popular yet and many of the local people could not use mobile SIM card as the price was still expensive.

The civil society groups decided to organize the sticker campaign and protests mobilizing the general public in Dawei, involving over one thousand people in the protest in Dawei in 2014. Civil society groups decided to give a pressure to government to respond on the demand of local people for electricity supply.¹¹⁹ Although these movement claimed for the electricity supply, public service, it also included resource right as the sticker in the campaign stated 'our resource for our people'. Activist who involved in organizing this event said that gas from Dawei was sent to national grid as well as was exported to Thailand but the people in Dawei could not have the chance to get benefit from that, especially for the electricity supply. In addition, Dawei people accessed electricity with the expensive price.

In responding the social movement on the demand to implement electricity supply by gas, regional government informally invited the leaders from the

¹¹⁶ Interview with member from CSO (6) in May 2018.

¹¹⁷ Interview with member from CSO (7) in April 2018.

¹¹⁸ The Peaceful Procession and Peaceful Assembly Act (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 15, 2011)

¹¹⁹ Interview with member from CSO (6) in May 2018.

movement and discussed about to deal with it.¹²⁰ Chief Minister went to Nay Pyi Taw to meet with Union Minister of Electrical Power to discuss to sell gas for the electricity generation to supply Dawei. Regional Minister of Electrical Power responded to the media that Union Ministry agreed to sign MOU with APU Company to sell gas for electricity generation for Dawei. He also said that the permission of Union Ministry was vital to implement the electricity project in Dawei. Discussion of electricity unit price would be included in signing MOU between regional government and APU Company as a purchasing power agreement (PPA) (Htut, 2014). Subsequently, regional parliament adopted the Medium and Small Electricity Production and Distribution Law in 2014.¹²¹ According to this law, the USDP government made a contract with Dawei Development Public Company for the electricity distribution before they handed over the power to NLD government in April 2016 (Zin, 2015).

7. Public sphere and communicative action on the electricity issue under NLD Government (2015 – present)

After winning landslide of the general election in 2015, NLD could form the government in Myanmar and took the power in April 2016. NLD took all the seats in Tanintharyi parliament except 25% of military seats as well as formed the cabinet appointing all regional ministers from NLD Party except military position. The activities of civil society organizations, particularly giving the pressure to government, went down noticeably after NLD took the power in Dawei as the people would like to wait and see the performance of the government that they elected.¹²²

In July 2017, more than 250 people in Dawei marched with the candle lights, claiming the accountability of the government to monitor the companies for the electricity blackouts very often and for the bad services of the companies (Win, 2017). Before the protest, people talked about these issues on the social media and public places, but they decided to protest as the government did not take any action on that.¹²³

Discussing about electricity issue in public place is also a kind of deliberation model. For example, a public forum was organized at the tea shop in Dawei in February 2018 to express the difficulties and concerns of the local people. The invitation for this event was shared on Facebook and then the township police contacted to the organizers to ask permission.¹²⁴ This approved that the local authorities are still keeping the local residents under the surveillance and try to control the public sphere.

As a lot of criticism on the government for the tender process via social media and mainstream media was formed as public opinion, the government held press conference to explain how the government decided for the tender process and why the electricity blackouts were occurred. The press conference was held in July 2017, in which the government, ESE, GGS Company, and DDPC

¹²⁰ Interview with member from CSO (1) in May 2018.

¹²¹ Tanintharyi Region Medium and Small Electricity Production and Distribution Law (2014, Region Parliament Law No. 21).

¹²² Interview with members from CSOs (CSO (3), (4) & (5)) in April and May 2018.

¹²³ Interview with a member from CSO (7) in May 2018.

¹²⁴ Interview with a member from CSO (1) in April 2018.

involved.¹²⁵ However, people did not satisfy on the government respond as people thought explaining itself was not enough to tackle the issue. A respondent in my interview (interview with CSO (2)) also commented on that the government did not answer clearly to the questions raised by the participants in this press conference as well as they felt the government stood on the side of the companies.

8. Discussion

In this section, I will discuss how the 2008 Constitution establish the new state structure and the political transition in post 2010 creates the space for the civil society. Then, I will explain how the decentralization and public sphere establish communicative action between the sub-national government and the civil society, which contribute the accountability of the government to the citizens in local level.

8.1 The 2008 Constitution and the Political Transition in Post 2010

The military government tried to adopt the constitution by holding National Convention since 1992. Setting up the roadmap to discipline democracy, the military held the referendum in 2008 to approve the constitution immediately after the Nargis Cyclone hit the country, which was the biggest disaster in the history. Though there were the movements to against the constitution and the referendum, the military government approved the constitution in 2008 by claiming the result of the referendum. Inevitably, the military designed the constitution to make sure that the military held the political position to guard this constitution and to involve in politics legitimately as the constitution was drafted by unilateral.

This constitution established seven Regions and seven States as the sub-national units by horizontal separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial power in both Union level and sub-national level and by vertical distribution of power between Union government and regional government, which was the new structure in Myanmar. Though the power were transferred by the constitution in Schedule 1 for Union government and in Schedule 2 for regional government, Union government still held relatively greater power than sub-national government. In addition, the residual power which was not mentioned in the constitution was delivered to the Union government.

As the 2008 Constitution did not receive legitimacy, major opposition party, National League for Democracy boycotted the general election in 2010, which was held by the military. But some political parties and ethnic political parties ran in the election by considering as the space for the transition. Given that, the military backed-up political party, Union Solidarity and Development Party led to form the government, winning the landslide in the general election in 2010 as the credibility of the election was also questionable.

After USDP came to power in 2011, the President Thein Sein started the political liberalization process to achieve legitimacy from both international and domestic. In 2012, the government released a large number of political prisoners, passed the Freedom of Procession and Freedom Assembly, and amended the political

¹²⁵ 'Dawei Khayaing Hlatsit Katesa Taninlarnaie Thadinsar Shin Lin Myi' (Press conference will be held on Monday for electricity issue of Dawei) (June, 2017). The Tanintharyi Weekly. Vol. 4. No. 49.

party registration law so that NLD could compete in by-election in April 2012. Subsequently, NLD run in the by-election in April 1, 2012 and won 43 seats out of total 48 seats in Union Parliament. As a result, Daw Aung San Su Kyi, country's democratic icon, became a member of *Pyithu Hluttaw* (House of representative).

As political parties, political activists, and student leaders from 88 generations could mobilize and encourage the citizens, people started to speak out the politics and discussed about political issues in public places. Though the legal framework for the political and civil freedom had the constraints, the civil society groups and political conscious people has been functioning the activities, particularly for the political nature. With the attempt of advocating by the civil society groups, Thein Sein government passed the Law Relating to Registration of Organizations in 2014, which allowed the local and international NGOs for legal registration and repealed the law under SLORC which restricted to the civil society organizations. In addition, the Printers and Publishers Enterprise Law and Media law were passed which provided the opportunity to emerge local medias.

8.2 Decentralization to Sub-national Government

Legislative of State and Region government is unicameral, constituting by two representatives elected per township, elected representatives for each of the 'national races' populated more than 0.1 percent of the state/region population, and 25% of military representatives (one-third of the elected members) who are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief (Article 161, 2008 Constitution). Regional Parliament is transferred the power to adopt and enact the law about the matters from the lists the Schedule Two under the 2008 constitution. The delivered rule-making power to sub-national government are primarily the regional level issues. For example, in the case study of Dawei, the small and medium scale electricity generation and distribution, which were not linked with the national grid, are under the authority of sub-national government to enact and administer.

The sub-national government is also transferred decision making for the administrative matters within the legislative power of State/Region Parliament as well as for the matters that are assigned in accord with any Union Law. The sub-national government is led by Chief Minister who is nominated by the President among the members of regional parliament and Chief Minister formed the cabinet by taking the approve from the parliament. Though the parliament shall approve the Chief Minister, they do not have the right to reject if they could not prove the failure to meet the constitutional qualification on the nomination by the President. Local people did not have the right to elect the Chief Minister, who is head of the regional government, as it was at the hand of the President. As a result, the regional government are likely to accountable to Union government instead of accountable to the citizens.

As sub-national government do not have dedicated administrative bodies to support in carrying out their functions and tasks, they had to rely on the departments in regional level that are assigned from Union Ministries. The constitution provides that State and Region Government can manage, guide, and coordinate with the subordinate government departments in the administering the tasks of regional government. In practice, it was a challenge for the regional government to supervise the civil servants who need to be accountable directly to their Mother Ministries.

The constitution also provides judiciary power in sub-national level by forming High Court of Region/State which entails between three and seven judges and it is led by the Chief Justice. High Court takes responsibility to supervises district and township courts. President nominates the Chief Justice by consulting with the Chief Justice of the Union while Chief Minister nominates the judges, in coordination with Chief Justice of the Union, and then approved by the State/Region Parliament. Regional High Court has the power of adjudicating on original case, appeal case, revision case, and matters prescribed by any law.

Though the regional government has judicial power, there is no mechanism that regional government can practice the power of adjudication to decide the dispute when new laws are enacted or new decision are made by particular actors, especially by Union government. The 2008 Constitution provides the power of adjudication to constitution tribunal to resolve the dispute between Union and a Region, or among the Regions/States in carrying out duties and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the law passed by the regional government must not inconsistent with any provision of the constitution and with any law passed by the Union Government. The Union Law shall be applied over regional law, provided that regional law is inconsistent with Union Law. In the electricity case, the dispute between the regional government and the company shall be resolved by the 2016 arbitration act in Yangon by forming arbitration tribunal, which did not provide for the space for the electricity users.

Despite that the regional government has the limitation in each power of rule-making, decision making, law enforcement, and adjudication, the power of the regional government ca still impact on the daily life of the citizens to administering public services such as the electricity issue of Dawei. The regional government could enact law to invite private investors in both electricity generation and distribution projects. In addition, the government also has power to decide the selection of the companies to contract for the projects both with tender process in 2017 and without tender process in 2014.

8.3 Civil Society and The Production of The Public Sphere

Since 1962, the military led government attempted to control civil, political, and media freedoms by imposing the law which restricted the citizens not to be able to make a challenge to the regime. Under the SLORC/SPDC, the military regime established the associations such as Women Affairs Organizations and Union Solidarity and Development Associations to claim that the government listened to the public concerns through these kinds of organizations. In reality, installing the supporters to the regime, the government tried to oversight the citizens, political organizations, and civil society groups who were potential to become the treats to the regime. The government detained those who criticized and made complaint to the regime with the long imprisonment in order to warn those who were potential to challenge the government. Therefore, the public sphere under the SLORC/SPDC in Myanmar can be defined as the authoritarian public sphere.

After the transition in 2010, some civil society groups started functioning the activities, particularly for service delivery for the local needs, but they did not function yet political nature as they were testing the space. As soon as the transition, there was no any legal guarantee for the civil and political freedom. But, since 2012, USDP government started liberalization throughout their term, releasing political prisoners, allowing to return political exile groups and individuals, and passing laws for civil, political, and media freedoms. These

factors made the civil society groups in Myanmar to revival, speaking out loud for the political issues as well as regional issues so that the government responded on them.

8.4 Communicative action and Government Accountability

Civil society organizations in regional level became active and focused on the issues that the local people faced in their daily lives through the emerging of the political space. They raised the public interests by applying the different channels including social media, mainstream media, holding public forum, public campaigning, and protests. As the 2008 Constitution created sub-national government, people could pressure to regional government, which became closer to them. It also created that the regional government were more accessible to the people than Union government as well as the political activities such as party campaigns, elections, regional parliament sessions, the cabinet meetings as the regional government office and regional parliament are set up in Dawei.

Therefore, civil society groups motivated to deliberate the public interests to the sub-national government and to pressure them. Even though the government are more likely to accountable to Union Government instead of being accountable to the citizens according the structure of appointing the Chief Minister and the cabinet, the regional government responded on pressure by the civil society groups as the Union government would not be happy if the civil unrest and the lot of problems were happened. Also, it will also affect the votes in the election if they run for the next terms.

After the people could access mobile SIM Card and internet since around 2014, the social media, particularly Facebook, became a channel that the civil society groups and the residents posted public issues and their voices while the government officials watched on Facebook and dealt with the issues on it. In addition, local media was also applied a channel to transmit the public voices and the government cared the issues on it. Civil society groups also approached to regional parliament to discuss their concerns as the parliament performed as the medium between the citizens and the government. Public forums and workshops are also the places which provide the space to have a conversation between the state and society as the government officials are invited to join these events organized by civil society organization. Though the protests were the most popular tools to receive the response of the government under USDP government, these relatively decreased after 2015 as NLD government received a large support by the people and the civil society groups wanted more engagement instead of confrontation.

9. Conclusion

Under the military regime before 2010, the accountability of the government was highly top down system as the military appointed regional military commander in sub-national level who was accountable to the superior within the military institution. Also, legislative power, executive power, and judicial power were under the control of the military. The military tightly restricted the civil and political freedoms without providing the space for the people to deliberate their concerns. In the case of electricity issue in Dawei, the military government implemented the projects for gas extraction in Dawei to transmit to the national grid and to export to foreign countries without caring the concerns of the

residents. Local people could not access the information on the government actions and decisions as well as the situation in other regions and states as the military imposed media censorship and controlled the information flow. Under these kinds of situation, the accountability in which the citizens' voice involved could not be possible.

After political transition in 2010, the regional government was established in Tanintharyi Region according to the 2008 Constitution. In transferring the power to sub-national government, the electricity supply for the Dawei township was included under the list of regional government authority. Therefore, the regional government held power *de jure* to make accountable to the citizens, but they were not accountable *de facto* till the civil society groups emerged through the political space after the liberalization process in the early years under the USDP government. With the process of liberalization to civil and political freedoms by the Union Government, the civil society groups checked the accountability of the government by giving the pressure through the constant social movements. Finally, the regional government became accountable via the deliberation of public concerns, leading to form the communicative action in regional level between civil society groups and the local authorities.

After 2015 when the NLD government came to power, the expectation on the regional government has been increased to become more accountable to the citizens. However, the regional government was not accountable in reality to the citizens though the regional government could exercise its power to make a change in the case of electricity supply in Dawei. Therefore, the role of civil society groups to exercise the countervailing power was still vital to make the government were accountable to the citizens. The regional government responded on the issues only when the civil society groups made a loud voice and spread the information so that the general people were aware that.

One of the aims of decentralization is to make regional government more accountable to the citizens. Based on the findings in the case study of Dawei, it should be also noted that the decentralized power holders can misused their powers if the structure of decentralization could not be designed to make sure that the regional government are accountable to the citizens. In this sense, the decentralization is not enough to make the government accountable to the citizens. Local democracy became essential to guarantee the government accountability as the activities of local democracy such as elections, rule-making, political pressure, publicity and public debate can reduce the gap between citizen and the administration (Smith, 1985). For Myanmar, decentralization reform should be moved forward to transfer the regional government to govern effectively particularly political decentralization in which local people should have the right to elect the head of the regional government and fiscal decentralization in which not only the power to collect taxes but also the power to manage the natural resource should be transferred. In addition, to exercise the power of political pressure, publicity, and public debate by civil society groups, the civil, political, and media freedoms should be guaranteed legally and removed the constraints.

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STATE'S STRATEGIES IN ESCAPING THE OIL CURSE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NORWAY AND VENEZUELA'S POLITICAL ECONOMIES

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Abstract

The intention of this master thesis is to establish a set of policy guidelines in order to combat the oil curse's negative impact on oil exporting countries' economic growth. Norway, an oil exporter since 1980s, has become one of the notable successful countries in the oil industry with sustaining GDP per capita growth rates through efficient management in sovereign wealth funds. On the other hand, Venezuela a traditional oil exporter since the 1920s, has been struggling through Dutch Disease for the third time, facing with both political and economic crises in 2017. Although, many literatures have found that there are three major resource curse mechanisms, presenting different key problems and actors within state's policy management. These can be categorized into the Dutch Disease, Rent-seeking and Institutional quality models. After analyzing the quantitative data through OLS regression model based on compiled indicators according to different mechanisms, results indicate that the Dutch Disease mechanism hinder economic growth of oil exporting countries the most, through the real effective exchange rate that yield negative relationship, while FDI yields positive relationship.

Norway shows that the regulated mechanism in oil revenue management through the Government Pension's Fund has allowed the country to avoid severe consequences from the financial economic crisis in 2008 and declined oil prices in 2015. As Norway's oil wealth has been transformed into holdings in equities, thereby diversifying the risk from oil price volatility. In combine with Norway's strong institutional management that despite state's intervention in the oil sector, incentives from refundable taxation still attracts competitive investment into the Norwegian Continental Sea Shelf. Venezuela, on the other hand has pursued in policies that further accelerate the Dutch Disease mechanism and deteriorate its own private sector, including domestic and foreign investment.

These include expropriation, nationalization, price subsidization, fixed exchange rate without proper reserve regulation and politicization of its own institutions. Venezuela's hyperinflation problem was addressed by a recommendation to either float exchange rate or adopt other currency.

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Keywords: *Oil, Norway, Venezuela, Resource Curse, Economic Growth, Dutch Disease*

Oil, a Blessing or a Curse?

Crude oil has long been a vital source of economic development and strategic component in energy security. It is traded globally and becomes a major energy commodity in many forms of businesses' operations such as transportation, logistics, and electricity generation. Many countries around the world rely on oil imports to maintain their national security through military capabilities and economic activities, while some countries are fortunate enough to have abundance supplies of crude oil on their territories. But are these oil riches really a blessing to those countries possessing it? Figures of economic growth and many literatures show us that oil-abundance has not always been a 'blessing' to the countries possessing it, although there are several successful examples, most notable one is the case of Norway's oil revenues management through the Government Pension Fund Global, as a long-term investment for public welfare's needs. But in reality, many developing countries with greater oil-rich have been experiencing it as a 'curse' to the economy and in most cases led by the misuse of bonus benefits that come from the great amount of oil supplies themselves.

According to the Natural Resource Governance Institute, the resource curse (paradox of plenty) refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs (NRGI 2015). When compare to non-resource-rich countries, those with resource rich tend to have a higher rate of conflict and authoritarianism with lower rates of economic stability and economic growth. In this research, the resource curse will be term as 'oil curse', due to primary focus of the study that rests upon the oil-exporting sector. Like many natural resources, wealth from crude oil is distinct in its own due to large upfront costs, long production timeline, site-specific nature, incentives involvement, non-renewable nature and volatility in price and production. All of which contributes to additional challenge for exporting countries' long-term efficient oil management.

Venezuela is a country with the world largest proven crude oil reserves. However, the combined development of social inequality stemming from capitalism and implementation of neo-liberal policies, have brought Venezuela into the socialist regimes of Hugo Chavez and later Nicolas Maduro. Both have been adhering and implementing socialist principles into their institutional design and policies. Thus far, it has resulted in a catastrophic outcome on both political and economic scale for Venezuela. As the boom in oil prices since 2004 have begun to rapidly decline in 2015, huge slump in oil revenues have dragged Venezuela into hyperinflation during its political transition after Chavez's death from cancer in 2013. Venezuela has been facing major economic crisis along with political oppression, series of political protests against Maduro have been ongoing since 2014 with higher casualties in each year.

Norway, on the other hand was already an industrialized country with strong democratic institutions that discovered crude oil much later than Venezuela. This allows the Norwegian people to acknowledge and become aware of the previous mistakes that oil exporting states made in the past. Norwegian-way of managing the oil wealth has led them to achieve the world's largest sovereign wealth fund

by value in 2017. These two countries do not share historical similarity or political system, but they do have one thing in common, they have certain amount of crude oil and rely on its export as the primary source of governments' budgets and economic growth.


At the same time, the OPEC led by Saudi Arabia has attempted to maintain significant influences in the global oil market through production quotas, as the United States has become a key active player in supplying crude oil from the new unconventional method, known as '*hydraulic fracturing*'. With a shifting power in the global oil economy and the rising trends in implementing alternatives due to environmental concern. International oil market faced difficult time from lower prices in 2014 and 2015, yet many countries' economy still heavily relies on exporting it and will continue to do so in the future. What will certainly changes be the stakes of key player in the oil industry through technological advancement that transfers market share and shapes the bargaining power of global politics.

These facts have concurred that the richness of natural resource does not always ensure sustainable economic progress, as there are many different ways to manage the long processes and chains of the oil business. Therefore, this study aims to compare the most different cases of Norway and Venezuela's strategies and policies in order to formulate efficient policy recommendation, management's rules of thumb and long-term solutions in combating the oil curse for oil-exporting states in the future.

Oil Economies of Norway and Venezuela

Both Norway and Venezuela rely on oil export as their major economic growth driver. Figure 1 reveals that the volatility in crude oil price directly shows impact on economic growth for both countries. However, Norway has shown a stabilized growth rate and was able to sustain its growth surplus amidst the heavy fall in oil prices in 2015, while Venezuela's growth rate has shown greater volatility that is prone to the fluctuation in oil prices.

Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate of Norway and Venezuela from year 2000 to 2018 against crude oil prices. Sources retrieved from IMF and OPEC.



Mechanisms of the Oil Curse

Michael L. Ross, a political scientist from University of California categorized the distinctions in resource curse literatures into those who either suggest oil hinder democracy or oil causes the state to perform poorly in economic growth and development. For this research, the author is determined to work with the latter case, as there are wide varieties of different approaches that still require further tests and interpretation for a long-term solution. As Ross has concluded the First Law of Petropolitics from his study that that the boom in oil prices hinder democratization, it is therefore imperative to explore further on whether the increase in prices and decline in democracy also hinder economic growth of oil exporting states or not. Political regimes and system of government will be analyzed in accordance with quantitative results as previous studies have shown their correlating relationships. The three major mechanism of the oil curse are reviewed below.

Dutch Disease Mechanism

The term Dutch Disease was first coined in the 1970s to describe the decline of manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the large discovery of natural gas fields in 1959. According to Investopedia, Dutch Disease has become the economic term referring to the negative consequences arising from large increases in the value of a country's currency. It is primarily associated with a natural resource discovery but can result from any large influx of foreign currency into a country, including foreign direct investment, foreign aid or a substantial increase in natural resource prices. There are two main symptoms describing the effect of Dutch Disease. Firstly, is the lost in competitiveness in the manufacturing sector due to appreciation of currency that leads to higher cost for domestic inputs. Following by increase in imports, which in long run would contribute to higher unemployment as manufacturing jobs are being moved to lower-cost countries. Thus, the Dutch Disease refers to the relationship and coexistence between the booming sector (natural resources) and the lagging sector (manufacturing). The idea of booming sector pulling resources from one another is known as *the crowding-out* logic.

Sach and Warner took this logic as a basis in their study on resource abundance in 1995. Evidences found that there is negative relationship between growth and natural resource intensity (Sach and Warner 1995 p. 22). According to their model, when there is an increase in natural resource sector, it tends to crowd out the growth of manufacturing sector due to lost in competition from the rises in price of non-traded sector (Sachs & Warner 1997 p. 6). The Dutch Disease model in the case of oil-exporting countries studied by Ismail in 2010 has also confirmed this crowd-out logic from the oil booms. Ismail also added that, the outflow of investment in manufacturing is due to expansion of labor-intensive and appreciation of capital intensity. However, manufacturing sectors with higher capital intensity are less affected by oil windfall (Ismail 2010). The Dutch Disease mechanism therefore sees the investor as the primary agent carrying the processes of crowding out when there is boom in the oil sector (Kolstad and Wigg 2009).

Institution Mechanism

The Institution model asserts the importance in institutional qualities. Most literatures on resource curse that concern on institution are varied within their own models. Study on institution and resource curse done by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik in 2006 has combined the aspect from resource abundance and institutions. Main findings were that countries rich in natural resource yield both growth loser and growth winner. They have shown through regression analysis that the qualities of institution determine whether states with oil abundance avoid the curse or not (Mehlum et al. 2006). However, states vary with different form of institutions. A combination of grabber friendly institution with resource abundance leads to low economic growth, while producer friendly institution helps countries take full advantage of the natural resources. Their concluding remarks also reject the Dutch Disease model of Sach and Warner as the decisive factor of the resource curse and favor for rule of law as the measurement of institution (Mehlum et al. 2006 p. 16). Thus, oil curse would only appear in countries with weak institutions, as resource abundance puts them into some kind of test (Mehlum et al. 2006).

Study by Robinson, Torvik and Verdier in 2006 also looked into the institution and resource curse, emphasizing into the political foundations. Their models combine rent-seeking aspect as the political incentives with mismanagement of wealth redistribution due to political biases in preserving their power. The results concluded that resources tended to be over extracted by those whom in control because they discount the future according to their probability in power, thus when resources sector boom, these incentives contribute to inefficiency as politicians spend them on influencing elections. Countries with institutional qualities that can limit clientelism could raise national income (Robinson et al. 2006 pp. 466).

The literatures reveal that, there are still many conditions and different scenarios within the institutional model itself and debate on resource curse is full of alternative approaches and dividing consensuses. In this study, we will be testing the institutional qualities within three areas. These are control of corruption, political freedom and transparency of the sovereign wealth funds.

Rent-seeking Mechanism

The Rent-seeking model asserts that the amounts of government revenue could change drastically from time to time due to the changes in commodities price and production. Studies from Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) claim that it is difficult to effectively spend fluctuating and unpredictable revenues (NRGI 2015). When oil revenues rise, government often gets trapped in boom-bust cycles, also known as pro-cyclical spending and has to make painful cuts when revenues decline. When the oil boom, states with rich natural resources often over-borrow because they have improved credit-rating when revenues are high, this led to debt crises when revenues declined in Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela in the 1980s (NRGI 2015 p. 3). The case is similar with private sector for it could over-invest during oil boom and experience bankruptcy during the fall.

Lane and Tornell provided notable literature surrounding the rent seeking and impact of oil rents in 1999 through their study of the *Voracity Effect*. Their results

proved that an economy in which there are powerful groups grows more slowly than one in which groups are powerless or act in a coordinated manner (Lane & Tornell 1999 p. 42). They suggested that growth is lower when power is concentrated among only a few groups than diffused among many groups. The *Voracity Effect* states that with the powerful group, an increase in income redistribution (rent) generates negative relationship between improvements in economic growth (Lane & Tornell 1999 p. 42). Thus, the mechanism marks state as a convenient recipient of oil revenues and budget processes for powerful groups to appropriate their share from the oil wealth.

Dunning also analyzed the concept of rent seeking with Venezuela and Mexico cases in his study on endogenous rent and concluded that there is strong plausibility that rent maximization or minimization lies behind the pattern in political incentives (Dunning 2007 p. 27). Study by Arezki and Bruckner as part of IMF paper in 2009 observed the effects of oil rent from panel-data regression. Their results has confirmed the common held belief that oil rents are associated with corruption and a worsening of political rights, they reject the hypothesis that oil rents are a direct threat to state stability (Arezki & Bruckner 2009 p. 17).

Methodology

The study employed the combined uses of qualitative method for interpretation of political events, policies and strategies that states have experienced and employed during the year 2000 to 2018, while using quantitative method through OLS regression analysis to compare and analyze the descriptive statistics from cross-sectional model, regarding the dependent and independent variables that relate to the oil curse. The quantitative method employed Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression model with average growth rate of GDP per capita as dependent variable from 30 selected samples of net oil exporting states. Although, emphasizing on the cases of Norway and Venezuela, the primary data has been collected for total of 30 oil exporting countries in order to establish the empirical findings for oil dependent countries in overall. The explanatory or independent variables begin with the basis of macroeconomic settings in term of Initial income level, which is the natural log of GDP per head of the economically active population in 2000. Oil rent, which indicates the profit before taxation from the exploration and production activities and Corporate Income Tax (CIT) are used to measure the level of rent-seeking activities, in the sense that they represent business incentives from conducting oil-related activities amongst different countries. Inflation is measured by average real effective exchange rate, which is employed to observe one of major symptoms of the Dutch Disease. Similarly, with the Foreign Direct Investment in percentage of total GDP (FDI), this is used to indicate Dutch Disease symptom in the sense that it indicates relationship from large capital inflows into the countries.

For the institutional model, variables are focus within two major areas. These are the level of transparency and political freedom. The levels of transparency are measured through two variables. The Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) developed at the *Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute* by Carl Linaburg and Michael Maduell is used to measure the transparency ratings of sovereign wealth funds.

The Control of Corruption (CC), developed by the World Bank as part of Worldwide Governance Indicators also captures transparency through

perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. The Voice and Accountability (VA), developed by the World Bank as part of Worldwide Governance Indicators captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Lastly, the OPEC is author-created *dummy variable* that indicates OPEC membership countries with value of "0" for non-OPEC and "1" for OPEC members. The OLS formulas for this study can be written according to hypotheses as

$$\text{Model I: } GDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LGDP + \beta_2 RENT + \beta_3 REER + \beta_4 FDI + \beta_5 LMTI + \beta_6 OPEC + et$$

$$\text{Model II: } GDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LGDP + \beta_2 RENT + \beta_3 REER + \beta_4 FDI + \beta_5 LMTI + \beta_6 OPEC + \beta_7 CIT + et$$

$$\text{Model III: } GDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LGDP + \beta_2 RENT + \beta_3 REER + \beta_4 FDI + \beta_5 LMTI + \beta_6 OPEC + \beta_7 CIT + \beta_8 CC + et$$

$$\text{Model IV: } GDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LGDP + \beta_2 RENT + \beta_3 REER + \beta_4 FDI + \beta_5 LMTI + \beta_6 OPEC + \beta_7 CIT + \beta_8 VA + et$$

Where GDP is the average real GDP growth rate as dependent variable, LGDP is initial income level, RENT for Oil Rent, REER is real effective exchange rate, FDI for foreign direct investment, LMTI for Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, OPEC for OPEC's membership up to 2008, CIT for corporate income tax, CC for control of corruption, VA for voice & accountability and et is the random error. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) collinearity test is employed as the first basis for qualifying the selection of variables, as it is designed to detect multicollinearity, which refers to predictors that are correlated with other predictors. A VIF between 5 and 10 indicates high correlation that may be problematic, thus the CC and initial income level in Model III are still being selected as they do not exceed the minimum problematic correlation at 5. The full definitions for each predictor's abbreviation can be found in *Chapter 3.4 Selection of Variables*.

Figure 7: Escaping the Oil Curse Variance Inflation Factor Test from *gretl*

Model	I	II	III	IV
Independent Variables				
Initial Income Level	1.30	1.33	3.64	1.43
RENT	1.59	1.64	1.96	2.24
REER	1.17	1.20	1.25	1.22
FDI	1.49	1.49	1.51	1.55
LMTI	1.36	1.37	1.44	1.40
OPEC	1.90	1.96	2.15	1.93
CIT		1.12	1.22	-

Model	I	II	III	IV
Independent Variables				
CC			4.57	-
VA				2.21

VIF(j) = 1/(1 - R(j)²), where R(j) is the multiple correlation coefficient between variable j and the other independent variables


Figure xx: OLS Regression Results from *gretl*

Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per capita, PPP (2000-2017)				
Model	I	II	III	IV
Independent Variables				
Initial Income Level	-2.21894 (4.34e-05)***	-2.37325 (5.94e-06)***	-2.31697 (0.0026)***	-2.06419 (0.0002)***
RENT (-)	-0.0430782 -0.2316	-0.0572670 (0.0873)*	-0.0587782 -0.1157	-0.0680164 (0.1142)
REER (-)	-0.0444701 (0.0244)**	-0.0376959 (0.0352)**	-0.0380681 (0.0418)**	-0.0484598 (0.0166)**
FDI (+)	1.00668 (6.08e-06)**	0.987173 (2.15e-06)***	0.985215 (4.16e-06)***	0.954612 (9.01e-06)***
LMTI (+)	0.19635 -0.1545	0.219795 (0.0811)*	0.222813 0.0925*	0.170492 -0.2077
OPEC (+)	2.51426 (0.0470)**	2.99822 (0.0119)**	2.96186 (0.0196)**	2.35039 (0.0629)*
CIT (-)		- 0.104052 (0.0185)**	- 0.102751 (0.0285)**	-
CC (-)			-0.0852527 -0.918	-
VA (-)			-	-0.767746 (0.2739)
Observations (120)	30	30	30	30
Adjusted R-Squared	0.76	0.81	0.80	0.82

Note: Value above is the coefficient; numbers inside the bracket is the p-value. Stars (*, **, ***) indicate significance level of p-value at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Signs inside the left brackets define the relationship from coefficient results.

Oil, a Blessing for Norway

Figure 14: Norway's GDP, PPP per capita in different administrations. Data retrieved from IMF and OPEC.



Bondevik's political stances and policies reflected great concerns on humanitarian development, human rights, oil regulations and environmental protection issues. Bondevik has not directly emphasized on the interference of economic matters besides engaging in the ethical guidelines for the GPF and administrative reforms of government structure, especially those that concerned with oil activities. Overall, Bondevik's administration has contributed largely to form the basis of oil industry's guidelines and regulating bodies for Norway. These two-primary works under Bondevik's government combining with the improving oil prices that began in 2003 have left the Norwegian economy booming even after his second term was completed. According to the IMF figures, Norway's GDP, PPP per capita in 2001 was at 48,339.96 USD. By the end of 2005 this figure had risen to 56,578.67 USD, a 17.04% increase since Bondevik began his second term in late-2001.

Stoltenberg is a supporter of privatization measures and the petroleum industry as evidences show that major government's efforts were contributed in strengthening Statoil's dominant role in both domestic areas and international expansion. Nonetheless, Stoltenberg has also proven to be a capable leader when it comes to state's intervention of the economy during the financial crisis. His solution to the financial crisis revealed to us that his government's coalition strongly adheres to the new Keynesian economic-model, particularly in the realm of unemployment, saving and investment, where macroeconomic stabilization by the government through fiscal policy can lead to a more efficient outcome. According to the IMF Database, Norway's GDP, PPP per capita at the start of Stoltenberg's second cabinet in 2005 was at 56,578.67 USD. By the end of his administration in 2013, this figure reached 65,572.08 USD, a 15.9% increase during his 8-year term as the prime minister, despite facing a financial crisis and Norway's wealth fund mechanism that increasingly rely on both the global financial market and cash flow from the petroleum industry.


Solberg's policy emphasized that further development of Norway's petroleum sector is still the key element in stabilizing its economy. Despite her initial

campaign to avoid further oil activities and shifting focus to the transition Norway's economy, Solberg appears to strongly back the oil activities of Norway as a measure to buy more time while attempting to integrate climate change issue into the GPF's investment strategy. According to the IMF Database, Norway's GDP, PPP per capita at the start of Solberg's administration in late-2013

was at 65,572.08 USD. At the latest figure of her administration in 2017, this figure reached 70,665.96 USD, a 7.7% increase during her 4-year term as the prime minister of Norway so far.

Oil, a Curse for Venezuela

Figure 19: Venezuela's GDP, PPP per capita in different administrations. Sources from IMF and OPEC



Venezuela's economy was directly impacted by the Dutch Disease, as Chavez's policy made the country rely even more on oil export and deteriorate the stability of its own currency through politicization of the Central Bank. The internal conflict between Chavez and the PDVSA in 2002 reflected in contraction for GDP growth and different stances in managing its oil industry, while the former PDVSA before his politicization wanted to enhance its production efficiency through privatization, Chavez chose to prioritize in restoring order and compliance within OPEC mechanism through centralization of power. In addition, Chavez's administration has been imposing strong subsidy and price controls on fuel products. Within 14 years of his administration domestic oil prices were frozen under

political decisions rather than economic argument. By keeping domestic prices below the international market, it has resulted in increasing contraband fuel trade with neighboring countries namely Columbia, Brazil and other Caribbean nations. The estimated illegal fuel trades amount to 30,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. Chavez's monetary reforms for the Bolivar fuerte (VEF) also yielded disappointment result. The new currency with three zeroes removed is anything but strong. According to ABC news report in 2013, the Bolivar fuerte has lost nearly two-thirds of its value since it was launched in 2008. Chavez

administration through the time of high oil price has resulted in unsustainable high economic growth, despite currency instability in the following Maduro administration. According to the IMF database, Venezuela's GDP, PPP per capita at the initial year of Chavez's administration in 2000 was at 11,468.31 USD. By the end of his administration and his life in 2013, this figure reached 18,607.46 USD, a 62.25% increase during his 13-year as the president.

Nicolas Maduro has continued to pursue in socialist agendas and populist policies exemplified by the previous Chavez administration. Maduro continues to strengthen ties with Cuba, Russia and China, while restraining the relation with the United States who condemned the legitimacy of Maduro's administration and increased sanctions. The issuance of national cryptocurrency that does not allow the purchase through its own currency shows that Maduro targets funding from abroad and the major distribution to sovereign fund allows him to hinder transparent transactions of payment. The secrecy of Venezuelan official statistics also contributed to the soaring inflation

Venezuela's central bank has steadily stopped releasing its economic data to the IMF since Maduro took power in 2013 but according to the IMF's estimates database, Venezuela's GDP, PPP per capita at the beginning of Maduro's administration in 2013 was at 18,607.46 USD. At the latest figure of his administration in 2017, this figure slumped down to 12,856.96 USD, a 30.9% decrease during his 4-year term as the president of Venezuela so far.

Oil and Foreign Policy of Norway and Venezuela

Norway has long taken its position in non-interference with OPEC, despite being occasionally invited to join the meetings as an observer. Norway has declined OPEC invitation in 2016 meeting, stating that they were aware of the invitation but would not take part (Reuters 2016). Even if Norway wanted to join OPEC, it would unlikely qualify all the prerequisites as it does not fundamentally share similar interests with other OPEC members, as Norway is a member of OECD and NATO, which is considered as both political and economic ally of the United States, whom pursue in contrary international oil market position against OPEC's countries like Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.

Norway has been pursuing in state's devise strategy in investment diversification through its wealth fund, by joining OPEC, it would have to comply with OPEC's production quota and lose its full sovereignty over natural resources management. Nonetheless, Norway is still able to enjoy overall benefit from OPEC's effort to increase oil price through production quota. Despite not being in OPEC, Norway pursued its standing on global energy issue through membership of International Energy Agency (IEA), which established since 1974 to collectively respond against oil supply disruptions and ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy. However, the most direct Norwegian's foreign policy effort that associated with its petroleum sector rests upon the Oil for Development (OfD) program under the supervision of Norad. The OfD globally promotes responsible management of petroleum resources in four major areas. These are environmental protection, transparency in revenue management, local participation in decision-making process and labors' rights (Norad 2018). According to Norad, the OfD has thus far cooperated with 12 countries namely Angola, Cuba, Ghana, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Mozambique, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

Their works range from the basis of petroleum resource's foundation by providing capacity development related to the policies and the legal framework governing the petroleum sector, including the transparency and accountability of the authorities. The Norwegian officials provide comments and assistance to other countries in the design of oil extraction through giving advices on how revenues could be managed without causing macro-economic instability and "crowding out" other industries (Norad 2018). All of these funding applications come with required ethical and audit guidelines written by Norad.

The OfD programs serve as Norway's exporting channel of its knowledge in institutional management. In addition to the promotion of greater transparent and sustainable framework, Norway will also able to gain better and updated insight information regarding the natural resources' opportunities from the applicant's countries, this in turn allow Norway to devise a more sounding investment strategy for both Statoil and the GPFPG. Norway's status-seeking for international standing therefore allowed it to accumulate trust, credibility and reputation in the global development areas, which reflected into its own 'soft power' through the global demand of the 'Norwegian-model'. In a questionnaire sent to Norad regarding opinion on the roles of Norway's oil industry, the OfD's secretariat replied that while oil revenue has been vital source of economic growth, it is also important to protect the competitiveness of other export sectors so that the gain in the petroleum sector is not lost through "crowding out" of other sectors. Norway-model requires constant assessment for long-term investment in equities through the GPFPG, by exporting its management style and sound policies will further ensure the stability of business operations and open new opportunities for Statoil itself to invest or be notified of potential competitors or acquisitions in different regions around the world.

Norway has also proved that to become successful in development of the oil industry, state does not always require participation with the OPEC. By not taking part in OPEC combined with its flexible model in oil revenue management, Norway can devise its oil strategies and management more efficiently according to different situations in the market. It could position itself as a reservoir in supplying crude oil whenever OPEC decides to fall short of its production without violating rules or agreements with other countries. Through the GPFPG, Norway could also act as an investor that redistributes funding to other growing sector against the downfall of the petroleum industry such as renewable energy.

Venezuela on the other hand has been a key player of OPEC since its foundation. However, according to the study by F.E. Paris on Venezuela's institutional failure, evidences pointed that adhering to OPEC's production guidelines and lack of investment due to state's hunger for fiscal revenue has brought less benefits from the oil industry than it could have done (Paris 2006). During the era of Venezuela under socialism led by Hugo Chavez from the year 2000, Chavez's first foreign policy was to revive the prospects of OPEC through high oil prices. He often uses international platform like OPEC as an instrument to assert his opposition against the United States. His policy was to use the OPEC's influence in oil prices as geopolitical leverage on global politics. Chavez once made a strong statement at OPEC conference concerning his views and position within OPEC.

"If the United States attempts the madness of invading Iran or attacking Venezuela again, the price of oil is probably going to reach \$200, not just \$100," and

"We are witnessing constant threats against Iran. I think OPEC should strengthen itself in this capacity and demand respect for the sovereignty of our nations, if the developed world wants a guaranteed supply of oil" (ABC News 2011).

Venezuela during Chavez adhered tightly to OPEC's production quota, although there were some occasions that production exceeded the limits (Reuter 2012). As Venezuela's relation with the United States further deteriorated after failed coup to overthrow Chavez's administration during 2002 and 2003, Chavez chose to cement strong ties with Cuba, Iran, Russia and China in effort to rebalance the geopolitical power. These efforts can be seen from Chavez visits to Iran and Russia in 2001 and Cuba-Venezuelan agreement in late-2004 that resulted in the formation of ALBA. Through ALBA, Chavez initiated PetroCaribe to provide preferential oil payment system for his allies in the Latin America in order to forge regional economic coalition against the American free trade agreement. This policy revealed to us that Chavez was ready to use Venezuela's oil resource as a gambling stake in opposing the American influence in the region. Initial Chavez's attempt to build concrete alliance with Russia was also not in shape until 2005 when Russia signed contract to sell 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles to Venezuela. Russia would later become the major arms exporter for Venezuela. Russian military equipment parts to fighter jets and attack helicopter have replaced those from the United States. Ties with Iran were strengthened through common stances against the American imperialism, mainly emphasized through OPEC. As of 2014, Venezuela and Iran had signed 265 agreements alongside with 58 projects in the industrial, environmental, agricultural, commercial, educational, sports, housing, cultural, energy and scientific and technology areas.

By using oil, as a geopolitical weapon against the United States, Venezuela needed to seek other importer in order to leverage different sources of funding; the answer to this was China. Venezuela's ties with China were strengthened through commercial aspect emphasized in 2007 when the two governments signed 11 bilateral agreements, resulting in the creation of China-Venezuela Joint Fund administered by China Development Bank (CDB). The initial endowment from China was 6 billion USD; in return Venezuela agreed to send over 600,000 barrels of oil to China. After the 2008 financial crisis, the joint fund gained rapid expansion, as the Chinese government becomes an alternative to the developing world for financing in replacement of the Western banks. Chavez signed a series of energy cooperation with China in September 2008 and later in February 2009, when Xi Jinping made his visit to Venezuela. China signed agreement to double the fund up to 20 billion USD, due in 10 years through oil export from the PDVSA to CNUOC, a subsidiary of Chinese state-owned CNPC. Since 2007, China has lent over 50 billion USD to Venezuela, becoming its biggest creditor and important trading partner. As of March 2018, Reuters reported that Venezuela still owes China about 19.3 billion USD.

However, the efficiency of using oil as a geopolitical weapon against the United States relies on two major components, which are the higher oil prices and the continuation of the United States' dependency on Venezuelan oil export, both of which did not last very long. The United States' import share of Venezuela's petroleum products has been in declining rate since 2006, while China has been

increasing its import share to almost 1 million barrels per day. Development of fracturing technology, opposition tactic against the United States, implementation of socialist agendas, oil-for-loan with China and increased oil production in the United States has contributed to this decline. In addition, the socialist revolution since the latter time of Chavez administration has not resulted positively to the economy, as nationalization and expropriation discouraged investment in the oil industry. In 2014 and 2015, Venezuela was reported to have fallen short on its oil export to China and missed a debt payment, as oil prices plunged to 50 USD per barrel. China's return from its investment now becomes a strategic gamble that depends on Venezuela's policy under Maduro administration.

Recommendation

The two core prerequisites for troubled oil-exporting states to escape the oil curse is to firstly acknowledge that both the value of crude oil and national currency are subjected to the volatility from the international market and global financial system. Secondly, by spending oil wealth is ultimately equals to liquidating a certain amount of national asset. Crude oil is treated as a commodity, which means it is a basic good that can be widely used, everyone needs it. However, after oil is consumed, the substance turned into energy for various kinds of operations and cannot be renewed or reused in any other way. This means that the value is lost after being consumed, unlike precious metals or currency that still holds its value even after using, unless you print too many papers without sufficient foreign reserve backing in the bank. In order to escape the oil curse, states need to reassess the perception of the oil wealth. Because oil wealth requires a long period of time for projects to extract, market and export, thus states need to plan its oil management in the long term. The aim is for oil exporting state to prevent falling into Dutch Disease by gaining *absorptive capacity* (NRGI 2015 p. 3), which is made of two elements. Zahra and George conceptualized these elements into

1. Capability to identify and acquire externally generated knowledge that is critical to conduct oil operations.
2. Routines and regulations that allow states to analyze process, interpret and understand the information obtained from external sources.

In order to achieve the first element, states require a strong and flexible human capital, which is a long-term process that can be gained from investment in education, research and development. Chavez's decision to put his consolidation of power over the PDVSA's intellectuals and human capital in 2002 was a mistake because it encouraged human capital flight to find more stable jobs abroad as they became unemployed, while directly undermining the true efficiency of Venezuelan population. To regain the capability in identifying and acquiring the generated knowledge is to allocate funding for education and restore reliability in the private sector development in order to create incentives and enhance market competition.

To improve Venezuela's funding for oil production, government should sell some stakes of the PDVSA to investors for funding, while retaining at least 60 percent

of the PDVSA' shares. The potential candidate is the highest creditor, the CNPC a state-owned company of China. This is due to the highest amount of external debt Venezuela owed to China from the oil-for-loan deal that is increasingly prone to default as Venezuela could not afford to refine the heavy thick crude into product. By allowing investors to participate in the production scheme, the PDVSA would be able to gain investment required in boosting its oil production capacity.

As for Venezuela's shortage of basic goods and oil smuggling problems, the first initiative that the government should take is to stop the price subsidization measures. Venezuela has been pursuing in import substitution and expropriation, while relying on oil export to drive its growth, this has to be stopped. As price control has contributed to the expansion of black-market transactions and ruins the functioning of market as businesses are forced to sell at a loss.

Venezuela's major problem is that the current government does not see and accept the failing market consequences from the socialist agendas, since it has been branding the idea of revolution from the beginning of Chavez's administration. Results are that population could not gain access to cash as the official rate is highly different than those traded in the black market and supply is limited, which becomes an obstacle to public consumption. This is the stake that Maduro's administration is facing, as the regime's most important concern is its survival. Corporate income tax should be reduced to attract investment. Incentives should firstly be focused on the agriculture sector through farm usages in land redistribution and support in establishing agriculture cooperatives. As property's value in Venezuela fall, it is the Venezuelans themselves that must display the true value of their lands.

Regarding Venezuela's hyperinflation problem, the first and foremost thing that the government must do is to release its economic statistics to the IMF. Ever since the government stopped releasing its statistic in 2013, Venezuela has been experiencing sharp increases in its real effective exchange rate in the following year. This is because an already inflated currency in the latter time of Chavez's administration was further accelerated by fears and distrust from the lack of official statistics and slump in oil prices.

Venezuela has two options, first is that it should totally disband the pegged-rate system, as the problem of hyperinflation was stemmed from government interference in politicizing the Central Bank, which resulted in a mechanism that allows the executive branch to exploit the spending of oil revenue in foreign currency from the PDVSA. In addition, monetary reforms introduced by both Chavez and Maduro to reduce three zeroes from the nominated original currency did not yield successful result in combating inflation and further discredited the national finance institution. Venezuela should introduce new reform for the monetary system to become floated because the USD-pegged system consistently requires certain amount of foreign reserves in the Central Bank. In combination, it should stop printing more money, begin saving more Bolivar and regulate other foreign exchanges besides the government, as it would directly address the issue of black-market transactions and restore confidence in the currency's value in the short term.

The second option is to temporality adopt other currency, while reforming the Central Bank; amongst the potential candidates are the USD and RMB.

Although, this option may not sound politically feasible for Maduro as it requires abandoning the financial identity of Venezuela. The measure is economically practical to enhance better flows of trade and investment. Like it or not, the United States is accounted for about half of Venezuela's total export, this is the fact that the government should be reminded in each policy it will be taking. The Chinese RMB is also a viable option, as China is the highest creditor of Venezuela and has already established a joint fund with some portion, injected as Chinese RMB. By adopting and backing the RMB in foreign reserve, Venezuela could negotiate better terms with China, attracts more Chinese investment and export more efficiently to China, in order to counter-balance the trade reliance with the United States. The goals for this option are to promote real consumption and publish official economic statistics as soon as possible.

Lastly and the most importantly, Venezuela has to reform its institution, especially the mechanism of oil revenue spending through the Fonden. To restore confidence and truly promote transparency as stated in 'Petro' whitepaper, The Fonden must be regulated and its distribution of expenditure must be disclosed to the public. The aim is to achieve the second element of absorptive capacity through reforming regulations that allow states to analyze process, interpret and understand the information obtained from external sources. Fonden should publish its own annual report and distribute some proportion for the PDVSA's investment and equity investment, similar to Norway's GPFPG.

Conclusion

From the observations of regression results and comparative analyses on Norway and Venezuela's oil management. The study pointed out that the Dutch Disease symptoms indicate the most crucial factors upon the oil exporting countries' economic growth, while the other oil curse mechanisms partially show some signs of relationship. Both the real effective exchange rates and FDI have shown the highest significant levels in all models. Therefore, these two factors must constantly be monitored and reassess by the government. As when the oil price booms, currency tends to appreciate but, on the reverse, if states have already fallen to the symptoms the result when oil prices bust and slump down is that the currency would become largely depreciated and lead to inflation as Venezuela has shown.

Despite, rejecting the institution and rent-seeking mechanisms, the main context is of incentives and institutions are still relevant for oil exporting states to be concerned. As from the qualitative review of Norway's oil management, we can see that institutions have played an important role in preventing the country to rely too much on oil export. Norway diversifies the risk generated by volatility of oil prices by transforming the oil wealth into company's stocks and bonds around the world. Norway achieved this through efficient management of its administrative reform that distributes different roles to many different institutions. All of these institutions are connected and coordinated through Oil for Development program under the Norad. The clear distribution of roles and responsibility has allowed Norway to maintain the balance of decision-making power within its administration.

Norway has shown us the management model sample in how considering oil revenues as transformation of wealth could save the eventuality of impact from fluctuations in the oil market. As it has essentially emphasized in the matter of

competitiveness and long-term saving. While states might also be able to implement other kind of alternatives, the uses of sovereign wealth funds serve as a decent example to combat the rising inflation. Venezuela on the other hand did not take much consideration in the importance of investment idea into its wealth fund, as the result it has turned state's efficient tool into distortion mechanism of its fiscal policy by constantly adjusting its rules, with so much oil Venezuela had ignored the idea in how its economy should be sustained without income from crude oil. Thus, this has eventually led to its failure in oil management and the results are clearly shown from its rising hyperinflation when the oil prices began to tumble down.

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MALNUTRITION ISSUE'S POSITION IN INDONESIA REGULATION: CASE STUDY IN CENTRAL JAVA

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Abstract

Central Java is one potential city in Indonesia regarding of the location, natural resources, good infrastructure, and best health care. Sadly, the potential conditions just make Central java struggling in poverty, education, health, and unemployment issues. One indicator is Malnutrition. Malnutrition, which is consequence indicator of poverty keep going up in Central Java from 922 in 2015 to 988 in 2016. The malnutrition needs become health indicator because it can cause the country's development goals becomes untreated. The condition is not comparable with Central Java potential resources and infrastructure condition. This study wants to explore malnutrition issue based on Indonesia regulation of Central Java perspective. The methods of this research were using observation and literature reviews. The literature review was using meta-analysis methods with malnutrition in central java, health policy, malnutrition regulation and malnutrition program as main keywords. The results showed that Indonesia that not had malnutrition specific regulation yet cause malnutrition issue still ignored by government that impact to society. It is impact decentralization program in Indonesia. Central Java had 384 NGOs to help government to society empowerment but only 6 NGOs had issue in health. On other hands, the concept of nutrition in society was missing by assumption about fulfillment of food. Central Java, as if others part of Indonesia had assumption to rice as basic needs at every home. Strong patriarchy concepts in Java cause women in struggling situation from government program and her household. The malnutrition issue needs human rights approach to gain comprehension that can become a base to make program. Human rights approach can help to reduce health discrimination to women and children. Human rights understanding from health department officer can help not only will help to create programs but also help in the process of counseling and routine check up from pregnant women. The needs of malnutrition issue are multi- sectors integration programs, structured monitoring and evaluation programs, and advocacy.

Keywords: *Central Java, Inequality, Malnutrition, Policy, Regulation*

Introduction

Central Java is one potential province in Java Island which is near to the Indonesia's capital city. The location is an advantage for Central Java and it can bring Central Java become the one of national food contribution in Indonesia (Tawonndast, 2017). The location is also bring out Central Java to have a rapid infrastructure development (Purba, 2017). Compared to another province in west and east of Indonesia, Central Java has easily access health care, proved that 3 of Central Java's health care innovation include to the top 99 (Humas Jateng, 2017). Nonetheless, those condition do not enough yet to overcome health issues, high unemployment rate, uneven electricity (Khamdi, 2016) and education problem (Wiangga, 2017).

Those problems arise as a result of high economic discrepancy in Central Java. Poor population percentage in Central Java according to BPS data is slowly decreasing since 2015- 2017, respectively 13,58%; 13,21%; and 13,01%. This high poverty rate might cause attendant issues like violence against women and child, health, education, economy, and poor housing standard. In fact, Central Java is the most contributor of women labor in Indonesia (Zamani, 2018), also still having high rate of child labor (Suara Pembaharuan, 2013; Paramita Dewiyani, 2015). Problems rooted in this poverty should be sought to be addressed in order to prevent bigger and sustainable impact to women and child (Schaner, 2014). One indicator of poverty from the health aspect is the high number of malnutrition cases in children (Ford Foundation, 2014).

Malnutrition is closely related to poverty, as malnutrition is a consequence of poverty itself. Malnutrition refers to deficiency, overload, and imbalance of nutrient intake, including stunting, wasting, underweight and micronutrients deficiency (WHO | What is malnutrition?, 2017). Malnutrition in children might cause the goal of state's development difficult to achieved (Ihuoma, 2015). While, undernutrition in children can lead to poor mental development and behavioral abnormalities (Martins et al., 2011). According to the health profile of Central Java in 2016, it only has data on the number of malnutrition that increased from 922 in 2015 to 982 in 2016 (Dinkes, 2017). Malnutrition is an indicator for the women's condition. A malnourished infant indicates that the mother who is carrying it is also malnourished. Malnutrition experienced by women is caused by poverty, lack of development, lack of awareness and education (Dewan, 2008).

The high number of malnutrition in Central Java, which is reached 28.3% in 2017 (Ministry of Health, 2018) is not proportionate with the location of Central Java which is near to the Indonesia's capital. Location of Central Java that facilitates access of health care, infrastructure and information should also be used to advocate for malnutrition programs and policies to the government. The high number of malnutrition and inequality that followed, therefore the study was conducted to analysis the position of malnutrition issues in Indonesia's policies from perspective of government and community's related-malnutrition situation.

This study aims to picture the reality of malnutrition issues in the health (government) and the community perspective. The description provided is also expected to provide thought-provoking recommendations related to programs and policies that are relevant in the health field. In addition, it is expected to be a source of program making to build the mindset of the community, especially family, associated with malnutrition.

Methods

Method used in this study is literature review using meta-analysis and observation in Central Java region. Keyword used in literature review is malnutrition in central java, health policy, malnutrition regulation and malnutrition program.

Results

Central Java's Condition

Central Java is a province located in the middle of Java Island with an area of 3.25 million hectares or about 25.04 percent of the total of Java Island or 1.70 percent of the total area of Indonesia. Central Java province consists of 29 districts and 6 cities consisting of 565 sub-districts, 764 villages and 7804 villages (Wikipedia, 2015). By 2017, the population of Central Java is 34,257,865 (Central Java Provincial BPS, 2018b). This population is scattered in Central Java with more population occupies more urban areas than rural areas. The densely populated areas are in Semarang Raya, Solo Raya, and Tegal-Brebes-Slawi (Central Java Provincial BPS, 2018a). Apart from the geographical aspect, the condition of Central Java can also be seen from the social and commodity aspects.

In the social aspect there are two aspects that can be seen is the level of education and health. In the education's aspect, the level of participation of Central Java people is still relatively low because there are 28.90% of the drop out of school (Central Java Provincial BPS, 2018d). While in the health aspect from BPS data in 2017, recorded the number of primary health care services (*puskesmas*) in 2014 are 561 units, 318 inpatient community health centers, 1827 *puskesmas* auxiliaries and 948 *puskesmas keliling* (mobilizing primary health care services) using car. The total number of medical doctors in 2014 are 1511 and 837 medical doctors are located in *puskesmas*. For the government-supervised drug and food distribution facilities in 2013, there are 2487 pharmacies, 35 pharmaceutical warehouses, a availability of data services in 63 government hospitals, 168 private hospitals, 873 *puskesmas* (primary health care service), 477 maternity hospital, and 1039 medical centers (Central Java Provincial BPS, 2015).

On the health sector, Non-communicable Diseases (NCD) is a concern because it affects the economy and productivity of the nation. Based on the health profile of Central Java in 2016, 6 groups of NCD are heart disease, stroke, cancer, diabetes mellitus, injury, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, as well as other chronic diseases. Among the 6 NCD, the highest proportion is hypertension that is equal to 60%. In terms of maternal and child malnutrition, the indicators used in 2016 compared to 2015 were the percentage of pregnant women who received Fe tablets (88.12% from 92.13%), low birth weight percentage (4.4% from 5.1%), percentage of infants receiving exclusive breastfeeding (54.22% of 61.6%), and coverage of malnourished toddlers whose received care (100%) (Dinkes, 2017).

Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) has been used as an indicator of the health status situation of a region as well as in Central Java. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) shows some health problems, one of it is the nutritional status of pregnant women. In 2015 to 2016 Infant Birth Rate in Central Java experience no change, which remained at 9.99 (Dinkes, 2017). In addition to IMR, Infants with Low Birth Weight (LBW) becomes a problem of maternal and child malnutrition that have to be noted. By 2015, from 556,863 births, 31,743 infants belong to LBW

and 922 of them fall into the category of malnutrition. The number of malnutrition cases in Central Java in 2015 has decreased when compared to the year 2013 and 2014 i.e. 964 and 933 cases. While in 2016, the incidence of malnutrition increased to 982 cases. Evenhough there is one region, Surakarta regency, which has 0% malnutrition infant percentage.

Besides malnutrition problems, Central Java also faces overweight and obesity. In 2016, recorded 848,938 of 11,143,190 people aged more than 15 years who came to the health center (puskesmas) has done obesity checks. The result is 11.19% percent are obese with 9.87% of men and 11.94% of women. There are two areas, Sragen and Demak, with percentage of obesity up to 100%.

Central Java which located near to the center of government is one of the provinces that become the national food contribution. Nevertheless, by 2014, rice productivity declined by 4.44 percent to 53.57 quintals per hectare compared to 2013's productivity. In addition, there was also a decrease in rice harvest area and total rice production by 2.41% and 6.73%, respectively. In agriculture sector, Central Java has both decreased and increased commodity in 2014. The decreased is found in cassava 5.3%, peanuts 0.64%, rice 2.41%, and sweet potato 9.57%. While, increase in commodity is found in corn 1.41%, soybean 10.66%, and green beans 38.45% (Tawonndast, 2017).

Central Java's resources in the field of animal husbandry is divided into two groups, large cattle and small livestock. Large cattle consist of cows (pieces / dairy), buffalo, horses, while small livestock are goats, sheep, and pigs. For various cattle are poultry and rabbits. By 2014, large livestock for cattle, buffalo and horses are 1.72 million, 66.86 thousand, and 13.46 thousand, respectively. Egg production of 284.30 million tons and milk production of 98.49 million liters. In the field of fishery, the production produced reached 505 thousand tons with a value of 2.55 trillion rupiah. This production decreased by 18.49% and its production value decreased 172.86% (Tawonndast, 2017).

Malnutrition in Policies Aspect

Indonesia has policies in the form of presidential regulations, ministerial regulations and laws regulating health issues and targeting nutrition. The existing government regulation is Government Regulation No 42 of 2013 concerning the national movement to accelerate the improvement of nutrition, Health Ministry Regulation No. 78 of 2013 on hospital nutrition service guidelines. In addition, there are Health Ministry Regulation No. 41 of 2014 on balanced nutrition guidelines, Health Ministry Regulation No. 23 of 2014 on nutrition improvement, Health Ministry Regulation No. 51 of 2016 on nutritional supplementation standard and Health Ministry Regulation No. 39 of 2016 on guidelines for the implementation of healthy Indonesia program with family approach.

A program designed by the government to address malnutrition is the First 1000 Days of Life. The principle of First 1000 Days of Life is the fulfillment of nutrition at 270 days during pregnancy and 730 days in 2 years life of a child. This program was first launched in 2012 by the field of Community Welfare with Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), the Minister of Health, and the Minister of Women Empowerment and Child Protection. This program was established to respond the global efforts to overcome nutritional problems

through UN-initiated Scaling-up Nutrition Movement (SUN Movement). The activities succeed to produce three documents and it formed by involvement from Ministries and Institutions (K/L), business world, international development partners, social institutions (NGOs), and supported by profession organizations, universities, and the media. These three documents are the policy framework of the First 1000 Days of Life movement, the planning of the First 1000 Days of Life movement program and the draft of presidential regulation on national nutritionally conscious movements (Bappenas, 2012).

Other supporting programs are the provision of Supplementary Food, exclusive breastfeeding programs, and the provision of Fe tablets. The objective of the Supplementary Food Program is the local food-based recovery for underweight children aged 6 - 59 months (Ministry of Health, 2011). Exclusive breastfeeding program is breastfeeding for 6 months and without provide any food or other beverages to infants (InfoDATIN, 2014). The administration of Fe tablets for pregnant women is done to prevent anemia during pregnancy, purpular sepsis, low birth weight, and premature birth (Peña-Rosas et al., 2015).

Besides the government, community groups through NGOs can also help overcome social problems. In the time of 2014-2015, Central Java has 384 NGOs. (Jatengprov, 2017) with only 6 NGOs working in the health sector. The issues of each NGO are, respectively, 1 women's health NGO, 1 elderly health care NGO, 3 public health NGOs and 1 NGO engaged in maternal and child health assessment.

Malnutrition in Societies

The understanding of malnutrition in the society can be divided into two groups, the understanding among society in general and people who work as health workers. First, issue of malnutrition in a society that impossible to separated from women and culture in Java. Indonesian government constructing values in Javanese society, which is *gotong royong* and islam to build community's dynamics in Indonesia. One of the values implanted in the family is women are required to be loyal to their husbands in order to make them ideal wives and good mothers (Rachmah, 2001). However, this ideal concept becomes unattainable when it is associated with the role of the mother in the stage of food service management within the family. Women are only often linked in terms of material as women in productive work area; social as women in their reproductive function; and physical as women who get emotionally while they are eating or relation to food (Allen and Sachs, 2007).

Malnutrition which refers to the balance of nutrient intake (WHO 2016) and always requests to involve women in overcoming it (the First 1000 Days of Life Program, exclusive breastfeeding, Supplementary Food Program and Fe tablet delivery) becomes unequal to the role of women who never exist in food service management. Loss of women's control in the food service management makes control of nutrition when pregnant and lactating are lost.

Malnutrition issues become troubled issue when families in the Indonesia have an understanding that rice is the main food, as well as the main source of income for small farmers (Warr, 2011). The rice's price as a political issue causes high price of rice which also result to many individuals becomes below the poverty line and have low dietary quality (Timmer, 2004).

Secondly, malnutrition issue among health workers. Although it has been sounded since 2012 through the First 1000 Days of Life Program, the issue of malnutrition is still an odd issue for health workers. It is proven that there are still many meetings aimed just to sound the issue of malnutrition. These activities were flown in 2018. Various activities such as the Salatiga City Health Workshop with the theme "through the empowerment of women we prevent and reduce the case of wasting and stunting in Salatiga City"; the theme of *Widaykarya* National Food and Nutrition XI "acceleration of stunting reduction through the revitalization of food and nutrition security in order to achieve sustainable development goals"; "opportunities beyond 1000 days" seminar; and "preventing stunting through food and nutrition family-self sufficiency in the first 1000 days of life".

The number of meetings on wasting and stunting show that health workers and experts still need the understanding related to the malnutrition. Integration that continuously declared show that integrated-program to solve stunting problem has untouchable yet. 3-days workshop at Salatiga city health workshop, requires 2 days to explain the rationalization of the wasting and stunting issues so that it needs to be handled seriously and explanation of the stunting indicators.

Discussions

Central Java has Natural Resources and Human Resources which is sufficient enough but still not proportional to overcome the growing number of malnutrition in Central Java. The handling of malnutrition cases in Primary Health Care (*puskesmas*) should be handled by nutritionists, unfortunately in Central Java the number of nutritionists has in unreachable proportional number. The adequate nutritionist target is 10 nutritionists per 100,000 population in 2014 and 14 per 100,000 population by 2019, while in Central Java it still has 4.58 per 100,000 population by 2016 (Dinkes, 2017). This low ratio resulted in the position of malnutrition in Central Java is being unnoticeable.

The neglect of the malnutrition issue is also seen from all presidential regulations, ministerial regulations and laws that never mention malnutrition target specifically. Unnumbered cases of malnutrition in particular cause not all malnutrition conditions, ie stunting, wasting, underweight, and micronutrient deficiency are resolved. Currently Indonesia is experiencing a situation called double burden, a state of malnutrition along with excess nutrients and obesity, or non-infectious diseases related to diet ('WHO | Double burden of malnutrition', 2017) and Central Java is one contributor to this situation (Hanandita and Tampubolon, 2015). Viewed from those definition, then the issues that must be addressed not only malnutrition and stunting but also overweight and obesity. Unfortunately, until now there is limited government program that tries to control the incidence of overweight and obesity in children. While handling stunting was recently rife in talking about in 2018.

However, in running the program, NGOs also play a role in assisting the government, especially in the field of community empowerment. Unfortunately, of the 384 NGOs in Central Java, there are no NGOs targeting malnutrition and from 0.16% of NGOs in health, the issues raised are women's health, mothers, children and the elderly. The issue of malnutrition needs to emerge as a specific issue because the malnutrition must emerge as a common understanding ranging from the scope of society to the family.

The issue of malnutrition that has been neglected at the government level has finally brought a sustained impact to society, especially women. Women are the most vulnerable because women rarely get extra food compared to males who end up more often malnourished. Malnutrition in women can result in her child's nutritional status (Bose, 2011). Manipulation of women is also evident from existing government programs. This manipulation lies in the position of women who are only involved behind the shadow of his son (Kimura, 2013). This government treatment includes to the behavior of symbolic dominance expressed by Bourdieu (1980). Bourdieu suggests that symbolic dominance is imposed as a form of obedience, the effects of symbolic violence, subtle, unseen and invisible violence. This dominance will arise through symbolic communication, knowledge, or caused by ignorance and recognition of the victim (Uhlmann, Bourdieu and Nice, 2002). Child subterfuge and ignorance are aspects that used by the government to place women only as objects of the program.

The form of this dominance also reached the family environment wrapped with the concept of patriarchy. A strong patriarchal concept in Central Java wrapped in Javanese culture leaves women with limitation bargaining position. Women become vulnerable to gender-based violence.

Besides the social issue that causes of neglecting malnutrition, another political issue that plays a role is rice. Rice that can be used as an assessment of the economic status of a person will unconsciously build the concept of food security. The must-have rice in each dish leads to a change in the concept of food security, which is a state where everyone at all times has sufficient physical, social and economic access, safe and nutritious food to suit his needs and choice of food for a healthy and active life (Napoli, Muro and Mazziotta, 2011). The government builds the concept of rice as a political strategy by ensuring rice is a domestic consumption (Mariyono, 2014). This concept makes people consider the family condition in a safe if it can provide rice. The neglected of nutritious food will be one of women's vulnerability factors.

Women who are often preoccupied with domestic affairs and have no understanding about the needs of their bodies effect to the provision of their needs. Busy to take care of domestic affairs causes pregnant and breastfeeding women often do not try to meet herself nutritional needs which also affect the child.

The form of neglecting malnutrition issue is health professionals' lack of understanding related to the malnutrition issue. Malnutrition-themed meetings or seminars are just held in 2018, when in 2019 is the target of achieving a decrease in malnutrition prevalence based on the National Medium Term Development Plan. One of observation for a workshop meeting in Kota Salatiga, one of the municipalities in Central Java, shows that health workers except nutritionist still do not have an understanding of malnutrition. Health workers are also confused to establish integration among appropriate sectors to overcome malnutrition. The lack of understanding among health workers for malnutrition issues reflects that the community has no information about malnutrition. This is because health workers are the first guides to inform the public. Although the government has launched programs such as First 1000 Days of Life Program, but the activities undertaken are only limited to socialization without understanding the root of the problem. Additionally, socialization activities were limited to providing information without looking at the level of its importance.

Peculiarities in Central Java, which is one of Indonesia's representatives, for the malnutrition issue indicates that the issue of malnutrition has not been a priority for the government or the community. For Central Java itself, it's seen from the increasing malnutrition cases from year to year and NGOs that do not touch the issue of malnutrition. Policies that only emphasize the overall nutrition field make the basic concept of malnutrition not understood by health workers in Indonesia, including Central Java. This inequality ultimately impacts society, especially women.

Recommendations

Seeing the numbers neglect made on the issue of malnutrition and the aggrieved parties, especially women, the government needs to put malnutrition as an important and integrated issue. In addition, the government also needs to apply the principle of human rights to bring the issue of malnutrition.

First, there should be integration among government with NGOs, academics, and society to overcome malnutrition issue in Indonesia. Socialization efforts undertaken by the government have to collaborate with NGOs and academics. Besides, this socialization requires follow-up to see the impact of the socialization given. Forms of follow-up can be done using program monitoring and evaluation methods.

Second, the Central Java Provincial Government needs to advocate on the issue of malnutrition. Policies should appear particularly for malnutrition so that these issues become the concern to healthcare services, and the public. The placement of the malnutrition issue will make women become aware of their own needs and rights. This can indirectly reduce the number of violence against women.

Third, incorporate human rights issues in any malnutrition policies and programs. The issue of human rights needs to be involved in discussing the issue of malnutrition because it can lead to a widening health gap between men and women, the gap between the poor and the wealthier widening, and equity increasingly being formed (Mathew 2016).

Conclusion

Central Java as one of the potential provinces in Indonesia with all its resources, in fact has not been able to solve various problems encountered. Economic disparities, including the high percentage of poor people, are causing various problems including the high level of malnutrition as a consequence of poverty itself.

Resources which are not proportional to the increase in malnutrition cases, the absence of government regulations and NGOs that specifically target malnutrition issues leads to a neglect of malnutrition issues. This neglect of malnutrition at the government level continues to the community, especially women as the most vulnerable to malnutrition.

The concept developed in the community related to the ideal wife and mother was not meet to the role of women in the food service management. Thus, the role of women in the control of nutrition during pregnancy and lactation was lost. Women continue to be the object of government programs such as 1000 HPK,

PMT, exclusive breastfeeding and Fe tablets. In addition, the concept of patriarchy that developed in the Java community led to women having no high bargaining position so easily experience gender-based violence.

The government built the concept that rice is a domestic consumption that must be ensured related to the safety of family food. As a result of this concept, women become vulnerable because of the neglect of the nutritious food aspect and the existence of women who are preoccupied with the domestic consumption affairs so ignoring the fulfillment of nutritional needs for themselves. Meanwhile, despite being sounded since 2012 the issue of malnutrition is still something odd for health workers other than nutritionist. Lack understanding of malnutrition among health workers reflect that the community has no information about malnutrition. Although there is, the information does not contain the understanding of the root of the problem and does not represent its importance level.

According to the reality of malnutrition issue in Central Java, malnutrition management needs to be carried out integrated among government, NGOs, academics and the community to overcome malnutrition with a thoroughly long-term program. Furthermore, it is also necessary to advocate on malnutrition which resulting in a specific policy on this issue. Finally, the issue of human rights must exist in every policy that will emerge to avoid any gaps that may occur.

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CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF THE CO DO LANDFILL IN CAN THO PROVINCE, VIETNAM

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Abstract

Landfills and its negative impacts livelihoods have been and still are a major concern worldwide for local residents who live nearby, particularly in Southeast Asia. In highlighting this topic, Co Do district of Can Tho province (Vietnam) was chosen as the research's main case study for this paper. The research uses Gordon Walker's concept of environmental justice as the main conceptual framework, using unstructured interviews and research field observations for the methods for data collection in Can Tho province. The field observation method was used to gain insights from the case study area and to better understand the actions of the local people. This paper aims to analyze the way local people and the government look at the landfill issue as well as determine what justice the local community received in the process surrounding making decisions about the landfill from its siting stage to the operating stage. The paper found that the community's perspectives about the negative impacts of the trash dump site on their livelihood were different from the government's perspective. The research also discovered that those who have faced injustice in Co Do have been influenced by several factors such as the policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Land Law of Vietnam, the House Hold Registration system as well as the living culture of the local community. With these findings, the researcher hopes to add a further, impartial case study to the environmental justice conversation, particularly surrounding landfills in Mekong region and how they impact the communities around them.

Keywords: *Environmental Justice, landfill, Can Tho, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Mekong Region*

¹²⁷ Huyen has five years of experience in the nonprofit sector. In 2015, Huyen had a great chance to be the only Vietnamese representative for the Global – Entrepreneurship project with seven other countries of the European Union. Two trips to India and the Ivory Coast during the project gave her a chance to meet local social sectors to learn how they manage their communities. Those trips have allowed her to be more closely acquainted with development sector. Coming back from those trips, Jolly decided to establish an organization named Education for Ha Giang Highland Community Organization (EHC) and took on the roles of co-founder and development project coordinator. She decided to move from the Ho Chi Minh to work and live in one of the poorest mountainous areas of Vietnam- Ha Giang, with the purpose of building capacity for disadvantaged hill tribe youth there. Part of her role there is to inspire her students to live with their all abilities and potential they have gained. Huyen is also recently a Founder of the Education for Vietnam Organic Lifestyle social enterprise (EVOL). Her organization particularly focuses on youth empowerment and environmental issues through organic farming models and community development projects. Her organization cooperated with other nonprofit organizations, international organizations and government entities to promote organic farming in urban areas, and at the same time to raise the awareness about the environmental problems facing the global community among the youth population. Huyen also serves as a main coordinator of the Vietnam leg of the Global Business project which is co-financed from Erasmus+ program. In 2017 she joined Chulalongkorn University's Master of Arts in International Development studies to pursue her passion for sustainable development.

I Introduction

Waste generation is one of the big concerns of every countries all over the world, which is mainly the product of human activities (Hoorweg et al., 2017). As a consequence, it is predictable that this disposal ends up in landfills. At the international level, “currently, world cities generate about 1.3 billion tons of solid waste per year. This volume is expected to increase to 2.2 billion tones by 2025. Waste generation rates will more than double over the next twenty years in lower income countries. Globally, solid waste management costs will increase from today’s annual \$205.4 billion to about \$375.5 billion in 2025” (Hoorweg et al., 2017).

At the national level, as the forecast from the General Statistics Office (GSO) predicts, the population of Vietnam will reach 100 million by 2024 (The General Statistics Office, 2014). This will lead Vietnam to rank 14th in the list of countries with the highest population density in the world. “Since 1986, when the Doi Moi reforms were introduced, Vietnam has developed from a centrally planned system to a “socialist - oriented market economy” facing the highest economic growth rates in Asia” (Schwartz et al., 2010). Since then, Vietnam quickly started its urbanization and industrialization period to “develop” the country’s economy. However, at the same time, this brings more pressure on natural resources and planning for urban and sub-urban areas.

Along with the inevitable consequences of the rapid economic growth, the volume of garbage is also increasing rapidly. According to Schneider’s research in 2017, Vietnam has produced around 28 mil tons of waster per year, which comes from many sources such as households, markets, business activities like restaurants, hospital, etc. Another report stated that Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) in cities will reach about 0.9-1.3 kg/ person/ day in 2015 (Ho Chi Minh City Department of Natural Resources and Environment, 2014). As a result, waste generation increases and ends up in landfills.

Can Tho is known as one of the five biggest cities of Vietnam, and the largest city in Mekong Delta area which holds a convenient geography in Vietnam and in the whole Mekong Delta Area: a region with full potential in developing economic and investment (World Bank, 2014) (see Fig. 1 below). In addition, since 2009, Can Tho has become a first- class city of Vietnam, which requires it to be under the direct management of the central government. This feature has helped Can Tho, which is considered a gate for agriculture, to attract more economic investment from both inside and outside of Vietnam (World Bank, 2014).




Fig 1: Co Do district on the map of Can Tho

The speedy development leads Can Tho to face many problems like other big urban area in Vietnam are dealing with in general. According to the report of The World Bank, 2014, Can Tho companies with other four cities Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Ha Noi and Ha Phong, respectively become the five biggest urban areas which contribute about 70 percent of trash for whole Vietnam. Can Tho is facing solid waste problem as well as a lack of public land for garbage disposal of the city. Under the pressure of finding new place to “solve” the urgent waste issue, Co Do - the sub - urban area of Can Tho province which is considered as one of the places receiving the most negative impacts form the development of Can Tho province came up as a temporary solution for the situation (Mai, T., 2017). One year after becoming the first - class city, in 2010, Can Tho government decided to move more than 50 percent of trash to Dong Thang trash dump, in Dong Thang commune, Co Do district (Khoa, 2016).

Waste disposal has created several public health impacts such as respiratory ailments, diarrhea and dengue fever (Hoornweg et al., 2017). Besides the outcome for environment, air and public health, the landfill also provides many negative effects to the economic and social integration of local people who are living with the landfill every day. The problem which needs to be mentioned here is that the local government from Can Tho still keeps expanding it over the time and any long-term solutions for the situation still have a long way to go (Mai Trinh, 2017). In the other words, there is a hundred thousand people and a hundred families receiving the consequences of the environment under the effect of the landfill every second of the day (Phan, A., 2016).

The purpose of this research was to not only point out the outcome of the landfill on local people’s livelihoods in Co Do district, but to also explore the major factors which affect the people directly. Furthermore, the different perspectives about environmental justice from both sides of the local government and local people

will be determine as a part of the research. Through that, the paper can help to understand the conflict between two levels of making and receiving decisions when standing on their point of view to look at the landfill problems. At the same time, the research explains why people in Co Do district have been receiving these injustices throughout the years as well as their reactions on the situation.

II Conceptual framework

The proposed research project will be using Gordon Walker's "environmental justice" lens as the main conceptual framework for gathering and analyzing data. Under this lens, the research tries to evaluate the impacts of the landfill on the livelihood of those in Co Do district who live near the landfill to see how they are receiving the justice in term of sustainable development and also to identify and understand the main factors effecting the justice here.

The environmental justice framework is not a new phenomenon among the academic field. There are many previous research studies and papers that use this conceptual framework. It became a main voice in the debate all over the world, from activist, politician, to academia and policy-makers. The Environment Justice conceptual framework of Gordon Walker is also being used for this research in order to analyze the conflict of perspective between the points of view of the government and local people.

To analyze whether the poor community's access to justice in comparing to the other groups or how vulnerability they receive in their view points which is being put on the scale with the government's perspective, the paper breaks down those concerns by using three main dimensions of the concept which are distributive justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition according to Gordon Walker's concept.

2.1 Distributive Justice

Using Gordon Walker's book (Walker. G, 2012) as one of the main references, the research is able to see many views from many academia about distributive justice which is considered a core concept of environmental justice. In general, distributive justice has been seen as a fundamental topic of the justice theory, "...central to environmental justice claim-making" (Walker. G, 2012). The primary questions that this core concept is trying to answer are "who lives with" and "who gets what in the environment?" All these questions are used to help the research point out how this distribution influences inequities within the certain society, in this case in Co Do district, under the phenomenon of the landfill. A part of the concept addressed the question which of "what are the good things and bad things they are receiving?" In other words, what are the burdens and benefits that are brought to the local community in the context of environmental justice. These two features of the concept are applied in analyzing the livelihood of people in Co Do district both in social and economic aspects because they "are always relative," complement each other, support and reflect each other in "particular group of potential resource users" (Schroeder et al, 2008).

2.2 Procedural Justice

The Coalition for Environmental Justice helped the research more easily understand the second concept of the framework using the phases of "access to information, participation in decision-making" (Steger, 2007). Procedural justice

is used to clarify the element of environmental justice claim - making which is known as the process, or why things are how they are. In bringing this element to apply on the regulations and the policy of Vietnam, the research understands the answer about how justice local people give from their perspective in comparing to the local government's perspective. The One Party policy in Vietnam also was broken down to analyze whether the local government uses their power in supporting local community's livelihoods in Co Do district under the impact of the landfill and have local people gotten involved in making the sitting decision and how. The Household Registration policy and Land Law of Vietnam are also examined as the factors which influence the policy - making process and its result on people's lives in Co Do. Clearly the procedural justice is an important concept of the framework which adds and supports the distributive justice.

2.3 Recognitional Justice

Scholosberg, 2007 mentioned that "if you are not recognized you do not participate; if you do not participate you are not recognized...", this means that recognitional justice is a necessary concept for the environmental justice framework. Scholosberg, 2004 adds the third recognition concept to the framework which made the framework able to stand stronger in order to analyze the justice situation, which in this case is the justice for the livelihood of people in Co Do district. With this concept, this research is able to examine whether the local people in Co Do district are respected and to what degree. The research also tries to access how the local people react to the landfill situation and how local government deals with the issue by implementing its policies.

These three parts of the environmental justice concept are independent but at the same time they are interconnected (Walker. G, 2012). Coming along with the elements which are justice, evidence and process helped the research clear the justice situation on the livelihood under the impact of the landfill from both perspective of local government and local people in Co Do district.

III Research method

3.1 Unstructured interview

The secondary data was collected in advance based on the information from the internet, governmental database, articles in the local newspapers, previous studies and also from the researcher's network both in and out of the research field. All information about the location, population of Dong Thang commune, Co Do district as well as the data of the landfill was researched a month before the field visits. The research is mainly via the qualitative approach and the data used came from many different sources with the research strategy is based on mixed method design which are unstructured interview, field note and observation.

Data was collected from April 25 to May 1, 2018 in Dong Thang commune, Co Do district where the landfill is located. In total, the research used unstructured interview method to approach 5 local people. The unstructured interview format took the natural extension of the participants and they will interact with the researcher by answering the general questions of the topic that the research is leading in the natural flow of the conversation (Patton, 2002).

Every discussion lasted around 30 minutes to an hour depended on the situation. Sometimes, it was interrupted because of their personal work with their small business or someone took an interest in the research as she was an outside of the commune. It took the first hour to understand and get involved with the local people's culture as well as their lifestyle. However, it was not too difficult for researcher to be accepted into the community and to catch the flow because of her prior experience in living and working with people in Me Kong Delta region.

For the first informant, the researcher used memory techniques to capture their details information from their answers because the research did not want to break their flow of talking about the problem they are facing and or the feeling expressed. At the beginning, the researchers faced difficulty to manage and control the interview and the first informant's direction as the feature of the unstructured interview that researcher has to keep in mind the research's goal and the scope of the problem that the study wants to talk to the informant (Fife, 2005) but still encourage the interviewees to share their experiences and perspective related to the topic that the researcher has interest in (Burgess, 1984). Luckily the research got better in doing the guide from the second interview and the talk went smoothly with all informants.

With the reason of not getting the acceptance from the government, the conducting could not use the semi - structured method and expert interview method to conduct data from local business company, local NGO organization or local hospital, local school. However, the unstructured interview approach allowed the researcher to talk to the small business of the community to conduct the data about the effect of the landfill on their business and what was the different from before and after the landfill is installed.

All the informants were randomly chosen based on the observation on site and the network in advance. With the short time of staying in the field because of sensitive political reasons, the researcher decided to collect the primary data while she took the non-participant observation. All the conversations was guided and managed using the questionnaire that was created prior, utilizing the Environmental Justice conceptual framework as its main influence. Regardless, the method was still challenging using the unstructured interview method because this method requires a significant amount of time (Patton, 2002) since the researcher needed to gain trust before reaching to the main discussion with the informants. Understanding their culture and talking style was an important skill to utilize during the research process, and the natural nature of the conversation greatly helped in the writing of this particular topic. That also helped local people think that that was just having a normal conversation which made them share their idea and express their feeling uncovered. It was useful for the paper in having many different perspectives in different edges of the issues which the paper could not get from anywhere else. Interviews were had with following five key informants:

No.	Date	Features	Distance from the landfill to their house
1	April 26	Female, 56years old Was born in Dong Thang commune, Co Do district	800m

No.	Date	Features	Distance from the landfill to their house
		Works in the rice packaging company	
2	April 27	Male, 28 years old Was born in Dong Thang, Co Do Works in the local hostel	400m
3	April 28	Female, 52 years old Moved from other commune to Dong Thang but still in Co Do district Own her own small restaurant	1000m
4	April 29	Male, 55 years old Moved to other commune to Dong Thang, but still in Co Do district Has his own coffee shop	1,200m
5	April 30	Male, 57 years old Was born in Dong Thang, Co Do Own his own sugar cane cart and planting rice and cucumber	850m

Table 1: Key Informants

3.2 Observation

In the field visit from April 25 to April 30, 2018 in Dong Thang landfill, Dong Thang commune, Co Do district, the researcher used non-participant observation methods to collect the primary data. This method is useful for validating and/or extending the data obtained (Lewis - Beck et al., 2004). The observation was held under the hot weather which made the smell of garbage and decomposition increase and notably affected the local people when the wind arrived. The aim of the observation was for gathering the profile of the landfill and the residents in the area around the trash dump site. The researcher observed two main things during her time in the field: first, the researcher has noticed the way local community live, their lifestyle, their daily activities such as where they buy food, what kind of food they buy, the resources of those food, which water resource they use for their daily life, where they often go or join like pagoda, park...in term of social activities and so on. Second, the process of putting trash into the landfill location under the direction of the government and how local people react with the situation. Moreover, the relationship between local people and the local government was observed, primarily how they react about the landfill and related activities. The researcher also went around the landfill to examine the environmental conditions. The purpose was not to understand the size of the landfill, but to see its actual proximity to the inhabitants' site the direct impact (flies and bad smell).

IV The factors affecting the decision making and perceptions of the local community

4.1 Communist Socialist Policy and the Land Law of Vietnam

Vietnam is a Communist Socialist country with a One Party policy, therefore, the State has the sovereign right to administer and control everything, as stated in Vietnam Laws, and land is one of factors among those Laws. According to the Land Law which was instituted by The Vietnamese National Assembly, Article 1, Chapter 1 “this Law prescribes the regime of land ownership, powers and responsibilities of the State in representing the entire-people owner of land and uniformly managing land, the regime of land management and use, the rights and obligations of land users involving land in the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. It means that the government at all levels in Vietnam has the right to manage the land for the government or public purpose inside the territory of Vietnam. In Chapter 2, Section 1, the “rights of the State involving land”, Article 21, Clause 1 once again emphasize that “The National Assembly shall promulgate laws and resolutions on land; decide on national master plans and plans on land use; and exercise the supreme right to supervise over land management and use nationwide”. According to this, the government has supreme right in deciding which area of land will be used for government plans.

In Chapter 1, Article 10, Clause 2 about Land use for public purposes which is “including land used for transport (including airports, airfields, inland waterway ports, maritime ports, rail system, road system and other transport facilities); irrigation; land with historical-cultural relics or scenic spots; land for community activities or public entertainment and recreation; land for energy facilities; land for post and telecommunications facilities; land for markets; land for waste dumping and treatment, and land for other public facilities”, means when a landfill is belonging to the master plan of the government, the government has the right to use land for this purpose.

The State at the same time has the right to decide the land price for recovery which is expressed in Article 18 in the same Section of Chapter 2, Clause 1 and 2 “The State shall prescribe the principles and methods for land valuation”, and “The State shall promulgate land price brackets and tables, and decide on specific land prices”. However, the process for negotiating between the government and local people takes time. Also, normally local people will be told in advance with the exact timing of these actions, then a negotiating process will be conducted, and sometimes at the end maybe the government will have to force people to leave. As a result of this, local people have to move to other places. In the other words, local people do not have the decision to choose to let the landfill come to their community or not, they are always vulnerable under the master plan of the government.

As one of the informants shared her story relating to the land use in Dong Thang landfill, which extended 5 more hectares prior to the creation of the landfill, local people owned that land area. When Can Tho government decided to extend the landfill area, the government applied the compensation clearance policy to all households who lived within the area to move out. Those families have received payment even though they were not fully satisfied with the payment, but the informant did not share how much she received. The injustice can be listed down here is that the government followed the Law of Vietnam, however the regulations of the Law with its own power bring the injustice to the local people who receive direct impacts of the decision. The government has paid local people the cost to settle in a new place but the fact that they are not satisfied with the payments still stands or the money they receive did not come to them one time

and on time, therefore, they could not afford to move to new settlement by building new house or buying new land.

The power of the top down regime in One Party policy was also used to protect the government from outside attacks. When the researcher went to the research field and asked for doing interview as she have had the acceptance in advance, she also mentioned the main purpose of the interview together with the letter from her Master's program as the evidence for her research, she could not interview anybody. The topic about Dong Thang landfill was really hot at that time and the government did not want to have any more interview to narrow down the influence of the topic. The researcher had asked for permission from higher level government - district level, but then when she went to district government, they asked her to get the approval from provincial government. That could show that Dong Thang commune government tried to use the power of top down approach to try to make it difficult to reach the research field and block the effort of understanding the landfill situation.

4.2 The Household Registration Policy - The Ho Khau Policy

In 1964, the Household Registration policy (or Ho Khau in Vietnamese) was implemented in Vietnam under the administration of the Ministry of Public Security. The main purpose of this policy not only focused on controlling the significant rise of migrants to urban areas but also went along with the security and the development of society. All Vietnamese inhabitants have to belong to one of the two main temporal categories which are temporary residents and permanent residents as a base for the requirements of the Vietnamese Law on Residence.

Also according to the policy, children of the family who holds the Ho Khau of which area will need to study within the same area, they cannot chose to study in another commune. With this regulation, many kindergarten students in Dong Thang commune have to study in the kindergarten school which is just around 750m from the landfill. The regulation also applies for medical treatment cases, as people must go for treatment at the hospital where their Ho Khau is registered. Again, the hospital is only just about 800m from the landfill. With this situation, children and the hospital patients face the related issues directly.

Furthermore, according to the policy, every group will receive specific rights and responsibilities for their residential household status. In the other words, people who hold the Ho Khau will be permanent residents and they will have full right of accessibility while temporary residents faced very few opportunities to access the public services and social protection. Specifically, permanent citizens have access to public health care services and free social health insurance for their children under 6 years old kids while children of temporary migrants have to pay for private health checking with the higher price although this is free according to the Law about children health of Vietnam (Work Bank, 2016). In addition, permanent residents even have the opportunity to join to social groups like those for the elderly (Elders' Association) groups for women (Woman's Association), groups for youth (Youth Union) or other organizations such as the Farmer's Association, Trade Union and Veterans' Association and so on where they receive support and protection for their development. Since permanent citizens in Dong Thang commune do not receive any free treatment from the hospital under the decision of the government for the impact of the landfill, temporary residents

have to face even more problems and are more vulnerability for the issues they are dealing with.

After 50 years of existing and dominating, the Ho Khau has helped the government a lot in managing public security and administrating migrant crisis into the big cities but at the same time, it controlled the accessibility to fundamental social services such as education, health, and employment opportunities. The Ho Khau has had a hand in reducing social protection, decreasing the voice as well as the rights of vulnerable citizens. In the other words, the policy rejected the opportunity to make the public benefits and social services available to everyone, instead injuring the justice of temporary residents, the life of the landfill victims more and more difficult.

4.3 Living culture

Vietnam is an agricultural country; therefore, land plays an important role in participating in all activities for the local people's livelihoods. "Soil is closely connected to the culture and civilization of an ethnic group living in a given place, including their religion, thoughts, livelihood and health" (Katsuyuki Minami, 2010). For farmers, land is their home, it is their livelihood, it is their culture which is built and passed from generation to generation. Edward Tylor in *Primitive Culture* (1870) also defines culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society". The norm about culture is various, in term of relationships, culture is described: "Culture consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves" - T. Schwartz (1992). Or Matsumoto (2002) explained that culture is "... the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next".

On the other hand, in an agricultural country, culture originally can be understood as the "cultivating the soil and raising crops" that "culture includes not only food, clothing and shelter, but also technology, academia, art, morality, religion, politics, and other livelihood-shaping modes" (Katsuyuki Minami, 2010). The Mekong Delta area is known as for agriculture where people live based on planting and harvesting of the land that goes with them their whole lives. To them, they were born on their land, land gives them food, raises their soul and body and they come back to the land when they die. This circle is repeated from this generation to the other generation. Therefore, land has an important position in the local people's life, it is hard to leave their homeland, especially people who live there for a long time. To them, resettlement in a new place is an impossible thing, even though their "home" is seriously polluted. This living culture made the local community vulnerable themselves.

V Environmental Justice framework analysis

5.1 Distribution justice

As with many other case studies on both the international and national level, this landfill is located in one of the poorest of Co Do district. People here are mainly

farmers who have worked in that sector from generation to generation and do not care much about policy problems or in other words, the inhabitant do not really have much knowledge about policies and regulations of Vietnam, that is why the government can easy manage and control them.

The top-down regime of One Party policy in Vietnam also brings injustice to the community in terms of distribution because the highest power is reserved for the highest government level. It means that the national government has the right to decide almost everything and the lower levels of the state needs to follow those decisions. This imbalance in power distribution leads to imbalances in responsibility distribution, the role of the government in the local level becomes blurry which is considered as a main voice of local community. As a result, the distribution of local resources and benefit are also affected, creating the situation at the landfill in question that we see today.

5.2 Procedural justice

Under the top down regime of Communist Socialist Policy of Vietnam, the higher level of government has the sovereign power to decide where and when to set up or install the landfill as well as extend the site area. As the paper just analyse in above, this led to the uneven in distribution of the region where the landfill is installed because the decision is just to serve for the government master plan which having no approval from the local community. The top-down approach also can be examined in procedural dimension. This approach of the Communist Socialist Policy of Vietnam actually has the power itself since it can influence from the top level. Furthermore, when it is brought to the local state level, that power seems demonstrated clearer. Once the provincial government (here is the higher government level) decided to choose the area for installing and delivering trash, Co Do district government could not refuse that selection. Then Dong Thang commune government (here is the lowest government level) needs to implement the decision without any other options.

The power of the One Party policy in Vietnam also influenced local people, makes them think that they do not have the right to request the information, do not have the right to access to information. That led them have to live with the situation for those years even these rights are stated clearly in the Law on access to information on the Vietnamese National Law system. People have set in mind that they cannot do anything to get the information about the issue they are facing from the state office because they do not have that power, do not have that right to their clean environment. People even thought that their complaint is just like “taking eggs to throw to stone”. This led them to be vulnerable themselves right in the situation they are facing. Or in the way round, the power has set on people’s mind about their rights which limits their accessibility.

On the other hand, besides the information accessibility, local people who receive the impact directly also could not take part in in the decision-making process. Lacking the participant in planing the landfill installing and receiving waste made local community was in the condition of receiving the decision passively. Public participation is the most important part of environmental planning and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), (“SEAHRN”, 2014). Moreover, this participation needs to be serious from the beginning of the process and also have to influence the final decision, not just join for fun. However, this right was not practised in many cases in Vietnam, include this landfill case even though this

right was also emphasized in the environment right as one of the fundamental human right.

5.3 Recognition justice

In this case, local people are who live with the landfill every day and receive the impacts from it every second of their life. As the result of the research, local residents in Dong Thang commune have not seen any benefits from the landfill except jobs at the landfill area but they are receiving many unexpected negative impacts from the trash dump site. Even though local citizens get jobs at landfill to improve their economic situation, if their crops had not failed because of the damage from the leachate of the landfill, they do not to take that “dirty job” but could get more money from their rice fields instead. Moreover, almost all of their community activities were closed due to the effect from the landfill. All the respect to their land which was expressed through those activities were not recognized anymore. In addition, the action that Dong Thang citizens took to mitigate the impacts of the landfill on their livelihoods such as stopping trash trucks were also considered as the activities which against the people who are taking the government duty in Vietnam Law, therefore, all their actions were stopped under the authority of the government. The complaint letter from the community also did not receive any response from the government even though according to Vietnamese law, they should receive an answer within three working days (or a maximum of seven working days if the issue needs to consult a higher-level government department). This can be seen that all the effort of local community to live in the clean environment was not recognized but controlled with the government power.

VI Conclusion

Going along with the negative impacts that the local community are facing, there are the factors which led to the existing problem in Dong Thang community. The main root of the problem would appear to be stemming from the One Party system of the Vietnamese government, in which all levels have the power to decide what they need to do for the master plan. For that, with the top down regime, the district government needs to follow the decision from the provincial government and the landfill in Dong Thang commune was that extended. The One Party policy of Vietnam made people receive less justice since the government has sovereign power to decide, so local people have no chances to participant the decision making as well as consultant from the beginning of the process.

The Ho Khau policy made local residents more vulnerable, especially for temporary residents since they will not receive the full service and social protection because they do not hold the official status. The government has paid to the local for the new settle cost, but the main thing here is the process to take that cost takes long time than people expect with many and complex procedural, especially since they do not hold the Ho Khau. Living culture, on the other hand, made Dong Thang inhabitants receive the disadvantages themselves since they did not want to move to new place to resettlement because they just want to stay on the land which is passed from generation to generation, to keep their root from their ancestors.

Even though the landfill will be moved to new location as is the plan for September 2018, the situation has remained the same. On the other word, with the top down regime of Communist Socialist Policy like in Vietnam, the higher-level government still has the power to control and change the decision. Therefore, the local community at the lower level will be impacted by these decisions without any consultation or participation. The impacts from Dong Thang landfill still exist and will affect the next generation without support from the government. The same type of situation will occur for the new landfill in Ba Dam commune if the dominance of the One Party policy still exists. Environmental justice concerns in Vietnam still remain.

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WOMEN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MYANMAR AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, A CASE STUDY OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Abstract

The possibility for all citizens regardless of gender, religion, ethnicity to participate in decision-making processes is the heart of democracy. However, in most of the countries, the political arena and decision-making processes remains largely dominated by men (Ishrat Jahan, 2008). In Myanmar politics, although women participation in politics is marginalized before 2010 during military time, in 2010 election, women had opportunity to participate at union and state/ region levels parliaments. Besides, in 2015 election, although the ratio of women participation is nearly double increased compared with 2010 elections at both national and local levels, politics has traditionally been a male preserve. The percentage of women participation in political activities in 2015 election is 10.3 % at national level and 9.7% at state/region level.

Therefore, the research discusses main obstacles and challenges for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar including economic factor, social factor, political factor, limited support of family, political parties, and government's policy and mechanism for women political participation in Myanmar by using both primary and secondary data. The primary concept for this study is based on women empowerment processes which are included four different pathways which women are changed –material, perceptual, cognitive and relational. It can be seen the biggest challenge for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar is lack of family support and the reason family does not want to provide support for women is because of political factor. Therefore, in Myanmar, family support and political factor is related with each other. Then, the second biggest challenge is limited support of political parties especially there is no gender policy in each political party though in National League for Democracy party which current government is leaded, there is special mechanism “if two persons are equal qualification, first priority is woman”. The other challenge is economic factor, surprisingly; the research found out social factor is not challenge for women in Myanmar to participate in political activities.

Myanmar is one of the countries signing in CEDAW; thus, Myanmar government is trying to empower women to participate in political activities in various ways though it is found out the implementation is weak. In spite of CEDAW and Beijing platform recommends using gender quota system in order to increase women political participation, in Myanmar, the research surprisingly found out most of women representatives, themselves in House of Representatives do not prefer to use gender-quota system, one of the potential ways to increase women participation in politics.

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Key Words: *Women, Politics, Participation, National Level, House of Representatives*

Introduction

In 1935, Myanmar became the second country in ASEAN women have the right to give votes in election. Since then, women in Myanmar have had constitutional rights of equal opportunity with men to participate in politics by giving their votes. Moreover, although women also have equal rights to access education, health care, same salaries and economic opportunities like men according to 2008 constitution, in decision-making processes of their own family, community, local and national level and in political activities, women especially in rural and ethnic areas are rare to participate and it is apparent that women do not tend to hold the same positions as men in decision-making processes and political activities. Consequently, women are always left behind in Myanmar society concerning with the participation of political activities and decision-making processes, and women voices are very silent as well.

In Myanmar politics, among 52 million populations of Myanmar, 50.7 % are women and 49.3 % are men. Although women population are more than men, the ratio of women participation in politics is very low compared with men according to 2015 election results. At the national level parliaments, women participation is 10.3 %, there are 23 women representatives in Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) which are elected based on state/ region out of 224 representatives. Otherwise, in Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) which are elected based on townships in the country, women participation ratio is 10.5 %, women representatives are 46 out of 440 members. At the state/ region level parliaments which are elected based on populations in the country, the rate of women participation is 9.7%, 86 women can participate out of 749 representatives (Asia Foundation Report, 2017) in fourteen state / region parliaments of Myanmar.

Besides, at present, in Myanmar government cabinet which National League for Democracy (NLD) headed by woman leader Daw Aung San Su Kyi has formed, there is one woman cabinet member, herself. She controls two ministry positions, Ministry of President's Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Expect her; there is no woman in both ministerial and deputy-ministerial positions. In local government, among fourteen chief ministers of states / regions governments, only two women are appointed as chief ministers in Kayin state and Tanintharyi state government. Comparing other countries in ASEAN region, Myanmar is the least country for women participation in politics, Thailand (10.6%), Malaysia (17%), the Philippines (27.2%), Lao PDR (25%), Vietnam (25.3%), Singapore (23.9%), Cambodia (20.3%), Bangladesh (20%) and Indonesia (17.1%) concerning with women participation in decision-making processes (Sein, S. S., Latt, 2017). Women participation is 22.9% in national elected bodies at global average.

Concerning with the level of participation in decision-making processes in Myanmar, the level of women participation in major decision-making processes is also low because women are very rare to get high rank positions in every organization especially in government administration sector. For example - in national parliaments' offices, although there are three Director General Level, the highest rank officers, there is no woman and in Deputy Director Level, among 11 officers, only three officers are women and for Director and Head of the

departments, there are few women as well. Women are just doing and following the orders of highest rank officers who are usually men and they do not have the opportunities to participate in decision-making processes of parliament administration sector like men.

In accordance with Myanmar is one of the signing CEDAW countries, though the government is trying for gender equality and women empowerment, women participation in politics and the level of women participation is still very low. Therefore, this research aims to identify why do women's participation is very low especially in the political activities? What are the main obstacles and challenges that women faced for expanding participation?

Research Questions

- Why does women's participation remain low in political activities in Myanmar?
- What are main obstacles and challenges for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar?

Research Objectives


- To identify the factors contributed to low participation of women in political activities in Myanmar
- To indicate main obstacles and challenges for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar

Conceptual Framework

The research mainly focused on the concept of women empowerment processes adopted by Chan, Martha & Simeen (1995). According to this concept, there are four kinds of pathways: material pathway, perceptual pathway, cognitive pathway and relational pathway. These four pathways are supported for economic, social and political factors. Empowerment processes are expected to occur through changes in different aspect along these four pathways and also these changes can be thought of as ingredients for empowerment.

For women empowerment in all economic, social, political sectors, the supports of family, community, Elite (political parties), Government are also important. If the family, community, political party, government efforts and affirmative policy action are very strong for women empowerment, women can be participated more in political activities while failure to implement affirmative action results, lack of family, community, political party support and government efforts lead to decrease women's participation in politics.

Conceptual Framework



In Myanmar, women can face economic, social and political challenges to participate in political activities, therefore, this will be linked with the factors why women cannot participate in political activities in Myanmar, research question. Then, if family, community, political parties and government will not support for women, they cannot participate in political activities, thus, limited support of family, community, political parties and government can be challenges for women in Myanmar to participate in political activities in Myanmar.

Research Methodology

Qualitative research method is used in this thesis in order to know the obstacles and challenges that are prevented for women to increasingly participate in political activities in Myanmar. Data collection will be conducted from documentary research: published and unpublished documents in relation to women participation in political activities, as well as political parties' policies and field research. Field research was conducted with six women representatives, five from political parties. Selecting women representatives for in-depth interviews, three representatives are chosen from main land constituencies (divisions), three representatives are chosen from ethnic constituencies (states).

Obstacles and Challenges of women's participation in political activities in Myanmar Economic Factor (Material Pathway)

Economic situation is one of the challenges for women not to participate in political activities in Myanmar. Myanmar is the male-dominated country; consequently, men take leadership role in every household and go outside for income. Besides, since 13th century, the Buddhist Sangha did dissemination to Buddhism that women are considered spiritually lower than men and also men just can attain Buddha-hook rather than women. In Buddhist language, "phone" is the abstract power that all men are believed to possess and take them to the higher spiritual level. For women, some women are considered to possess "phone" but it is not the same degree as the men's possesses. Therefore, Myanmar Buddhist men are very afraid to lose their "phone" and all Buddhist people believe some sort of domestic and household jobs such as washing, ironing women

and men's clothes especially trousers and skirts, and also when girl kids pass their fathers make men lose "phone" (Minoletti, 2014).

Consequently, the responsibilities of women are household activities: washing, ironing, cooking, and looking after children and husbands inside the house. The responsibility of men is to go outside for income and family's support. Because men are the main persons to find income, ownership of housing, land, properties are with the men's name although in Myanmar, according to article 378 of 2008 constitution, every people regardless of gender have equal opportunities to occupy housing, land and other prosperities.

Therefore, in Myanmar, generally, women do not have much time to find income because of lot of household jobs and just spend the money that husband gives. To do political activities, MPs need to spend campaign expenses from their own money although they may be provided by donors, and political parties. In Myanmar context, women face economic challenges to do political activities than men because they do not have their own income even though they are interested in politics.

"When I started to do political activities, I cannot do my economy, moreover, I donot have strong economic background and I am single person, consequently, after I did for political activities for two years, I started to think whether I should do or not for political activities because of my economic situation" (Woman MP from National League for Democracy Party (NLD)).

Social Factor (Cognitive pathway, Perceptual pathway)

According to conceptual framework of the thesis, under social factor, there are education, leadership skill, electoral and campaigning knowledge, political and decision-making knowledge, self-confident and self-esteem as well as leadership mind. By doing in-depth interviews with 6 women MPs, it is investigated social factor is not challenge for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar.

Education

In historical period of Myanmar context, men need to find income for family support and the responsibility of women is to do household jobs. Therefore, parents send their sons rather than daughters to the schools and universities. At present in Myanmar, article 366 of 2008 constitution guarantee every people may have equal right and opportunity to access education regardless of gender issue. Consequently, women have the right to access education like men. Education makes people be self-esteem, empower individuals (especially women) and enhance political participation (Gender Dimension, 2017). Thus, education is the basic need for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar. According to Gender Dimension, 2017, the literacy rate of men is 92.6 % while the literacy of women is 86.9% in Myanmar. Although literacy rate of men is higher than women, the graduated, postgraduate diploma, master's degree and Ph. D degree women are more than men as follows:

Degree	Women	Men
Graduate	1,097,993	763,762
Postgraduate Diploma	29,452	18,718
Master degree	56,514	20,202
Ph. D	7,241	4,576

Table (), the number of women and men attained degrees in Myanmar in 2014 (Gender Dimension, 2017)

When women MP education in Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) is looked at, the degree obtain of women MPs is higher than men MPs. Besides, there are two MPs who do not have degree. At current situation of Myanmar, it is observed education is not challenge for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar because the rate of degree attained of women is more than men throughout the country, Myanmar.

“I married when I was attending second year, therefore, I did not get degree but at present, I become woman MP in both two parliament terms of Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) (2011-2015) and (2016-2020). Although I did not get degree, I can represent my constituency people and also can participate in parliamentary functions very well (Woman MP from Rakhine National Party).

Leadership skill, electoral and campaigning knowledge, political and decision- making knowledge

To be woman MPs, women should have leadership skill, electoral and campaigning knowledge as well as political and decision-making knowledge before they become MPs. Unsurprisingly, in Myanmar context, in spite of some young woman MPs have knowledge about leadership, electoral, campaigning, political and decision - making knowledge, most women MPs does not have opportunities to study these skills and knowledge and as a result, they do not know about these before they become women MPs. By doing in-depth interviews with six women MPs, it is found that three woman MPs have these skills and knowledge before they become MPs, otherwise, three women MPs do not have these skills and knowledge before they become MPs.

“I do not opportunities to attend the trainings about leadership skill, electoral and campaigning knowledge, political and decision-making knowledge before I compete in election because I stayed in prison for twelve years. In prison, although I can have chance to read, I need to wait one month to get one book. When I won 2012 by-election, I could attend the training about these trainings which were given by Civil Society Organizations (CSO) (woman MP from National League for Democracy party (NLD)

Self-confident

Self-confidence is arguably one of the important factors for women not to participate in political activities in Myanmar. Based on in-depth interviews with six women MPs, it is observed women MP do not have self-confidence that must be woman MP but they just want to transform democratic system from military rule and want to do charity, public services for prosperity of the people.

“I did not have a plan to compete in election as MP and I do not have self-confident that I must be woman MP. Although I do not have self-confident to become MP, when I become MP, I did my best in function of the responsibilities of woman MP (woman MP from National League for Democracy Party (NLD)).

Political Factors (Relational Pathway) and family/ relative/ neighbor support

Sixty years of military rule in Myanmar has seen the critical role of its citizen's political participation marginalized. During military times, not only women but also men cannot do politics, if they are interested in politics and working for politics, these persons went to jail as political prisoners. Besides, family members and the relatives of politicians are also punished concerning with political issues. Because of military rule, Myanmar people are very afraid politics and political activities, also they are inculcated politics is very dangerous for them. Besides, in political history of Myanmar, 1988 democracy movement, 1990 revolution and 2007 “Shwe War Yaung” revolution, Myanmar citizens, monks, students who were revoluted military government went to prison as political prisoners. Because of bad and terrible memory of Myanmar politics, almost every Myanmar people assume politics is insecure job for people.

In 2011, Myanmar transforms multi-party democratic system; politicians can have opportunities to participate in Myanmar politics. Otherwise, it is assumed although mental and physical security of politicians is safe than before during military time, there are many restrictions for political rights of people: freedom of expression, assembly until now. Also, political rights of Myanmar people are still being broken according to article 124A (Sedition) of Penal Code, article 66 d of telecommunication law, and peaceful assembly law in Myanmar which has many restrictions for political rights. At current Myanmar politics, the people who criticize government's activities are charged with the above laws, thus, there are political prisoners in Myanmar until now.

Consequently, because people assume political job is not safety and insecure job even though the country transforms to democratic country, almost every parents, relatives and neighbor do not want to provide women to do political activities. It is assumed that politics is not for women, politics is not an easy job and the political situation is not stable, they will be in jail if they enter into politics. Besides, Myanmar people assume teachers and government staff have been noted as professional and respectful careers for women, so, almost every parent want their daughters to be teachers and government staff instead of doing politics. Women representatives describes during the campaign, the disapproval of parents, spouses and close relatives created significant tension within their families and they could not emphasize fully on campaigning because of family tension.

“My father is a soldier and there are 6 siblings including me in my family. I am elder daughter in my family. My family wants me to be a teacher; and they do not want me to do in politics especially my mother. My mother always cries when I started to do political activities because she thinks politics is insecure job, but for me, if I decide to do, I will not hesitate and must do” (Woman MP from NLD party)

By observing in-depth interview with six women MPs from Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives), limited support of family/ relatives/ neighbor is the biggest challenge for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar. When it is investigated the reason why family/ relatives/ neighbor do not provide support for women is because of political factor and political fear.

Family Member’s participation in politics

Almost every family in Myanmar except political families does not want to encourage their daughters to do political activities. By looking at current women MPs from Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives), most of them are from political family. When the State Counselor of Myanmar is looked at, her father is Bogyoke Aung San, independence father of Myanmar. And as a result, she is so easy to do politics because she is from political family. In her first political speech in August 1988,

“I could not, as my father’s daughter, remain indifferent to all that was going on. This national crisis could, in fact, be called the second struggle for independence.” (Speech of Daw Aung San Su Kyi, the chairman of NLD Party in August 1988)

When the campaign posters of NLD in 2015 election is looked at, the campaign posters are frequently featured side by side images of father and daughter. It is not surprisingly that most of women MPs are from political families in current parliament term (2016-2022), consequently, they can be women MPs easily with the support of family. By doing 6 in-depth interviews with women MPs, it is observed four women MPs are from political family although 2 women MPs are not.

“Till 88 democracy movement, my father is politician and also member of NLD party. My father and other politicians always do political dialogue in my home. Therefore, for me, the words “politics and democracy” are not strange and I am single person, I do not need to take care husband and children”. (Woman MP from NLD)

The research found out woman from political family background can be easily become women MPs due to family, relatives’ support. According to Myanmar political context, women who are interested in politics will be very struggle to get permission and support from their family, relatives and neighbors if they are not from political family background.

Support of society and community

In 2010 election, NLD did not compete; therefore, Myanmar people give their votes to USDP party which is from military background and other ethnic parties due to limited choice of political parties although they want to get civilian government. In 2012 by-election and 2015 election, Myanmar people give their

votes to NLD party. Unlike other countries, in Myanmar, people are ravenous civilian government and want to transform to democratic system from military rule, consequently, when they give their votes, they just look at party regardless of ethnicity, religion and gender. Thus, concerning with support of society and community, every women MPs describe society and community support them by giving their votes and there is no gender-discrimination in voting. Otherwise, community and society are also afraid politics, so, they do not want to contact with woman MP candidates when they went to villages and towns within their constituency as campaign before election. It is observed expect giving their votes, community and society do not support anything. For National League for Democracy (NLD), some people from community and society who are willingly to transform civilian government donate money but for the other ethnic parties, they do not get financial support and other support from community.

“Generally, ethnic people are poor, and the rate of unemployment is high, so, community and society cannot provide financial and other support expect by giving their votes. For me and other ethnic politician, we are very pleased and thankful to ethnic community and society because of giving their votes although they cannot provide any support”. (Women MP from Ta’aung (Palaung) National Party).

Support of political party

Political parties are the most important institution for increasingly women MPs because if they select women as candidates for election, women can participate in political activities in Myanmar. Unlike other countries, the Myanmar people give their votes by looking at only party regardless of gender issue. For example, in 2015 election, the leader of NLD gives campaign speech to the public “just look at party, not to look at candidates”. From the Myanmar people’s side, they want to transform democratic system and want to get civilian government, therefore, they just look at party without looking at candidates are women or men and also qualification of candidates. Therefore, political parties are the important and essential channels for women participation in politics, but it is observed that political parties have been slow to respond for enhancing women’s political participation.

In 2015 election, the political parties selected 789 (12%) of women as candidates for MPs while 6074 (88%) of men candidates and after election has finished, 1150 men candidates and 151 women candidates won in election and became MPs in both national and state/region parliaments.

Winning numbers in election




Chart (1) participation of women and men candidates in both national and state/region parliaments in 2015 election

Party	Total MPs	Women MPs	Women as % of Party's MPs
Shan Nationalities League for Democracy	42	7	16.7%
National League for Democracy	887	134	15.1%
Taang National Party	11	1	9.1%
Arakan National Party	45	2	4.4%
Union Solidarity and Development Party	116	3	2.6%
Pa-O National Organization	10	0	0%
Other Parties	47	4	11.8%
Independent MPs	5	0	0%

Table () Women and Men MPs in both national and state/region parliaments in 2015 election

Gender policy and gender quota system of political parties

By looking at the above statistic, the political parties select only 12% of women as candidates for both national and state/region parliaments; consequently, the ratio of women participation is low in Myanmar politics. The other potential way to increase women's political

participation is gender policy or gender-quota system that stipulates minimum number of women candidates for each political party. Therefore, in most of the Nordic countries which the percentage of women participation in politics is very high, Scandinavian parties, Swedish Liberal Party, Swedish Communist Party, Norwegian Socialist Left Party, Danish Socialist People's Party adopted gender-quota system in their respective parties. In Myanmar political parties, there is no gender policy and gender-quota system until now although political parties play vital role in increasingly women participation in political activities in Myanmar.

In spite of there is no gender policy for each party, it is investigated that in NLD, there is gender platform in criteria of selecting MP candidate as follows;

- (1) If there are two persons who are equal qualification, the party selects woman as first priority.
- (2) If there are two persons who are equal qualification, the party selects young people as second priority.
- (3) If there are two persons who are equal qualification, the party selects ethnic people as third priority.

It is observed that the other political parties, USDP, SNLD, do not have not only gender policy but also gender platform or guideline like NLD. Moreover, when the 2015 election manifestos of political parties are observed, there is one party that would emphasize on women affairs in its manifesto, NLD. Unsurprisingly, almost every political party would not emphasize on women affairs in their parties' policies and election manifesto expect NLD party because the leader of

NLD is woman, Daw Aung San Su Kyi, consequently, NLD party is more emphasized on women affairs than other political parties.

In NLD 2015 election manifesto, the party gives commitment to the people to implement thirteen sectors including women affairs. Concerning with increasingly women participation in political activities in Myanmar, NLD party' commitment on increasingly women participation in politics was as follows according to 2015 election manifesto,

- (1) The party would take action to get gender equality in administrative, economic and social sectors and to implement all laws which are concerned with gender equality very effectively and efficiently.
- (2) The party would take action to get equal rights for women like men in equal jobs, as well as not to gender-discrimination in promotion of all levels in all sectors.

It is investigated women's political participation is also challenged by the policies and practices of the political parties themselves. In spite of Myanmar now has more than 90 political parties, there is no concrete policies promoting women's participation or set aside reservations for women candidates. Besides, most of political parties assume gender equality issue is not important in Myanmar like other issues, economic, health, education, peace- building, etc, therefore, the parties did not mention about women's affairs in their manifesto and they do not think about gender policy and gender-quota system with the aim of increasingly women participation in politics.

Concerning with using gender quota system, In the countries which women's political participation is very low, these countries use quota system which is one of the potential mechanisms for increasingly women's political participation because gender-quota system can stipulate a minimum number of seats for women in both political activities and decision- making processes. By looking at ASEAN countries, Indonesia and Philippine have already introduced quota-system laws and in Asia countries, Bangladesh, China, East Timor, India, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Nepal and Pakistan have already applied gender quota- laws (Minoletti, 2014). Countries around the world which apply quota-laws show the quota-system have had quick response for increasingly women political participation.

Besides, Beijing Platform recommends for adopting thirty percentages of quota-system laws, consequently, in Myanmar which is one of the countries signed CEDAW and Beijing, NSPAW recommends and calls for the application of quota-systems to guarantee increasingly women's participation in decision-making processes in Myanmar. Though NSPAW urges applying quota system for gender equality in politics and decision-making processes, the research found women MPs from National League for Democracy (NLD) which leads the current government does not prefer to apply quota-system.

“At present in Myanmar, women MPs are very struggling. When women's participation will be increased by using quota-system, the people will criticize women do not have qualified, but women can participate in political activities because of quota system. Because of criticism, I am so worry women can struggle” (Woman MP from NLD party).

Though women MPs from NLD donot prefer to use quota system, the research found out ethnic women MPs assume quota system should be used in Myanmar. Besides, in 2013 when previous government period was, ethnic woman from

Rakhine National Party tried to submit proposal whether the government has the plan to apply quota system or not, but, the chairman of Pyithu Hluttaw, U Shwe Mann told to raise questions instead of submitting proposals to her, thus, she raised question to government sector. Minister of Presidential Office,

U Soe Thien answered the government does not have plan to apply quota system for increasingly women participation in political activities and decision- making processes.

“In our country, Myanmar, quota system should be used. If the parliament adopts specific quota-law that every political parties must have how many percentages of women’s number in MP candidates, the percentage of women’s participation in political activities will be increased” (woman MP from Ta’aung (Palaung) National Party).

Legislation for gender equality

In Myanmar, it is observed 2008 constitution cannot guarantee for gender equality. The article 347 and 348 of 2008 constitution, every people have equal rights before the law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender and also article 249 and 350 of constitution guarantee that every criticize regardless of gender must have equal rights and equal pay in economic sector. Contrarily to these articles, article 352 is the problem for gender equality because this article specifically identifies “the positions that are suitable for men only”. Besides, constitution does not guarantee equality clause describing special measurement or affirmation actions that can increase women’s participation in political activities in Myanmar which is generally dominated in spite of the constitution gives 25% of the seats of both houses for military channels which women are generally excluded.

Providing a framework for conducting elections in Myanmar, there are electoral law which is referred in the Constitution and series of other principal laws: Union Election Commission Law, the Political Parties Registration Law, Pyithu Hluttaw Election laws, Amyotha Hluttaw Election Law, State/ Region Election Law and four by-laws. Although these laws guarantee that every people regardless of gender who are qualified with criteria adopted in these laws can be candidates of member of representatives and every people regardless of religion, gender have rights to vote, it is observed there are no special measurement or affirmation actions for increasing women’s participation in political activities in these laws.

Besides, though in first term of parliament (2011-2015), concerning with women’s affairs, Prevention of Violence against Women could be adopted, in current second parliament term (2016-2020) which is headed by National League for Democracy; the leader is woman,

Daw Aung San Su Kyi, there is no legislation concerning with women’s affairs and gender equality in political activities until now.

Discussion and Conclusion

The research found out the most important challenge and obstacle for women not to participate in political activities in Myanmar is limited support of family. Myanmar is the Buddhism country, thus, according to Buddhism, if women want to do politics, they need to get permission from their family and husbands, women

are very hard to get permission from their family and husbands than men though men don't need to get permission from their family and wives because men are normally the influencing person on the family and they are the only one who is decision-maker in the family. In Myanmar context, women are very rare to get permission from their family because Myanmar people assume political jobs are insecure jobs and it is not suitable job for women than men. Hence, it is needed to think why Myanmar people think political jobs are insecure. It is apparent because of political factors.

Historically, Myanmar is governed by military for sixty years, and during military time, the people who works for politics were arrested by military as political prisoners in 1988 democracy revolution, 1990 revolution and 2007 "Shwe War Yaung" revolution. Therefore, Myanmar people are very afraid to do politics and they assume political jobs are insecure and insecurity jobs, as well as people do not encourage their daughters to do politics. At present, though Myanmar transforms to democratic system, many laws which are broken International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights such as article 124A (Sedition) of Penal Code, article 66 d of telecommunication law, and peaceful assembly are still now. Because of these laws, Myanmar politicians were still arrested by the government because of these laws. Consequently, people are still assuming politics is insuring job though Myanmar transforms its system to democracy. Therefore, the research found out 6 out of 6 women MPs describe political factor is related with support of family. When Myanmar people assume political job is respectful job, family will fully provide support for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar.

The second important challenge and obstacle facing gender equality and increasingly women participation in politics is limited support from political parties and lack of gender-policy in political parties. It is found in 2015 election; the political parties were selected 789 (12%) women candidates while 6074 (88%) men candidates. Surprisingly in Myanmar politics, the Myanmar people just look at "party" regardless of gender, religion and ethnicity when they give their votes. Thus, political parties are particularly important in providing crucial support to MPs in Myanmar, including women MPs but their general lack of gender-related policies is hindering potential legislative progress on gender equality. In spite of 91 political parties do not have gender-policy until now, the research found that in 2015 election, National League for Democracy applied special mechanism for gender-equality that "if there are two persons who are equal criteria, the first priority is woman", and there is professional team which the responsibilities are to check all MP candidate nomination forms and reselect women who are capacity and qualified though they do not select MP candidates by their townships because of many factors, as a result, it is assumed the percentage of women's participation in political activities is increased than 2010 election because of NLD's special mechanism in 2015. Moreover, 2015 manifestos of all political parties are looked at; expect NLD, the other parties do not put women's affairs and gender equality as main factors in their election manifestos. Thus, it is assumed that the concept and practice that gender equality in all sectors should be cannot practice widely in Myanmar until now.

Besides, 2008 constitution does not guarantee gender equality. Though the article 347 and 348, every people has equal rights before the law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender and also article 249 and 350 of constitution guarantee that every people regardless of gender must have equal rights and equal pay in economic sector. Contrarily to these articles, article 352 is the problem for gender equality because this article specifically identifies "the

positions that are suitable for men only”. Moreover, constitution does not adopt equality clause describing special measurement or affirmation actions that can increase women’s participation in political activities in Myanmar which is generally dominated in spite of the constitution gives 25% of the seats of both houses for military channels which women are generally excluded.


Next, though there are many laws which are concerning with conducting elections in Myanmar, Union Election Commission Law, the Political Parties Registration Law, Pyithu Hlutaw Election laws, Amyotha Hluttaw Election Law, State/ Region Election Law and four by-laws, these laws can guarantee that every people regardless of gender who are qualified with criteria adopted in these laws can be candidates of member of representatives and every people regardless of religion, gender have rights to vote. Otherwise, there are no special measurement or affirmation actions for increasing women’s participation in political activities in these laws.

The research found economy is one of the challenges for women not to participate in political activities. It is found criticism of men from political society especially men from opposition party and within parties as well as violence is another challenge for women not to participate in political activities in Myanmar. The research found 6 out of 6 interviewed women MPs described they faced criticism of men from opposition party and within party “women cannot do anything”. One woman MP describes that in 2015 election, she faced campaign office was destroyed and volunteers for campaign office were attacked with knife. Moreover, she mentions women are more chance to face violence than me during campaign period. Thus, criticism of men from political society and violence is one of the challenges for women to participate in political activities in Myanmar.

Surprisingly, though lack of education, electoral, decision-making skill and self-confident is one of the obstacles and constraints for women to far from political activities in Bangladesh, Georgia, Kenya in Myanmar context, the research found out these are not the challenge and obstacles for women in Myanmar. Currently in Myanmar, comparing with the literacy rate of men and women, men’s literacy rate (92.6%) is more than women (86.9%). Though literacy rate of men is higher than women, the graduated, postgraduate diploma, master degree and Ph. D degree women are more than men (Gender Dimension, 2017), and if it is looked at the educational background of MPs, women are more educated than men, thus, 6 out of 6 interviewed women MPs describe education is not the problem for women to participate in political activities in current situation of Myanmar. Besides, 6 out of 6 women MPs also describe “electoral, decision-making and leadership skill is also not the constraint for increasingly women participation in politics though they should have these skills comparing with their experiences in 2015 election. Most of current women MPs are political prisoners, thus, they do not have opportunities to learn and study about these skills before they become women MPs but they can become women MPs and can actively participate in parliamentary functions. Therefore, they mention these skills and knowledge should have in women, it is totally wrong women cannot be women MPs because women do not have these skills and knowledge.

THE RIGHT TO AIR: AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE FACING GER DWELLERS IN MONGOLIA'S CAPITAL

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Abstract

Main objective: *To determine how the “Economy First Policy” has resulted in structural violence towards people living within the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar.*

*This paper investigates and researched the impact of the Government’s ‘Economy First Policy’ by analyzing the situation through the lens of Johan Galtung’s concept of Structural Violence. The research answers the question: **How have current development challenges and trends by the Government of Mongolia led to systemic structures of violence against Ulaanbaatar’s ger district residents?***

In 2014, the Government aimed to jump start the flailing mining sector by focusing on rebuilding trust amongst foreign investors and other key partners. As a result, the economy was put ahead of social issues and services, with limited consultation

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with those most effected: the herding populous. As a result, a pattern of injustice was set in some structures so much so that the lowest-ranking actors, in this case the rural migrants now living in the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar, were deprived not only their respective potential, but undeniably below subsistence minimum. These policies were compounded when the Government, in 2017, received a bailout from IMF. As a result, basic social services were slashed and taxes rose across the country to meet the demands for the loans.

Using Alan Bryman's social research methodology on qualitative analysis, this paper is particularly focused on extracting data via interviews of internal migrants originally from rural communities now living in Ulaanbaatar City, Mongolia. To support these findings, an analysis of civil society and UN reports and in-depth interview have been conducted, as well as a review of public statements by government officials. The research has found evidence systemic structural violence towards migrants that have settled in the capital city, forced to abandon their livelihoods in the countryside and retreat to the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar.

This paper concludes that due to vast inequality, as a result of the Economy First Policy, poor governance, and exclusion of poor communities from meaningful civic participation, citizens living in the ger districts are experiencing structural violence due to the disproportional higher morbidity and mortality rates.

Keywords: *Air pollution, Mongolia, human rights, structural violence, inequality*

Background

For centuries, Mongolian nomads have roamed the open steppe: from the plains of Manchuria to the Altai Mountain in the West. Mongolian pastoralists and the grasslands lived in an almost symbiotic relationship with one another. However, today, that life style and heritage is under threat. Due to rapid urbanization, climate change and economic instability, the Mongolian herders are at risk of becoming extinct. Whilst their livelihood sustains the country, there seems to be little political will to protect the herders and their sacred grasslands. Thousands of herders, as well as families that have livelihoods that depend upon animal husbandry, have abandoned their ancestral homelands and livelihoods in hopes for a better life, and a piece of prosperity, in the nation's capital of Ulaanbaatar.

These significant development challenges – socio-economic, corruption, poverty and environmental – have led to the vast inequalities that exist today. Namely, inequalities between the elite and those living in the ger districts. Although a large portion of the population is still dependent on some form of animal husbandry, the wealthy elite have all but distanced themselves from their ancestral past. From the mid-1990s, corruption and elite self-enrichment became increasingly serious issues in Mongolia (Fritz, 2008). Assumed estimates claim that over 70% of the country's wealth lies in the hands of just 10 wealthy families, with all of them having family members representing their interests as Members of Parliament, whilst the nomadic herders still average less than 3,000USD per annum (World Bank, 2010). In fact, none of the current members of parliament have ever lived or worked in animal husbandry. A shocking realization when considering that 30% of the population still relies on herding as a livelihood.

Mongolia's physical environment and population density make it a unique development challenge unlike any in the world. With the fall of the socialist state and the rise of the free market economy from the mid-1990's to the present day, corruption and self-enrichment by the political and social elite, it has become an increasingly serious challenge facing the country's development progress.

Landlocked between China and Russia, the predominantly Buddhist country of Mongolia is sunny, arid, and cold (World Bank, 2009). Mongolia is classified as a medium-human development country with human development index of 0.675 and a rank of 103 out of 187 countries in 2014 (UNDP HDR, 2014). Wintertime temperatures regularly dip below -40° C (UNDP, 2013). Mongolia also experiences frequent droughts and occasional severe winters "Dzud¹³⁰" (a natural disaster encompassing a summer drought followed by an unusually harsh winter).

From 2000-2012, Mongolia's mining industry has grown rapidly. As a result, almost a quarter of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is linked to the mining sector. The country's mining boom has led to rapid economic growth. Unfortunately, however, it's not reaching everyone. A key challenge for the Government, the private sector and Mongolia is to find ways to manage impacts, both positive and negative, and create a solid foundation for social development which respects and supports nomadic livelihoods, health, and social wellbeing of all people (Menon, 2011) Historically, Mongolia's natural environment supported widely dispersed family's dependent on herding sheep, cattle, horses, goats, and camels across the steppe (World Bank, 2009). Today, it is recognized as the least densely populated independent country in the world, with a population of 3 million spread over a surface area of nearly 1.6 million sq. km (NSO, 2015). However, the population landscape is changing. The population is becoming more urbanized, with 63% of the population residing in urban areas, while 36.3% are residing in rural communities (SISS, 2013). This population is increasingly concentrated in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar, which now accounts for nearly 50% of the total population. With more than a third of the population still reliant on herding livelihoods their primary source of income, 45% of households still living in gers¹³¹, increasing desertification, widespread corruption, and a flailing economy are just a handful of the challenges facing Mongolia's development (NSO, 2015).

Over the last 20 years, the transition to democracy and the free market economy, while peaceful, were not necessarily equitable for all. The transition left many without support mechanism during disaster or other crisis. While herders now held their animals as private property, many services – veterinary, marketing, emergency assistance – lapsed in the countryside. The universal school and health care system, hitherto rather unique among any nomad population, noticeably degenerated (Fritz, 2008). Bold reforms have been carried out with the aim of stabilizing the economy, privatizing state firms, strengthening the private sector, establishing fundamental market institutions and improving the investment environment. Unfortunately, many of these reforms, arguably, have resulted in great inequality.

¹³⁰ dZud: a unique disaster where as too much snow falls and livestock are unable to graze, thus causing them to starve.

¹³¹ Ger: Traditional Mongolian dwelling or often referred to as a yurt.

The income inequality is becoming more and more apparent as the anticipated mining boom has completely busted. In 2010, when the author arrived in country, economic growth was reported at 17.5 per cent. Economic prospects remain extremely dim for the foreseeable future, as growth fell below 0 to -1.4 percent during the third quarter of 2016 (Trading Economics, 2016) Despite GDP growth from 2000-2010, *one in three* Mongolians are currently living below the poverty line. According to the estimation, concluded jointly by NSO and the World Bank, the poverty rate in Mongolia reached 29.6 percent in 2016 – an increase by 8.0 percentage points from the poverty rate of 21.6 percent in 2014 – an additional 300,000 people. This shows that 907.5 thousand people out of the total 3.0 million people in Mongolia are living in poverty (NSO & WB, 2017).

By 2016, the population of Ulaanbaatar stood at nearly 1.3 million. A breakdown of the data, provided by the National Statistics Office (NSO), shows that nearly 60% of the urban population resided in ger districts due to the increasing costs of apartment options and an inability to access financing (NSO, 2016). Additionally, adult unemployment rate stands at 7.3 per cent (NSO, 2016) but this is widely regarded as an underestimate, with informal estimates putting it at 12 per cent. However, Mongolia has a unique opportunity, similar to Japan nearly 30 years ago, as the country is currently experiencing a population dividend. With more than 60% of the population under the age of 25, the Government of Mongolia has an opportunity to invest in its young people, thus bolstering an abled bodied workforce for decades to come (Barter, 2013). However, turning this opportunity into a reality is complex, if not impossible. Unfortunately, youth unemployment rate is close to 25 per cent, with youth underemployment estimated to be higher than 40 per cent and 50 per cent of young people are still relying on a parent to support them (Barter, 2013). Mongolia's economy and current development challenges are interlinked with its nomadic livelihoods, geography and extreme climate. With a culture deeply rooted in history and respect for its nature, the Mongolian traditions still significantly influence the day-to-day life of most of the population.

Like many developing nations, especially those that have been culturally nomadic, rapid urbanization prove to be major challenges for both the population and the government. Urban services and infrastructure are extremely poor, with the conditions worsened by the growing 'ger districts'¹³². Urban infrastructure and services are poor in general, and the conditions are exacerbated in informal settlements (ger areas) that comprise up to 60% of the capital city (WHO, 2013). Urban issues include poverty, increased intensity of air and soil pollution, heightened risk for disasters, especially earthquakes, as well as lack of access to urban basic services including water, sanitation and heating (NEMA, 2013). Many of urban population suffering the most are the ger district residence. These issues, compounded by extreme weather and unchecked poverty, is a result of years of poor governance and, regardless of political party, miss management on the side of the Government of Mongolia (GoM).

Through this research, as well as research done by experts within the field of health and safety, vast social injustices have been revealed. In Mongolia, specifically within the confines of the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar, this research

¹³² Ger Districts: Surrounding the Capital of city Ulaanbaatar, are hundreds of thousands of 'ger' dwellings. These are divided up into districts and sub-districts.

investigated social injustice and inequalities that have resulted in structural violence towards Mongolia's most vulnerable citizens.

Furthermore, countryside communities are viewed as the bearers of Mongolian culture. In the capital city of Ulaanbaatar, however, the same people, yet only recently removed from their ancestral homelands, are often the point of blame by the middle and upper classes who feel the ger district residents have caused the pollution, increases in crime, the bad traffic, and other challenges facing the city. Until recently, countryside families continued to make their way into the capital looking for work and opportunities, whilst they continue living in the 'nomadic' lifestyle. However, due to these assumptions, whether verbal or otherwise, have real world implications and result in forms of violence against this population of people, as are the policies, or lack thereof, meant to assist them.

In October of 2014, due to the rapidly deteriorating economic situation within Mongolia, Members of Parliament demanded the resignation of Prime Minister N. Altankhuyag and his cabinet for various reasons: poor governance, economic mismanagement, corruption claims, etc. After weeks of deliberation, the Altankhuyag cabinet stepped aside and Ch. Saikhanbileg was anointed Prime Minister under the Democratic Party and Mongolian People's Party Coalition Government. It is important to note that, since the peaceful transition to democracy in 1992, every Government, aside from PM Enkhbayar's, has resigned before completing their term (ANN, 2017). In previous Prime Minister's policy speech, acknowledging the critical situation facing the economy, Saikhanbileg announced policies that put the economy first and stated that he aimed to create "a government that can make decisions quickly" (MoFA: Japan, 2016).

The Economy First Policy, while never formally written, rather spoken, was a response to the collapse of the mining sector within Mongolia. The Government's aim was to jump start the flailing mining sector by focusing on rebuilding trust amongst its investors and other key players.

This policy, as described by Prime Minister Ch. Saikhanbileg during his address, puts the economy at the center of governance. All other policies related to social issues, the environment, etc. are temporarily tabled until the economy begins to recover. Now, this does not mean the Government has completely forsaken all other issues, the Government simply meant that the first point of concern is the economy (McRae, 2015). Whilst Saikhanbileg's Government is no longer in power, his actions have had a domino effect that continued on into other governments.

For instance, in mid-2017, the International Monetary Fund brokered a deal with the Government of Mongolia in the form of a bailout in exchange for policy and tax form IMF. Subsequently, on May 24th, a deal was approved for three-year loan of US\$434.3 million to the Government. As well, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Japan and South Korea also committed support with an additional US\$5 billion loan, while the People's Bank of China agreed to extend a swap line with the Bank of Mongolia (Bayartsogt, 2017). Within in the framework of this deal, the Government of Mongolia was required to raise taxes on all its citizens, as well as scale back social programs. These cuts had deadly and life altering consequences. For instance, the budget for the procurement and distribution of conception was cut. Thus, according to the UN Population Fund, there was a 50% increase in maternal mortality in 2016 (Tali & UNFPA, 2018). After pressure from civil society and UNFPA, the Government increased its procurement and distribution of contraception in 2017. As a result, the currently

available data confirms that the maternal mortality rate dropped back to 2015 levels during 2017 (Tali & UNFPA, 2018).

Unfortunately, this policy is indicative of the assumed beliefs, values, and ambitions of the ruling elite and urban middleclass of Ulaanbaatar. The ruling elite turned their policy gaze towards the extractive sector and away from the spoon that has fed the entire population for millennia's. What troubles many herders and countryside residence is the fact that their livelihood accounts for more than 80 per cent of the gross agriculture product within the agriculture sector that is contributing 30 per cent of the country's GDP (Enkhbayar, 2017). Whilst there's nothing wrong with the Government of Mongolia giving special attention to economic issues, it should not be at the expense of basic social services that should be provided to all citizens – particularly the most vulnerable. Through Mongolia's recently approved Sustainable Development Visions 2030, the Government recognized three key pillars: Economic, Social and Environment. Yet, minimal investment has been attributed towards the second and third pillars.

Additionally, whilst the agriculture sector is not facing an economic crisis per se, it's worth noting that almost 30 per cent of Mongolia's grassland biomass production has been lost over the past 40 years (Vernooy, 2011). At the same time, the Gobi desert, which dominates the southern half of the country, has been steadily expanding north at a pace of 150 kilometers every 20 years (Vernooy, 2011). With such dim environmental forecasts, many herders are likely surprised at the government's "Economy First Policy".

Take for instance Tsogttsetsii Soum, located in Umnugovi Aimag (province), is home to 3 major, multi-national mining companies: Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, Energy Resources, and Tavan Tolgoi Joint Stock Company. Over the last decade, Tsogttsetsii has grown rapidly, mainly with transient populations (drivers, mining staff, their families, etc.) moving into the area seeking career opportunities. However, the number of herding households in Tsogttsetsii has dropped significantly from 378 households in 2008 to 232 in 2013 (Tsogttsetsii Governor's Office, 2014).

In 2017, the city mayor banned all migration into the capital. This policy limited the freedom of migration, a human and constitutional right. This law was levied specifically on the poor, as it excluded property and mortgage owners. Poor families wishing to move to the capital for more better schools, healthcare, and/or job opportunities were subsequently restricted.


Mayor S. Batbold stated in 2017: "Even though freedom of movement is a constitutional right afforded to every citizen, the threat of air pollution in the capital has reached a point where it could potentially affect national security. The right to health and safety of Ulaanbaatar residents is being violated, therefore, the Mayor's Office has decided to issue the decree within the rights afforded to it, based on multiple studies and consultation from numerous agencies, in order to meet the demands of our residents" (UB Post, Jan 2017).

Further compounding these issues, across Mongolia, nomadic herders and rural communities have been significantly impacted by the 1999-2001 and 2009-2011 Dzuds, that decimated entire herds and left millions of livestock dead. In 2010 alone, approximately 43,500 herders were left without a single animal (Vernooy, 2011). With dim outlooks for many herders and the Government boasting of its great economic outlook, due in part because of the mining boom, mass migration

of herding families began to flow into the capital city of Ulaanbaatar. Unfortunately, the herders were neither skilled for the modern workforce, nor was the city adequately prepared the influx of this population.

Livestock deaths linked to harsh winters

After winters facing extreme conditions, Mongolia's livestock population sees a higher than usual death toll during the following year. During the 1990s, regulation to prevent overherding was lifted and the livestock population has doubled to more than 50 million



In just the past 15 years, the capital city of Ulaanbaatar has seen its urban population increase by 67 per cent, adding nearly 600,000 people, most of them setting up their homes in the Ger Districts of Ulaanbaatar (IOM, 2010). The vast majority of the residence live in abstract poverty – unable to access basic social services or find dignified, meaningful employment. Their basic needs have been denied: access to health care, clean water, sanitation, and breathable air have all been denied. Many of them are on the brink, living paycheck to paycheck, if they are receiving a paycheck at all. The ger districts remain unplanned and unregulated, with no attempts, other than out right banning people from arriving, to improve the infrastructure in a meaningful way (see figure 1 below).




Figure 1: The Guardian, NSO, & Mapbox 2017

The background of the ger district residents is diverse, yet similar. Many of those interviewed for this thesis arrived in the late 1990's to early 2010's, during some of the worst dzuds on record. Aiming to escape impending poverty, families upended their entire lives in hope of a better life. A life dreamt but never achieved.

“This is our home now. We are settled. Some of my children have jobs and families here in the city, so there’s no reason to go back. We just need to make our home [the city] better.” – 73-year-old, female from a ger district.

Today, many have lost hope. They know there’s no going back and that they must improve the community in which they live. However, whilst there have been proclamations by the Government that things are getting better as the GDP growth was net positive in 2017 and the forecast for 2018 predicts even more growth, data disputes these claims. In 2017, the National Statistics Office (NSO) and the World Bank in Mongolia, announced that the poverty rate had dropped to 29.6 percent in 2016. This was an increase by 8.0 per cent from the 2014 poverty rate of 21.6. So, whilst the economy may be growing, it’s had little, to no effect on the poor, working class families.

On air pollution, the current situation is an apocalyptic scenario that was unimaginable decades ago. The air pollution disproportionately effects those living in the ger districts, as the highest rates are concentrated in and around the ger areas. This is because of the harsh winter climate and vast ‘ger district’, where people live in tents and burn coal to stay warm – a traditional lifestyle that works in the countryside but not in a dense urban environment. Shockingly, on 30 January 2018, air pollution exceeded 133 times the international safe limit set by the World Health Organization (UNICEF, 2018). The measurement was taken at a monitoring station at Baruun 4 zam where PM2.5 pollution reached 3,320 micrograms per cubic meter (UNICEF 2015). The elderly and children are seriously affected by air pollution, particularly those living in ger areas. According to UNICEF in Mongolia, reducing the effects of air pollution on children is in desperate need of political commitment to ensure resources are allocated for research into its health impacts, adopting an effective regulatory framework, as well as to evaluate the impact of policies on air quality (UNICEF, 2016). UNICEF and partners have found strong statistical correlations between ambient air pollutants and spontaneous abortion in Ulaanbaatar as well as uncovering significant associations of air pollution in Ulaanbaatar with low birth weight in full-term births (see figure 2 below). According to UNICEF and WHO, respiratory infection is the second leading cause of infant and under-five mortality in Mongolia, accounting for 15 per cent of infant deaths in children under 5 (UNICEF, 2016).

Estimated disease burden for Ulaanbaatar, 5 diseases, 2015			Relative ranking
Disease	Deaths	DALYs	Years of life lost
Children under 5			
Pneumonia as an acute lower respiratory infections (ALRI) (aged 0–4)	435	37,290	2
Adults			
Ischemic heart disease	2,151	47,903	1
Cerebrovascular disease (stroke)	1,493	34,321	3
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease	453	17,739	17
Cancer of the trachea, bronchus, lung	233	5,826	18

Figure 2 Air pollution-related disease burden in Ulaanbaatar in 2015 (UNICEF & Ibid, 2016)

Research methodologies and limitations

There were limitations for the research. The highly politicized environment was completely unexpected. The 2017 election, and subsequent run-off, left the country fractured. Rather than focusing on policies or issues facing their respective communities, participants attacked candidates directly. Additionally, some participants, felt ostracized because their political affiliation was different than others in the room. Compounding this issue was the nearly 100,000 young people, including some of the focus group discussion participants, that refused to mark the ballot. This, ‘White Ballet’ vote, as it became called amongst activists, angered many. This frustration also came to light during the discussions and made for a tense atmosphere.

The discussion groups became political, rather than discussing issues. Questions, whilst open ended and directed more broadly at policies, were answered by addressing specific MP’s, Ministers or those running for office.

Cultural aspects were not considered. Although gender equality and youth empowerment indexes are quite high in relation to Mongolia’s development status, several barriers remain, impeding upon the discussions during the focus groups.

For instance, the elderly would either silence the young people in the room or they would not allow them to speak freely – contradicting or demeaning the young people in the room. Additionally, politics are usually seen as ‘issues’ for men. Therefore, as the discussions became political, thus, the women would retreat back, letting their spouses speak on their behalf.

Finally, having a younger translator proved to be problematic. The older participants didn’t extend the same respect to the translator as they did to the researcher. Therefore, controlling the tense atmosphere was nearly impossible.

After discussing these challenges with colleagues and researchers within Mongolia, it was suggested that more focus be placed on one-on-one interviews so not to have the focus groups turn political. This advice proved invaluable, as the participants were much more relaxed in the comfort of their own homes.

In this study, Alan Bryman's social research methodology on qualitative analysis was used as the basis for data collection. Qualitative research methods fit nicely with the skill set of the researcher and his knowledge of the language and culture. As an outsider, the researcher has experience extracting information that locals may not be capable of retrieving. There will be little to no attempt at conducting surveys, as the researcher has close ties with the Nations Statistics Office of Mongolia, the United Nations Populations Fund and the Ministry of Population Development and Social Protection. All of which, respectively, have conducted massive quantitative analysis over the last five years.

This research is particularly focused on extracting data vis-à-vis individual household interviews of internal migrants originally from rural communities now living in Ulaanbaatar. To support these findings, an analysis of civil society and UN reports was conducted as well as statements by government officials within the public sphere. The research has uncovered significant social injustices between the urban middle class and the migrants that have recently settled in the capital city, forced to abandon their livelihoods in the countryside and retreat to the 'ger' districts of Ulaanbaatar.

The researcher aimed to obtain a firm understanding and picture of what's happening on the ground; from the market to the local herder to the local and national governments through the eyes and hears of locals. The meetings and interactions with key informants and/or community stakeholders proved to be a necessity for the successful investigation on the **"Development challenges and systemic structures of violence facing herders in the 21st Century"** A thorough breakdown of the consultation process is described below.

A secondary analysis was also conducted. This included, but was not limited to, the analysis of data from NSO, news reports, studies conducted by UN agencies and international institutions, as well as academic publications.

Scope of the Study

Positioned in the northern part of Ulaanbaatar city, Chingeltei district is one of nine districts within the capital. The population consists of predominately ger district dwellers with a population of more than 153,000 residents, accordingly to the most recent census by NSO. The district is one of the most impoverished and polluted (air and soil) communities in Mongolia, as well as being extremely underdeveloped when compared to the southern districts of UB.

Ethical considerations

This study had certain ethical issues – as briefly mentioned within the 'research limitations' section. The purpose of the interview and research was expressed to all the interviewees and key informants over the phone, as well as in person, before conducting the interviews. Consent was obtained in person for the use of

their respective quotes when writing this thesis. As the political climate has become increasingly divisive, it was best to conduct private interviews, rather than traditional focus group discussions. Additionally, Mongolia is a small, interconnected country. Therefore, all interviews will remain anonymous as the consequences for revealing a key informant or an interviewee could have career and/or personal implications on all involved.

Significance of the research

Without giving all members of society an equitable opportunity to achieve their personal and community-based development goals, Mongolia's growth and development will stagnate, leaving thousands of people behind in the process. Within Mongolia, there has never been research undertaken on this specific topic. This paper, will, hopefully, add to the larger discussions involving inequality within Mongolia. This research explores and analyses policies and practices, as well as their impact, on internal migrants that have left their respective livelihoods in the countryside with the hope of a better life in the capital city.

Overall, the findings of this research will contribute to ongoing discussions and debates that are underway to improve the quality of life, as well as access to services, for incoming internal migrants and current ger-district residents. In efforts to reduce air pollution, the Government of Mongolia and local authorities must look beyond simply improving on ger stoves and limiting access to coal – a systematic approach is needed to address the root causes of structural violence and inequality.

Findings

How have current development challenges and trends by the Government of Mongolia led to systemic structures of violence against the Ulaanbaatar's ger district residents?

By the simplest definition, Mongolia is classified as a "peaceful" country. This classification is wrong, and misleading, as they are usually referring to the absence of war, as peace involves more than simply a society without armed conflict. When one thinks of peace, they may also assume harmony.

To discuss or achieve the idea of peace, we must first follow three principles:

1. The term 'peace' shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not most;
2. These goals are likely complex and challenging, but not impossible; and
3. The statement *peace* is absence of violence shall be retained as valid (Galtung, 2005).

When defining violence, people tend to view it as actions of force – a military acting against its people, a police officer shooting an unarmed black man, or oppression of an ethnic group. Yet, violence is more complex and deeper than how most would define. For instance, when the actual is unavoidable, then violence is not present even if the actual is at a very low level (Galtung, 2005). Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in Mongolia during the eighteenth century it would

be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all of the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to Galtung's (2005) definition. Correspondingly, the case of people dying from earthquakes today would not warrant an analysis in terms of violence, but if they died in the days following the earthquake due to lack of water, sanitation, or other preventable illnesses, such deaths may be seen as the result of violence.

As such, this research has found that structural violence is widespread and unacknowledged. Resources have been unevenly distributed for decades, as income distributions are heavily skewed, quality access to education unevenly distributed, equitable medical services are limited, and environmental health threatens the most vulnerable (Galtung, 2005). Whilst there is no one individual that has created this structure of violence and inequality, the violence is none the less built into the structure of Mongolian society, specifically within the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar, where unequal power and poverty has consequently led to unequal life chances for residents (Galtung, 2005).

3.2 Expulsion and Exclusion

Rural communities in Mongolia are particularly vulnerable to climate change and the effects of natural and/or man-made disasters. For instance, when a herder loses his/her livestock due to a dzud, that loss in livelihood has compounding effects up the supply chain. This usually directly impacts small markets in rural communities, as it sends their prices skyrocketing due to low supply of meat. In other words, when a disaster hits, the entire supply chain is effected and rural businesses are particularly vulnerable. Due to limited opportunities in the countryside and with a struggling business, or even loss of a livelihood, rural persons often look to Ulaanbaatar as a beacon of hope, as they consider leaving behind their lives and community for a better life in the capital city. But they're not going there alone.

Although often reported that there are 'tens of thousands of displaced rural migrants' in Ulaanbaatar, throughout this research it has been proven differently, as there is strong evidence that supports the notion that the rural migrants have not migrated in mass numbers to urban areas (IOM, 2010). Interestingly, the International Migration Organization's field observation reports that those who have been affected and have migrated to the capital have scattered throughout Ulaanbaatar, settling on family plots primarily inside areas of the ger district (IOM, 2010). In other words, of those rural herders surveyed who were contemplating migrating to urban areas, most state that they have family within the urban centre - half of these are planning to migrate to an area where they have close relatives (IOM, 2010).

The 2009-2010 assessment by IOM on the 'Displaced rural herder communities' response assessment and intention survey' found a large number of displaced populations from previous disasters and crisis'.

Findings from the qualitative study reinforces the IOM's assessment from 2010:

In-depth interview: I moved here [Ulaanbaatar] in 2002. I'm originally from Bulgan province. Previously, I was a cook in the school dormitory and my husband

was originally a herder. He passed away, but before that, we had lost much of our livestock during the dzud., I decided it was best to move to Ulaanbaatar because my daughter became a university student and there were more opportunities for our children in the city (n=CDI1).

This respondent lived on top of one of the mountains in Chingeltei District in Ulaanbaatar. She had two gers on her property (one was her and the other was her son's). Her home was simple, yet, comfortable. While she would be classified under the poverty-line, she seemed content with her life, but did convey it could be made easier. Like many Mongolians, this respondent did not want to leave her beloved land and community, but felt there was no other choice. Another respondent felt the similarly:

***In-depth interview:** We've been living this spot, on top of the mountain, since 2003. When we first moved to UB, we had five children that were still students, and a disabled brother. We had just retired and wanted better education and job opportunities for our children. It was tough then [in the countryside]. But since moving to UB, we have development, like new buildings and roads, but we don't really have development in terms of "lives". We can't purchase the necessities and education is so expensive now. It's expensive to get an education. Also our retirement benefits are difficult to rely on. It's not much. So, I wouldn't say our lives have gotten better(n=CDI2).*

In the Killing Fields of Inequality, Therborn (2014) explained that exclusion in human societies takes shape particularly in the faces of the poor, a condition which takes on different shapes, but which has universal social meaning. To be poor means that you do not have sufficient resources to participate fully in the everyday life of the bulk of your fellow citizens (Therborn, 2014).

Inequality is a violation of human dignity; it's a denial of the possibility for everyone's human right to develop... It takes many forms, and it has many effects: premature death, ill-health, humiliation, subjection, discrimination, exclusion from knowledge and life chances.

Inequality always means excluding some people from something. When it doesn't literally kill people or stunt their lives, inequality means exclusion: excluding people from possibilities produced by human development.

The other door of exclusion closes off the elite from the rest of the people. In Mongolia, that means the top .01% from the rest of the population. This second door creates a divide between the policy-makers and the policy-takers. The larger the gap between the 1 and the 99 per cent, the thicker the door of exclusion, the more distorted human cooperation and interdependence become.

3.3 Understanding the rationale and impact of the Economic First Policy and the role of stakeholders in policy making

There are several important environmental factors that have led to the disenfranchisement and marginalization of Mongolia's internal migrants: the enrichment of political elites, corruption and related forms of mis-governance, rise of income inequality since the 1990's, limited leadership with strong ties to

herding lifestyles, limited access to basic social services, assumption that ger district citizens are uneducated, the mining boom of the 2010's, among others (Vernooy, 2011).

Evidence suggests that policies and practices of past governments¹³³ have resulted in structural and cultural violence against the internal migrants making their way to Ulaanbaatar for a better life. This “Economy First Policy” – established under the now deposed Prime Minister Saikhanbileg – was, and is, indicative of the mind-set of the ruling elite. This policy, and coupled with others, has led to the disempowerment and disenfranchisement of rural migrants that have arrived on the doorsteps of UB. The former Prime Minister, in 2015, made it clear that his government’s focus would have to be on the economy, stating, “we must focus on reigniting confidence in national and foreign investment” (McRae, 2015). **Begging the question, how have current development challenges and trends by the Government of Mongolia led to systemic structures of violence against the Ulaanbaatar’s ger district residents?**

Johan Galtung defines cultural violence as the prevailing attitudes and beliefs that we have been taught since childhood and that surround us in daily life about the power and necessity of violence (Galtung, 2015). While defining structural violence when groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc are assumed to have, and in fact do have, more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc, and this unequal advantage is built into the very social, political and economic systems that govern societies, states and the world (Galtung, 2015).

There are many important environmental factors, as previously mentioned that have led to the disenfranchisement and marginalization, resulting in social injustices, of the residents of the ger districts: the rise of political elites, corruption and related forms of mis-governance, rising poverty rates, poor sanitation, limited access to health, among others (Vernooy, 2011).

Since the fall of the Mongolian Socialist State, pressure by the elite to buy into the market-based economy has been significant. While social inclusion or assimilation is practiced by many governments, even supported by international development agencies, the transition from a nomadic sense of inclusion versus that of modern-day capitalist is vastly different. As current social inclusion thinking has missed a number of insights related to culture, livelihoods, poverty and inequity (Jackson, 1999). We cannot simply dismiss ethnic identity or culture during the push for progress. The demise of old ways of living can cause anguish, and a deep sense of loss (Sen, 2001).

Taking into consideration a populations skills, experiences, and culture should be at the forefront of development frameworks and economic policies. If your policy is to bolster foreign investment into a sector that traditionally employees few people, how are you using the return in dividends for the benefit of the masses? Are you investing in training programmes or ensuring citizens have access to a robust social safety net?

Economic inequality is simply a result of social injustices, economic squandering, and political distortion. Inequality of economic resources and their political deployment has relegated the ger district residents and their children to a life of

¹³³ At the time that this thesis was written, the GoM changed three times. Therefore, this thesis has focused on previous governments.

poverty and poor health (Therborn, 2014). In the case of the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar, visually speaking, there is a stark contrast between the ger districts and central residents. You can visibly see the rampant inequality with a naked eye. But, it's when you speak the people is when you realized how entrenched inequality is and nearly insurmountable it has become.

In Mongolia, particularly if you're from the ger districts, your life may be stunted for being born poor. A Swedish study found a 'strong correlation' between adult unemployment and child school failure (Nyheter, 2013; Therborn, 2014)

In-depth interview: *Before I delivered, I worked in a factory. Since the baby arrived, I now work from home. I've now been working from home for about 5 months. From my work, I wasn't given maternity leave with money because the company I work for did not pay the social insurance. Therefore, my maternity leave is unpaid. So after I gave birth, I just left work and started trying to work from home. Luckily, the company did provide some sewing equipment and materials so I could work freelance from home. But the income is not the same. Because of the kids and our new baby, I can't get as much work done as I could in the factory (n=SD11).*

In attempts to 'share' the wealth of the booming mining sector, the Government of Mongolia instituted a policy that would give mothers up to 8USD per child each month. This money is supposed to help with raising and supporting the child. When, in reality, it's not even enough to pay for children to attend private kindergarten. In the ger districts, the kindergartens are overcrowded. The Government has instituted a lottery in order to slim the class sizes. If your child is not selected in the lottery, you either pay a bribe or send them to private kindergarten. This was the case for one respondent:

In-depth interview: *We have three kids. My smallest one is right here. She's two years-old. Unfortunately, we didn't get the lottery for the kindergarten, so I need to stay here with her. To get the lottery, you must register your kids with the local kindergarten, within your district. Because there are too few kindergartens in our district, some of the kids are omitted through the lottery. This is so difficult. After my daughter was rejected through the lottery, we tried to give her to one of the private kindergartens, but the with the private kindergarten, they don't have standards, so it can be pretty bad. When I would send my daughter to the private kindergarten, she would cry about having to go. That made me also think it was quite bad. During the winter, it was manageable because my husband wasn't working, so she could stay with him. However, now that it's much warmer, my husband needs to go back to work. Since we both work, I don't know how to deal with this issue.*

My salary, before taxes and social insurance, is only 250USD. So having to pay for the private kindergarten, on such a small salary, is very difficult for myself and my husband. For eight years, I was a stay at home mom. We needed the extra money so I decided to go back to work. By having two incomes, we do okay financially. But right now, it looks like I'll have to stay at home to care for my daughter (n=CD3).

One's ability to function is impacted by the affluence or poverty within their relative community. Therefore, relative poverty is a meaningful concept. The severity of poverty also tends to depend on the overall rate of poverty.

In-depth interview: *There are many challenges in our area. It's quite far from the bus stop and we don't have a car, so we must walk very far just to get a ride. For electricity, we're not connected to the central grid. To get power, like many families in our area, we have cables running from other gers far away. As you can also see, our biggest issue is waste management (n=SDI1).*

A key instrument that fosters inclusion within a society is one's ability to meaningfully participate within it. Whilst this does not guarantee that issues don't arise or anguish does not exist, it does help governments and communities address ongoing issues constructively. During the in-depth interviews, respondents were routinely asked about their ability to meaningfully participate in society.

Respondents answered, when asked, *do authorities within the national government or your representatives give you opportunities to discuss your issues with them:*

- ***In-depth interview:*** *No, we have never tried to raise it with authorities. To be honest, I've never really thought about telling the government.*
- ***In-depth interview:*** *Of course. But it doesn't seem like they have done anything to make it better. They make promises but nothing ever changes.*
- ***In-depth interview:*** *Just once, I did remind our local authorities about this issue, of the waste. I raised it and left it with them. I expected something would get done. I don't think it's up to me to demand or to solve these problems. Once the authorities know, they should just fix them. (SDI2)*
- ***In-depth interview:*** *There's no need to speak to decision-makers or authorities. When we talk, they just listen and then leave. They never do anything. With today's civil servants, they're more worried about how to live themselves and not about how to improve the lives of citizens. (CDI2)*

Structural violence and injustice are not inevitable in developing countries. Policy and decision-makers taking the time to listen and respond to the challenges their constituents face would be a significant first step in reducing inequalities and improving lives. Yet, when a majority of respondents feel that there's 'no point' in speaking with local authorities because they don't listen or care, something is broken.

As Amartya Sen has mentioned, change is inevitable and a part of our shared humanity, especially in today's society since global trade and commerce can bring with it—as Adam Smith foresaw—greater economic prosperity for each nation (Sen, 2001). Yet, there can still be losers as well as gainers, even if in the figures move up rather than down (Sen, 2001). Therefore, it's important, at all times, that decision-makers explain global trends and market changes, in an honest way, to their respective constituents. This way, people can plan their lives.




Figure 3.1: The breakdown of structural violence amongst ger district residents

However, as figure 3.1 highlights, while much of the country is getting richer, the poor are losing lifesaving rights they once held. For instance, respiratory infection is the second largest cause of infant and under-five mortality in Mongolia, accounting for 15 per cent of infant deaths in children under (UNICEF, 2017). On water and sanitation, the UN Special Rapporteur, Leo Heller, observed that there was clearly a different standard applied to Ger areas, in terms of access to clean water, as most prominently that they are not connected to the central water and sanitation infrastructure (Heller, 2018). He added that in addition to explicitly recognizing the human rights to water and sanitation under the Constitution, the Government of Mongolia should ensure that human rights perspective is clearly reflected in the legislation and respective regulatory instruments (Heller, 2018).

One common trait that emerged from the in-depth interviews with local residents, that aligned with the aforementioned, was that they lacked basic services, such as access to waste management, clean water, clean air, and electricity. Some commonly held feelings were:

- ***In-depth interview:*** *I lived my entire life in the countryside. I never had to worry about air pollution. We had fresh air and we always had food on our table. But now that we've moved to UB, it's not what I expected. The pollution is very bad and earning an income can be unpredictable (n=NDI1).*
- ***In-depth interview:*** *Our waste issue is the biggest issue we face. As you can see there's so much waste. Before we moved here, they told us that the waste would be cleaned up. The government said they came in and cleaned, but people still think it's a dump so the waste continues to pile-up because the waste truck never comes to our area. Also, our kids are sick quite often. Our youngest son was recently in the hospital for respiratory illness (SDI1).*

- ***In-depth interview:*** *We have to travel far to fetch water. For electricity, in the past, we would run along cable to connect to another ger that would connect to another ger. I think it was over a kilometer of wires that would be connected. It was dangerous. I'm grateful we received a grant to buy solar panels. The local government told us that up-to 12 homes can be powered, but it can hardly power our own home. Other families still need to run wires to the central grid (n=CDI4).*
- ***In-depth interview:*** *I hear about a lot of families that can't afford to buy food because they're spending so much on fuel for their ger. Even the prices of meat continue to rise, but salaries and pensions remain the same. Meat is so expensive these days. Something needs to be done. How can families afford to eat and stay warm? (n=SDI1)*
- ***In-depth interview:*** *We are pretty happy living here, but we didn't really have any other choice. There's nowhere else to live. So, we'll make do (n=CDI3).*

The words from the interviewees are nothing new. This evidence has been well documented over the years and publicly available, yet, the government makes the choice to focus its attention on foreign investment, all the while slashing public services. Millions of dollars have been invested high-level forums in attempts to attract investment. Billions have been handed out to the mining sector to support the sectors development. All the while, thousands of ger district residents lack access to basic rights and dignity: clean water and air, decent employment, among others.

As a result of many of these actions, more specifically the “Economy First Policy”, the citizens within ger district have witnessed increased inequalities. Whilst no disaggregated data exists, it can rightfully be assumed that due to higher rates of air pollution, poverty, access to basic social services, and poor sanitation, among others, has resulted in higher morbidity and mortality for the residents living in the ger areas of Ulaanbaatar. The growing inequality and poverty rates in the ger areas is extremely disconcerting.

When the actual is avoidable, such as the current situation in the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar, then violence is present (Galtung, 1969). With the quality of life seemingly significantly lower than that of their fellow citizens, structure violence is present.

Recently, the UN Resident Coordinator, Beate Trankmann, spoke on the challenges of growing inequality as it relates to the ger district communities stating:

“In terms of challenges, while growth is recovering, the ‘recovery’ is not necessarily being felt. During the downturn, poverty jumped – from affecting one in five citizens in 2014, to one in three in 2016. So a major task now is to try and better share the benefits of growth. While mining makes up 20 percent of GDP, it has not benefitted everyone equally”.

Good governance is essential to upholding the values of a nation's citizens and, at the same time, progressing the development agenda of the state. Without proper mechanisms, people are left behind and in this case, it is leading to the demise of an entire group of people. These forms of structural and cultural violence are avoidable, but if left unchecked, it may cause great despair and

anguish amongst the most vulnerable population. For smoothing the process of transition, there also have to be opportunities for retraining and acquiring of new skills for people who would otherwise be displaced, in addition to providing social safety nets for those whose interest are harmed (Sen, 2001).

3.5 Conclusion

Mongolia, for the most part, is a tranquil society, free from direct violence. Structural violence, in Mongolia's context, has become particularly apparent because it stands out (Galtung, 1969).

Whether or not structural violence was occurring within the ger districts of UB, was never a topic of debate. Similar to other post-Soviet or European countries, we can assess that in the ger areas not only does death come earlier to the poor but also the less education (Therborn, 2014). Relative deprivation also reduces health and increases chances of death (Eibner and Evans, 2005; Therborn, 2014). This, and the evidence collected, unequivocally points to structural violence on several fronts: higher morbidity and mortality rates, lower quality of life, and basic human rights and dignity denied. However, the how and the why structural violence is so prevalent in a country so small was the perplexing issue.

Poor governance is the obvious first conclusion. We have witnessed complete breakdown in basic social services to ger district communities. From clean water and air to public transport to access to basic health care have all been denied to some of the most vulnerable residents in the capital city.

Higher mortality rates, though not desegregated, is another forgone conclusion. As UNICEF pointed out in its 2016 report, the high rates of under 5 child mortality has a disproportionate impact on children, and their families, within the ger districts. Access to the most basic social services have been denied to thousands. One such respondent explained:

In-depth interview: The location of our home is just over the boundary for the other district. For my neighbors across the road, the district office and hospital are very close. For us, it's so far. It's difficult for us to reach the district authorities. Just to go to the hospital for our baby, due to mountains being in the way, we have to walk to the bus stop and then travel over 10 kilometers by bus to our district hospital. We could walk over the mountain, but it's very far and can be difficult in the winter with a baby. Basically, we have to travel around the entire city just to go to the district's office (n=SD11).

Mongolia is a small country, with a well-educated populous and vast resources. Mongolia can have positive growth and respect human rights and dignity all the same. In fact, by investing into its citizen, dividends will be returned and its people better off.

Recommendations

Below are a set of recommendations for local and national decision-makers to take into consideration when developing policies and programmes to tackle injustices within the ger district areas of Ulaanbaatar.

First: Tackle air pollution fully. Tackling air pollution will be Mongolia's greatest challenge of the 21st century. Taking meaningful action to improve heating systems will be one step, but it's also important to address heating units within

individuals. The free electricity during the night for ger residents is a noble attempt, but secondary heating units are dangerous. Innovation is needed and it should be done in consultation with the ger dwelling communities.

Second: Meaningful mechanism for participation and a robust civil society that represents ger district residents are needed. Regular town hall meetings, that targets various demographics of people is suggested.

Third: Water and waste management infrastructure is needed. Every person is entitled to sanitation and clean water. These systems are not cheap and go relatively unnoticed, but it's a human right enshrined within the Mongolian constitution.

Fourth: Equitable access to public transportation and quality roads within the ger districts is paramount. Improving the transportation infrastructure in ger areas will boost economic growth and access to basic social services.

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TRANSITION FROM A HIERARCHY TO A DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION

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Abstract

In this study, the researchers studied transition Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association from a traditional hierarchy to a decentralized organization in Mon State, Myanmar. This research took the qualitative approach, utilizing data collected from documents, including electronic sources, as well as interviews and observation during fieldwork. For the case study, the research focused on the association in particular and Rāmañña Mon Sangha organization in general, and it mainly focused only on the transformation of the association. The participants were interviewed on transitional studies and then asked to share their experiences of practicing in administration, decision-making of the association after being appointed from the general members. The results of the study showed that the approach of decentralization phase in the transition from hierarchy to decentralized organization was the deconcentration phase and the process towards to the stage of delegation. However, at the period of the commission, the association transforming was also stepping on devolution, its transform was weakening traditional hierarchical power and growing of democratic and decentralized power. These approaches slightly conformed that transforming of the association had transformed the attitude and practice of the executive members and the mission to reform the movement was active implementation. Besides these, the study will have contributed to the literature on transition, in Mon version, to the summit of Rāmañña Mon sangha, Rāmañña Dhammācariya association, and especially Rāmañña Rottha Buddhist University.

Keywords: *Transition, Modernization, Democratization, Decentralization.*

I. Introduction

The research will study the case of that transitions of the Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association from a traditional hierarchical organization to a decentralization one. Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association (RDA) is an ecclesiastical association established by the Rāmañña Nikāya Mon Sangha (RNMS) since 1972 (up to the present). The headquarter of the association is in

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the 2500-monastery, Mawlamyine, Mon State, Myanmar. There are the economic, political and social changes in recent Myanmar politic. Due to the impact of this transformation, the administrative structure of the organization has been changed from a traditional hierarchical to a decentralized one. It is the purpose of this research to analytically study the attitudes, perspectives, the process of modernization, decentralization of this association transform; it is also to inquire how the association overcomes its tension.

In case of modernizing the institution is the forceful process of decentralizing hierarchical power and democratizing traditional system. Ideologically, public institutions need to be democratized like institutional power needs to be decentralized. By democratizing of hierarchical structure power, association can make a process of decision making which is accessible for everyone. And by decentralizing the structure, association can transfer the authority from a central to the other local units. As for the consequences of hierarchical power structure system, and conservative traditionalism principles, it is really difficulty for the association to provide the democratic values and decentralized structure in order to move forward. Therefore, modernization in structure became the aim of the new generations who are educated monks since they have encountered the Western rationalism during their Mon sangha's monastic life time.

RDA has existed under Rāmañña Nikāya Mon Sangha furtherance. Rāmañña Nikāya Pariyatti (RNPar), Rāmañña Rattha Buddhist University (RRBU) and Rāmañña Nikāya Parahita (RNP) are under the central line of RDA. Even it has three branches; the central executive committee has a control over these branches. As with much conservative religious organization, the above-stated organizations were formed in the hierarchical structure. Even though some senior's monks are comfortable with the old, hierarchical structure junior's monks want changes. Some innovative functions acted by reformist monk were forbidden from cooperating and participating in an activity of the association. Therefore, in these association, there are two different main types of ideas, and it is raising the conflicts that undermine on truth building and teamwork.

Traditionally, in monastic life, juniors usually pay respect to seniors in terms of hierarchy and seniority. At the same time, for conservative monks, there are prevailing ideology that preserving the traditional hierarchical principles is the responsibility from the aspect of religious value. Subsequently, the different ideology of committee members was deeply dissenting among themselves. The side of conservative senior monks seriously traces to practice in hierarchical structure power, while the other reformist monks side traces to decentralize. If it lets the contentious ideology and structure continues for the future, the association will face social-political transformed into modernization. Lastly, the nature of these dissensions is often found in tradition of hierarchical power structure. Thus, the continuing challenges to the present and future is a way to handle this issues that Rāmañña Dhammācariya association need to be decentralized and modernized on reform movements.

This present study argues that the inevitability of the transition from traditional values to modern organization is the process weakening traditional hierarchical power and a growth of democratic and decentralized power. When facing with the issues of social-political change, the conservative senior and junior monks are still living in traditional, conservative way rather than employing modern approaches. Despite this the reformist seniors and junior monks are convinced

that need to reform and modernize the traditional hierarchical structure into a modern decentralized structure.

II. Modernization, Democratization and Decentralization

A. Modernization

Nowadays, in Myanmar, the theory of modernization has been challenged and does not capture the entire experience of monastic society as scholars Kawanaaini, McMahan and Swearer have written about. Thus, modernization is a threat to traditional hierarchical culture. Nevertheless, as Kawanaaini described, people have nature and ability to opposes the repression and control. This nature is democratic (Kawanaaini, 2016).

As “Modernization” has been defined in many ways, it is necessary to define how this term is used in this study. According to Kumar stated that modernization is a continuous and open-ended process (Kumar, 2016). The Cambridge dictionary has defined “modernization as “the process of starting to use the most recent methods, ideas, equipment, etc. so that something becomes or seems more modern.” Another widely quoted definition is Kawanaaini (2016) definition of modernization as “a transitional process and involves a process of secularization. It systematically challenges religious institutions, beliefs, and practices, by substituting them with reason and science.” Thus, the meaning of modernization in this section is modernization as the focus is on Kawanaaini.

In modern Southeast Asia Buddhism, the sangha organization has been increasingly formalized and centralized, along with the bureaucratic system of the government (Tavivat, 2013). As we were known, the state indirectly imposed organizational structure on the Sangha. For instance, Buddhism in Thailand is not only structured by the official state-imposed system of the Sangha administration, but also by a complex and fluid network of unofficial relations between the Buddhist laity and individual monks and monasteries Prince Mongkut introduced Western rationalism into Buddhism to make it more logical and secure (Tavivat Puntarigvivat & Standford, 2013). Another instance, under military government, knows as the New Win government, introduced the centralized sangha order. With the context of purification, perpetuation, and propagation of the law, this is a kind of modernization in its local background (Lall, 2016). However, despite given these reasons, the real intention of the government is to control the Sangha in favor of the government system.

In conclusion, modernist scholars have stated that modernization is a process of individualization, differentiation, specialization, and abstraction. But, it was the process which lacks spiritual welfare, and more values on materialistic society as a result of modernized and developed societies. The religious and traditional scholar had the experience of the crisis of the modernity. Even though they do not explicitly state that if it is to be developed it has to be modernized, we usually try to be a modern society, the institution with what today world did as a recent. Otherwise, your belief system and the practical value will be disappeared. The process of modernization has to base on the development of both psychically and spiritually value and has to step on the path of the middle way.

B. Democratization and Decentralization

Today, decentralization has been being discussed in the developing countries. Since 2010, Myanmar’s governance structure has been transformed into the open

policies and transparent political systems. With the effect of the globalized economy and personal politic, decentralization is a significant process in the transition of the country. This study argues that the process of decentralization is inevitable if we want to reform and modernize the traditional hierarchical structure into a democratic system.

As scholars pointed out, many countries in Southeast Asia are influenced by religious belief and social performance. Theoretically, the assumption of politic and economic of these countries was dominated by religious values. Myanmar, especially, was embraced by Buddhism as well as Thailand. As Kawanaaini (2016) stated that, Theravada Buddhism contains many ideas that are highly incompatible with liberal democracy (Kawanaaini, 2016). Generally speaking, monks usually hold the leader position in Buddhist societies in Theravada Buddhism. According to Rondinelli, decentralization has four types: Political decentralization, administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and economic or market decentralization. Among these, administrative decentralization aims to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resource for providing public service. Indeed, these processes were transferring of responsibility for the planning, financing, management of specific public. In the fact that, international development organization prescribed decentralization as a part of the structural adjustments need to strengthen democracy and promote good governance. Therefore, the decentralized system can be conducive in promoting the improvement and efficiency of the administrative system.

In part, decentralization creates and strengthen democracy. Decentralization has four types; political decentralization, administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization and economic or market decentralization. Theoretically, democracy can be happened by decentralizing within these four realms or four typologies. Practically, decentralization often fails because of low-level administration and management capacity. Decentralization would probably increase the potential for the elite to control and work in their favor. In the design of decentralization, human resource management should be seen as an essential component. Yes, in democratization, by empowering the ability of mass can keep and create democratic value, and by innovating good governance with transparent, representative, accountable, and participatory system institutions and produces for public decision making, can establish and produce the process of democratization.

Religion origination are hierarchical in nature. They can be contradicted to democratization and decentralization. As religion was the hierarchy, the politicians and state want to influence it for its benefit. Thus, the influence of the state on religion and the influence of religion on state can clash. In our analysis of transition of the hierarchical organization to decentralization, then ideological practices are vitally important: reformation, modernization, and decentralization.

III. A Brief History of Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association

Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association (RDA) is an ecclesiastical organization first established in 1972 to translate Pāli Tipitaka into Mon Language and to publish it in a book. To respond to the rapid changes and challenges to RMS, to work for the welfare of Sāsana and people brightly, they have built up a Dhamma

hall which is called Laviman in 1997. After built the Laviman 1, RDA has grown significantly in size, scope, and breadth, including the handling of the Rāmañña Nikāya Pariyatti of the Mon's monastic education. Today, RDA continues to provide the academic educational services that initially motivated its establishment Rāmañña Rottha Buddhist University along with diploma in Pāli program, its establishment Rāmañña Nikāya Parahita program focusing on holistic community growth, Mon monastic education development, and revitalization of Rāmañña Sāsana in Mon Land. RDA particular team for the translation project is dedicated to translating Pāli commentary through the monastic education and publishing it and Mon Tipitaka book sealer. Programs and services are offered to create empowerment and ideal tools for Mon monastic educational development and to separate the Rāmañña Sāsana into the patriotic of Mon community.

The assembly developed a hierarchy to regulate Rāmañña Nikāya Sangha at the Mon national levels via committees and devised a central governing body of 15 members called the central committee of Rāmañña Dhammācariya association, which would be responsible for all Rāmañña Buddhist monks in the Mon people. The committee also developed regulations to force Rāmañña monks to participate and support. The committee which consists of 15 members, including a chairperson, two vice-chairpersons, one secretary, two vice secretaries, one financials, joint financials one, one accountancy and two vice accountancies, all of whom are appointed in the Rāmañña Dhammācariya assembly. Until 2014, appointment terms lasted a year. Since 2014, the association has cut term lengths, with a quarter of seats changed every three years.

In theory, the Committee oversees the violation of the constitution, the traditional regulatory framework of Rāmañña Dhammācariya association Buddhist monk. In practice, the Committee appointment terms were permanent and based on his desire whether to continue or to resign. This body has participated in non-religious affairs. This association has the following responsibilities:

- To enhance race and religion, and education.
- To compilation of Buddhist Treatises Pāli-commentary into Mon literature.
- To publish the Buddhist Treatises in Mon to the whole Mon land.

This committee is responsible for enhancing race, religion and education activity with Mon in Myanmar and abroad. It also undertakes the translation of Pitakas and compilation of Buddhist Treatises. The Rāmañña Nikāya Pariyatti and the Rāmañña Rottha Buddha Takkasi (Mawlamyine) and Rāmañña Nikāya Parahita fall under this committee.

Founded in 1982, The Rāmañña Nikāya Pariyatti is a community-based education and examination team organization with over 300 members and over two programs (Kaesara, 2007, p. 64). Each year, it provides for the Pariyatti monks to recite Pāli course as oral examination and to answer the question as the paper examination that has two monastic educational programs, in formerly. But, late gradually, they left the oral exam and just provided for paper examination. At first, the committee had faced a lot of challenges: inner and outer. The committee holding examination even does not have venues and to sit in the test, and the student's monks have to sit on the floor around the pagoda. Some years, because of the raining, even the exam paper was wet and destroyed by rain. So, they had the bad experienced like this (Jondaobāsa, 2007, p. 50).

After they accessed to the place where the headquarter of Mahāsangha Sāmaggī and built an examination hall the test was the relief to many monks (Koṅṭisāra, 1997, p. 35; Sīlacarra, 2009)

Rāmañña Nikāya examination has been the symbol of Mon monastic education until now. In 2018, it reached on 34rd and had huge participants listed more than 2000 monks, including Nun. Historically, it examination itself full of the political background and it was an identity of Mon and Mon Buddhism (Jondaobāsa, 2007, p. 49). According to an educated young monk explored in his social media post, “the Mon monastic education of Rāmaññanikāya includes the concepts of Mon national identity.

- 1) The Mon Sangha of Rāmaññanikāya is the main stable wall in maintaining the Mon monastic education and the Mon literature.
- 2) The waves of Mon monastic education of Rāmaññanikāya influences on the Mon society.
- 3) The impacts of Mon monastic education strengthen the Mon national identity.
- 4) The Mon monastic education is conducive to nationalism.
- 5) The Mon monastic education of Rāmaññanikāya is worried about its future.

Therefore, though Mon monastic education is under threat of its future, the concept of Mon monastic education of Rāmaññanikāya includes an idea of maintaining the Mon Buddhist culture and tradition, the influences on the Mon society, national identity and nationalism.” On 14 January 2011, RRBU was formally established at a primarily based conference of the Buddhist monk in Mon, with the mission of promoting modern Pariyatti education on Mon. its Pāli name is Rāmañña Rattha Buddha Takksī, which means Buddhist University of Mon land. RRBU have formed in response to the Rāmañña Dhammācariya association, the whole Mon land. In 2015, RBBU educational committee launched the program of Diploma in Buddhism.

In Myanmar Sangha society, nine sects have been officially recognized by the government since 1980. Among of these sects, Mon sangha especially Rāmañña Nikaya including in Central Working Committee as Suddhamma Nikaya. Reformed by the government, Rāmañña Nikaya sangha is left to recognize as Rāmañña Nikaya sects. In 1972, Rāmañña Mon Sangha established Rāmañña Dhammācariya association. Rāmañña Dhammācariya association can be regarded as one of the most influential ecclesial organizations among on Mon ethnic group (Koṅṭisāra, 1997, p. 17). This association represents in Mon ethnic affairs, and adviser similar to New Mon State party, Mon political parties, and others secular organizations.

IV. The Problems of Hierarchy in Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association

Rāmañña Dhammācariya association in the traditional period which it before 2007, stabled and had full authority in its association. However, the association has problems and challenges when faced with social and political changed. Changing and transformation were mainly brought about by the young monastic members who have experience of 2007 saffron revolution. Indeed, this association has been engaged in the process of modernizing. Here, we would like to point out that under the traditional condition, the association had had activities such as performing rituals and religious ceremonies successfully. Ideally, it is possible.

But, practically, whenever an association or an individual cannot retain and modernize by the changing of society and politics, it will have fewer chances for development.

In the context of Rāmañña Dhammācariya association, even though its administrative system was the hierarchical system (Koñtisāra, 1997, p. 18), the association is can earn respect and praise by other communities because of their successful activities. For example, they have many programs such as ritual ceremonies, monastic examination, translating text from Pāli to Mon. Similarly, under the military regime at the national level, the government organizational system is a hierarchical structure one. In the same way, in favor of the structure which is currently existed, the religious institution has also been centralized. For instance, Ney Win made the formation of Myanmar sangha to centralize structure for the purpose that there would be the political influence on religion. Second, in the contemporary period, the religious and social pattern in Myanmar and many organizations such as Rāmañña Dhammācariya had been changed in light of political reform that occurred since 2010. From a socio-political perspective, within the Rāmañña Dhammācariya association, there are four different causes of reform movements can be distinguished. They are the criticism and activities of young, educated monks, the co-operation of young Mon sangha, the participation of modernly educated monk and the planning for a modern educational institution.

Under the four categories, the section will use what we have observed to categorize and point out the causes of the transformation of Rāmañña Dhammācariya association and its consequence and reaction to the various social and political condition in the process of transition. The ideological and structural transition of RDA has changed from traditionalism to modernism in the context of evolving social-political reformation. The historical context in traditional period, the association had an utterly conservative conventional system and hierarchical structure incident. The reformist's movements on the transitional period of RDA have transformed in the context of changing societal attitude. As contemporary context, the association that has reformed its traditional value and practice after facing the modern distinction that participating in modernization and decentralization on administrative structure.

A. The Criticism and Activities of Young Educated Monks

Throughout Myanmar politic history, most of its reform movements, such as 8/8/88 boycott by university students, 2007 saffron revolution of young Buddhist monk are all started and based on the activities of the youth. In the life timeline of human, such being reformist for social, political belief and practice in the growing period, as also being conservative for social status and title. Consequently, since ancient times the humankind faces the conflict that issue typically from the different ideas produced by the young and the old (Rāmañña Center, 2007, pp. 46–48). By replacing the what the present situation need that argued by young reformist, the development and enlightenment process takes place in the society. So, the argument and the needs of the new generation are instrumental in the tools to develop and modernized. (Rāmañña Center, 2007, p. 50)

B. The cooperation of Young Mon sangha

The first encounter between the elder conservative monks and the younger reformist monks in Mon society occurred along with the social and political change in Myanmar. This encountering is to improve the associational functions

and its structure. To counter the top-down system, the reformistic monks introduced modern practice into the association to develop the organization. The association believed that the cooperation from the young monk could help modernize the organization (Kaesara, 2007, pp. 64–66). It is, therefore, necessary to introduce the reformistic and anti-traditional aspects of young monks into the conservative, hierarchical practice.

C. The participation of modern educated monk

The young, educated monks who had university educational backgrounds from abroad, such as India and Sri Lanka, have been participated in the association more and more. After 1996, many Mon young monks want to abroad to study in University. aforementioned was possible because they passed the higher level of the ecclesiastical Pāli examination, known as the *pariyatti* examination in Myanmar.

Many of Mon laities realize that to improve the education and the development of Mon people, they need to support the young to study abroad. Especially, urban middle-class Mon society has established the foundation that help the monk and give scholarship for them to inquire abroad. Moreover, Mon sangha who stay in overseas countries also invite the elder monks who are in high position and conservative to visit their country. The trip is aimed at to fill the gap between the seniors and the juniors. This trip will help reduced the conservative of the elder as well as change the way of their thinking. At the same time, they also will know the necessity of study English, and the learn the modern organizational system that can be employed in social affairs such as administrative system, project planning, etc. As a result, the young, educated monks were accepted.

D. Planning for A Modern Educational Institution

There are critical moments in the history of modern Mon society. These moments led to the establishment of the program for building Mon monastic University. The effort to create University initially started in 2007 and was not successful. Later, when it was launched by the young, educated monks is successful, and the academy is called Rāmañña Rottha Buddhist Academy. Today the academy provides basic courses on Buddhism such as Diploma in Buddhism. The constructions of the University are initiated in 2011 and up to present. Started from August 2015, the system of modern education has carried in Mon sangha.

V. The Discussion on Traditional and Hierarchy in Rāmañña Dhammācariya Association

A transition is compared and discussed by three periods: traditional, transitional and contemporary period. It is a comparative discussion on organization between the conservative and the reformist. With different age group, attitude, different perspective an of the organization will be discussed. A conservative hold in traditional view, a reformist a more modern view. The conventional hierarchical structure in the RDA has undergone transition and decentralization. RDA also, conservative and reformist cannot be categorized by age. However, elder monks tend to be conservative; young monks be reformist. In Mon monastic tradition, the organizational structure was formed in the hierarchy, which follows the Buddhist monk tradition.

A. Traditional Period

A hierarchical system is described as a system or organization in which people or groups are ranked one above the other according to status or authority. In contrast, modernization is a continuous and open-ended process. It refers to the transitional process of moving from traditional or primitive communities to modern societies. For instance, while the conservative understanding on modernization as the threat to hierarchical traditional culture, the reformist believed on it as the process that involved not only structural changes but also shift in outlook, including new attitudes toward an openness, liberation, plurality, and individuality.

Nowadays, Sangha societies have been facing with the challenges of modern social-politic system. In fact, with the consequence of the state transition in Myanmar since 2011, the religious institutions and its value and practice system had been shifted to meet the challenges of modernization. Ven. Kae Sara stated as follow:

“According to the saying from Pāli ‘Kala Desa Dhana Agha’ the time of yesterday and today are not similar. Time is always changing for it is also the impermanent nature. Therefore, those who are not able to catch up with the times will be left behind while others who can keep with the pace become modernized. The same is true to any organization as well. A modern organization will be prosperous and developed while the out dated organization will be left out dated. The undeveloped and old-fashioned organization will always be left behind.” (Kaesara, 2016, pp. 33–34) (McMahan, 2008).

Indeed, Buddhism is the institution which had deeply relied on its lay societies supporting, and the Buddhist institutions had been informed accordance with it societal attitude changing. For change in outlook and perception, modern Sangha institutions tend to be governed by constitution, regulation. With the notion that modernizations are socially constructed and changed in society, the challenges of modern value have forced the religious societies to shift its participants’ outlook and practice.

To cope with the problems that organizational disunity, the association need to reform its existing hierarchical structure. It is important to note that in these association there are two different main types of ideas and it is raising conflicts that undermine on team building of all these effect causes be these consequences. of course, the religious association, in particular, RDA dependency on strong leaders.

Ven. Teaja, explained his view on the hierarchy as follow:

“We have to change; currently, the whole of association practices is conservative. We just are organizing people in some traditional way and not using in some modern style. You see, now we are doing traditional and ancient style. Give speech, talk and then not sharing the tasks and responsibilities. The chairman can do whatever he wants or not; sometime, some person had overwhelming on the other work-space. Thus, it was increasing the conflicts.”

According to Ven. Teaja have mentioned, this kind of practice is the primary task that to increase the dissenting, conflict and, inversely, to decrease the consolidation of the association. Conservative traditionalism in the organization has hierarchical structure power that effects on their administrative and structural transition to be decentralization, democratization, and modernization. Currently, as a result, observation shows that the transitional movement in RDA

has been hindered by religious, traditional practices and systems even though the Southeast scholar had stated that teachings, practices, and monastic institutions of Buddhism in Myanmar had been transformed with the dramatic changes in Myanmar Buddhist world. So, more details concerning the transition that reformation in patterns of ideologies, modernization in structure and decentralization in administration will be explained in the following section.

B. Transitional Period

The transitional process of moving from traditional communities to modern societies refers to the process of modernization. In the understanding of development and acceptance of new technologies, the self-realization and the self-consciousness are the heart of modernity. According to McMahan, the modernity is a condition that refers to a condition of social existence that is radically different to all past forms of human experience (McMahan, 2008). In contrast, according to the oxforddictionaries.com given definition on conservative is holding to traditional attitudes and values and cautious about change or innovation, typically about politics or religion. After had presented the modernization that refers the process and the modernity that refers to the condition, the transitional phase is the period that takes place and exits between the traditional period and the contemporary periods.

The attitude of the elder committee arrangements for the transform of the structure of the association was stepped back. As Swearer (2010) had pointed, the traditional Buddhism was the heart of the Buddhist society of Myanmar. But the roles of monks have been seriously challenged in contemporary condition. This is clarified by Ven. Kaetu Mālā who said:

“Even though we want to apply the modern system in this association, most of the central committee members are still roots in the traditional hierarchical system. RDA activities are just like the festival, unlike a national level movement. In reality, we have to show up for the new generation more and more developed and helpful such as monthly Dharma journal, yearly supporting scholar monks who can study modern education aboard. Otherwise, RDA was holding for them monastic examination only. It is not able to follow with the new development.”

As a result, to ensure the development of Mon people, the monastic community which could be progressive by planning and promoting the modern education. The elaborate this initiative action in which these monks undergo seem far removed from the Pariyatti tradition.

C. Contemporary Period

The socially constructed and changed in the traditional and modern society were the result of the notions behind the modernization. A new form of Buddhism is the result of a process of modernization that has been taking place not only in the West but also in Asia countries for over a century. As Ven. Kae Sara had stated that those who are not able to catch up with the times would be left behind while others who can keep with the pace become modernized; and, the undeveloped and old-fashioned organization will always be left behind. In addition to, according to the definition of Kawanaaini, modernization as “a transitional process and involves a process of secularization. It systematically challenges religious institutions, beliefs, and practices, by substituting them with reason and science.” Thus, McMahan (2008) mentioned that modernization involved not only

structural changes but also shift in outlook, including new attitudes toward such as openness, liberation.

For change in outlook, modern institutions tend to be governed by constitution, regulations, and reform to be democratized by the decentralized system. Kumar (2016) had stated that modernization carries the institution and values of society along with it. For instances of Thai and Myanmar such as King Minguk, U Nu and Ne Win, the Sangha organization had been increasingly formalized and centralized, along with the bureaucratic system of the government (Kawanami, 2016; Tavivat Puntarigivat & Standford, 2013; Walton, 2016). With the impact of Myanmar's governance structure has been transformed Since 2010, the monastic institutions, and particular the RDA has been discussing on the process of modernization which include reforming and decentralizing that were the challenges it. Therefore, this section presented that the process of modernization and decentralization are inevitable if we want to reform and modernize the traditional hierarchical structure into a democratic system.

VI. Conclusion

The committee monks of the association in this study consider their association principles apply to utilizing the modern monastic tradition by the Mon cultural practices and value. They are proud of themselves being faithful servants of the monastic community (Sangha) to serve to promote the development that improved the Sangha in all areas. However, even they have a generosity towards the modernizing of the administrative system through both modern and traditional. They consider themselves as applying a transforming role to seriously the chance of these association to carry out the benefit for the monastic community and Mon society. Self-perception of the non-official Nikāya stimulates them to interest in the function of the association to get access to sufficient organization. Their benefaction conducts their benevolent reformist view that uncountable merit can give physical and mental development. With their best regard, it is hopefully glowed to reform situation for the modernity for the invaluable transition.

Their vision arises to be following the ideologies of the modern monks that modernization is more flexible to be stable in the social-politically condition in democratic society of Mon. In reality, young-reformist-led monastic association irregularly accomplishes in modest lifestyle. As a result, the unlimited-age-reformist-led organization was integrated into the gradualist-led administrative system in few years after the amended constitution of the association in 2014. The first amended constitution enabled the young monks to access and introduce the organization to the decentralized structure that provides the democratic practice and value.

The Rāmañña Dhammācariya committee monks and the administrative structure of the association took an actual meaning state in religious and national aspects of ancient and modern Mon's society. The association and its committee members played basic ethical-social and nation educational value in the culture of Mon activist masses who in turn became the revelatory person to lift the monastic community and the Mon people. In the contemporary period, even though the monastic community practice re-constructed its authentic value and developed structure, the perception of society has changed. In this day and age, monk and lay, young and elder learn at the modern subject using both by religious and by secular in their performance.

Traditionalist and reformist of the Rāmañña Dhammācariya association have to face challenges related to the secular social and political situations. In socially, the committee team was tolerant that the modern reformists misunderstood on an arrangement of its transitional process. Unstable military government's ruling effects caused the tension; in the relationship management sector, the association communication effort was the trend to the underground system, narrow space, lack openness, ambiguousness and obscurity especially for general and board membership. With the attempt to resolve these problems, the religious association such as monastic community also have to deal with challenges like providing proper management, using apply to systematic administrating and facing some restrictive indication by the state Sangha to ensure control over any ethnic monk activities of the religious sect.

Related to the context of religious official nine sects, the activities of the association such the Rāmañña Dhammācariya association, which it had the political tension with the military government of Ne Win since 1962, has in addition to such challenges. Specifically, the other struggle has the concern with their ethnic and religious identity. Such kind of problems includes less modern technical approach, the biased religious tradition of their existence and their performance concerning their volunteer position in the monk lifestyle.

To cope with the challenges caused by social and political modernization, the committee membership team in the association need to step more on the decentralization and democratization theory. With the changing from military to civil governance system, the threat of unstable government can be overcome. Consequently, the association has to provide the path, the channel to established effective communications system and to build transparency relationship with other religious networking such as domestic and international. In response to the modern intimidation regarding their work, the reformist committees of the association apply the non-confrontational method in decision-making cases and non-acquiescence method in some. The senior's opinion is to prioritize the decision-making and then give junior's performance access to planning. The reformist takes a harmonious view of the central administrative body. By doing that, the association function enables winning the cooperation of the association and the smooth transition of their reform process. Even though the transform has the risk, the association can be organized to the modern manipulation. However, the traditionalists also take a non-acquiescence approach to modernization by using their spiritual integrity and their benevolence stimulate for their volunteer aid.

The discrimination that based on the relationship between teacher and pupil is a traditional stereotype of the monastic community. By allowing and accessing young reformist to the core field of the association, the central committee can be provided the credibility of the team. They reckoned on the reformist educated ability, trust building, team working, religious practices, perseverance and tolerant. The reformist also belief and respect to the central committee that has representation on Mon monastic community and can extend the dedication to them. The traditionalist, especially in central committee effort, is also the inspiration on the whole Mon religious community and Mon civil society. In addition, even in Mon ethnic army force, the association charismatic has been influenced along with its revolutionary historical evident. To contribute to the task what they responded is to retain the former primary objectives of the association. On the other hand, how to promote and achieve that results of the functions are the main thing in this transforming process. In the way of the

membership who had recognized themselves as the volunteer, not like the permanent staff, it was a hub difficulty in the management operation. With the form of the volunteer, in the level of helping on association and in the concept that gives service on the monastic community (Sangha) get the return back merits in according with the practice of ascetic perfection, it is making hinder to form into the modern administration and democratic system.

Specifically, Budgets lacks allowance on the title of community development is the central issues of overall challenging. To raise hierarchical organizational structure up to the decentralized system, the association have to expand the financial constraints on the line such as contextual awareness, peripheral vision, design thinking and a multi-disciplinary approach for taking care of the vulnerable project, instead of the controlling the association must to empowering. With the changing elder perception on the role of young as the pupil, they must be recognized as members. Even not necessarily need to change in the overall relationship stereotypical attitudes, the association has accepted the criticism from outside. The general impression of the changing of the association was from the educated young of social-political realms.

Similarly, in the religious realm, young participation seems to be equal and not necessarily to be ageism. The young involvement in the decision-making space that has to relate to the association. The senior does not necessarily consider of young thoroughly enough maturity and have to think on their knowledge. Young position in an independent relationship with creativity and ideology what dominated by modern education, it not based on traditional and cultural norm such kindship, teacher and pupil, conductor and follower. The value of monastic tradition and culture have shaped and influenced by the traditionalist who extremely on religious function. Also, due to the sangha state ideology of Sangha Mahā Nayaka hierarchical system, the association need to carry out their federations ideology what had been shaped by ethnic politic inherent. Mons organization which formed by ethnicity automatically rooted in the decentralized structure because of they have experienced from the social sense. Nowadays, in the modern organizational system, the equal position such as the networking form, decentralized structure led to purpose from profit.

To sum up, the hierarchical management mode is no longer suited for the challenges of the modern society. Every pillar of a traditional organization is now in flux. Even though conventional monk's utilities the monastic hierarchical system to enhance the exceptional reputation of the authority, it has been the path to transform the traditional attitudes to modern practice in global lifestyle. By shifting from profit to purpose, hierarchies to networks, controlling to empowering, planning to experimentation, privacy to transparency, the association can be seen that traditionalist tend to participate in the modern administrative realm. In senior levels, by comparing with the contemporary developed association, the religious position can be enhanced in equal to current status. Eventually, the traditionalist mindset shifts for organization transformation is the value for monastic members in the future.

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COMING OUT AT THE DEEP SOUTH: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE LGBT YOUTHS AT THE THREE PROVINCES OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF THAILAND

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Abstract

In Thailand, where the reputation of the country is well-known as the gay-friendly country and ranked as one of the top countries in Asia and in the world regarding the tolerance issues toward LGBT community. But in the reality Thai LGBT community is still struggling in several levels, which paradoxically contrast with what the state agencies or the private sectors in Thailand are trying to portray. As the society is more tolerate but unaccept, the LGBT individual in Thailand are still facing a lot of challenge of the human rights violation and discrimination through the political, socio-cultural and legal perspectives. When looking through the LGBT discourse and situation in Thailand, several of the previous studies are not much inclusive on the minority LGBT group in the country, at the Deep South. As the Deep South of Thailand is a Muslim majority community, LGBT individuals are facing several constraints through their daily life which includes the lack of protection and violation of human rights from the state and the discrimination from the non-state actors as well. Especially the LGBT youths in the Deep South, which currently living in the globalization era where the movement of the LGBT rights are becoming so widely popular in the capital but is very sensitive in their area. The quantitative and qualitative methods will be conducted in this study. Surveys and interviews will be conducted in both youth participants in the Deep South provinces of Thailand; Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat as well as with the key persons who are working and/or familiar with the issues in the area. The research will identify the human rights violation and discrimination at Deep South by different actors and to provide the discussion and recommendation for the future mechanisms to protect the LGBT youths in the Deep South.

Keywords: *LGBT, Human Rights, Youth, Deep South*

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Introduction

The guarantee of the non-discrimination and the violation against all individual, which including the fair treatment towards the equality from the universal human rights instrument approach is being assured that all people regarding their sexes, sexual orientation and gender identity will be protected. The international human rights law specifies the obligations that the member states will respect the law, by the ratification of the international human rights treaties; the member states' governments should take these actions to put the human rights protection of all individuals into the domestic measures and legislation mechanisms with their treaty obligations and duties. Although the international communities are trying very hard to make the human rights protection applicable in various aspects and to ensure the rights of all individuals in every corner of the world, but it's unavoidable that nowadays the existence of human rights violations and discrimination are still occurring around the world. As definition of human rights, according to the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHRCR), mentioned that human rights are rights which inherent to all human beings, regardless of the nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status, with the principles of rights which must be interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. With this definition, the human rights violation could be considered as the act which violate, prohibit, or limit the enjoyment of rights that human being are possessed. In addition, the human rights discrimination means the act which cause the unequal or different treatment or harassment that causes harm (Human Rights Legal Support Center n.d.).

As human rights specified that all human being are equally entitled to the human rights without discrimination, the act of unjust and prejudicial treatment regarding the difference of races, ages, or sexes are considering as the human rights discriminations.

With the dynamic of the society become more complex and the social problem is expanding further to several aspects that have to deal along with the complexity of the society. In the present day, the number of the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender (LGBT) community are increasing and expanding (Gates 2011). Aligning with this development, there are several cases on the human rights abuse towards LGBTs that happen in every geographic locations all around the world. The harmful punishment from the state towards the LGBT people, which includes imprisonment or even execution are ongoing in several countries around the world. Sometimes these acts of cruelty are not committed only by states, but also by the non-state actors with in these states that punish the people who are being labeled and alienate from them. The acts perpetrated by non-states actors including, such as in Chechnya, the Russian autonomous state, public humiliation, extorting, or beating by their friends and neighborhoods are committed. Extremely, the honor killing would be performed by their family to restore the honor to the family if one of their member family are homosexual (Bogani 2017). These states-sponsored homophobias provoke the acts of committing the crime by violation and discrimination by the non-state actors. Some of the non-state actors also participate and engage in practices of norm-setting (Hessbruegge 2005). The openness of the sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) is becoming an issue in the political, and socio-cultural perspectives in the society. Diversity is becoming the challenge and issue that the global societies has to be accepting with. The acceptance of the LGBT community in the international community seems to be on going in the positive way. But as

the history evolved, not all the state was decriminalized, recognized or respect the rights of the individuals of LGBT community. All

over the world, the LGBT people are still struggling with the challenges in their daily life such as the education, employment, healthcare, and housing.

The acceptance and tolerance of Thai society towards the LGBT community are the deep-root problems which affecting towards the non-discrimination policy as well as several human rights to the people in the LGBT community. The acceptance and openness about the realization and recognition of the existence and respects of rights are still taking into the account as the constraint to the public discussion in the society which is still very limited. Although Thailand is being famous of being a gay-friendly country, and ranked as one of the top countries in Asia on the tolerance of the LGBT community (UNDP and USAID 2014). The Tourism Authority of Thailand is actively promoting Thailand's image as a gay safe place, but in fact, Thailand struggling of the LGBT community in Thailand is still on various levels. (Mosbergen 2015). There are several cases that happened in Thai schools where the homosexuality students were targets of being monitored by the school faculty in the all-boy school at Nakhon Ratchasima province (Matichon 2017). Furthermore, LGBT people in Thailand still need to bear with the pressure and the expectation of the family and the society to be a good citizen, as they are suffering from being alienated from their peers, families or as well as the state action through the legal context.

LGBT Discourses in general Thai society

In the pre-modern era of Thai society, it was mainly focusing on producing the population in the country. This also includes the reproduction of population as the human resources for the civil duties; conscription for the military personals for the wars. So, at that time the family institution played important role as the main mechanism to the state security. The roles of heterosexual for men and women were connected to the code of conduct of being a good citizen. And the family institution at that time were only consider on gender binary. So, the act of homosexuality is very unacceptable at that era. Even it was unacceptable at that area but there is no evidence of the

punishment over the people of LGBT community also called homosexuality at that time. It was considered to be a tolerant society towards the homosexuality. The idea of the power and discourse of a society on sexual orientation and gender identity that were influenced in Thai society as it was considered to be very eurocentric. Which the discourse was very different from Thai society, as the law back in the history didn't specify about the homosexuality discourse as well as there is no punishment mentioned in the legal provision. So, his study didn't agree with the idea that several Thai scholars were using this eurocentric perspective to study about the behavior and the identity of homosexuality in Thailand. So back at that time could be conclusively mentioned at the Thai society was tolerate to the act of homosexuality, or at that time called '*kathoe*'.

The modernization of the kingdom during King Rama V brought a lot of change to Thai society, as he was very fond with the westernization idea and want to apply those western civilization to make Siam as the civilized country. The application of gender roles also shifted during his reign and continue to his son reign, King Mongkut or Rama VI, but still only widely in the Siamese elite class. After the modernization period, the nation-building process in Thailand

enhanced the significant growth of the homosexual visibilities in the society and also caused change in the homosexual behavior ideological definition. Medical personnels such as doctor was coming up with the descriptive definition and explanation of the homosexual condition, which not considered as medical breakthrough, but as a new method of ideology response to the idea of homosexuality. Wars were also a vital factor that changed and disrupted the patterns of traditional gender relations and sexuality as well as the homosexual expression especially with millions of young men and women, whose sexual identities were just developing as they need to leave their family and small town where heterosexual is influenced, as a gender binary, to the same sex rooming houses where they need to live together while relocating to employment opportunity.

In Thailand, wars also take the significant role on shifting the perspective of homosexuality

in the country in another direction. Romjumba (2002) also identified about the myth of the homosexuality in Thailand traditional era, which dated back before 1947. Thailand were influenced gigantically at the end of World War II, when the support of United States was flooded into Thailand; including the medical consultation especially in term of psychological support, which tremendously affect the homosexual in the country negatively. And from that period, homosexual behavior became a social problem of Thailand. He mentioned on the society back then which very concentrate on producing the new population to the society; for kingdom protection, war, labor to produce foods and construction for the infrastructure. The non-productive sexual behavior such as sexual intercourse of the same-sex; both man with man, and, woman with women, were considered as the inappropriate activity. Back during that time among the Siamese elite, the family was an important political institution. Reproductive family members are important to the maintenance and succession of family. Homosexuality was viewed as a threat to the political order of those days, based on the family relationship.

The nation-building era was also the important era that illustrate the history of LGBT community during that time through the national policy and several 'Thainess' creation to control and preserve the moral issues in the country. The nation-building era was cited as the creation of civilization within Thailand. The main purpose is to make Thailand civilized as equal as other countries, especially with Western world countries. The separation of men and women's role were really important during this period, as men should serve as the 'fence' of nation, mean men should serve in the military and protect the country from invasion of the foreign countries and women should serve as the 'flower' of nation, mean women should behave nicely to their husbands, behave nicely as a mother and should dress properly and beautifully. And when the role of men and women were clearly divided, the terminology of masculine and feminine also follows those discourses of being men and women in Thailand during nation-building era.

The study of Richard Lemke, Tobias Tornow & PlanetRomeo.com (2015) by the survey conducted by Johannes Gutenberg University, so called the Gay Happiness Index or GHI was introduced to the public. Thailand was ranked as the highest gay happiness country regarding the survey. And positioned in the 16th rank in the world index, with 115,000 individuals participate in this survey. With this index, which seems to represent Thailand's reputation as the country that welcome and established itself to be the gay-friendly country but in reality

there are a lot of constraints that LGBT community as a whole in the country still suffering. Yongcharoenchai (2013) mentioned that while Thailand is viewed as a tourist haven for same-sex couples; the reality for locals is that the law, and often public sentiment, is not so liberal. Tourism authorities are trying to market Thailand as a 'pink' destination, but local gay and transgender activists say the campaign disguises a darker reality that beneath the veneer of public tolerance, conservatism and discrimination remain rife. A study by UNDP and USAID (2013) portrayed that LGBT people in Thailand still face discrimination affecting their social rights and job opportunities and face difficulty gaining acceptance for non-traditional sexuality, even though the tourism authority has been promoting Thailand as a gay-friendly country. With several challenges affect the community, LGBT movement in Thailand has been dynamic and much has been achieved during the past twenty years, by the great activism and determination, the community has been able to overcome a multitude of challenges and have built a positive momentum towards achieving equality for LGBT people.

Youths are also the big part of the LGBT community in Thailand; this demographic in the community also face several constraints including human rights violation, discrimination and even several crimes that occurred towards them. A research by Mahidol University, Plan International and UNESCO Bangkok Office (2014: 48-52) indicate a huge number of the youths were affected by the violation and discrimination in several environment. 56 percents of LGBT youths in the school of 5 provinces in 5 different regions of Thailand with total of 2,070 samples where the surveys had

taken place were reported to be bullied because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. Almost 2 out of 3 or 68 percents of youths bullying victims because of homophobia mentioned that they never told anybody about the bullying and almost 1 out of 4 or 23 percents of youths bullying victims mentioned that they do nothing, as they cited 'nothing would be change even they tell someone'. And almost 7 percents of the bullying victims because of their sexual orientation reported to attempt suicide in the past year, compared to only 1.2 percents among those that had not been bullied for any reason, and 3.6 percents among those that had been bullied for other reasons. But with these researches, it was not mentioned on the LGBT youths in the Deep South as the researched only focus on the main schools in major cities.

Likhitpreechakul (2016) also reported about violence cases towards LGBT youths in the country, where he mentioned that those who think that Thailand is immune to such homophobia and LGBT have been fooled by the myth of acceptance. There are several reports by the local media about the violence crime towards the people in LGBT community in Thailand. In fact, local media has reported cases of violence against this group. In 2011, a woman admitted to having her daughter's lesbian lover, age of 16, killed in Trat because she wanted her child to date a man. The victim clearly was murdered because of her sexual orientation and gender identity, she identified as tom; the Thai definition for a self-styled masculine lesbian. Moreover, many lesbians are subjected to rape in order to cure their sexual orientation, often by their own family members. There is a report from Loei where a father confessed that he raped his daughter, age of 14 years old, in order to stop her from socializing with tom for 4 years. This also extend to the frightening social trend that this so-called corrective rape or rape to normalized their sexual orientation, which in Thai society through the expression of *kae tom som dee* which means fixing tom and dee; dee is the terminology regarding the feminine counterpart to tom. Likhitpreechakul also

mentioned that these violation towards the LGBT youths in Thailand are just the tip of an iceberg, as many more murders of Thai LGBT individual are brushed aside as crimes of passion, as hate crime terminology doesn't exist in

the legal system of Thailand. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) identified murder, beatings, kidnappings, rape and sexual assault against LGBT people as homophobic and transphobic violence that 'constitute a form of gender-based violence, driven by a desire to punish those seen as defying gender norms', and that violence against LGBT people "tends to be especially vicious compared to other bias-motivated crimes".

LGBT Situation in the Deep South

In the Deep South of Thailand, Muslims are dominantly widespread in the demographic of the communities. Thongsiri (2015) elaborates about the discussion on the sexual orientation and gender identity in Islam, that frequently some Muslims will always blame or put a shame on this group of people by using violent abusive languages. The religious provisions specify that sex which is not the engagement between heterosexual is a sinful act. In the other hand, the LGBT community also responded back by attacking Islam religion and Muslims by using the matter of religion, the unfair of law enforcement, human rights abuses or even link to the international terrorism. From Thongsiri study regarding the religion factor in the Deep South founded out that Muslims in some respective areas has different opinion regarding the LGBT issues in the Deep South. It is a group of people who do not support and resist to those who do not mind, understand, accept, and even support. Each group has different ways of thinking. The main reason is often referred by the resistance groups regarding LGBT issues is a religion provision in Islam. It has been determined that love and sex are only between men and women. Same sex is a sin, and it can result by ending up in hell. For those who are Muslims, it is a common practice to follow religious teaching to refer to the good life of being a Muslim. So, it is common to refer that Islam could not support the LGBT people, especially towards the persons who are coming out, who many people show signs of severe hatred. This is something they do not understand and cannot let go. It is seen that in countries where the law is based on Islam. There may be a jail sentence or even a death penalty for someone who is sexually assaulted (Thongsiri 2015).

Kummetha (2015) mentioned on her article about the minorities within the Muslim community in the Deep South also mentioned the interview conversation with the LGBT and Women's rights activists in the Deep South that it's the very hard to get Muslim Malays in the Deep South to understand LGBT issues. As they are concerning the religious framework with the LGBT as sin. Furthermore, in the Deep South Muslim majority also are anti-human rights at the same time. The ideology of anti-western idea which they believed that human rights are the westernization context which aims to draw people away from the religion. But the experience of the activists found that many human rights do not come into conflict with the religion at all in the Islam ideology, but it's only become the problem with the customs and mores of the people here. They assure that Islam is not the obstacle towards the understanding of human rights, but as the issue that have to deal with the ideological root cause that were penetrating deeply in the society which were built to engage the supremacy of masculinity as the value on the Muslims community in the Deep South.

However, despite the religious provisions or religious leaders determine the rules to prohibit a sexual diversity in the community. But in the reality, there are several Muslims who identify themselves as LGBT individuals, and those who are not, does not deny its presence. There are even the support or acceptance in some certain levels of the sexual orientation and gender identity which are not justified by the religious provisions by a variety method of "negotiation" or "the way of thinking". Thongsiri also extends her study by giving the examples regarding the Muslims in the Deep South towards the LGBT by these following. Although same-sex love is defined by the religious law as a sin. But sin is personal. It is between God and the believer. Others have no right to judge. The only thing that they could do is warning, there are provisions to warn each other when the offender. If the person didn't warn each other, they will be sinful as well. But the warning must not be oppressive, or to physically abuse others. The sexuality which is different from the provisions even it is a incorrect regarding the religion provisions. But in other religious principles, which speak of love and compassion toward human being, so everyone should be treated with tender love. Even if they incorrectly commit the act that against the religion provisions it should be no one that deserves to be harmed or expelled from society.

Method

To reach the research objectives, the analysis of the documents from various types of publications will be the basis and crucial part on developing to the following research process. This data collection will ensure a comprehensive understanding of the political, socio-cultural, and legal framework through the experience of LGBT youths in the Deep South. The main sources of information will gather and analyze from qualitative primary and secondary data.

The in-depth interview will also be conducted by the researcher, with no need for the translation as the main interviewees will be Thai and speaking Thai. But the local interpreter for the local Southern dialect will also accompany with the researcher to translate particular Central Thai language term to the local participants. The researchers will propose targeted questions regarding to the interviewee's experiences on human rights violation and the discrimination, related to their everyday life basis due to their sexual orientation and gender identity.

Selection of the interviewees will be identified by 2 different groups. First group is the research participants selected by using the snowball sampling. The research participants will be recruited by voluntarily participation. There will be 5 participants from each province (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat) total of 15 participants will be participating in this study. The ages of the participants will be among 15-24 years old, which are considering as youth by the definition regarding the United Nations.

Finding and Discussion

In Thailand, the legal provisions development towards the effective and conclusive protection of the LGBT rights have been on and off throughout the time. One of the important legal provisions which affect the LGBT rights in the country is the Gender Equality Act B.E. 2558 (2015), but there are several problems in terms of contexts and the implementation of this law. One of the articles in this act also create a problem to implement the protections and rights

under this act effectively, in part of article 3 it stated that ‘... unless in the case of academic, religious, or public interest reasons. In the Deep South of Thailand, this Gender Equality Act is facing a lot of obstacles, as the strong families and communities’ institutions are playing the crucial roles from the political issues of Thai State from the border insurgency. The implementation of this law is not able to penetrate to these communities where the religious factor is the huge principle on their daily life. If there are still going to use the exception of religious case in the legal provisions, any law regarding the protection of LGBT rights in Thailand will not reach any possibilities to be achieved and be implemented in the Deep South.

The important of the legal provisions in the Gender Equality Act of Thailand is the justice provided by the law, including the procedure of the complaints, protection mechanisms and the legal contexts itself should be able to measure, monitor, and reliable. The complaints apart from the individual, which the civil society organizations in Thailand are trying to create the movement towards the achievement justice of LGBT rights to all individuals, are being ignored by the authority group of this act. And this issue also reflects on the performance of this law and the support of the state level on the movement of the civil society organizations towards the LGBT rights in all level. The law itself is made to protect the conservative structure of various issues, such as the traditional gender perspectives, gender binary, the hierarchy in several social and state institutions. As well as the law also reflects on the state, which only perceive and look towards the citizen as the person who begging for the justice and they have to ‘aid’ them per request, rather than ‘provide’ them the full rights and justice generally and equally.

The legal protection in terms of development and problems on initiate and implement to the LGBT youths at the Deep South is very limited and impractical, as Thai State is mainly focus on the ceremonious legal protection rather than the practical solution on providing accessibility to the rights and protection. It also applied in the same case with the peace building in the Deep South provinces, which state always play the ceremonious protection over the practical issues as the peace issues also affect the implementation of the protection of rights of the LGBT individuals at the Deep South. This ceremonious implementation of the rights protection on the gender equality in the Deep South and in Thailand generally is only to illustrate and proof to the international community and organizations such as the United Nations that Thailand is the civilized and developed country in regards of the human rights protection.

Domestic violence in the family is playing the crucial part on the LGBT youths in the Deep South violation and discrimination. The violence includes the physical and mental abuse towards the LGBT youth individual in family, as well as the discrimination regarding the sexual orientation and gender identity. Working in the communities at the Deep South, a huge majority of the Deep South LGBT youths were experiencing at least any kind of forms regarding the domestic violence in the family. But at this information, it is notable that the LGBT youths who are never experience the domestic violence, the violation and discrimination of human rights from the family institutions mainly come from the middle or upper-middle class. The middle or upper-middle class is reflected by their educational background of the LGBT youths and their parents as well. Another group that the domestic violences, violation and discrimination in the family is rarely or almost never happened in the Deep South are the Thai buddhists families.

Some of the LGBT youths participants were trying to cover the situations at their household. But when it comes to the further discussion and investigation, it was revealed that some of them

were punished, physically and mentally, since they were younger until nowadays. The punishments of their families aim to change or force their children by using fear of the punishment to stop being the homosexual. Some of their parents stop doing the punishment when they are getting older or enter to the college/universities level because it could not change their sexual orientation and gender identity as the family is expected as this idea of the gender diversity is non-exist and unacceptable in their communities.

Another important factor on the family institutions in the Deep South is about their premises and family creation. The family institutions at the Deep South are the expanding family, which means the premises will be expanding to welcome the new family to the same premises when the family members are getting married and join to the family. And with the physical factor at the premises, where the land boundary between the premises or even within the premises, create the act of the sexual abuse by their family members as well, especially not only in the female children but LGBT youths also have to face this violation.

Political issues play significant roles in the situation of the LGBT rights in the Deep South, not only it influenced the insurgency climate in the areas but it also affects the movement and the public participation towards achieving the equal protection of the LGBT rights in general. Thai state, where the Buddhism principles are the core principles of the morality to the law enforcement and to the process of making law, create the tensions and marginalized the Deep South communities, which considered to be the minority of the country to be forced to accept the law which influenced by the principle of Buddhism. With this issue, Thai State is considered to be the 'outsider' and 'stranger' of the Deep South community. Apart from the influenced of the political issues to the general situation of the LGBT rights in the Deep South, it also affects the movement of the LGBT rights itself. Especially the civil society organizations that are working on the gender equality rights, or towards the LGBT rights directly. The political ideology plays the enormous roles on their movement and the procedure to make the rights protection fully achieved in the Deep

South. There are some of the civil society organizations who are working on the LGBT issues that are openly support the current military government, because they need the space and the platform for the LGBT community to express their voices. But with these support from some of the civil society organizations, it has to exchange with the morality and the control from the political power to the LGBT individuals as they need to be a 'good' citizen by the criteria of the conservative authority who is currently ruling and executing their power towards the human rights issues generally in the national policy level.

The 'outsider' perspective is also the big constraint and an important role by the communities towards the Thai state and also towards the activists and movements as well. The movement in the Deep South on the LGBT rights and the protection of violation and discrimination towards the LGBT youths are working together by the civil society organization within the area and outside the area. So, with these differences of the LGBT rights movement individuals, it create the sense of alienation to the people who works towards the movement. As well as the alienation towards the differences of genders to those who are not belong to the social and religious constructed's gender binary which is the crucial

factors of the obstacles to achieve the protection of violation and discrimination in the area. The religious leaders in the communities also play as a crucial actor in the Deep South. As in Islam, the basis principles of the religious itself is not well perceived on the gender equality between men and women and in the LGBT individuals. The pressure of the religious domination, in this case Muslims dominations create the social pressures on the openness of the acceptance of LGBT youths in the community.

The patriarchy society in the Deep South which penetrated deeply in the community also caused a lot of pressures to the LGBT youths in the society. It would say that both men and women who identified themselves as the LGBT individual has to suffer the pressures by the violation and discrimination, but in different forms. Especially for the female LGBT youths, it would be two layers of pressures from the socio-cultural perspectives.

The result from this research would be the foundation for the further attempt to study on the human rights violation and discrimination in the youth population at the Deep South, especially on the LGBT issues. It is very hard to find other study which study on the LGBT youths at the Deep South in the quantitative research to compare and analyze on the consistency of the results. Mainly the study of LGBT issues in Thailand are focus in the capital or only in some particular parts of the country, but it's not inclusive enough to include the minorities which are living in the shadow to be presented in the academic study. The researcher aims to make this research as a pioneer attempt and attract other researchers to investigate and study further in the youth population of the LGBT community especially in the Deep South, where the information of the situation is very limited in terms of the scope of study and the access to the target population. With this expectation for the possible further study of this issue, personally the researcher would be grateful if this research could be able to be the voice to deliver the message of the human rights violation and discrimination in the sensitive area on the sensitive issues to the public. And to create awareness and understanding among people without the borders and obstacles within the diversity of population in the country.

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PERSPECTIVES OF ARAKANESE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AIDS

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Abstract

International non-governmental humanitarian (INGO) agencies working in protracted social conflict need to see both fulfilling immediate needs and long-term conflict transformation. Rohingya Muslim from Rakhine state have been suffering from exclusion and human rights violations for decades. Due to intercommunal conflict in 2012, almost 90000 Muslim are living in temporary camps as Internally Displaced Person (IDP) near Sittwe. Since then 73 INGOs based in Sittwe are providing humanitarian assistance to IDP camps. There has been tension between local Arakanese from Sittwe and INGOs. In the time of highest tension, INGO offices are being attacked in 2014. Under recent political development, Arakanese population are felt being excluded by central government. It is also rooted in historical tension between central majority Burman and peripheral minority. Arakanese itself is victim of structural violence. Theoretically, it is dilemma for humanitarian agencies to support Arakanese because of their relatively less needs and less suffered than Rohingya community. According to Do No Harm principle, a conflict sensitive approach, international humanitarian agencies has moral obligation to do no harm. It is needed to avoid divider that make more divide between two communities and to improve connector to increase social cohesion between two communities. In this regard, relationship with local Arakanese community is very crucial for INGOs because they based in Arakanese community and commuting IDPs camps day to day. INGOs have potential to be connector under current context. This research looked at the relationship between INGO and local Arakanese from Sittwe. It is observed that Arakanese community is fragmented in opinion and fragile that vulnerable to be manipulated. After military clearance operation in response to attack of Arakan Salvation Rohingya Army (ASRA) on security post, fragmented community was being over politicized by both internally from government and nationalist groups and externally by intense media attention. Relationship between INGOs and local community are also influenced by political forces. Complexity and ebb and flow of this relationship epitomized the nature of conflict context itself. It is suggested that there should be more engagement with local Arakanese community in term of intensity and diversity of tactics. Strengthening and working with Civil Society Organizations (CSO) that hold more balanced views will be one of key interventions to transform overall conflict situation.

Keywords: *humanitarian aid, conflict transformation.*

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1. Introduction

There are moral hazards that can make things worse when international agencies working in protracted social conflict neglect crucial part – which is comprehension of long-term solution – of conflict while fulfilling immediate needs. According to Lederach's conflict transformation model, agency working in conflict needs three lens – one to look at immediate needs, one to look at deeper relationship pattern and another to envision a conceptual framework to find creative responses and solutions. (Lederach, 2003) To do this, they need to engage three layers of actors – top leadership at national level, mid-level leadership at sub-national or community level and the grassroots level with wider community International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) who have been engaging in the conflict are no longer outsiders but actors of conflict drivers.

Based on traditional humanitarianism, international NGOs have to support persons who are in need the most regardless of race and ethnicity. Given the limited resources, INGOs prioritize the most vulnerable group of people. Human rights-based approach made INGOs more accountable to direct beneficiaries by encouraging participation of victims in the decision-making process that affect their lives. New humanitarianism embraced human rights and politically sensitive agenda. They stand up for “motivated truth” that is speaking out for victims. (Decobert, 2016; Fox, 2001; Redfield, 2006) Humanitarian aids were also used for political reason and proven in the context of Afghans war and being criticized for breaching its own principle of neutrality and non-political. (Abiew, 2012; Atmar, 2001)

As of February 2018, 72 agencies have reported activities in Rakhine State. 54 agencies are UN and INGOs while 3 donor organizations operating in the area. There are variety of humanitarian and development projects across the Rakhine State. Humanitarian projects are concentrated in Sittwe and northern part of Rakhine State where IDP and Muslim community present. Development projects are focused on the whole state and distribute widely. International aids agencies are based in different places in which Sittwe is the place with the highest number of active humanitarian agencies (total 20 agencies) and the highest number of projects (total 20 humanitarian projects)¹³⁷. According to one INGO staff interviewed, humanitarian aids projects are geographically limit with large volume of activities and supply. So, this is more visible than development projects that in nature long-term and geographically spread. INGOs are working to provide basic needs and other essential services to internally displaced persons. Protection sector and WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) sector are the most widespread sectors. Other essential services include health, nutrition, education, food and other non-food items.

According to recent studies of local community's voice, the majority of Sittwe residents hold that the international community – particularly aids agency and news media – does not understand the context of Rakhine and have bias towards the Muslim population. (Commission, 2013; CPCS, 2015; Slim, 2014) There were frequent demonstrations against international organizations and even attacked to INGOs offices in March 2014 at the time of highest tension.

The perception is largely held by political, religious and institutional forces including ANP and nationalist Buddhist monks. (Gray & Roos, 2014) In this

¹³⁷ MIMU: Overview of the 3W RAKHINE State (Feb 2018)

background of political marginalization and misunderstanding on humanitarian work, the relationship between INGOs and local Rakhine community is not improving. It is critical for international community to look beyond those animosities of Rakhine Community in term of origin and development. In this regard, both traditional humanitarianisms practiced by INGOs in Rakhine State and new humanitarianism overlook some part of conflicts.

Adam Burke ascertain that humanitarian assistance as a very different field of international engagement have been interacted with conflict dynamics in Rakhine. Rakhine activists are critical and suspicious about the principle of neutrality of humanitarian aid. International community are also maneuvering to safeguard human rights in Rakhine state. This effort was used to label as international intervention against national sovereignty. International community, mainly humanitarian agencies, had become aware of this dislike and tried to consult with local Arakanese leader. (Burke, 2016) Many experts recommended to consult with local Arakanese community. (Aron, 2016; Aron & Gilmore, 2017; Slim, 2014). Although international agencies are trying to engage with local leaders, it is not sure and lack of evidence to claim success in building relationship that is prime important for conflict dynamic. This research asks beyond that rhetoric of aid agencies by looking at perspectives of Arakanese community from Sittwe. During field research in Sittwe, interviews with diverse groups of people were conducted. It is included local CSO, representatives from political party, influential persons from community, government officials, local INGO staffs and international INGO staffs.

This research examines the perceptions of the Arakanese community – who are not direct beneficiaries but are affected by conflict context – on humanitarian aids in order to understand how that relationship between actors have developed. This paper shows that the perception of local Arakanese is not homogenous with contend forces among themselves. Remarkably, there are radical groups who hold large anti-aids and anti-international sentiments while CSO which have moderate views needing more spaces. CSO in Rakhine is an emerging force that have familiarity with aids system and willing to work with INGOs in many areas. It is showed that relationship between INGO and local CSO have failed. There are internal barriers among INGO themselves. Thus, it will be argued that INGO, an international community, must find reliable strategy to engage with Arakanese to be more conflict sensitive.

To make the case clear, brief background of conflict is described in term of historical roots, complexity and multi-actor involvement. The concept of “conflict sensitivity” is explained by

using definition from Do No Harm literature. The concept is applied throughout the analysis of research. Then, perceptions of Arakanese on humanitarian aids and international community is expressed. Analysis and conclusion end the session.

2. Brief Conflict Analysis

Arakan¹³⁸ was an independent Kingdom before 1784 and then controlled by Burma Empire. It became part of British India after first Anglo-Burmese War in

¹³⁸ Former name of Rakhine, interchanging use two terms

1826. Richness in culture and flourished in the past as independent kingdom, Rakhine had built distinct and strong identity. Although, sharing same religious and many cultural aspects between two ethnics group, Arakanese sees as they were colonized. Structural conflict between Rakhine ethnic and Majority Burma people have been persisting since then. Many Rakhine, today, proudly referred themselves as “Rakkhita People” meaning that “the one who protects his own race”. (Saw, 2016) Being one country with India 60 years earlier than the rest of Burma under British administration, many Indian from East Bengal has privileged to cross border and earn their lives in fertile and prosperous land of Arakan.(Chan,2005) There was significant migration of Muslim from Bengal area to Rakhine.

Presence of Muslim in Rakhine State and linkage to historical events is the most contesting issue. Advisory commission on Rakhine State remarked that situation as “the clash of narratives” in which both Rakhine and Muslims tried to legitimize political claims by using historical past and leading to exclusive and irreconcilable. Rakhine narratives is focusing on demographic threat from migration, socio-cultural exclusion and grievances from structural conflict under Myanmar current political system. Muslim narrative is mainly concentrating on lack of citizenships and equal rights.¹³⁹

There is no proven record of violence before and during colonial time between two communities. It was only in World War II period that conflict started. But, it can be dated back as the most recent history is conflict within World War II and post-independence. During the Japanese invasion into Rakhine state, the first violence broke out. Generally, Rakhine together with other ethnics were pro-independence and fought along Japan. Muslim were largely pro-British who got privilege status under Colonial rule. There was loss of lives from conflict mainly in northern part of Rakhine. ((Chan, 2005; Leider, 2014) In the memory of Rakhine people today, this is still vivid and assumed as main reason of being Rakhine minority townships in Muangdaw and Buthidaung. Post-independence insurgencies of Muslim created further violence in the region until late 1970s.

There were sporadic small violence and clash between communities and not reach to large scale.¹⁴⁰ Starting from series of crime¹⁴¹, conflicts between two communities transformed into widespread violence across Rakhine State in 2012. Due to this intercommunal conflict, more than 100,000 populations were displaced and have been living in IDP camps since then. The worst situation was Sittwe where 5339 houses were burn down and some 75,000 were displaced. According to government reports, 98 people were killed and 123 injured, from both communities.¹⁴² Since then, displacement are encamped and remained status quo. International humanitarian organizations are still supporting essential services.

¹³⁹ See ICG (2016): Myanmar: A new Muslim insurgencies in Rakhine State

¹⁴⁰ See also Commission (2013) page

¹⁴¹ First crime was a raped and murder case of a Rakhine women by Muslim groups and then followed by mob killing of 10 Muslim “Tabligh” of Islamic proselytization group

¹⁴² see also Commission (2013)

Table 1. Conflict Timeline after 2012

Timeline	Event	Impact
June 2012	Intercommunal conflict in 2 townships triggered by a rape case	98 deaths, 5339 HH lost, some 75,000 displaced In response to humanitarian needs, many aids agencies initiated emergency operation
Oct 2012	Second round of intercommunal conflict spread out into 7 townships in Rakhine	94 deaths, 3276 HH lost, some 32,000 displaced
March 2013	Intercommunal conflict in Meihtikla, a central town, and later spread into other parts of country,	Tension increased between Buddhist and Muslim Community
March 2014	Attack on UN/INGO premises in Sittwe	Damaged more than 32 offices and lost property, no reported injured or death case
Nov 2015	General election	NLD won majority in Myanmar, ANP won majority in Rakhine State (change of political landscape)
Sept 2016	Established Rakhine Advisory Commission (Known as Kofi Annan's Commission) to analyze situation and recommendation for durable solution	Drew strong refusal and criticism from Arakanese community and nationalist
Oct 2016	Attacked on security posts by ARSA terrorist	Resulted in military campaign and displacement of some 20,000 people. Operation of some aids agencies was restricted by military.
23rd Aug 2017	Release final report of KA commission	International community welcome the comprehensiveness of report. UN/INGO are also committed to implement recommendations
24th Aug 2017	Second attacked on security posts by ARSA with more intensification	Tatmadaw started Clearance operation and drove out more than 600,000 Muslim into Bangladesh and Hindus and Rakhine abandoned their houses.

2.1 Stakeholders involved

There are many stakeholders involved in the context of Rakhine conflict. Conflict in Myanmar can be characterized by complex and complicated struggles between different groups. There has been contest between civil and military for democratic

changes in main stream politics. Central State mainly authoritarian regime under military control fought against ethnic groups who claim for share of resource, identity and federalist state over 5 decades. Central-peripheral tension between Burma majority and minority groups are also visible. It is applicable to Rakhine ethnic groups who have been against both to central government that controlled by Burma majority and military. At the same time, there is conflict between sub-groups within ethnic minorities.

Due to 2008 constitution, State and Region governments were formed and shared some executive and legislative power. Arakan national party (Rakhine National Development Party – RNDP at that time) gained more space in sub-national level politics. For Muslim community, they got right to vote in 2010 election but disenfranchised in following 2015 election. After landslide won in 2015 election, major political dispute between NLD, the majority winner nationwide and ANP, the majority winter in Rakhine over power sharing in State executive role. ANP became the leading opposition. Since then, ANP is very critical to any of NLD’s government effort to improve the situation of Rakhine State.




Figure 1: Key actors in Rakhine Crisis (Source: Stokke, Vakulchuk & Øverland, 2018)

Figure 2 illustrates the key actors involving in Rakhine State crisis. Due to nature of conflict, international attention is enormously higher than any other conflict in Myanmar. At international level, human rights groups are active and campaigning along the United Nation Platform. Geopolitics and interest of Western Countries and China is discernable. Neighboring Bangladesh with support of Muslim bloc is long standing contested for migration issues with Myanmar. At national level, military play big role as they have constitutional power to control all security and administration related ministries. Civilian government is their first term in office and national reconciliation including with military is at the top of their priority. Rising nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiment that strongly links Rakhine and other Buddhist groups in Myanmar also fueled the conflict. At local level, Muslim who have been living in the IDPs

camps since 2012 are largely sympathized by international community and receiving humanitarian aids and advocacy works. In this regard, INGOs who providing humanitarian aids to IDPs Muslim have normally strong relationship with Muslim. At political perspective, ANP represent majority of Rakhine and branded as “nationalist” groups. Emerging Arakan Army that mobilizing local Arakan youth through different platform is still unclear. The latest Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), who attacked security post twice, is the most contested actor. Myanmar government announced them as terrorist group. Their action, movement and purposes are controversial.

3. Conflict Sensitivity not to do harm

Given the situation of complexity and multiples actor involved, any external agency working in Rakhine conflict must be aware of constantly changing nature of situation and maneuver their action. Do No Harm is generally known as peacebuilding and conflict sensitive tool for foreign aid particularity provisioning at conflict situation. Conflict Sensitivity (CS) take the position of overarching concept for aid agencies to be balanced their intervention according to conflict context. Conflict Sensitive is defined as “the capacity of an organisation to:

- Understand the (conflict) context in which it operates
- Understand the interaction between its operations and the (conflict) context; and
- Act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the (conflict) context¹⁴³

According to conflict analysis, aids agencies have good relationship with IDP population who receiving direct support but not with local Arakanese. At the end of the day, it is Muslim and Rakhine community will have to live together. Excluding Arakanese grievance can be said that not having conflict sensitive. Impact of aids on local community is well founded in literatures. Diversion of aids, feeding into conflict and strengthening dividing factors are also need to avoid. Humanitarian aids are mostly not weakening the tension and not supportive peacebuilding. (Browne, 2007; Zürcher, 2017)

4. Perspectives of Arakanese on Humanitarian aids

The perspectives of Arakanese community are characterized by diverse and fragmented. As said in previous session, international community including INGOs in Sittwe hold the view that Rakhine are not understand the nature of humanitarian aids and jealous factor play a big part in anti-humanitarian sentiment.¹⁴⁴ Actually, it is just partially true. Generally, it can be divided to two groups of people – radical and moderate in Rakhine community. Radical are those who have strong nationalist mindset and generally opposed any international organization or any external intervention. In my interview, Arakan National Party and town elders hold such perspectives. Moderate are those who holds fair view on humanitarian aids, try to understand the opposite groups, and, the most importantly, willing to engage with international organizations. CSO are

¹⁴³ Resource pack, www.ConflictSensitivity.org

¹⁴⁴ See Slim (2014)

working for variety of mandate. In research interviews, it is included CSO working formally working as “structured organization”. Some CSO received small grant from INGOs and donors. I’ll try to differentiate perspectives of two groups in this session.

4.1. Perspectives on ways of working of INGOs

Radical group hold the view that aids have been supporting Muslim community since long time ago. They referred back to the entry of UNHCR and other INGOs particularly Medicine Sans Frontiere Holland to northern part of Rakhine State in response to repatriation process in 1990s. Since UN agencies and international aids agencies working in Rakhine State, their mandate was to support repatriation process and protection of stateless people rather than development of whole region. These people also cleverly pointed out that Arakanese villages from northern Rakhine are not benefited from support of international aids. Although Arakanese villages are small number in northern part of Rakhine State, Arakanese from other part were quite aware of the situation. Since Myanmar government’s action to initiate national verification process in 1991 was highly politicized and securitized, many Arakanese supported the government’s action. International agencies who intervened and criticized government actions on handling of Muslim community became natural opposition to Rakhine community. In this groups of people, seeing and branding international organization as “interferers in internal affair and national security” is prevalence. This perception is still strong and visible in anti-aid sentiment after conflict in 2012. This point of view is amplified by government actions. Myanmar government accused World Food Program and other INGOs supporting terrorist, ARSA groups based on seizing of WFP’s supply in militant’s training camps. There are similar examples used by radical groups to incite wrongdoing of international aids agencies.

At the other hand, CSO and moderate groups have different opinion in some parts and share some opinions. As they are regularly engaged with INGO and many international visitors, their understanding on aids system is remarkably high. Unequivocal voice among CSO is that aids agencies in Sittwe are not conflict sensitive. International aids agencies are narrowly focused to provide humanitarian aids. Nature of humanitarian aids is targeting the most vulnerable and targeted community according to prioritized needs. Muslim have been living in IDPs camps and their needs are fulfilled only by humanitarian support. Disproportionate in basic needs, aids are naturally flowed large volume to Muslim camps. To balance this, CSO demand that INGO should do more development projects to address different needs of Arakanese who are living in impoverished condition.¹⁴⁵ Generally, most of INGOs in Sittwe are weak in local knowledge

about culture, languages and social lives. CSO felt that international agencies are failed to acknowledge long-standing grievances of Arakanese. Largely overshadowed by past experiences that similar to radical view mentioned above, most of the CSO have critical view on actual intention of INGOs working in Rakhine. They expressed about “untold political agenda” of aids agencies even though many of those organizations have “non-political mandate” as part of humanitarian principles. In this regard, they shared the same perceptive with

¹⁴⁵ According to World Bank, Rakhine State is the poorest state (78% poverty rate compared to 37.5% national average) and hosted 14.9% of Myanmar’s poor. (World-Bank, 2014).

radical groups that international organizations are interfering in internal affair. Denouncing about human rights violations, demanding Myanmar government for accountability by international community are largely seem as involving in internal political issues. It is assumed as INGO are breaching their own mandate. This opinion is intensified by the fact that lack of transparency in funding. Many CSO recount their experiences about how INGO staffs are not aware of funding sources and not able to explain to community. This issue is linked with weakness of INGOs to invest in capacity of their internal staffs and failed to communicate beforehand with their own staffs.

Local staffs from INGOs support the views of CSO about weak in conflict sensitivity of programming, humanitarian minded aids and failed to recognize needs and suffering of Arakanese. In addition to that, INGOs staffs assert that aids agencies have sound awareness of conflict situation. This is one of the reasons, in the past, that why they are working very closely with government to get necessity protection. Agencies gave the blanket reason to the Arakanese that they are working under Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Myanmar government. Aids community also aware of the increasing sentiment against aids among Arakanese community and so they are initiating engagement with CSO from local community. This trend is becoming prevalence among INGOs as a part of conflict sensitive and transformative ways. Radical groups are seemingly not aware of those improvement and steps of aids agencies to get more acceptance of Arakanese community. Relationship between Arakanese CSOs from Sittwe and INGOs is epitomized the complexity of relationship between local community and international aids agencies.

4.2 Relationship between CSOs and INGOs.

One international staff acclaimed that there is lack of coordination and lack of trust between INGOs and CSO in Rakhine. CSO has local knowledge and at good position to understand needs of the community. As CSO are active citizens with higher understanding and capacity than general population, they can mobilize community for better reasons. There are three basic types of CSO in Myanmar - community based organization, local NGO and international NGO. Community based organization involved religious-based and social services providers such as funerals to women groups in a community. Normally, they do not have paid staffs and regulars members.¹⁴⁶ In Sittwe, these groups are mainly working for issue based and covering almost all political and popular issues. Town elder is also self-appointed community-based groups of people who tried to increase their voice. They organized network of “Sittwe Civil Society Representative Committee” and claimed including more than 70s CSO. It is not clear that how they organized representative committee. At the same time, CSOs working with formal structure, office, paid staffs and clearer purposes are existed. This groups also have informally organized networks and meetings to exchanges knowledge and information. Around 20 CSO are regularly joined this network meeting. According one CSO leader, there is only around 7 CSO who are really active and working with long term activities. This is the group proximately working with international community.

¹⁴⁶ ee ADB: Civil Society Brief Myanmar
http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Ref_Doc_Brief_on_CS0_and_NGOs_ADB_Feb2015_0.pdf

It is always good idea for INGO to engage with community through CSO. From CSO sides, it is a different story. There are two channels of communication between CSOs in Sittwe and INGOs. First one is through government body, then-ECC (Emergency Coordination Centre) before 2015. Two representatives from Arakanese CSO are present in coordination meeting between State Government and UN/INGOs. They had opportunity and space to voice their concerns and perspectives through this mechanism. After 2015, new government changed name of ECC to CC (Coordination Committee) and dropped the representative. Secretary of CC said that they still inviting representatives whenever necessary. The selection of those representatives is unclear. There was no voting from CSO and some reject to support. Unsurprisingly, two prominent radicals are selected as representative of Arakanese community and gave a vast space. Another channel is through direct engagement with INGOs. Under this channel, some INGO tried to reach individually to CSO based on their thematic areas and working relationship. There was an initiative to organize regular coordination meeting between INGOs and CSOs in Sittwe.

From all those engagements, CSO who have direct engagement with international aids agencies have complaints about their experiences. First of all, INGOs usually dominated the discussion in coordination meeting. One of CSO leader who is working in social cohesion and professional development of local youth said

“There is no meaningful communication other than INGO’s effort to put CSO under their control and to work for their mandate.”

This expression is echoed in many interviews with CSO from Rakhine. From CSO perspectives, INGO influenced the discussion in the regular meeting. The regular coordination meeting was meant to build collaboration in emergency preparedness and response. International aids agencies have capacity and technical skills while most of CSO are community based and advantages in field operation. This weakness in capacity is entry for INGO to strengthen capacity of CSO to work systematically. Each international aid agency has specific mandate and approach. There is no common understanding among INGOs on how to deal with CSO. While INGOs are trying to influence the agenda to be in-line with organization mandate, CSO saw as disadvantaged and not being treated as equal partner. As INGOs are mostly working for humanitarian mandate providing aids to Muslim community, it makes more difficult to directly and openly deal with CSO. This unproductive relationship was worsening by differences between local CSO and international staffs who have weak in cultural sensitivity and understanding of dynamic and diversity among CSO itself.

CSO also insisted that they are manipulated for benefits of international aids agencies. In many occasions CSO were invited to meet with INGOs, international donor and get inputs from them. There is little or no practice of sharing information back to consulted CSO what was the outcome and how it was used from donors or international aids agencies. CSO realized themselves as tool of proposal development of international aids agencies. This is one of the reasons that increase lack of trust to INGOs. As one member of CSO said

“We are not sure whether it is project for community or community for project. They come and see us to know how to overcome our criticism rather to work together”.

At another side of the coin, both international and national INGO staffs mentioned the challenges to work with CSO from Rakhine. Two main groups of CSO in Rakhine is

exclusionary and different, sometime opposite, in perspectives and mindset. Sometime, CSOs which engaging with international agencies have expectation to get financial and other supports. When international agencies are not communicating clearly and openly, CSO get the wrong messages. When those expectations are unfulfilled, CSO frustrated. At the same time, INGO have no clear picture of CSO and its nature in local level. That makes them demotivated and confused. INGO don't know which CSO they should approach. CSO development in Myanmar is recent phenomenon and capacity is rudimentary. CSO in Sittwe are weak in skills on proposal writing, applications, and competition. They are also lack in clear mandate. Although they are working for Arakanese community in general, they don't have well-defined focus mandate area. Being influences by contextual experiences and community pressure, some CSO have nationalist and other political agenda that is not fully in-line with INGOs. In this regards, international community tried to fill the gap. They tried to strengthen the capacity of CSO. Again, it creates another challenge that is which CSO should involve. There are many things to do to get full understanding of CSO and build good relationships between them. One member of agency that providing small grant to CSO in Rakhine State admitted

“It is nascent relationship. We are navigating on how to work with them and we still don't have clear picture on what will be the possible means of communication and what could yield.”

4.3. Impact on INGO on local lives

Apart from perception above, interviewees mentioned some physical impacts of residing many aids agency offices in a small town. Local market is heavily impacted. Aids agencies and international staffs hire good quality houses in as resource limited town and created the rocket high prices of housing. There is also increased in prices of basic commodity. This burden is impacting on local who used to survive with manual and low skilled labour. At the other hands, local business related to material supply to IDP camps are benefitted. Job opportunity for youth and some educated peoples is opened. Some CSO expressed that they are also benefitted somehow. They got chance to communicate with international staffs and organization, got opportunity to learn from them and developed.

4.4 Government Policy

Above all, government policy is shaping the perception of Arakanese communities much. Government policy is pushing INGO to be equal support, which mean 50:50 ratio of support to two communities.¹⁴⁷ Due to nature of humanitarian aid and limited funding, it is big constraint for aid agencies. This message of equal support is largely spread across the Arakanese community mainly through the radical groups who had spaces in ECC in previous government. At the same time, CSO raised their concern about restriction from government. Many CSO from Rakhine are not registered officially. They are under pressure from government to register. Registration takes risks for CSO in term of operation restriction and

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Secretary of Coordination Committee

financial burden. Government treats CSO very selectively based on registration and voices they made. It is impacting on relationship with INGO as well.

INGOs also have similar restraint from government policy that is scrutinizing every single activity of INGOs. One of INGO staffs expressed that *“we are feeling like we are watch list criminal. If we make some mistakes, we are done.”* Similar expression is noted from both CSO and INGOs. Government is not willing to change this situation. Although CSO are moving slowly toward social cohesion activities at community level, it is very difficult to get government official permission. CSO have to take their own risks without getting official approval. There are also participatory issues in government policy on Rakhine State. ANP have been criticized over time on inability of government to listen Arakanese.¹⁴⁸ Political disputes since 2015 election make Rakhine State Government weak in legitimacy with limited public support. This is challenging government to engage with local community effectively.

5. Conclusion

This paper has sought for further understanding of the perception of Arakanese community on humanitarian aids. Generally, it is assumed as Arakanese are against the international organization and viewed as biased to Muslim because a jealousy factor that plays a role. Actually, the perceptions of Arakanese are not homogenously radicalized. It cannot be denied the presence of radical groups who capitalized the general public who have the low education, low media literacy and lack of understanding on INGOs. Political conflict between NLD government and ANP at the sub-national level is also impacting on the perception of Arakanese. Arakanese dislikes existing government and blamed them for not controlling INGOs activities.

There are emerging forces among Arakan community. CSO, as an emerging force, have wider understanding the conflict context and role of INGOs. Although their influential power on the community is unclear, there is potential to engage community through CSO. INGO engagement with CSO has failed in the past. It is largely to unequal relationships between INGO who have more capacity compare to CSO. COS feeling that they are used by INGO for their project rather than meaningful coordination. At the same time, CSO have many challenges to operate due to government restrictions. INGOs also have similar restraint from government policy that is not proactive and more direct to keep status quo. Having restricted space for moderate forces could hardened the perceptions. All actors believe that INGO can play supportive role to transform conflict situation but government who is the most responsible. Nonetheless, all those situations demanding better strategy from aid agencies to engage with local Arakanese community to decrease tension and conflict sensitive.

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ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SCIENTISTS IN YUNNAN, CHINA

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Abstract

Background: *The rigid investment for research and development (R&D) stems in the commercialization of the academic research community in China. Material profit drives researchers to pay more attention to funds arising and misappropriation of use rather than the quality of research conduct and outcome evaluation. Chinese following action for anti-corruption targets the scientific research fund fraud and misuse. Meanwhile, stricter fund management system is urged to ensure an accountable, transparent and democratic R&D community.*

To echo such central-driven campaign, in 2016, Yunnan R & D funding subsidy implementation protocol was launched to shift the fund instalment mechanism from "pre-development subsidy" to "post-investment subsidy". This regulation deems to strengthen the multi-sectoral governmental intervenes instead of institutional initiatives for configuration efficiency.

Method: *This paper argues that anti-corruption actions direct specific ripple effect to barriers progress of scientific advancement and scientist's rights in the way. Based on the semi-structured interview with 21 interviewees working for universities, research institutes and private enterprises in Yunnan Province of China, the author traces how such existing funding mechanism's impact to scientist's daily work and research engagement. Furthermore, interviewees reflected local scientist's endeavour to balance the regulations and practice.*

Finding: *Study finds that project leads have the less reasonable flexibility of fund use. They have no chance to adjust budget during project's progress. Moreover, they have to invest too much energy and time in following complicated and headache reimbursement procedure and regulation to concentrate their work on scientific research and exploration.*

Conclusion: *Waste, ineffectiveness and corruption constrain China's policies of improving the firms' technological capacities. However, from the lens of human rights, the author believes that the present dilemma happens when anti-corruption campaign works for a collective interest but fails to give space for individuals under Article 27 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Researchers suffer from lack of local context-based mandatory system without proper flexibility, which forces them to pay much more attention to meeting administrative procedure rather than research activities.*

Keywords: *Scientist's Rights, UDHR, Anti-corruption Campaign, Yunnan.*

¹⁴⁹ A Chinese M.A student of Institute of Human Rights and Peace Study, Mahidol University. Her presentation is about anti-corruption campaign in China and how it impacts the community of scientific researchers in Yunnan, a southwest province of China.

Chinese anti-corruption campaign has raised an International concern and widespread impacted domestic social dimension since 2013. The rampant corruption tackled the misconduct and allegations of bribery, embezzlement or other corruption while governmental scientific research fund fraud and misuse. Given most of the research grants are under-supervised by the university (governmental), amount of illegal practices and criminal behaviours were investigated across the country including Yunnan province.

Background

The most significant misuse case was Chen Yingxu, executive vice president of School of Environmental and Resource Sciences, Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. He forged receipts, invoices and contracts to divert funds from government research grants for his account. The case sums amounting to up to 9.5 million CNY. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. In general, the higher professional title and grant in charge provides the more probability of misconduct due to the greater credibility of research capacity, social connection and space of power abuse. However, even for the province in more disadvantage like Yunnan, the issues of misuse and cheating is severe. On July 3, 2014, Zheng Chaodang, the former Communist Party Secretary of the Yunnan Nationalities University was accused of corruption, intervening civil construction project bidding and bribery summing up around 7.5 million CNY. Zhen got life imprisonment and confiscation of all personal property. According to report released by the Yunnan Provincial Committee in 2016, detector found 273 problems relating to financial management, 69 clues on law and discipline violated by programme leads and cadres (within which 38 are provincial accredited professor and cadres) at 22 national universities and colleges in Yunnan.

Impact R&D Cost-Efficiency

Moreover, fund misuse mostly impacts cost-efficiency approaches adopted by researchers, and eventually, the result and outcome of the activities cannot be well secured. Fund misuse is part of factor barrier the R&D cost-efficiency of China as believed. Zhang Anming et al. (2003) examined a sample of 8341 Chinese industrial firms in the cross-sectional. The R&D productive efficiency among state-owned sector is lower than the non-state sectors. Meanwhile, foreign firms have a higher production efficiency than domestic collective-owned enterprises to achieve the rapid growth of intellectual sovereignty.

According to Fu, Xiaolan, and Akter, S., (2016), the UN established governing council member of the Technology Bank for the least developed countries, the management of R&D grants at different levels still drag off the cost-efficiency. A regulatory mechanism is recommended to ensure the investment incentivised and various types of R&D are proportional to be supported.

So, the anti-corruption campaign strengthens to reshape a more competitive research fund system wracked with corruption and the misuse of funds. Take the example of the Yunnan Provincial Department of Education on the Further Implementation of the National Scientific Research Fund Management Policy and Strengthen the Management of Scientific Research Fund Notice (2014). The notice urges colleges and universities to take strict check and review of all research project contracts, protocol, and approved budget. A comprehensive and complicated financial & reimbursement procedure went along with university and

institutional operation protocol. Adjust of expenditure different from the submitted budget is not allowed typically. Any labour expenses should be a bank transaction in line with tax law.

Thus, it is worthy to discuss the differences between the misuse of the fund and reasonable flexibility of fund use. The anti-corruption campaign uniformed the financial management and applied to all type of researches which project leads and researches are forbidden to adjust any budget use even based on existing scenarios. Researchers have to invest more energy and time into following complicated and headache reimbursement procedure and regulation rather than concentrate their research agenda, especially in Yunnan.

For instance, “official documents” undermines the motivation of anti-corruption campaign. The social science researches always convene at rural areas of Yunnan where official cards and printed invoice (issued by village home) are not available. To meet financial regulation, “forced misuse” takes place with some alternative methods (transfer money to project interns and allocate to a villager) or paying some extra money to a hotel (invoice purchasing). Above are the general performance of researchers to release more money back. Hence, interviewees believe the requirement of ‘official documentation’ fails to trace the money flue but barriers on activities organising, cost- effectiveness and even more ‘forced misuse’ for Yunnan’s scenario.

Low Wage Based Campaign Endeavor

“Project System” was stipulated by China's National Science and Technology Plan in 1999, and the implementation prosperities rapid growth of S&T investment. Project lead is fully engaging into process since fund applying to implementation. Units counts on researchers to introduce more fund to enhance capacity and dignity at public. Thus, Person in Charge responsibility system gives project leads more flexibility to determine the usage. In general, the project lead could approve the purchase of equipment, travel, hotel accommodation, meeting attendance, publication in accordance with budget line, even though there is non-formal invoice certifying the real expenditure. And in terms of ‘labor cost’, no bill offset is an unspoken rule defaulted by financial administrative.

Lack of inter-sectary project monitoring make repeated allocation and coordination in and between vertical and horizontal project. Except overwhelming central governmental fund e.g NSFC, NSSFC, the Ministry of Education, Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information, provincial and municipal governments and their constituent departments, foreign funds issue numbers of research projects. However, no unified project database leverages the difficulty to check subject and mandate of projects; applicants/researchers are much easier to get ‘makeover’ programming through multi-resources approaching.

The profit-driven culture pushes applicants pay rare attention on quality of research conduct and outcome evaluation. In order to secure the funds, applicants have to invest on social connection, figure out the cumbersome procedures to mitigate any reasonable or unreasonable restrictions and regulation of fund usage. Any application for fund must process peer-reviewed for both university-initiate projects and governmental fund projects. So, in general, good social connection with experts makes applicants easier to win the bid.

At the government end, it is important to bribe reviewer (materials, names, or others). Allegedly, a bid applied research project casted project funds around CNY 300,000, of which nearly CNY 150,000 was used for bribing a variety of reviewers and decision makers. A certain portion of commission will pay in advance, and then after obtaining fund the rest will be sent out. But because the operation of the project must comply with budget, saying the budget is 300,000, false accounting is quite common by then.

Anti-corruption campaign tackles the management system with the goal of 'Foster a culture of inclusion through change management efforts resulting in change leadership and accountability'. The personnel cost and project leads are strictly forbidden to be material awarded based on engagement into research activities and any accomplishment eventually. Legally, project leads and members working at project units only claim more moral and honor benefit from the projects implementation and achieving rather than materials. Then, without material motivation, Yunnan researchers with lower wages have been discouraged on their scientific work.

Thus, project leads and members take a lot of effort to release budget in subtle way. However, the solution actually goes against the original intention of such financial policy design. This underground practice imposes fund use out of monitored by project units and donors; the prolonged behavior will greatly damage reputation and accountability of community.

An interviewee from Kunming Medical University tried to compare the differences between U.S and Yunnan, saying "The mechanism works for the United States is because the scientific researchers have fair wage to value their wisdom. Good social security makes no big difference between people earning 90,000 or 200,000 USD. Profession brings great social security and bonus for better condition of livelihood. But China, especially Yunnan, is quite different. A professor earns CNY 5,000 a month, which is too low for a good quality of living. Therefore, teachers commonly have strong

willingness to the project for enriching the economy. Due to the policy limitation applicants and university employee members who input their intelligence are not allowed to get materials interest back, which is unconscionable. We must admit that this policy tries to build up a good system for anti-misuse, but in the way, may not be suitable for poorer economic condition in Yunnan."

The low wage of Chinese researchers makes public believe that they are inevitable to misuse the research grant as a special bonus. However, this assumption that "everyone is greedy" as the basin of system building shames on people's dignity and freedom that goes against human rights norm.

Article 27(1) of UDHR articulates of that "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits". The mandate of a financial system should be to serve scientific researches with accountable and reliable back-up rather than force researchers to meet administrative procedure such as filling forms, attach invoice, photos taking accordingly. Researchers feel no ownership but comprise their energy and time to work on unnecessary work, and then lose enthusiasm for scientific researches and innovation.

Conclusion

Anti-corruption Campaign is good to pave better fund management system for accountability and transparency. However, the stricter and much-unappropriated regulations to Yunnan's situation lead the underground to force misuse and cheating. Through the lens of human rights, the present dilemma happens when anti-corruption campaign works for a collective interest but fails to give space for individuals. Researchers suffer from lack of local context-based mandatory system without proper flexibility, which forces them to pay much more attention to administrative procedure rather than research activities.

The misappropriation entirely goes against the value of scientific research and people to enjoy the advanced research outcomes and progress, for which anti-corruption activism is enforced intensively across the country and research institutes. Fund misuse

has violated both the misuser and researchers' rights to science. Even though it seems misusers may obtain a bunch of vested interests, the ripper effect impacts every member of research community negatively for a long term.

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THE LAND QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DEBUNKING MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT LAND REFORM

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Abstract

Since the advent of democracy, South Africa has embarked on programs to dismantle past injustices and the legacy of colonial rule. The most contested of these programs has been the land redistribution plan enacted by the government assuming power in 1994 to amend racial inequality evident in land ownership affording land rights to previously disadvantaged people (Lahiff, 2007, p. 2). Political discourse surrounding land reform has been riddled with misconceptions about the objectives, process of expropriation, and the beneficiaries of the redistribution (Cousins, 2016, p. 12). In addition, the widespread use of historical narratives of land dispossession and the oppression of indigenous people has carried a powerful political charge used by politicians and opposition parties to mobilize support. This paper will look at the upsurge of revolutionary populism in Southern Africa in addition to the dominance of populist rhetoric in political discourse. I argue that the politicization of land reform with the current emphasis on the sovereignty of certain peoples fails to capture the actual objectives for land reform, resulting in divergent expectations between the state and the people. Rash policy changes and the rapid dispossession of land from the minority currently responsible for agricultural output could threaten food security and the economy. Land redistribution is necessary but should be conducted in an objective and equitable manner. This paper also argues that land reform policies, particularly the land redistribution plan in South Africa, although initially established to provide access to land and ownership rights to the rural poor and economically disadvantaged, its market and output based approach to land reform is the reason for stalled implementation.

Keywords: *Land Reform, Access to Land, Land Redistribution, Politics, Populism*

Literature Review

The South African government's initial purpose for land reform was the development of programs to change racial disparities in land ownership and assist formerly excluded people in acquiring land ownership and rights but progress has been exceedingly slow. This has given rise to a harmful form of populism (Cousins 2016, pg. 2) where political rhetoric is centered on race often leading to the radicalized use of land reform for retribution rather than redressing structural imbalances (Jankielsohn & Duvenhage 2018, pg. 3). Hall et al (2011) details how land's nature as a commodity its value is derived from access, which leads to profits. Exclusion is consequently central to land access. Various mechanisms such regulation, force, legitimation and the market are employed to justify exclusions.

In their study on land redistribution in South Africa Kepe & Hall (2018) indicated that the post-apartheid land reform has not been central to the objectives of the state. The authors attributed the failure of land reform on the commodification of land, and focusing mainly its productive capabilities. South Africa's freedom at the end of apartheid was therefore a façade in what they term the "colonial present". Decolonization efforts should be the process of dismembering the economic and political structures of colonialism and facilitating access to land through land reform (Kepe & Hall 2018, pg. 128-132).

The crises faced by South Africa's land reform can also be attributed to the alteration of objectives by the state. Initially land access and securing land rights was central to the priorities of land reform. Intentions, however, have shifted from affording beneficiaries' ownership, to lease holding where the state is the land owner and overseer of land usage. The targeted beneficiaries have also shifted to strategic business partners and agribusiness (Hall & Kepe 2017, pg. 1, 7). Moyo (2004, pg. 4) however interprets the current prominence of neoliberal analyses of the land question as the source of confusion. The state's current focus on production and land rights rather than social justice is fundamental to stalled progress in reform.

States that are facing challenges such as decreasing voter confidence, stagnant economic growth, and powerful opposition parties are more likely to seek ways to divert anger by endorsing short-term policies in favor of the majority. Sikor & Lund (2009) detail the process of legitimation as a two-way relationship between the state and society in relation to land. Land as property is therefore a state seeks to be legitimized by society and when society seeks legitimation. During colonialism for example settler farmers were able to rely on the state, police and the laws to protect their claims to land. Changes in polities are therefore characteristic of society's continual quest for the legitimation of its claims, thereby recognizing the authority of the state.

Most of the literature on the racialization of land reform have focused mainly on Zimbabwe which underwent similar radicalized policy changes in 2000, dispossessing land from white farmers and plunging the country into economic turmoil. In his paper on the racialization of land reform Mlambo (2010) described the use of race by colonial powers to dispossess indigenous people from their land, using narratives that the land is "stolen" and needs to be "taken back".

Theoretical Framework

The theories and concepts that will inform this research paper are firstly Land by Derek Hall, who details the complex multidimensional relationship that the state and people have with land. In his book on Hall (2013) details the strong connections evident in land sovereignty where individuals attach meaning, identity and connection to land. Individuals have a complex relationship with land characterized by encompassing views, identity and connection.

The state on the other hand views land as territory, property and an asset for acquisition, control and power. This explains the divergent views of the south African government and its market-based approach to land, its continuous hunger for land acquisition and the shift of beneficiaries from the rural poor to empowering middle to upper class farmers.

In terms of acquiring “within-state” frontiers, these are not limited to the periphery only but can also be shifting interest groups, where the state’s focus changes from one group to another. This is detailed in Hall et al (2011) power of exclusion which details the exclusionary nature of land as resource. In order for certain groups to reap its benefits access to land has to be restricted. This is especially true in a capitalist economy that is driven by market forces. The state therefore employs certain “powers” such as regulation in the case of South Africa to give access to certain individuals at the expense of others.

Legitimation also plays a major role in access to land, Sikor (2009) details this complex symbiotic relationship between the state and people. People pursue authorities that will legitimize their claims to land, where power and authority are central to access to land. Power is used through mechanisms such as the market to acquire access to land whereas authority is where certain institutions mainly political have the power to afford land and its benefits to certain groups.

The author also states that rights to land do not necessarily guarantee access to benefits, this is apparent in the case of South Africa where former “homelands” which are stated to belong to the people are kept in trust under the authority of tribal chiefs, these chiefs have access to the benefits, through taxing commercial farmers utilizing the land but none of the benefits are given to the people.

a) Significance of the study

This study aims to undertake an inquiry on the politicization and racialization of land reform. A gap was evident regarding the role of the state and a variety of local and international interest groups in land reform policy.

1. Outcomes of the research will create public awareness relating to the influence of political figures on land reform
2. This research will provide objective information about the land redistribution plan which can be used as a tool for future negotiations

b) Methodology

Textual Analysis will be used as a method for this research study, by analyzing discourse records and media publications and public texts as data sources. This will be done through examining political manifestos, journal articles, media stories and newspaper articles (digital).

The study may also incorporate legislative and historical records. An inclusion criterion will be used to narrow down the scope of the research for relevance focusing on a specific time frame, sample population and type of media. In this research study the inclusion criteria will be limited to article topics related specifically to land reform and land reallocation in South Africa. Types of sources are also limited to national written news from 2012 until present. Opinion articles also met inclusion criteria.

Introduction

Nearly two decades after the abolition of the apartheid regime, South Africa still grapples with its legacy. The politically sensitive history of land dispossession and eviction has carried a powerful political charge used widely by political parties to evoke action and mobilize support (Mbetse, 2015). The land question, detailed in Section 25 of the South African Constitution terms agrarian reform as “in the public interest” and provides for both the redress of past injustices and the protection of property rights (Branson 2016, pg. 1). The challenge, however, has been the provision of necessary recompense for past injustice while maintaining property rights, food security and economic growth (Branson 2016 pg. 1).

Following a motion set forward by the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters), the ruling party buckled under pressure to consider the amendment of section 25 of the South African Constitution. In February 2018, parliament passed the motion to review the property section detailed in the constitution of South Africa and determine whether its needs to be amended to permit the state to confiscate land without compensation in order to expedite land redistribution process.

This paper provides insight into the discussion around land reform in South Africa after the country’s transition to democracy in 1994 and its progress to date. The paper begins with an outline of the history of the land reform program, followed by key policy changes and the misguided claims evident in political discourse.

1. The History of Land Dispossession in South Africa

Dispossession of land and displacement of the native persons in Southern Africa began in the colonial era continuing over an extended period of time. Decades of apartheid rule and racial oppression resulted in inequality and widespread rural poverty (Lahiff 2007, pg. 3). These conditions were anticipated to change radically post-1994 with the end of apartheid rule and the beginning of democratic governance. Change however has been radically slow, with increasing frustration from the disadvantaged and poor.

South Africa today still faces the challenge of high inequality. This is evident in unequal land ownership where access to land, standards of living and wealth are strongly linked with race. The transition to democracy after apartheid was negotiated with little or no institutional changes; this meant that wealth and property rights remained relatively unchanged (Jacobs et al, 2003 pg. 1). New democratic government’s primary focus was the provision of resolutions to address injustices through policy, its implementation however has not been without challenges (Cousins, 2016 pg. 3).

2. Overview of Land Reform in South Africa

Agrarian reform is just one of various governmental efforts aimed at assisting the country in reducing inequality and improving the livelihood and living standards of the rural poor (Cousins, 2016 pg. 2). The land reform enacted by the government is divided into three programs: land redistribution (focusing on the giving land to small scale farmers and the poor), land restitution (focused on compensating formerly dispossessed individuals) and tenure reform (focused on protecting property rights) (Cousins, 2016 pg. 2).

Aided by the constitution of South Africa which provided the legal background for implementing the three-part programme. The main purpose of the programs was to achieve objectives of equality, access to land and ownership for both commercial and residential purposes (Lahiff 2007, pg. 2). Although I give a brief background of each program, this paper focuses on Land Redistribution which is the most contested of the land reform programs.

1.1 Land Restitution

The Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act 22 of 1994) enabled the establishment of the land restitution program which aimed to enable compensation for persons and communities dispossessed of land after June 19, 1913 under racially discriminatory laws (Rugege 2004, pg. 4) Beneficiaries of the program (who had been dispossessed and displaced during land grabbing by the apartheid regime during the 1960's to the 1980's) could lodge a claim either for financial compensation or alternative land (Lahiff 2007, pg. 3)

1.2 Land Tenure

Land tenure was created to provide property and land rights to farmworkers, former farmworker and leaseholders. The policy aimed to protect beneficiaries from unlawful evictions and displacement. Beneficiaries of this program were granted certificates that enabled them to occupy state-owned or communal land. The rights to occupy however did not entail ownership and were not formalized (Turner 1999, pg. 3)

1.3 Land Redistribution

Land redistribution was aimed at providing access to land to the poor, small scale rural farmers and former farm workers (Jacobs et al, 2003 pg. 1). The first mechanism of the land redistribution program was Settlement of Land Acquisition Grant, which provided grants for the poor, farm workers or former farm workers (with an income cap of R1.500 per month) for the purpose of land acquisition. Although these grants were meager, recommendations from the government were for multiple beneficiaries to pool funds together to purchase arable land (Rugege 2004, pg. 11.)

Due to dissatisfaction with its efficacy and progress SLAG was replaced with the second mechanism for land redistribution which was the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Program (LRAD). LRAD offered higher grants and was aimed at encouraging commercial agriculture but required a contribution from beneficiaries. Unlike the first program LRAD has no income cap and beneficiaries were not limited to the rural poor or farmworkers. This permitted

groups, families or business people to access grants and facilitated the purchase of shareholding in standing farms (Rugege 2004, pg. 12).

Up until this point the state's role was limited to the provision of grants, paying out compensation and assisting beneficiaries in entering the land market (Lahiff 2007). The policy has however undergone profound changes in a period of 20 years such as the shift from state assisted land purchase to state land purchases that are leased to beneficiaries (Hall & Kepe, 2017, pg. 1). The main mechanism for acquiring the land was referred to as the willing buyer, willing seller approach which was limited to land offered voluntarily and land owners had full discretion about who to sell to and payment for the land. This approach was abandoned in 2005 in favor of new policies such as land purchase ceilings, prohibition of land purchase by foreigners and the introduction of race and gender information on the national deeds registry and the transfer of customary land to traditional communities (Cousins, 2016 pg. 4)

Generally, the land reform program has consistently fallen behind its stated targets. The state attributes this failure to limited funding, and resistance from land owners there has, however, been no evidence that the program's failure is due to unavailability of land. The State's failures to can also be attributed to its neglect of land reform, unclear objectives, beneficiaries and complicated application procedures, poor planning, not effectively targeting potential farmers and negotiation of good prices (Cousins, 2013).

3. The rise of populism

According to Haggard & Webb (1993) the effects of democracy have been the rise of "adjustment" programs where politicians alter policy in favor of certain groups of individuals to the detriment of others, in order to create benefits for certain groups at the loss of others. The success of reform therefore depends on the state's ability to mobilize support and cope with resistance. The spread of fragmented ideology in South Africa emphasizes the sovereignty of the black indigenous population, attacking the "elite" white farmers while excluding other racial groups. The reasonable explanation for this could be the use of resources to maintain power and political support. Popularity is therefore maintained through extravagant attainment and expenditure policies which cannot be sustained over time (Engesser et al, 2017).

The land reform in South African politics is a highly emotive issue; this is due to land ownership being racially unequal. Political parties and new opposition parties will therefore continually use land reform as a tool to mobilize support. The use of sensitive issues in such as land politics threatens the peace and potentially economic stability of the country (Hall & Kepe 2016, pg. 6).

Populism is defined by Inglehart & Norris (2016, pg. 17) as a political ideology grounded on the considerable influence of charismatic leaders and a focus on serving public interests. Based on its devotion to the interests of "the people" over corrupt "elites populist movements tend to promote nationalism and protectionist policies. Populism sets itself in alienation to others and defines "the people" in homogenous terms. The term is exclusionary in nature and seeks to define who belongs and who does not and often leads to division within the nation itself (Engesser et al 2016, pg. 3).

According to Ensegger et al (2016) populism is contextual and is a “thin concept” that allows political leaders to customize it with other ideologies such as nationalism, or African nationalism as in the case of South Africa.

3.1 The EFF

The rise of populism in South African politics can be largely credited to the upsurge and influence of opposition parties such the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters). The EFF is grounded in the culture of resistance and has flourished by initiating issues that the state has failed to address such as accountability, service delivery, land reform and policies that deal with the reduction of poverty and inequality (Essop 2016, pg. 30).

The party’s fame is largely due to its embodiment of radicalism and African nationalism which has earned them widespread media coverage. Embedded in its objectives is the promise of short-term solutions to gain the sympathy of people or voters. (Mbetse 2017, pg. 35, 36 & 37).

Milton Shain (2017) argues that the use of emotive and popular struggle language in populist movements is highly appealing to a society embedded in racial inequality and poverty. Although support for such movements can be rightfully justified, the focus on short-term solutions and policies is often misleading as it characterized by very little or no regard for future implications (Shain 2017, pg. 6)

The EFF fits into the global trend towards populism where political rhetoric has turned towards racial populist nationalism which appeals to the majority of the population. This has had a profound impact on South African politics (Mbetse, 2015). African nationalism or racial nationalism is largely exclusionary in nature and using the past as a tool to fuel racial exclusivism (Shain 2017, pg. 5). The EFF has publicized widespread support of racial-based land redistribution (Jankielsohn & Duvenhage 2018, pg. 18).

4. Popular misconceptions about land reform

After parliament passed the resolution to consider amending the constitution and allow for land expropriation without compensation the decision created mixed reviews, with some parties seeing this as an overdue process of restoration, whilst others anticipate disaster as in the case of Zimbabwe. Contributions to the debate and media have largely misrepresented the facts contributing to the movement of unreliable information regarding the resolution.

The misconceptions in this paper are termed “populist” because of their use in popular political and media rhetoric during campaigns. What is even more disquieting is the use of land reform and generalized statements to mobilize support.

a. People will own the land

The state-focused market-oriented nature of the land redistribution as it presently stands is aimed at the optimization of commercial farming. The liberal approach to land reform has resulted in the state purchasing land on behalf of beneficiaries. The majority of the land acquired after the adoption of LRAD has been purchased and owned by the state, beneficiaries are offered 3-year leases (extendable to 30 years) to establish productive farms, failure to do so has

resulted in evictions. The majority of beneficiaries are also considered as “too risky” to qualify for funding (Keswell & Carter 2014, pg 260).

b. Land redistribution will alleviate poverty

Land and agrarian reform on its own cannot reduce poverty for all the rural poor (Cousins, 2009 pg14.) As a market-based program, LRAD was targeted to beneficiaries most interested in farming but support structures by the state post acquisition are not provided. Therefore, it is already functioning, commercial farmers who benefit more from the program than the rural poor. Legislation and property rights alone cannot transform rural poverty but the practical application of necessary resources, support services could assist in reducing poverty and inequality. The creation of employment and non-farm economic opportunities should be the focus national politics. A market-based assumption is that property rights and markets alone can transform rural poverty.

c. Land belongs to all black South Africans

A major hurdle in dealing with land conflict has been the racial-based ideological bias that dominates deliberations over the social and economic aspects of land reform. Although land restitution was formulated for the recompense of formerly dispossessed people, the majority of whom were native African, the land redistribution program was initially targeting the rural poor, regardless of race. Its new found use as a tool has misleadingly altered even the most basic aspects for use in radical political objectives. A political rhetoric centered on race tends to dominate land discourse, where land reform and the expropriation of land is used as retribution for past injustices (Cousins 2013, pg. 12). Currently however, in terms of the program’s objectives there is lack of definition about beneficiaries or who the target for land redistribution is whether it is an emerging class of black capitalists, the rural poor, farm worker or small-scale farmers. Land reform in South Africa needs a new focus on inclusivity and a focus on the rural poor, regardless of race.

d. Private land ownership is best model

Private property or private ownership is seen as the most ideal form of land ownership. This is despite the fact that the majority of people hold no title deeds to the land they occupy such as traditional homelands, urban informal settlements and social housing (Keswell & Carter 2014, pg. 261). This leads to the assertion that the current focus of land reform on democracy and land rights not only protects the minority but also polarizes society along a continuum of artificially defined value differences. As stated by Ben Cousins:

“Access to land through redistribution is not a right but the state is responsible for taking reasonable measures, within available resources to enable equitable access to land” (Cousins 2016 pg. 12).

The most important outlook should be the de-racialization of land reform. Initially the Land redistribution program’s intended targeted beneficiaries consisted of small farmers and the rural poor, this included all people born in South Africa, irrespective of race. There is a need to look at other reasons behind stalled implementation of land redistribution policy is due to its complex nature and the existence of various actors and interests and how these result in tension or collaboration.

Conclusion

This paper reviewed the land reform in South Africa, specifically the redistribution policy adopted by the government assuming power in 1994 in relation to its use as a radicalized tool. The nature of the land question in South Africa is inherently complex. Post-apartheid land policies must provide redress for historical injustice at the same time as creating sustainable livelihoods through production, employment creation and equitable forms of growth (Cousins 2016, pg. 2).

My basis for choosing this topic is my interest in the argument surrounding land redistribution in South Africa. The government's political turn towards expropriating land without compensation has been influenced largely by popular outlook and the need to mobilize the majority voting population.

There is no simple solution to land reform as it is a complex and lengthy process. The long overdue process of the restoration of access to land and rights lost through colonization and apartheid is a good necessary process, but it should be conducted in an effective and objective manner. The politicization and racialization of land reform however is a dangerous manner of going about restructuring access to land. People have to be weary of this process as it threatens peace and potentially economic stability of the country.

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THE PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA CONCERNING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA FROM ANTAGONISM TO FRIENDSHIP

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Abstract

The Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the South China Sea can be characterized as a shift from Aquino III to Duterte Administration; from antagonism to friendship. It is undeniable that, whether aggressive or conciliatory approach adopted by the Philippine government, the SCS dispute still significantly affect not merely to the bilateral relations between the two countries, but rather the whole Asia-Pacific regional stability and peace. Hence, this research aims to examine the factors that determine the shift in Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS from Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016) to Rodrigo Duterte Administration (2016-present) by using neoclassical realism theory for analysis.

According to neoclassical realism, independent and domestic-level intervening variables are two main factors influencing state foreign policy making and state's responses towards systemic stimuli. In particular to this research, the independent variables are China's assertiveness in the SCS in recent years and its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region; the US ambiguous standpoint towards the SCS; and the US criticism towards Duterte's war on drug policy as human rights violation. For domestic-level intervening variables, leader images on Duterte's perceptions, his beliefs, personality, and past experiences towards international affairs and other states, especially China and the US; as well as the Philippine's strategic culture on prioritizing internal security play significant role in foreign policy making led to the shift in the Philippine foreign policy from being a close alliance with the US and antagonist towards China under Aquino III administration to distancing itself from the US and revising friendship with China and other major powers, Russia, during Duterte administration.

Keywords: *The Philippine foreign policy, Aquino III's South China Sea Policy, Duterte's South China Sea Policy, the South China Sea Dispute, The Philippines-China relations*

The Philippine Foreign Policy Towards China Concerning the South China Sea from Antagonism to Friendship

The shift in the Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the South China Sea (SCS) from Aquino III to Duterte administration can be characterized as a shift from antagonism to friendship. Overtime, the Philippine governments have adopted different approaches, either aggressive or conciliatory, to China in order to protect its legal sovereign claims in the SCS. It is undeniable that the SCS dispute has extensively affected the bilateral relations between the two countries, while the instability and no peace in Asia-Pacific region also has inevitably been influenced by this longstanding issue. Therefore, this research aims to examine the factors that determine the shift in Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS from Aquino III (2010-2016) to Duterte Administrations (2016-present) by using neoclassical realism for analysis.

The ongoing SCS dispute between the Philippines and China can be traced back to year 1995 over the first military confrontation, Mischief Reef incident. China started occupying the Mischief Reef in 1995, which is an overlapping claimed area among China, Vietnam and the Philippines. However, because the reef is located within the Philippines-claimed 200 nautical miles EEZ and continental shelf, the Philippines has a legal right to assert this sovereign territory against China. Thereby, in 1995, there was a strong resistance from the Philippines against China, an external security and sovereignty threat, under a ninety-minute fighting between three Chinese naval vessels and a Philippines navy gunboat resulting in a crisis in the Philippines-China relations. Because of the Philippines' weak military capability, the Philippines lacked capacity to deter China resulting in the Chinese constructions argued for civilian purposes as the resting places for Chinese fishermen and continued its expansion on building more structures in Mischief Reef in October 1998 without any regard for the Philippines government's protests (Semeña, 2015). However, Philippines-US military relation was restored during Ramos Administration as after the incident. Soon after, the U.S. Navy had conducted a joint military exercise with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on Palawan Islands. After the signing of ASEAN- China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), mutual trust and cooperation improved between the conflicting parties through call for a peaceful settlement of dispute. Eventually, ASEAN could persuade both parties signed the DOC in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). However, due to the nature of DOC as a non-binding, it failed to prevent the provocative actions of claimant states and tensions in the region, evidently during Aquino III Administration, the Philippines confronted with several provocative actions from China in the disputed Spratly Islands; in June 2011 the Philippines called a Chinese envoy to express its concern over the Chinese naval incursions in its territorial claimed area since there were at least five incursions conducted by Chinese ships in 2010 near the Spratly Islands and the Amy Douglas Bank, which located near the Philippines's Palawan Island. However, the intrusion started in March 2011 when Chinese surveillance ships harassed the Philippine survey vessel which was tasked by the Philippines

Department of Energy for exploring oil in the Reed Bank. The two parties announced this incident had violated the commitment of 2002 ASEAN-China DOC and this incident also led to a higher number of skirmishes in the region between the two parties (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

The SCS dispute between the Philippines and China has become the problematic issue due to the fact that the Philippines has a legal right to claim the disputed islands and features in the Spratlys Islands as a part of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) accordance to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for exploring and exploiting the natural resources both living and non-living of the waters extending to the seabed and its subsoil from the coast, whereas China also claims on particular area based on the historical rights of nine-dash line map (Semeña, 2015). Overtime, the consecutive Philippine governments have adopted different approaches, either antagonist or conciliatory, towards China for protecting its legal sovereign claim in the SCS.

During 2010-2016, the Philippine foreign policy under President Aquino III was antagonistic towards China. President Aquino III started challenging China's provocative actions which intruded on the disputed islands between the two states on the Reed Bank in 2011 and the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 as well as preventing the Philippines' fishermen going to the areas by relying on ASEAN for the SCS Settlement of Dispute (Amurao, 2015) filing a case against China's nine-dash line claim in the SCS to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013; strengthening the U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliances under Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA); and promoting a Strategic Partnership with Japan (Castro, 2016), along with modernizing the Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP) territorial defense capabilities (Castro, 2016, p.142) in order to encounter the challenges to the country's territorial integrity and maritime security while establishing the comprehensive border protection program on the surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), the Philippine Navy (PN), and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in its territorial waters, contiguous and EEZ against foreign intrusion or external aggression including other illegal activities (Castro, 2017, p.6). However, after Rodrigo Duterte gained electoral victory in June 2016, Philippine foreign policy is largely shifted to be more independent, pragmatic and friendlier with China by seeking closer economic and diplomatic relation with China; distancing itself from the longstanding ally the US; enhancing the Philippines-Japan Security Partnership (Castro, 2016). The Philippines also sought to rely on ASEAN for the SCS Settlement of Dispute (Serapio & Petty, 2017) while seeking military cooperation with Russia (Parameswaran, 2017).

Because of China's assertiveness in the SCS in recent years and its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region; the US ambiguous standpoint towards SCS; and the US criticism towards Duterte's war on drug policy as human rights violation, which resulted in over three thousands drug dealers and users' extrajudicial killings since he officially becomes a president on 30 June 2016 until 17 October 2016 (Rushford, 2016), this incident along with the deep anti-US

imperialism and nationalist sentiments of President Duterte influenced by leader images on Duterte's personality, his beliefs, past experiences, and perceptions towards international affairs and other states, especially the US and China. During Duterte administration, the government aims to develop domestic infrastructures and promote national economic growth under Build, Build, Build Program, so the administration seeks the closer economic and diplomatic relations with China in order to attract more Chinese investments on several infrastructure projects, for instance, on constructing railways in Mindanao and the drug-rehabilitation center for Filipino drug dealers and users in the Philippines (Castro, 2016). As a result, he has a tendency to set aside the SCS dispute and rather pursue the bilateral dialogue with China to resolve this overlapping territorial and maritime issue instead. Also, the Philippines's strategic culture on prioritizing internal security over external play significant role in the shift in foreign policy from being a close alliance with the US and an antagonist towards China under Aquino III Administration to distancing itself from the US and revising friendship with China (Teehankee, 2016) and other major power Russia under Duterte Administration.

Factors Determine the Shift in the Philippine Foreign Policy Towards China Concerning the South China Sea

According to Gideon Rose, neoclassical realism combines two main elements of structural and classical realism. First, Kenneth Waltz thesis on the structural constraints on state behavior in which an anarchical international system imposes upon states. Second, classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, E.H. Carr and other neoclassical realists on the practical understanding of statecraft and the complexities of state-society relationships (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). Basically, neoclassical realist theory aims to explain varied political phenomena such as the short-term crisis decision-making, foreign policy behavior, the forms of general strategic adjustment of particular states towards the external challenges and opportunities given by the international system (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.11) including systemic outcomes and the evolution of the structure of international system (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.1).




Figure 1. Type III Neoclassical Realist Model. Reprinted from *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (p. 38), by N. M. Ripsman, J. W. Taliaferro and S. E. Lobell, 2016, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Copyright 2016 by Oxford University Press. Reprinted with permission.

Basically, this theory considers independent and domestic-level intervening variables as the two main factors influencing state foreign policy making and state's responses towards systemic stimuli. For this research, Type III of neoclassical realism will be used for analyzing the shift in the Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS from Aquino III to Duterte administration. Type III neoclassical realists consider the structure of the international system, which refers to the relative distribution of capabilities among the units and polarity on the number of great powers within the system at particular period of time (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.38); and structural modifiers - a class of material variables at the level of the international system or a regional sub-system, for instance, geography, the rates of technological diffusion, and the offense-defense balance in military technology, that can modify the impact of the system's structure on strategic interactions' parameters and the possible external behaviors of individual units - as independent variables. Normally, the structure of international system and structural modifiers influence the broad parameters of states' possible strategic options including the likely international outcomes. Moreover, neoclassical realist theory emphasizes the importance of two main systemic variables namely a clarity over the nature of threats, a time horizon of threats, and an appropriate policy response to those threats (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.56); and the nature of a state' strategic environment whether it is restrictive or permissive strategic environment, into analysis in order to understand the international system as well as understand national foreign policy options.

Neoclassical realism also places importance on the domestic-level intervening variables that condition whether and how states react to the international systemic pressures through foreign policy and grand strategy. For type III neoclassical realism, the domestic-level intervening variables compose of four clusters namely leader images – the beliefs, perceptions, personality, past experiences of the foreign policy executive; strategic culture – a set of inter-related beliefs, norms and the collective expectations of the entire society that influence the strategic understanding of political leaders, societal elites and the general public; state-society relations – the character of interactions between the central institutions of the state and several economic and societal groups whether there is a harmony between state and society regarding foreign policy matter; and domestic institutions – the structural constraints on foreign policy executive's ability to enact and implement the policy from both formal and less formal institutions (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.8-9). These four main groups shape the state foreign policy's formulation and implementation under the unique contexts of each country. By taking the independent and domestic-level intervening variables into analysis, neoclassical realism can use those variables for explaining crisis-decision making, foreign policy responses, and grand strategic adjustment in the short-to-medium term; international outcomes in the medium-to-long term; or the structural change in the long run. However, short-to-medium term is a period of time that neoclassical realists study state foreign policy and grand strategy (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.88).

In particular to this research, the shift in the Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS from Aquino III to Duterte administration is inevitably caused by the independent and the domestic-level intervening variables. For this case, independent variables are China's assertiveness in the SCS in recent years and its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region; the US ambiguous standpoint towards SCS; and the US criticism towards Duterte's war on drug policy as human rights violation. For dependent variables, leader images on Duterte's perceptions, his beliefs, personality, and past experiences towards international affairs and other states, especially China and the US; and the Philippine's strategic culture on prioritizing internal security over the external play significant role in foreign policy making.

Degree of Systemic Clarity (High to Low)			
		High Clarity	Low Clarity
Nature of Strategic Environment (Restrictive to Permissive)	Restrictive Environment	Leader images and Strategic culture	Leader images and Strategic culture
	Permissive Environment	Strategic culture, Domestic institutions, and State-society relations	Indeterminate – all four clusters could be relevant

Figure 2. Intervening variable clusters by the degree of systemic clarity and the nature of strategic environment. Reprinted from *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (p. 94), by N. M. Ripsman, J. W. Taliaferro and S. E. Lobell, 2016, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Copyright 2016 by Oxford University Press. Reprinted with permission.

By looking at systemic level, the Philippine under early Duterte administration is faced with a restrictive environment where there is a high clarity of threats, especially from China's assertiveness in the SCS together with its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region in the midst of US ambiguous standpoint towards China's assertiveness in SCS and towards the commitment on security guarantee to the Philippines as traditional ally in time of threats as well as the US criticism on Duterte's domestic war on drugs policy. The Philippine is conscious about the possible threats that it can confront, so the Philippine has limited options to select in order to respond appropriately to external environment within short time horizon. Therefore, Duterte administration has decided to shift the Philippine foreign policy from balancing policy or aggressive stance towards China during Aquino III administration to equi-balancing or friendlier with China through seeking closer bilateral diplomatic and economic relations, while distancing the Philippines from the long-standing ally the US after Obama administration criticized Duterte's war on drug policy as human rights violation.

For the first systemic stimuli, *China's assertiveness in the SCS in recent years and its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region*; in recent years, China's assertiveness in the SCS and its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region have noticeably presented. Being the second largest economy in the world, its economic position brings about greater political power to influence other states, especially small and weak countries to conform to its demands as an exchange with economic advantages in terms of investment, loans

and financial aids. Recently, China's rising political and economic power has been demonstrated from its new initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) that provide huge economic benefits, particularly to developing countries in Asia on promoting infrastructure development and boosting economic growth through financial supports. At the same time, China under President Xi Jinping has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, especially on territorial issue in SCS by intruding and controlling the disputed Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and China since 2012 as well as building artificial islands, increasing military presence and military outposts on disputed islands in the SCS to protect its territorial and maritime claims and energy sources such as oil and gas fields under the nine-dash line. Moreover, after the PCA ruling award was launched in favor the Philippines in June 2016 against an illegal China's historical nine-dash line claims in the SCS, China responded to the situation by issuing a white paper the day after the announcement of the ruling and declaring 'four nos' such as no-participation, no-recognition, no-acceptance and no-compliance (The People's Daily, 2016 as cited in Zhao, 2018, p.8). China's Supreme People's Court also issued a new regulation on law-enforcement power to arrest any invaders into its claimed SCS territories. China has clearly expressed its position on non-acceptance of the PCA ruling and continued to control its territorial claims in the SCS by deploying fighter jets and nuclear-capable long range bomber to the disputed Scarborough Shoal, which is located within the Philippines 200 nautical miles EEZ (Heydarian, 2017, p.10). As a result, the tension in the region has highly escalated.

The second systemic stimuli, *the U.S. ambiguous standpoint towards SCS*; the vague position of the US towards its traditional treaty ally the Philippines over the commitment to provide security guarantee to the Philippines in time of external attacks based on the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, especially in case of the possible confrontation between the Philippines and China in the SCS, has been skeptic after China has adopted greater assertiveness policy in the SCS by controlling some of the Spratly Islands since mid-June 2011 (Castro, 2014, p.263). Moreover, with the limited response from the US towards aggressive China, who has illegally intruded and occupied the disputed islands located within the Philippines' EEZ and continental shelf, it also illustrates the US ambiguous standpoint, especially the events of the Maritime Standoff over Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and China in 2012 and the aftermath of PCA ruling award was launched in favor the Philippines in 2016, in which the US neglected to take any actions on enforcing the 2012 agreement for mutual withdrawal by the Philippines and China from the Scarborough shoal as a mediator (Heydarian, 2017, p.12) as well as the US and Western powers only reacted to the tense situations that China deployed fighter jets and nuclear-capable long range bomber to the disputed Scarborough Shoal after the PCA ruling award was launched in favor the Philippines in 2016 by making statements on adopting the necessity for calm and patient diplomacy without pressuring China to comply with the court results (Heydarian, 2017, p.10).

For the third systemic stimuli, *the U.S. criticism towards Duterte domestic policy on War on Drugs*; the US criticism towards Duterte's war on drug policy as human rights violation led to the worse relations between the Philippines and the US. Evidently, after former U.S. President Obama and Washington criticized President Duterte on extrajudicial killings of drug traffickers and postponed \$400 million Millennium Challenge Corporation aid packages as well as cancelled shipment of firearms to the Philippines' police (Heydarian, 2017, p.13), President Duterte responded Obama harshly with statements "son of the bitch" and "go to hell" as well as declared the broke up relation with the US as we can see from the Philippines government's declaration on ending joint Philippine-US naval patrols in the SCS (McKenzie & Liptak, 2016). Meanwhile, there are two major powers, China and Russia, who did not criticize Duterte administration, but rather expressed fully understand and support his stance over fighting against drug crimes (Kine, 2017). Because Duterte's war on drug policy is popular domestically. Although the US made a criticism towards this policy, but since the majority of Filipinos are in favor of eradicating the problems of criminality and drug trafficking in the country, President Duterte has an incentive to continue in order to gain domestic popularity and electoral success. While, there are still available options for President Duterte to choose in the midst of US criticism or bad bilateral relation between the two by seeking closer diplomatic and economic relations with China and Russia, who have capabilities in both economic and military as another alternative financial and military assistance during the time of distancing from the US. At the same time, these two states will not interrupt Duterte's domestic policy on war on drugs because they pay less attention to human right issues.

The shift in the Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS from Aquino III to Duterte administration is made under restrictive environment of high clarity of threats from China, the Philippine has limited alternatives to choose in order to respond appropriately to external environment within short time horizon. The decision making that made by during this short period of time is called crisis decision-making or short-term foreign policy decision making which falls into the short term category. In particular to the short term, two domestic-level intervening variables such as leader images and strategic culture play the most significant role on state foreign policy making, while the other two domestic-level intervening variables such as state-society relations and domestic institutions play more role on the longer-range planning.

In particular to leader images, when there are requirements of secrecy and quick decision, especially in crisis situation, a larger amount of power will be in the leader's hands to influence and shape the national response, in which the influential societal groups and strong domestic institutions that usually restrain policy making might be excluded from the process (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.93). Thus, the leader's perceptions and misperceptions, beliefs, personality, past experiences towards international affairs and other states are considered as the most significant factors towards foreign policy and crisis decision-making (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.91). Evidently, President Duterte's personality, his beliefs, past experiences and perceptions towards the US and

China play an important role on shaping the Philippine foreign policy during his administration to be friendlier with China while distant from the US.

By based on leader's personality and ideology, President Aquino III and President Duterte are largely different. In general, the former President Aquino III is clean, liberal reformist, pro-American, anti-China. Thus, his foreign policy is enhancing a closer bilateral relation between Philippine and the U.S, especially regards to security cooperation. During Aquino III Administration, the Philippines acquired military assistances from the U.S. in terms of military weapons and equipment, aids and loans, joint military exercises, the security guarantee under the 1951 MDT and the 2014 EDCA. Meanwhile, President Aquino III adopted antagonistic foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS by filing a case to the PCA against China's territorial claim on the nine-dash line in 2013. On the contrary, President Duterte, he is characterized as populist, pragmatic, leftist, nationalist and anti-American person. Therefore, the foreign policy during Duterte administration is distancing the Philippines from the US, while revising bilateral diplomatic and economic relations with China. Evidently, President Duterte declared his separation from the US during his state visit to China in October 2016, ended the joint Philippine-US naval patrols in the SCS (McKenzie & Liptak, 2016) for avoiding angering China and high escalation in the region. While, normalizing the bilateral relation with China as is evident from Duterte made his first foreign state visit to China, instead of the traditional early foreign visit's destinations like U.S. or Japan; set aside the arbitration tribunal award which ruled in favor the Philippines against China's territorial nine-dash line in the SCS; and preferred bilateral talks with China on addressing the SCS dispute.

By examining leaders' past experiences, President Aquino III and President Duterte also have dissimilar past experiences. For President Aquino III, during his youth, his father Benigno Aquino Jr. was a leading opponent against the dictatorship rule under President Ferdinand Marcos during 1966 to 1986. However, Aquino the father was jailed by President Marcos for almost eight years and later, he exiled to living in Boston, the U.S. with his family in 1980 for three years before he was assassinated during his return trip at the Philippines airport in 1983 (Notable Biographies, n.d.). In the Philippines, his father is known for a senator fighting for democracy since he strongly resisted the premarital law's ruling that lacks the check and balance system within the government together with his mother, former President Cory Aquino who played an important role on restoring democracy in the Philippines during post-Marcos period from 1986 to 1992 (Mckee & Wallerstein, 2009). Therefore, when President Aquino III came into power in 2010; he also promoted democracy, transparency and accountability and respect the rule of law as same as his father and mother. We could say that with the influences from his family on upholding the liberal ideology together with his background and experiences in studying and living in the U.S. for three years, he has absorbed liberal principle and be familiar with democratic regime. Therefore, it is easily for him to be pro-American and imitate US policy on good governance, transparency, respect rule of law and anti-corruption as his main agenda during

presidency. In addition, because of the corruption issue under the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking Agreement (JMSU) in the SCS between former Philippines president Gloria Arroyo and China. President Aquino III strongly criticized the former President Arroyo's decision on exchanging the Philippines' security with the concessional loans from China in order for China can advance its security standpoint in the SCS (Semeña, 2015, p.50-51). As a result, the Aquino III government had skeptical to China and the mistrust between the two governments was largely occurred resulting in more antagonistic stance towards China under Aquino III Administration (Semeña, 2015, p.50).

Unlike President Duterte, before Rodrigo Duterte becomes the 16th Philippines President, he used to be the local politician in Davao City, Mindanao which located in the Southern part of the Philippines. Also, he is the first Philippines President who is from outside of the capital Manila (Teehankee, 2016, p.72). By looking at President Duterte's past experiences, it shows the reasons why President Duterte distrusts the US. Since his childhood, his grandmother who is a Muslim told him about the U.S.'s guilty on committing crimes in Mindanao, a Muslim-majority area in the Philippines, during U.S. invasion and colonization of the Philippines in the first half of the 20th century, said by Jocelyn Duterte, President Duterte's sister, during an interview on the Wall Street Journal. Evidently, President Duterte has mentioned several times on the 1906 Massacre of the Muslim Moros incident. For him, this incident illustrates the U.S. has not redeemed a mistake on acting brutality and torturing the Filipinos and subjugating the Philippines (Parameswaran, 2016).

Moreover, during his youth, his college professor, Jose Maria Sison, the founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is believed to have influenced Duterte's viewpoint (Teehankee, 2016, p.84) as we can see that President Duterte upholds left-of-center ideology. It means it is easily for him to favor China and seek closer relations with China instead of the longstanding ally the US due to the fact that during his childhood, the Philippines was ruled by US imperialism resulting in the widespread of anti-US imperialism and strong nationalist sentiment during his generation. Moreover, since President Duterte was working as Davao Mayor, there was a long cooperation between Davao Mayor Duterte and the CPP (Teehankee, 2016, p.85). It even strengthened his left wing ideology with nationalistic sentiment from the CPP.

Together with the event of Meiring Incident in 2002, on 16 May 2002, there was an explosive bomb committed by American citizen Michael Meiring in his hotel room number 305 at the Evergreen Hotel located in the Southern Part of Davao City during the time President Duterte was served as a major of Davao City. Because of this situation, President Duterte hates the US till present day. During that time, Meiring was being under investigation by local police, but he disappeared not long after. President Duterte believed that the escape of a Michael Meiring from Davao City in May 2002 was assisted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Both Manila and Mindanao's press reports have presumed Michael Meiring worked for the CIA amid the U.S. was promoting its military presence in

Mindanao to support the U.S.'s War on Terror policy after the 9/11 incident (Sullivan, 2016). At that time, the press reports believed that Meiring was a part of the US secret operation to destabilize Mindanao, in which later this pretext could justify the Philippines government on permitting the US presence in the region (Sullivan, 2016). This event strengthens President Duterte's mistrust towards the U.S. and his anti-American sentiment. Moreover, by referring to the speech of Philippines Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, a former defense attaché in the US, during his interview with the local media, ABS-CBN in September 2016, he stated that Meiring Incident in 2002 still angers President Duterte, "*That was a long time ago...but he still mentions it once in a while that he just feels hurt that the United States can come in, unannounced in his city, grab a person that is being under investigation by his police, and bring him out [of the country].*" (Parameswaran, 2016). From President Duterte's perspective, the U.S. had violated the Philippines' sovereignty and not respected his authority by based on this incident (Chang, 2017).

Also, the event of president Duterte was denied for a U.S. Visa at the time he was a mayor of Davao City also deepens his anti-American sentiment. According to Presidential Proclamation 8697 signed by President Obama in 2011, it mentions "*any alien who planned, ordered, assisted, aided and abetted, committed or otherwise participated in, including through command responsibility, war crimes, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of human rights,*" is ineligible for granting U.S. visa. As a mayor of Davao City, Duterte has been claimed as violating the human rights by supporting the extrajudicial killings in Davao City against the drug users and dealers under his anti-drugs policy. Therefore, the American immigration system denied him getting visa for visiting the U.S. since his action is specified under Obama's Presidential Proclamation 8697 (Parameswaran, 2016). Until now, such anti-US imperialism and nationalism sentiments still remains deep down inside President Duterte's feeling. As a consequence, his foreign policy is primarily driven by his personal and idiosyncratic viewpoint so that it is easy for President Duterte to make a friendship stance towards China and distant itself from the U.S. after President Obama officially blamed Duterte's War on Drugs policy as human rights violation. Such U.S. criticism on his domestic policy has demonstrated the U.S. intervention in the Philippines domestic affairs, in which even strengthens his past experiences' grievance towards the imperial U.S.

Regarding Duterte's perception towards the opportunity for economic gains from China global-led initiative under OBOR during the time Duterte administration wants to invest on domestic infrastructure development under Build, Build, Build Program. Under Duterte administration, infrastructure development is a top priority project for boosting the Philippines sustained economic growth and development. The Philippines is always ranked behind many Southeast Asia neighboring countries: Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, in terms of the infrastructure quality (National Economic and Development Authority, 2017, p. 282). Thus, Build, Build, Build program is the

main mechanism to improve the Philippines' poor infrastructure quality and connectivity by building more railways, urban mass transport, airports and seaports; constructing more bridges and roads as well as building new and better cities in the Philippines, in which Duterte administration plans to boost the infrastructure spending to 7.3 percent of the GDP within 2022 (Alegado, 2018). So the current international event of China's OBOR could support Duterte's Build, Build, Build program and provide huge benefits to the Philippines' economic development and growth through Chinese infrastructure and investments.

In the context of the Philippines, OBOR will give the economic opportunities to the Philippines in terms of trade, tourism including infrastructure capitals and investments projects from China (Philippines HSBC, 2017) such as a deep-water project resulting in the improvement of the Philippines' infrastructure and a higher employment rate, which helps boosting the Philippines' economic growth (Gonzales, 2016). Evidently, this new international context influence the state leader's attitude as is evident from President Duterte is interested to seek the economic ties with China as well as to participate in the initiative since the beginning of his administration. By participating in this China-led initiative, it will support Duterte's economic plan on increasing infrastructure spending to 7 percent by the end of his term (Philippines HSBC, 2017).

Eventually, after President Duterte normalizes bilateral diplomatic and economic relations with China, the Philippines gains large economic advantages from increasing trade, attracting huge Chinese investments, and having an opportunity to participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative under the 21st Maritime Silk Road as a participating country. By joining OBOR under MSR, it helps the Philippines to become more competitive in global trade because OBOR will open new markets for Philippines products, especially the electronics parts, food and tropical fruits exports. Moreover, after Duterte participated in OBOR Summit in May 2017, the Philippines already received the package of assistance from OBOR summit and from bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping in the amount of US\$ 75.4 million for the infrastructure projects on the construction of two bridges across the Pasig River in the Philippines (Samonte, 2017). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also disclosed the agreement made by the Philippine and China governments, in which China is expected to give concessional loans to the Philippines' three priority infrastructure projects such as the South line of the North-South Railway which will link Bicol to Manila (Metro Manila to Legazpi City, and Albay), the Chico River Pump irrigation in the provinces of Cagayan and Kalinga, and the New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam in Quezon province as well (Department of Finance of the Philippines, 2017). We could say that OBOR initiative comes at the right time when President Duterte has an intention to boost the Philippines economic growth through infrastructure investments under Build, Build, Build Program.

Another significant domestic-level intervening variable, strategic culture also has an impact on short-term foreign policy decision-making. Within time of crisis, when a quick decision is required, strategic culture, the national attitude toward the use

of force and other policy alternatives can restrain the national leader and important officials who are responsible for policy making's options. Moreover, during the short term, state culture can have an effect on the contents of discussions and the interpretation of international events among top policy makers. Therefore, national values, attitude towards the use of force as well as cultural preferences are the significant factors that should be considered in analyzing state foreign policy (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016, p.92).

For the Philippine, the Philippine strategic culture has been emphasized on internal security especially in countering insurgency and combatting terrorist groups rather than external play significant role in foreign policy making due to the fact that the Philippines has been faced with several domestic security threats from insurgencies and terrorists namely the communist New People's Army (NPA) in the main island of Luzon and the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) for many decades including Abu Sayyaf that become active in 1991 and the Islamic State-linked militants in the southern Philippine city of Marawi that emerges in 2017. With an absence of any external security threat during Cold War together with the reliance on the US for the Philippine territorial defense security (Gavan, 2012. as cited in Castro, 2014, p. 255), they support the Philippine government to primarily emphasize the internal security over the other. Although the traditional strategic culture of the Philippines has been attempted to shift its focus from internal security/counter-insurgency to territorial defense in the time of China's assertiveness in the SCS during Aquino III administration (Castro, 2014, p.249), it remains much unchanged due to the limited financial resources to upgrade its military capabilities and immediately purchase the war material namely blue-water missile-armed ships, search and rescue vessels, naval helicopters, which used to protect oil exploration projects and ensure its claims in the SCS, in the short period of time as well as most of financial sources were used for internal security operations (Castro, 2014, p.262). Also, even though President Duterte maintains the modernization program of the AFP during his administration, it is redirected from previous administration to focus more on internal security, especially on domestic counter-terrorism and insurgency such as the Islamic militant group Abu Sayyaf in the Southern Philippines, the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Islamic State-linked militants in the Southern Philippine city of Marawi that had emerged in May 2017 including illegal drugs trade and crimes issues (Deogracias, 2016).

Due to the perceptions among the Filipino elites over the government will never have enough funds on its own to enable the country to defend against external threat (Castro, 2014, p.254) because of the country's limited agricultural resources and fragmented topography on being one of the longest coastlines in the world approximately 10,850 miles, then the elites pay less attention in strategic matters and focus more on manipulating regulations to redistribute the state's limited resources from defense expenditure to their socio-political priorities, especially on education and public works for electoral success (Timberman, 1991. as cited in Castro, 2014, p. 254) while rely on the US for security guarantee and military assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces. Together with the power of the elites to

control over the legislative institutions, the bicameral Philippine Congress, local government units, especially on the allocation and budgetary matters and the national defense programs, the defense expenditure has decreased from time to time (Castro, 2014, p.254). Over time, the Philippine Congress was reluctant to support any major AFP reform on increasing defense expenditure and arms modernization since a dominant perception among the Philippine elites consider the internal security threats directly threaten their traditional authority and property rights rather than the external, so internal security is the most urgent mission for AFP (Morada & Collier, 2001. as cited in Castro, 2014, p.256) as well as the civilian government's sentiment on sharp increase in defense expenditure is considered as a guns-versus-butter issue (Castro, 2014, p.256). Therefore, the AFP have limited influence and capabilities comparing to the military in other Southeast Asia countries, especially among the founding members of ASEAN namely Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.

By looking at the data on the military expenditure in ASEAN in 2016, Singapore was ranked as the first largest spender with US\$10 billion followed by Indonesia US\$8.2 billion, Thailand and Vietnam approximately US\$5-6 billion, Malaysia and the Philippines around US\$4 billion (Steinbock, 2017). In terms of ASEAN military expenditure per capita, the top three Southeast Asian countries mostly spent are Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia with US\$1,750, US\$940, and US\$136 respectively. While the Philippines who was ranked at the seventh merely expended US\$38, less than the first top spender Singapore 46 times (Steinbock, 2017).

Despite the Philippines's Military Modernization efforts in the past few years during Aquino III administration, the Philippines remains one of the weakest military in Asia (Parameswaran, 2017). During Duterte administration, the defense budget for 2017 was the highest record of 137.2 billion pesos (US\$6.6 billion) risen from the previous year of 117.5 billion pesos (US\$5.65 billion). It is considered as around a 17 percent increase (Parameswaran, 2017). However, it is limited at around 1 percent of GDP. Basically, Duterte's 2017 primarily focus on domestic issues such as infrastructure, social services, agriculture, and internal security since the administration adopts the domestic policy against illegal drugs and crime including terrorism and insurgency (Parameswaran, 2017). In the midst of China's expansion in the SCS, the Philippines needs to increase its aerial and maritime capabilities in the SCS, however according to the detailed 2017 budget by Department of Budget and Management illustrates that among three main military services, the Army, Navy and Air Force, most budget approximately 57.4 billion pesos went to Army, 21 billion pesos to Navy and 18.9 billion pesos to the Air Force (Parameswaran, 2017). This data demonstrates the domestic security issues are prioritized than the external.

By being a small state with weak military capability, the policy option on confrontation or using force against other states, especially major power like China in the SCS for territorial defense is not the optimal choice that the Philippines government will choose because it will definitely lose from military confrontation because China, who is ranked as the world's second military

spending country, holds larger amount of modernized military weapons and equipment than the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Philippines government has prioritized on internal security than external for several decades, military weapons, equipment and facilities used for external defense is insufficient in the sense that even though the Philippine government under Aquino III attempted to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines and shifted the focus from traditional internal security concern to external on territorial defense, it will take several years for the Philippines to have comparable military capacity comparing to its neighboring countries. Also, it is even more difficult for the Philippines to reach the equal level of military strength as major power like China in the near future.

Conclusion

With the differences in international contexts at particular time together with the role of individuals who are responsible on foreign policy making in distinctive state including the strategic culture that deeply shapes the elites and public attitudes towards security concerns are needed to be considered in order to understand the state foreign policy making of the Philippines during crisis. By based on neoclassical realism, the shift in the Philippine foreign policy towards China concerning the SCS from Aquino III to Duterte administrations are influenced by both systemic and domestic level factors. For Systemic level, China's assertiveness in the SCS in recent years and its rising political and economic major power in Asia-Pacific region; the US ambiguous standpoint towards the SCS; and the US criticism toward Duterte's domestic war on drug policy as human rights violation play significant role. Meanwhile, the domestic factors on leader images from Duterte's perception, beliefs, personality and past experiences toward international affairs and other states, especially the US and China as well as strategic culture on prioritizing internal security over external also shape the Philippine foreign policy making during Duterte administration. As a result, Duterte's administration foreign policy is different from the previous administration, especially on seeking closer diplomatic and economic relations with China including making a defense cooperation with other major power Russia while distancing the Philippines from its traditional ally the US.

In the future, the Philippine foreign policy will be made in what direction is depended on the international contexts at that particular time, whether they will put a high and clear threat to the Philippines security and interests or not; as well as the individuals, especially those are responsible for foreign policy making. In case of the Philippines, due to less institutionalized, more personalistic and mainly responsive to major powers' behavior, the Philippine foreign policy is regularly changed from time to time based on administration. Therefore, the President is the main actor in foreign policy making that should be highly considered on his/her perceptions, personality, beliefs and past experiences towards international affairs and other states; including a strategic culture, a rooted beliefs and perception of the elites and the mass towards security issue. We could say that for the Philippines, the change of leader images from one administration to another is considered as an inconstant factor, which highly influences the direction of Philippine foreign policy the most.

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